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Abstract 
 
In 2009, the Lisbon Treaty introduced new roles for national parliaments in EU 
decision-making with the aim of increasing democratic legitimacy in the EU. One key 
role was deemed to be the ability to ensure governments represented the electorate when 
negotiating at EU level. This thesis explores under what conditions national parliaments 
employ their formal powers for this purpose. It does so by using a normative 
categorisation of political representation to frame an empirical analysis comparing two 
national parliaments (the House of Commons in the UK and the Second Chamber in the 
Netherlands). Each deploys its formal powers to control and influence government 
representatives in different ways – the first operates by empowering them as trustees, 
while the second tends to treat them as delegates. The thesis compares the impact of 
these two approaches over a number of case studies. The main theoretical argument 
suggests that the formal powers of both types are relevant, but their impact varies under 
different conditions (like party composition, salience and the Lisbon Treaty). 
The empirical part of the study consists of applying the descriptive categorisation of 
Pitkin’s political representation theory to the world as it is, and examining to what 
extent mechanisms of control and influence make NPs part of a delegatory or 
trusteeship model based upon commonly-used indicators. Secondly, it investigates 
under what conditions the government is most likely to be responsive to the NP.  
The outcome of the case studies shows that, notwithstanding their formal powers, 
national parliaments can act on either a delegatory or trusteeship model of 
representation depending on different circumstances.  
The conclusions of this research contribute to the literature on institutional adaptation 
and to the normative debate on political representation, but are equally relevant to EU 
policy-makers involved in future Treaty changes focusing on further developing the 
EU’s democratic legitimacy. 		
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Chapter	1	
Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
 
Growing concerns about the democratic deficit following several European Union (EU) 
Treaty changes involving more EU integration led to the call for more influence for 
national parliaments (NPs). That was mainly because the increase in the EC’s powers 
over previous decades was responded to with an increase of the EP’s control. 
Increased EU competences have enhanced the power of governments too within EU 
affairs, for example via qualified majority voting (QMV). This has led to calls for the 
executive authority to be held to account by enhancing the EP’s powers.  
Increasing the powers of the EP, however, proved to be unsatisfactory, as EP elections 
were considered second order elections.1 Besides, the Council as a whole is not subject 
to the control of any one political institution, even though its powers have increased as 
well. This led to the view that it is necessary to enhance the role of NPs. 
 
While some theories argue that the EU is sufficiently democratic because it mainly 
deals with topics of low electoral salience2, public opinion about the EU is shifting from 
some kind of permissive consensus to constraining dissensus3 as became clear in the 
UK’s recent referendum.4  
NPs are considered to be a solution in this area, as was evident from the Lisbon Treaty, 
which included a protocol regarding more powers for NPs. Besides, David Cameron 
requested a ‘red card’ for NPs during his negotiations about EU reform in February 
2016. 
 
NPs are able to use their mechanisms of control and influence to ensure that their 
governments are representing the interests of citizens during EU negotiations.  
They have been shown to be pro-active in setting up different mechanisms to influence 
EU affairs, like the European Affairs Committees.5 Because of their democratic 
qualities (accountability and authorisation) as elected representatives, MPs have the 																																																								
1 Hix, 2008, Bellamy and Kröger, 2012. 
2 Majone, 1996; Moravcsik, 2002. 
3 Hooghe & Marks, 2008. 
4 23rd June 2016. 
5 Auel & Benz, 2005, p. 373. 
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potential to increase the EU’s responsiveness to citizens. Furthermore, citizens also 
have a greater sense of being represented by their national representatives than those in 
the EP, and parliamentary involvement might give citizens a greater awareness of and 
ownership over EU decisions.6  
 
So far, most scholars who have studied the role of NPs in the EU have done so via 
comparative studies in the field of their formal powers. This current study looks at a 
follow-up question, namely whether institutional variety - or in other words, different 
formal powers7 - between NPs lead to a different impact on their government’s EU 
policy position or whether the chances of having an effect on government is determined 
by the different conditions under which they operate, namely partisan composition, 
topic salience or when they operate under the new Lisbon provisions8 (the independent 
variables of this research).  
 
Based upon the work of previous scholars demonstrating a relationship between 
different types of explanatory factors and the use of parliamentary formal powers, I 
agree with those who argue that if institutional rights are not used and taken up by MPs, 
they are worth little.9 The levels of parliamentary impact not only depend on its formal 
levels of accountability and authorisation, therefore, but also on other factors, such as its 
own political agenda. An MP can act differently in different contexts.10 Formal rules are 
important but not sufficient by themselves to guarantee greater substantive impact on 
EU policies. It is therefore important to look beyond them at real ‘influence’ rather than 
‘power’.11 
 
1.2 Aim of this research 
 
To answer my research question ‘under what conditions can NPs have an impact on 
their government’s policy on the EU?’, I developed a theoretical framework which uses 
a normative categorisation for the empirical analysis.  
																																																								
6 Auel & Raunio, 2012a:11; EU Barometer, 2012; Pew Institute, 2013.	
7 As laid down in constitutions or rules of procedure. 
8 Whereas the provisions allocated to NPs in the Lisbon Treaty are also formal powers, they are European 
formal powers directed to the relationship between NPs and the European Commission. With regard to 
the relationship between the government and NP it is an external factor, of which the outcome can vary.  
9 Pollak & Slominski, 2003, p. 708.	
10 Blomgren & Rozenberg, 2012, p. 9. 
11 Russell & Benton, 2009, p. 15. 
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My overall theoretical argument is that institutional design shapes parliamentary impact 
on the government’s position on EU policies via the mechanisms of influence and 
control, but this occurs only under certain conditions (see above).  
 
The aim of this thesis is therefore two-fold: it looks at different ways of conceptualising 
the operation of institutional arrangements in a representative democracy (analytical 
part) and secondly, it looks at any possible connections between such institutional 
powers and the impact they can have on their government’s EU policy position when 
operating under different conditions (empirical part).  
 
This research adds to a vast amount of comparative studies in the field of NPs before 
and after the Lisbon Treaty came into force. Although many researchers welcomed the 
new provisions on NPs12, and considered them to be a positive step towards greater 
democratic legitimacy of the EU, others hypothesised that the new powers of the NPs 
might not work in practice because of the tight timetable and busy domestic agendas of 
MPs.13 It was also argued that the Lisbon Treaty would not make any change to the 
democratic deficit14 or that NPs did not need a new Treaty to defend the principle of 
subsidiarity.15 These preliminary hypotheses on the outcome of the new article 
regarding the role of NPs in the EU was followed up by many comparative research 
projects, often bringing observations from the 28 NPs of the EU.  
 
However, comparative studies of the role of NPs in the EU should not focus solely on 
what they ‘can’ do (i.e. their formal rights), but rather on what they really do.16 In other 
words, in order to explain the real impact of NPs, it is necessary to look at formal 
parliamentary institutions in relation to the external conditions under which they operate 
(the independent variables of this research).  
Hence, the objective of this research is to find out when NPs are most influential in EU 
legislative files via their government. This thesis is crucial, therefore, for those 
interested or participating in future EU Treaty changes as the normative standards will 
help them to know whether and under what conditions NPs are able to contribute to the 
levels of political representation in the EU. The outcome of the empirical part of the 
thesis will furthermore be of interest to political scientists working in the field of EU 																																																								
12 Cooper, 2006; Yevgenyeva, 2009. 
13 Raunio, 2007; Dougan, 2008. 
14 Sieberson, 2008; Best, 2008; Hellström, 2009.	
15 Kiiver, 2006. 
16 Saalfeld, 2005, p. 349.	
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institutional design. The thesis can therefore be considered to be empirically innovative 
because of its original choice of dependent variable, where it offers a more nuanced 
understanding of impact, which is combined with inherent data collection17. 
 
More specifically, this research is about exploring the ways in which the efforts of an 
NP (as the represented) are most likely to have success when scrutinising their 
government (as the representatives) in EU policies. By looking at the formal powers of 
NPs based upon previously used indicators, I began by establishing whether an NP has 
few or many formal powers by creating a table in which I divided all 28 EU NPs in 
different clusters according to these formal powers. Those NPs that instruct their 
governments before a meeting with the Council of Ministers on the basis of their formal 
procedures are hereby referred to as conforming to the ‘delegatory model’, because they 
treat their governments as delegates. In contrast, NPs that give more leeway to their 
governments to act as trustees during the Council of Ministers – in the absence of ex 
ante formal procedures to instruct them – but which still exercise ex post control 
regarding government input into the Council afterwards, are referred to as conforming 
to a ‘trusteeship’ model.  
 
However, to investigate whether or not the impact of NPs really depends on these ex 
ante or ex post institutional settings, or if the impact they have relies on whether and to 
what extent NPs use their mechanisms depending on certain external factors, I looked at 
how both weak and strong NPs exercise influence and control mechanisms while acting 
under certain conditions. Impact in this instance is assessed as NPs using their influence 
and control mechanisms to achieve a visible contribution to the positions on European 
legislative proposals formulated by their governments.18 
For the analysis in the empirical part of my research, I investigated the research 
question through a small-N comparison. This enabled in-depth empirical analysis, 
showing a deeper understanding of the relationship between the NP and government in 
EU affairs. For these case studies, a huge amount of new data has been collected in the 
form of meeting documents, correspondence between government and NP and 
interviews.  																																																								
17 Meeting documents, governmental memoranda, correspondence between the NP and the government, 
and transcripts of interviews.	
18 This research looks only at the impact of NPs on governmental EU policy and not at the final outcome 
of the EU dossier agreed in the Council. In other words, an NP could have a large impact on their 
government, but it may be that the government does not negotiate successfully with others in the Council 
(Cygan, 2013, p. 84). 
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A total of 16 cases (eight cases are added by eight shadow cases) consisting of EU 
legislative files have been used for the analysis. I traced the scrutiny processes of these 
EU legislative files and compared their parliamentary activities during the Ordinary 
Legislative Procedure (OLP) in two different NPs (the House of Commons (UK), 
conforming to a trusteeship, and the Second Chamber (NL), conforming to the 
delegatory model) when operating under different conditions (multiparty composition, 
salience and the Lisbon Treaty).19 
In other words, this research compares possible differences within one of these two NPs 
when operating under these conditions, and does not include a cross-country 
comparison.20 
 
1.3 Research contribution  
 
Using a normative categorisation for an empirical study about a possible role for NPs in 
the EU’s representative democracy has rarely occurred in the literature. Yet, the use of 
normative standards allows the empirical findings to be placed in a wider context 
regarding the values of political representation. Political representation in normative 
theory has often been claimed as shifting and nuanced21, which shows that comparative 
research of formal powers consisting of a classification of NPs as strong, moderate or 
weak - as has happened in previous literature22 - proves not to be sufficient. We 
therefore need a theoretically-driven and empirically-viable method in order to analyse 
political representation in practice.23 In other words, there is a lack of empirical analysis 
of representation in the EU that goes beyond the description of delegation channels and 
accountability as laid down in the Treaties.24 
Based upon Pitkin’s theory which describes the relationship between the representative 
and represented as being one that shifts along a sort of continuum between the 
trusteeship and delegatory model depending on the circumstances, this study applies her 
categorisation to the relationship between the NP and government when operating on 
EU issues and connects the use of parliamentary formal powers to external conditions. 
This study thereby adds to the existing literature on institutional adaptation, but in a less 																																																								
19 Both NPs tend to be classified as ‘moderate’ players in empirical research about NPs (Neuhold & 
Smith, 2015, p. 668). 
20 As the NPs in the EU vary greatly with regard to their formal powers and ways of scrutiny, comparing 
NPs would be too difficult.		
21 Rehfeld, 2009,p. 216. 
22 E.g. Norton, 1999. 
23 De Wilde, 2013, p. 280.	
24 Ibid., p. 282. 
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rigid way, as it assumes that the relationship between the NP and its government is not a 
static one.  
 
On the other side, the study also adds to normative theories of political representation. 
Normative theorists tend to describe political representation in a more abstract way, 
whereas empirical scholars deal with representation issues with precision: the concept 
of representation is reduced to ‘responsiveness’ or ‘correspondence’.25 However, this 
study looks at representation in the EU in practice, as opposed to formal legal 
representation26, which is relevant in order to understand the developing process of EU 
integration and the accompanying concerns of citizens not feeling represented by EU 
institutions and how NPs could be involved in this.  
 
Secondly, empirical literature on EU policies normally deals with the impact of the EU 
on member states and NPs (in other words, top-down research). My own research, in 
contrast, will consist of the rarely-used bottom-up approach. It starts, therefore, at 
domestic level, for example, institutional arrangements or salience of EU topics (which 
is one of the independent variables) and tracks down the substantive impact of these 
issues on government EU policy-making (the dependent variable). In adopting a top-
down approach, most research to date has studied the impact of European integration on 
domestic policies.27 In so doing, however, this perspective describes the role of NPs as 
solely passive. Indeed, NPs are said to have no direct control over European policy-
making. A bottom-up approach, by comparison, might help to analyse first of all 
whether NPs are capable of making an impact on the different democratic levels in the 
EU and secondly, if so, how they do this. This is in line with different theories, arguing 
that the role of NPs in EU decision-making should be described as a set of intervening 
variables, as their role consists of an interaction between different players who all 
influence some level of EU decision-making.28  
Thirdly, although there have been many comparative studies about the influence of NPs 
in the EU, they are entirely focused on comparing NPs’ formal powers and institutional 
arrangements.29 To date, no attempts have been made to measure the actual impact of 
																																																								
25 Rehfeld, 2009, p. 216. 
26 De Wilde, 2013, p. 281. 
27 Radaelli & Pasquier, 2008, p. 40-41.	
28 Goetz & Hix, 2001, p. 20. 
29 Russell & Benton, 2009; Auel & Raunio, 2012a. 
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these formal levels of control and influence.30 Raunio argues ‘[t]here is a demand for 
more theory-driven analyses of actual behaviour that extends beyond describing formal 
procedures’.31  
 
1.4 Main findings 
 
After the process-tracing and pair-wise comparisons of the cases, it has become clear 
that strictly categorising NPs according to trusteeship or delegatory models or as strong, 
moderate or weak (as is normally done in empirical studies) is not sufficient.  
 
Different conditions have proven to increase parliamentary activities which were 
resulted in increased feedback by the government in every case. It was therefore 
noticeable that salience was the main condition in which MPs were most likely to be 
effective. Real impact was thus only measured in those cases where topics were either 
politicised (cutting along the left/right cleavage) or Europeanised (discussing issues 
involving further EU integration). Although the salience condition was the most 
obvious condition to increase the use of parliamentary activities, the others were also 
present to some extent. The partisan composition condition could not be linked to the 
increased use of formal powers by the NP, but a cautionary note must be made here, 
namely that the scrutiny of the cases took place during the Cameron-Clegg coalition 
government which was an outlier in the normal single party governments. The 
Eurosceptic condition did seem to be present in those cases analysing the partisan 
condition, but there was no link found between the dependence on a Eurosceptic 
government in the Netherlands and the increased use of formal powers and its impact in 
the very scrutiny of these cases. Although the findings reject the posited mechanisms 
which link the dependency of a government on a Eurosceptic party to the increased 
impact of the NP on government EU policy positions, but do establish a link between 
the increased use of formal powers and the fact that the NP has been scrutinising a 
minority government. In other words, the partisan composition is present in these cases. 
With regard to the last explanatory factor, namely the use of Lisbon provisions, in this 
research it translated as sending a RO to the EC when the NP is of the opinion that the 
EC legislative proposal is breaching the subsidiarity principle, it can be argued that the 
RO is not considered to be a condition upon which the NP would increase the use of its 																																																								
30 With the exceptions of Rozenberg (2002) who uses the variable of ‘impact’ to measure the levels of 
Europeanisation of NPs, and Saalfeld (2005) who quantitatively links institutions to outcomes. 
31 Raunio, 2009, p. 4. 
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formal powers, as it purely used as a legal instrument. However, after sending the RO, 
the NP did increase the use of formal powers, just because it is a topic in which it 
argues that it, at the domestic level, should be involved.  
 
In conclusion, the outcome of the case studies gives a very clear signal that in order to 
involve NPs in EU issues, allocating either ex ante or ex post formal powers is not 
essential. The topic of debate is decisive for the NP to determine whether using its 
formal powers is most likely to have an effect. In other words, whereas based upon its 
formal powers the NP is part of either the trusteeship or delegatory model, its use of 
formal powers is dependent on the contents of the topic. A NP, which  based upon its 
formal powers is considered to form part of the trusteeship model, can still act as part of 
the delegatory model so long as the topic is salient to the NP and vice versa. A 
cautionary remark is thereby necessary. Using ex ante influence powers has proven to 
be more effective in creating an impact on the government’s EU policy position than 
when this is done ex post. More specifically, external conditions decide the use of 
formal powers by the NP, but in order to have an impact, it is still necessary to have 
powers to influence its government ex ante the Council meeting.  
 
1.5 Plan of the thesis 
 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the normative literature on political representation, 
the role of NPs in this, and the challenges posed by European integration to political 
representation. It compares the work of other theorists in this field and explains the 
background of the main theoretical argument of this thesis. It furthermore explains two 
tables (table 1 and 2), one matrix of which shows the formal and substantive forms of 
political representation and the position of NPs according to their formal powers. The 
second table gives an overview of all EU NPs ex ante and ex post formal powers. These 
two tables are helpful in understanding how the normative theory of political 
representation, such as that of Pitkin, can be translated to the empirical world, and 
specifically to NPs in the EU. These tables have furthermore enabled the case selection 
for this thesis, as table 2 clearly distinguishes between NPs with stronger ex ante 
influence powers and those with an emphasis on ex post control powers. Selecting a NP 
with stronger ex ante influence powers (the Second Chamber in the Netherlands) and 
one with stronger ex post control powers (the House of Commons in the UK) has been 
useful in order to establish whether there is a different outcome depending on the use of 
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formal powers or whether external conditions determine the outcome of the NP’s use of 
formal powers when scrutinising its government over an EU legislative file.  
 
Following on from this, Chapter 3 introduces the empirical side of the research by 
giving an overview of existing theories in this field and how the hypotheses are 
embedded within them.  
Chapter 4 explains the methods used for the empirical research, including the 
operationalisation of the variables, an overview of the data collection, the type of 
analysis, and the case selection.  
It also explains the choice of impact as the dependent variable, how other scholars have 
used this and what will be done to overcome its difficulties. 
The following Chapters, namely 5,6,7 and 8 are the core of this research in that they 
deal with the outcome of the analysis of the different independent variables. During 
each step of the OLP, the use of formal powers will be studied per case when operating 
under different conditions and it will be investigated as to whether the use of their 
powers correspond to the expected causal processes.  
Chapter 5 discusses the independent variable of partisan composition by looking at two 
cases which are two legislative files, one being the single party government of Labour 
(2010-2015), and the other being the multi-party government of the Conservative-
Liberal Democrats (2010-2015) in the United Kingdom (UK). Through a pair-wise 
comparison, the Chapter compares the levels of impact as a consequence of the use of 
parliamentary formal powers via process-tracing and elite interviews.  
Chapter 6 discusses findings for the Eurosceptic government independent variable 
which compares the levels of impact in a case where the Dutch government depends 
upon the support of a Eurosceptic party to a case in which the government does not 
depend on any Eurosceptic support in order to achieve a majority in parliament.  
Chapter 7 deals with the salience independent variable, and compares two cases by the 
same (multi-party) government in the UK where one case is considered to be a salient 
EU legislative file and the other is non-salient.  
The final Chapter in the core section of the research (Chapter 8) looks into the variable 
of the Lisbon provisions and compares a case wherein the Dutch parliament decides to 
send a reasoned opinion to the EC as it believes that the EU legislative proposal 
conflicts with the subsidiarity principle to a case where the NP scrutinises its 
government without making use of reasoned opinion.  
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The concluding Chapter compares the different case outcomes as described in the core 
chapters and places them in a wider context and within the wider literature in this field. 
The outcome of the comparison will contribute to establishing the extent to which NPs 
can best contribute to EU policies and under what conditions they will have most 
impact on their government’s EU policy position.  
The conclusions of the empirical research are furthermore linked to the normative 
debate on political representation and the extent to which the role of NPs can increase 
representation levels  in the EU; this is relevant for the debate on EU levels of 
democratic legitimacy and to what extent the NPs are able to increase these when using 
their formal powers or whether this depends on the conditions under which they 
operate.  
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Chapter 2 
Conceptualising political representation in the European Union 
2.1 Introduction 
With an increasing number of decisions taking place at EU instead of national level, 
there are consequences for the political representation theory and the role of national 
parliaments (NPs). 
When governments make non-domestic decisions at intergovernmental level, they are 
often considered to have a lot of discretion. In the vast literature about the EU, this is 
referred to as a ‘democratic deficit’. However, as governments must often decide on EU 
legislation with domestic consequences, NPs need to play a role in order to control what 
their governments are doing and whether their EU policies are in line with the views of 
the electorate at home.  
In much of the normative literature, NPs are described as the representatives of the 
electorate, but in this case governments represent their NPs. This can be described as a 
second stage of representation. Part of the role of NPs as the represented (the principal) 
of their government (the agent), is to instruct and control what their government is 
doing. This Chapter will explain the theory of representation and categorize both how 
NPs as principals are able to hold their government to account and to authorise it, and 
how these processes work at EU level.  
In order to undertake the empirical part of this research - examining the conditions in 
which NPs are most likely to have an impact on their government’s EU policy position - 
an understanding of the normative standards of political representation is essential to 
better explain the processes of authorisation and accountability. In addition, this helps 
the researcher to identify whether the NP can be considered as being part of a 
trusteeship or delegatory model according to the tools by which influence and control is 
exerted on their governments in EU policies. 
This Chapter will begin by explaining why the conceptualisation of political 
representation in this research is based upon Pitkin’s theory. It will thereby describe the 
relationship between the government as representative and NPs as the represented, and 
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this can either form part of a ‘delegatory’ or ‘trusteeship’32 relationship. In order to 
explain this relationship, which can alternate depending on external factors, a matrix has 
been created which shows a continuum of the trusteeship-delegatory model and what 
this means in formal and substantive terms.  
From there, the Chapter will describe the problems around the democratic legitimacy in 
the EU and the possible role of the NPs. It will continue to describe NPs’ formal 
powers, including a table which gives an overview of the formal powers of EU NPs. 
This table will identify which NPs can be allocated as NPs with more ex ante influence 
powers and those which can be allocated as NPs with an emphasis on ex post control 
powers. This will help with the selection of NPs for the empirical research, during 
which an attempt will be made to measure the impact exerted by NPs on their 
government’s EU policy position and the extent to which this can alter when they 
operate under different conditions.  
The final section of the Chapter highlights some important formal powers of NPs in EU 
decision-making, namely the European Affairs Committees (EACs) and other sectoral 
or specialised committees which deal with EU legislative files in some NPs. Although 
there exist huge variations in the extent to which NPs can make use of them, these 
committees are among the parliamentary tools most frequently used to authorise the 
government (if the committee meets before Council meetings) or to hold it to account 
(where the committee meets after the Council meeting).  
2.2 Delegatory and trusteeship models and national parliaments  
The following section discusses the role of NPs in political representation theory and 
whether the NP can be considered as forming part of the delegatory or trusteeship 
model in its relationship with the government depending on its formal powers. Pitkin’s 
theory is thereby relevant as it shows how the relationship between the representative 
and the represented alters according to external factors, which is the crux of this 
research.  
In formal terms, representation is referred to as the means by which one individual takes 
the place of another (where representatives are authorised by the represented who hold 
																																																								
32 These terms will be explained in section 2.2. 
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them to account).33 Although political representation begins with elections (first level of 
representation) via the equal distribution of votes, once the government is authorised, it 
will be stimulated to act by those who can hold it to account34, namely the NPs (second 
level of representation). Authorisation and accountability are the key elements of 
political representation, therefore.35 NPs are institutions that not only represent the 
electorate but, in authorising their governments and holding them to account, are also 
the represented where the government in this case is the representative. Representative 
democracy can therefore be considered a type of government that starts with elections, 
but develops beyond them36, on different levels.  
Parliamentarism is also described as a chain of delegation from voters to policymakers. 
Citizens, as the principals, authorise their representatives (the agent) to make political 
decisions. The chain of delegation is paralleled by a set of accountabilities operating in 
reverse37: via the process of accountability, citizens can use control and via 
authorisation, they can use influence.38 The same chain of delegation can be applied to 
the relationship between NPs and government whereby the NP authorises the 
government to execute certain policies and, conversely, the NP possesses a number of 
accountability tools to check whether the government acts according to the wishes of 
the electorate (the process of double delegation). 
NPs vary internally in their formal powers to achieve accountability and authorisation 
and in the extent to which they are able to use those functions. Accountability is a type 
of ex post control as it is based upon the monitoring and reporting of representatives.39 
Whereas accountability takes place ex post, authorisation is a form of ex ante influence 
where there are procedures through which Y selects and directs X with respect to Z, 
while responsibility for those actions and decisions of X rests with Y.40 
Pitkin argues that formal political representation determines the levels of authorisation 
(influence) and accountability (control).41 The levels of formal representation depend on 
																																																								
33 Pitkin, 1967:58; Bellamy & Castiglione, 2013:208. 
34 Urbinati, 2011:24-25.	
35 Bellamy & Castiglione, 2011:120, Kröger & Friedrich, 2013:175. 
36 Urbinati, 2011:26. 
37 Bergman et al. 2000:257. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Bovens, 2007:453-454. 
40 Castiglione & Warren, 2006:6. 
41 Ibid., 7-8 
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the legal consent to act for others.42 She argues that the greater the authorisation and the 
stronger the accountability mechanisms, the more likely the represented (the principal) 
is to act according to the ‘delegatory model’.43  
In other words, formal powers are necessary to establish the extent to which the 
principal can authorise or hold the agent to account, and whether the relationship 
between the principal and the agent is either a mandating or independent one, better 
known as trustee and delegates in normative theory.44 In cases where the represented 
has few mechanisms and the representative has therefore more freedom to follow its 
own judgement, we speak of a ‘trustee model’.45  More specifically, in the delegate 
scenario, authority is concentrated on the principal whereas with the trusteeship, 
authority lies with the agent, the representative him/herself. The delegate is, therefore, 
less autonomous and less independent than the trustee.46 Historically, the trustee is a 
representative who is free to follow his or her own opinions.47 Delegates, on the 
contrary, follow the opinion of those they represent and act as a ‘subordinate substitute 
for those who sent them’.48 
 As described in the introduction above, in this research NPs with few formal powers 
are referred to as conforming to the trusteeship model, whereby the government has 
more freedom to act according to its own judgement; and NPs with more formal powers 
are considered to be conforming to a delegatory model, in which the government is 
more restricted to act according to NP’s wishes. 
The strict division between trustee and delegate has been widely criticised49 as being 
abstract and over-simplified. Representatives are often partial delegates and partial 
trustees, depending on different contexts.50 According to Rehfeld, the debate about 
delegate/trustee is not all about the location of authority between principals and agents 
and in some cases the delegate (as the representative) has the freedom to follow its own 
																																																								
42 Pitkin, 1967: 133-34.	
43 In the delegatory model, the judgement of the agent is subordinate to the superior authority of the 
principal (Saalfeld 2011, p.275). 
44 Blomgren & Rozenberg, 2012:12. 
45 In the trustee model, the agent is free to follow his/her own judgement based upon an independent 
assessment of the issues at stake (Saalfeld 2011, p.275). 
46 Rehfeld, 2009:217. 
47 Blomgren & Rozenberg, 2012: 12. 
48 Pitkin, 1967:134.  
49 Castiglione & Warren 2006:8; Blomgren & Rozenberg, 2012:15. 
50 Pitkin, 1967:154; Rehfeld, 2009:222.	
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judgement. Conversely, there may be occasions during which the trustee (as the 
representative) receives tighter instructions from the principal to act in a certain way.51  
The relationship between representative and represented is one that can alter over 
different periods of time, whereby the extent to which the representative is authorised 
and the extent to which the represented holds the representative to account can either 
increase or decrease according to different factors (and do not, therefore, solely depend 
on formal powers).52 Pitkin makes a distinction, therefore, between formalistic 
representation (institutional arrangements to allow and limit the levels of authorisation 
and accountability) and substantive representation (the extent to which the 
representative ‘acts in the interest of the represented’ where the latter is concerned with 
the activity of representatives).53 Representation can therefore be defined in terms of 
either formal arrangements or the nature of the activity itself.54 The focus on the 
continuity of the relationship between the representative and represented, rather than 
interpreting representation as a static one off result of, for example, elections, is used in 
most normative research since Pitkin published her theory of political representation.55  
Similarly, when the representative is ‘acting for’ the represented, it can indicate 
different manners of representation, for example, as a trustee or delegate. This form of 
representation is about how political agents enact this formal relationship 
substantively.56 The mandate-independence controversy does not lead us anywhere, 
according to Pitkin57 and creates a false dichotomy as neither end matches well the 
concept of representation.58 
‘The representative must really act, be independent; yet the represented 
must be in some sense acting through him. Hence there must be no serious 
persistent conflict between them.’59  
In other words, the representative is a bit of both. Pitkin describes the relationship 
between representative and represented as a continuum between the two along which 																																																								
51 Rehfeld, 2009:215. 
52 Pitkin, 1967:210. 
53 Ibid., 113. 
54 Pitkin points out two other types of representation, namely a descriptive and symbolic type, which are 
not relevant for this research.  
55 E.g. Michael Saward, 2006, 2009, 2010; Rehfeld 2006, 2009. 
56 Bellamy & Castiglione, 2013:208. 
57 Pitkin, 1967:154. 
58 Karlsson, 2013:28. 
59 Pitkin, 1967:154. 
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the representative shifts depending on external factors, such as the message it receives 
from the principal.60 This categorisation is more suitable than other political 
representation theories, such as that by Eulau and Wahlke who add a third category next 
to delegate and trustee, namely ‘politico’ for whom it depends whether they follow their 
voters or not.61 This distinction fails to offer a meaningful understanding of the 
relationship between the represented and their representatives62, whereas Pitkin 
distinguishes different types of representation such as formalistic and substantive.63  
The principal-agent model of representation as delegation64 is for similar reasons 
inadequate according to the political representation models of Mansbridge and 
Rehfeld.65 According to these normative standards, the relationship between 
representative and represented is an ongoing one and the role of the latter continues 
even after elections. It is through the act of representation itself that representation is not 
only about the expression of will, but also of judgement.66 The representative must 
pursue the wishes of the represented in a way that is responsive to such wishes.67 
However, the principal-agent theory is based upon a chain of delegation and 
accountability (in both directions) between delegates and agents.68 According to this 
delegation theory, accountability follows a single line between agents and principals 
whereby parliament is accountable to its voters and government is accountable to 
parliament.69 However, representation is more than a single action by one participant, 
but rather refers to a whole structure and the functioning of a system; it deals with 
patterns that are a consequence of the multiple activities of many people.70  
The interpretation by Pitkin will be applied to this thesis in order to establish the extent 
to which NPs (as the represented) shift along this continuum depending on different 
explanatory factors when scrutinising their government (as the representatives)  in EU 
affairs. While Pitkin discusses political representation as being the relationship between 
legislature and voters, in this thesis her interpretation of political representation will be 																																																								
60 Bray, 2011:91. 
61 Eulau & Walke, quoted in Andeweg & Thomassen, 2005:507. 
62 Andeweg & Thomassen, 2005:509. 
63 According to Pitkin, there are four types of representation: next to the formalistic and substantive form 
of representation, there also exist descriptive and symbolic forms (Pitkin, 1967), but the latter are not 
relevant for this research.  
64 Bergman et al. 2000.	
65 Piattoni, 2013:224-225. 
66 Ibid., 225. 
67 Pitkin, 1967:213. 
68 Piattoni, 2013:230. 
69 Wessels, 2011:108. 
70 Pitkin, 1967:221-222. 
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applied to NPs in their relationship with their governments, whereby they are the 
represented and the government is the representative. The relationship between the 
represented and its representatives is considered to be one of representation run from 
above71 in which the representative (in this case the government) has an active role and 
where the role of the principal is translated into one of accountability and authorisation. 
In other words, the government receives a mandate which authorises it to execute 
certain policies, and accountability implies approval from the represented after the 
execution of such policies.72  
Pitkin’s interpretation of the democratic representative ‘who does not always have to be 
in agreement with his or her constituents, but must not come into conflict with their will 
when they have an express will’73 is the most accepted in political representation 
literature.74 When applying this trustee-delegate model to NPs, it can indeed be seen in 
its relationship with the government that NPs continuously shift along a delegate-trustee 
continuum in legislative decision-making in response to different situations or 
constituencies.75 A Member of Parliament (MP) may act differently in different 
contexts.76 With their mechanisms of control and influence, NPs can hold their 
governments to account and also authorise them in the field of EU affairs. The level, to 
which they decide to do so, depends on different situations. 
Pitkin’s influential study on political representation is particularly useful in this field as 
it distinguishes between different types of representation77 and shows that the 
relationship between the principal and the agent is not static but fluctuating along a 
continuum of greater or lesser authorisation and accountability, depending on different 
circumstances. If the topic is of particular interest to the principal, he or she may use 
more formal procedures to clearly authorise and hold the agent to account, whereas if 
the principal does not know a lot about the topic, the agent may obtain more leeway to 
act according to its own judgement. The same can be said about the relationship 
between the government and NP. For example, in instances where the represented 
expresses a clear wish for their representatives to act in a particular way, such as in a 
salient case, the representative may behave differently from the instance in which the 																																																								
71 Andeweg & Thomassen, 2005:511. 
72 Ibid.	
73 Pitkin, 1967:163. 
74 Rehfeld, 2009:219. 
75 Bray, 2011:91. 
76 Blomgren & Rozenberg, 2012:9. 
77 This study will concentrate on the formal and substantive representation strand. 
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represented does not express any explicit wish. In cases where the government is the 
representative and the NP is the represented, it might be expected therefore that the NP 
would use less formal powers to authorise and hold the government to account when the 
topic is not salient to it - the NP. How the representative behaves must be responsive in 
some way to the principal’s wishes, in other words.78 It is therefore necessary to not 
only concentrate on the composition of NPs (formal representation), but also on the 
impact of their activities under certain conditions (substantive representation). 
Representatives could, in different contexts, claim to represent a geographical unit, the 
nation, a party, an interest group, ideology, or ministry and so on.79 This will impact 
upon the manner in which it is able to be responsive to the represented and can adapt its 
position on the continuum for delegates/trustees. In other words, the higher the 
responsiveness of the representative to the represented, the more the relationship is 
expected to be a delegatory one.80 
The same can be said about the different conditions under which the representative 
operates. For example, according to Lijphart, consensus democracies perform better in 
achieving higher levels of public deliberation than majoritarian democracies and should, 
therefore, be considered more democratic.81 Lijphart’s main argument is that there is a 
correlation between the number of parties and the number of salient issues discussed. 
Put another way, the greater the number of parties represented in parliament (other than 
government parties), the higher the chances of reasonable disagreement and the more 
the government must take these different opinions into account, since it will be faced 
with stronger control mechanisms by opposition parties.82 In the next Chapter, different 
conditions as applied in empirical research will be described and used as explanatory 
variables.  
The conceptualisation of this thesis is thus based upon the political theory of Pitkin and 
the main theoretical argument of this research is a conditional one: institutional design 
affects the impact that NPs have on their national government’s position on EU policies 
when using their formal mechanisms of influence and control, but this impact is 
conditional upon other external conditions (partisan composition, salience of EU issues 
and the Lisbon provisions).  																																																								
78 Pitkin, 1967:155. 
79 Bray, 2011:91. 
80 Bowler, 2016:2. 
81 Lijphart, 2012:295.	
82 Ibid., 241-242. 
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In order to determine whether NPs can make a difference to the outcome of an EU 
legislative file, it is indeed necessary to establish whether the NP has many or few 
formal powers in order to prevent the representative from acting in a manner contrary to 
the wishes of the represented.83 This allows for the establishment of whether the NP can 
therefore be considered as conforming to the trusteeship or delegatory model84, as 
described in the section above.  
Once the formal powers of the NP have been established, the focus moves to whether 
the outcome differs when operating under different conditions. 
However, the mandate-independence controversy has received much criticism, not least 
by empirical researchers who have had trouble to operationalise this relationship.85 In 
order to be able to apply these political representation standards by Pitkin for the 
empirical research in this thesis, a matrix has been created (table 1) which gives an 
overview of formal and substantive forms of representation (normative standards), 
including the different influence and control mechanisms of the NP depending on these 
forms of representation (empirical application). Based upon this matrix, the NP can be 
classified as conforming to a trusteeship or to the delegatory model according to its 
formal powers which are static. In other words, based upon the classification of NPs 
according to its formal powers, it is either a NP with many formal powers or one with 
few. It, however, also adds information on the NP as a substantive representative which 
makes the position on the trusteeship-delegatory continuum a fluctuating one. 
Furthermore, the matrix indicates what competences and mechanisms can be associated 
with the different positions on the continuum. This matrix will serve as a bridge 
between the normative standards on political representation and the empirical research 
which will be set out in the next Chapter.  
																																																								
83 Andeweg & Thomassen, 2005:510. 
84 This model looks most like that of the ‘policy shaper’, whereas the trustee model comes closest to the 
‘government watchdog’ model (Rozenberg & Hefftler, 2015:31). 
85 Andeweg & Thomassen, 2005:508.	
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Table 1 Matrix of Political Representation 
Continuum 
Trusteeship
-Delegatory 
model  
Trustee-
ship  
model 
-------------- -------------- --------------- Delegatory
model 
Formal 
representation  
Weak 
authorisation
/Weak 
accounta-
bility  
Weak 
authorisation/
Strong 
accounta-
bility  
Levels of 
authorisation 
and accounta-
bility depend 
on topic 
Strong 
authorisation/
Weak 
accountability 
Strong 
authori-
sation/ Strong 
accounta-
bility  
Substantive 
representation 
Acting For 
(e.g. as an 
expert) 
Acting For  
 (acting in 
‘the interest 
of’) 
Acting For  
(as a ‘mere’ 
agent or as a 
‘free’ agent) 
Acting For 
(as a kind of 
substitution)  
Acting For 
(to do 
something 
specific) 
Definition  X authorises 
Y without 
any further 
specification 
X authorises 
Y but will 
control its 
actions ex 
post 
X authorises 
Y and levels 
of control and 
influence 
depend on 
importance of 
the topic  
X authorises 
Y, but with 
clear ex ante 
instructions on 
what to do.  
 
X authorises 
Y, but with 
clear 
instructions 
ex ante and 
strong ex post 
control 
Competences  
X 
Possibility 
of electing/ 
appointing   
X has got 
strong control 
levels, e.g. the 
possibility to 
ask questions 
and 
participate in 
debates ex 
post.  
 
Levels of 
influence and 
control by X 
depend on the 
topic. 
Although X 
might have 
formal ex ante 
and ex post 
rights, 
whether it will 
use them, 
depends on 
the topic.  
X has got 
strong levels of 
influence, e.g. 
the possibility 
of getting 
information ex 
ante and it has 
the possibility 
of negotiating 
bargaining 
positions and 
issuing 
resolutions. 
X has got the 
possibility of 
being 
involved ex 
ante and ex 
post and will 
influence 
debates and 
have the right 
to check them 
afterwards. 
Mechanisms  
X 
X has the 
right to (re)-
elect or (re)- 
appoint 
X can ask 
parliamentary 
questions 
after the 
meeting. 
X can 
organise 
hearings after 
the meeting.  
EAC deals 
with it in first 
instance and 
decides 
whether to 
delegate to 
sectoral 
committee. 
Number of 
meetings 
X gets 
information as 
early as Y. 
X is allowed to 
get 
information 
independently 
from Y. 
Y is obliged to 
Y has to 
attend ex ante 
meetings of X 
and give 
explanations. 
High 
implementati
on rates. 
X has control 
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X can raise 
motions of 
confidence. 
All EU 
matters are 
dealt with in 
EAC. 
increases. 
Time of 
discussions 
increases 
during 
plenary. 
provide 
information. 
Y is bound to 
decisions of 
committees  
X can use 
mandating 
rights. 
 
 
over 
legislative 
agenda.   
Resolutions 
on X are 
binding. 
Involvement 
of sectoral 
committees.  
Overview of different forms under which representatives operate in a representative 
democracy, whereby X = the principal (the NP) and Y = the agent (the government). This 
matrix, based upon Pitkin’s concept of representation, is limited to the substantive and 
formal forms of political representation.  
2.3 (The lack of) democratic legitimacy in the EU and the role of NPs 
Although the Lisbon Treaty refers to the EU as a ‘representative democracy’ committed 
to ‘political equality’ (art. 9 and 10 TEU), the possibility of a representative democracy 
in the EU has lead to many discussions. Since the nineties, when the Treaty of 
Maastricht was adopted, scholars have written about how to improve democratic 
legitimacy in the EU and whether NPs can play a role in this by holding their 
governments’ actions in the Council to account.  
The powers of the EP have been strengthened during many Treaty changes in order to 
approve the proposals of the European Commission (EC). This benefits the democratic 
legitimacy of the EU. However, the Council decides on an increasing number of topics, 
often by QMV. This prevents domestic democratic systems to control their governments 
in these issues.86 This part of the chapter describes that, in order to be sure that 
governments reflect the general preferences of the electorate, NPs have a potential role 
to play.  
Much of the criticism about the lack of the democratic legitimacy of the EU is related to 
its mode of political representation.87 According to Lord and Pollak, political 
representation is absent at EU level because there is no distinct audience as at national 
level.88 The electoral relationship between the representative and the represented is 
																																																								
86 Bellamy and Kröger, 2014: 443. 
87 Moravcsik, 2002:606. 
88 Lord & Pollak, 2013b:518. 
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therefore unclear.89 Besides, there are no clear accountability structures in place. 
According to Lord and Pollak, this is a consequence of the distance between EU 
citizens, the European Parliament (EP) and the elementary stages of political parties at 
EU level.90 
Others do not doubt the quality of representation between EU institutions and European 
citizens as such but see a problem with the current structure in the EU, as representation 
takes place on different levels and citizens have no overview of who decides what. This 
is the main cause of the democratic deficit since it implies that many citizens no longer 
feel represented. According to Bellamy and Castiglione, however, this is not necessarily 
due to the compound polity91 of the EU but to the fact that the three different levels of 
representation in the EU are not linked.92 Although the Lisbon Treaty distinguishes 
between four different channels of representation - namely an electoral, territorial, 
functional and direct channel of representation - it does not mention the relationship 
between them anywhere.93  
Some theorists94 are of the opinion that all these different channels create the 
democratic legitimacy of the EU, others consider the compound polity of the EU and 
particularly the lack of a link between different levels of governance - or at least the 
lack of a clear division of competences between these different channels - to be the 
main reason for the democratic deficit in the EU.95  
Some, like Moravcsik and Majone, are of the opinion that the EU deals with expert 
decision-making which is superior to political decision-making in the sense that it is 
better to take into account long-term decisions, while politicians are more focused on 
short-term re-election objectives.96 Majone states that for certain EU competences the 
solution lies in allocating powers to non-majoritarian institutions which are not directly 
accountable to any represented groups but are experts in dealing with the technicalities 
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of modern decision-making, such as the EU.97 Moravcsik is of the opinion that the EU 
has enough checks and balances and that indirect parliamentary control via national 
governments and the powers of the EP are sufficiently democratic.98 Further, national 
representatives such as ministers and civil servants who attend the Council meetings are 
under constant instruction from their executives back home, just as happens in domestic 
politics.99 With regard to the lack of transparency of Council meetings, Moravcsik is of 
the opinion that at national level there are also meetings that take place behind closed 
doors which makes it harder for NPs to hold their governments to account.100 Majone 
and Moravcsik’s theory received much critical response, particularly in the late 90s 
when scholars were more sceptical and there were more question marks regarding the 
EU’s democratic deficit.  
Most critics attribute the weakness of the EU’s democratic legitimacy to the absence of 
a European demos. They argue that the EU can never become a proper democracy 
because there is no such thing as a European demos.101 Other scholars contradict this 
theory, however, pointing out that in a representative democracy the idea demos (agreed 
as homogeneity) is substituted by the acceptance that there is plurality of wills.102 
According to Zürn and Walter-Drop, a demos is never externally attributed but always a 
result of political institutions, such as for example, a state.103 It is Christiano who links 
democracy to a common world and argues that people who share a common world 
conceptually do not have to share the same culture or even the same nationality, and 
that many common worlds are a consequence of arbitrary causes.104  
Nicolaïdis sees a solution in the EU developing towards a form of demoicracy 
representing the different European identities.105 Whether the EU requires one demos or 
a plurality of demoi, the importance of public discourse remains the same, however. 
This requires the development of institutions capable of guaranteeing opportunities for 
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political participation, influence and control.106 These institutions in the EU are both the 
EP and NPs. 
However, most studies in this field analyse the evolution of the EP and national 
parliaments separately.107 The opinion being that representation by actors at different 
levels in the EU may be colliding108 or at least insufficient to compensate for the 
absence of shared communication and identity which allows for majoritarian politics.109 
According to Bellamy and Castiglione, this is exactly where the problem lies. The EP 
represents the European voice whereas the NPs and governments in the Council 
represent various European voices, the different demoi. So, these different channels 
represent a different public with potentially different interests which are 
incompatible.110 The different voices were reflected, for example, in the EU Budget 
negotiations 2014-2020 in February 2013. The voice of the EP represented the EU 
interest in a higher EU budget, whereas most governments and their parliaments 
defended the need for budget cuts in line with their national budget policies. However, 
according to Crum and Fossum, domestic and European parliamentarisation are 
interdependent because the EP and national parliaments co-exist in the same political 
environment. They share a common focus on democratic representation in the EU’s 
multilevel parliamentary field.111 Both levels of representation have some of the 
concerns of citizens represented, one at national and the other at EU level. This form of 
dual legitimacy complements one other and cannot be viewed in isolation from one 
another. Recognising this is a way of acknowledging the role of the NP in the EU multi-
level political system.112 It serves as a way to bridge the gap between the policy-making 
level and citizens, the ultimate holders of the right to justification.113 
By increasing the powers of the EP in different EU Treaty changes, it can be argued that 
the voice of the European demos has increased its representativeness and with the 
Lisbon Treaty, for the first time, the voice of the different ‘demoi’ are also recognised, 
through the voice of NPs. As argued by Christiano, even though a common world does 
not require one homogeneous culture, the diversity of interests does require that all 
those different interests from different people get an equal chance of collective 																																																								
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decision-making. Collective decisions should therefore be made democratically.114 All 
those who are bound to collective decision-making should have an equal say in their 
making and in controlling those who take the decisions.115 In other words, those in 
power must be authorised and held to account for their actions. The lack of inclusion of 
NPs in the EU decision-making chain lead to many worrying articles. Some scholars 
have even referred to a de-parliamentarisation due to the increased powers of the 
European Council.116 
The inclusion of NPs in EU affairs could help in overcoming the sociological facet of 
the democratic deficit117, especially because the lack of accountability and authorisation 
has increased in recent years as the Council votes by QMV on a higher number of 
dossiers. Although QMV benefits the EU’s effectiveness in decision-making, it also 
means that the voting system in the Council becomes less transparent. This makes it 
harder for sovereign states to defend their own interests.118 The lack of transparency is 
further increased by decision-making in the Council being made behind closed doors, 
making it difficult for both the EP and NPs to control the Council and their 
governments and justifying an increase in their powers. NPs are the national bodies 
through which citizens have equal rights (one voice one vote) which responds to the 
political equality principle necessary to justify democracy. Involving them in EU affairs 
could therefore imply higher levels of representative democracy in the EU. NPs are 
different from other institutions in that they are neither nationally-elected executives, 
like the Council, or transnationally-elected representatives, such as the EP.119 Including 
them evolves the EU indeed into a ‘demoicratic’ political system whereby 
representation takes place at different levels120, the so-called multi-parliamentary 
field.121 The EP is a directly-elected legislator whereas NPs have developed different 
formal powers, such as the EACs in order to limit their governments’ freedom in 
Council meetings.122 Besides, EACs support domestic communication of EU affairs.123 
Including the NPs is a way to overcome the democratic disconnect between EU 
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decision-making and  EU citizens via the processes of authorization and accountability 
at the member state level.124 
A representative democracy including NPs could therefore also be a way to overcome 
the problem of a joint demos and the distance between voters and institutions which, as 
we have seen, is used as the main explanatory factors for the democratic deficit in the 
EU. 
Representation in the EU occurs via a two-track system with citizens represented by the 
European Parliament and by national governments accountable to national parliaments 
(see Article 10(2) of the Lisbon Treaty).125 In addition, the Lisbon Treaty includes in its 
Protocol that NPs must be more fully informed about the EU legislative process and 
gain more rights in controlling subsidiarity (more about this in Chapter 3.2). Equal 
access to information, combined with stronger control by national parliaments, can 
increase the levels of political equality by strengthening domestic democratic 
institutions.126 In other words, from a normative point of view, the role of NPs in EU 
legislation is now acknowledged.127 
Although NPs are referred to in the Treaty of Lisbon (2009) for the first time in the 
main text, a clear division or hierarchy of competences is absent. The EU’s 
representative democracy is based upon two different normative subjects: the individual 
and the state. Normally, political equality refers to the right of the individual to vote, 
control and sanction the government. However, the state is the subject of political 
equality within international organisations. They deliver rights and obligations. In other 
words, the two different subjects relate to political equality in different ways.128 
Next to this lack of hierarchy, many scholars worry about practical issues when 
involving NPs in EU affairs, such as their lack of resources and full agendas.129 The 
involvement of NPs in EU affairs has been described, furthermore, as actually 
threatening political equality in the EU.130 According to Lord, NPs have different 
interests and EU salience differs between them, as we have seen during the 
development of the financial crisis. This increases the role of some NPs, but decreases 																																																								
124 Ibid.,138. 
125 Winzen, 2010:1. 
126 Bolleyer & Reh, 2012: 485, 
127 Benz, 2005:508.	
128 Kröger & Friedrich, 2013:184. 
129 Raunio, 2009:16. 
130 Lord 2011, writing in European Voice. 
	 39	
the role of others, which overall strengthens political inequality. For that reason, the EP 
should be the only institution to play a larger role.131  
Nonetheless, while NPs have different formal rights to achieve accountability and 
authorisation, which implies different levels of control and influence over their 
government, they still represent their demoi, whereas the EP cannot. NPs are authorised 
by their citizens and hold their national governments to account. In this regard, their 
involvement increases political equality in the EU (all NPs use a one person one vote 
system). This is in accordance with the Lisbon Treaty’s meta-democratic principle of 
equality, referring to a form of political representation, which pays equal attention to 
citizens of the EU.  
Besides, empirical research shows that voters feel closest to NPs as their 
representatives.132 Increasing their role in EU politics can contribute, therefore, to 
higher levels of representation in the EU, as suggested by Bellamy and Castiglione133 as 
a solution to overcoming the democratic deficit caused by the triple form of 
unconnected representation. Supranational level of representation (EP), Bellamy and 
Castiglione suggest, corresponds to the thick concept of democracy.134 In other words, it 
promotes the common good, but pays less attention to pluralism. The intergovernmental 
level of representation (via the member states and their NPs) relates to a thin concept of 
democracy, on the other hand, which defends individual rights but has less focus on the 
common interest. Because of the unequal distribution of political resources135, the thin 
concept of democracy might not fulfil the meta-standard of democracy, namely political 
equality.136 At the moment, the EU is characterised by the thick concept and in order to 
add some more of the thin concept, NPs would need to play a role. By doing this, the 
EU would be better able to represent its different demoi with their pluralist identities. 
This would lead to a space of reasonable disagreement due to increased electoral 
competition which characterises the thick concept of democracy.  
Additionally, the NPs are able to overcome the increasing tension between European 
integration and the need for self-rule by connecting the two together. According to 
Kröger and Bellamy, they can do so by normalising and domesticising EU policy 
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making.137 In other words, when EU topics gets discussed by MPs, they are discussed at 
a domestic level by those who directly represent the electorate. When regularly 
discussing EU topics, MPs can develop competing EU policies, which is a way to 
normalise the politicisation of EU issues.138 
In summary, different opinions from both left and right wing perspectives could be 
discussed in NP committees or plenary debates, which increases policy choice.139 
Besides, the use of mechanisms like control and influence would help the EU to further 
shape its democratic legitimacy. As a result, the EU would be a proper representative 
democracy which is the best way to guarantee its principle of political equality. The 
Lisbon Treaty and the new Protocol for NPs have led to a change in representative 
democracy in the EU140; this has created the possibility of a ‘demoicracy’. The next 
section will explain what tools NPs have to contribute to this ‘demoicracy’. 
2.4 The formal powers of NPs  
Following on from the previous section, NPs have formal powers in order to represent 
the different demoi in the EU and control what their governments agree at EU level and 
decide whether this corresponds to the views of the electorate. We have seen that, in 
order to determine whether NPs can make a difference to the outcome of an EU 
legislative file, it is indeed necessary to establish whether an NP has many or few 
formal powers in order to prevent the represented from acting in a manner contrary to 
the wishes of the representative.141 
Now that we have seen the development of NPs being introduced into the EU decision-
making process via different EU Treaty changes and the combination of supporting and 
opposing academic responses to this, it is worth looking at the different formal powers 
NPs can have and the extent to which they are able to hold their governments to account 
and authorise them in EU legislative files.  
As we have seen, the normative motivation behind the matter of formal powers and NPs 
is related to the delegation theories of parliamentary democracy.142 This approach 
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recognises different steps in the chain of delegation between voters and EU Institutions, 
from voters to MPs to cabinet ministers and prime-ministers.143 The lack of democratic 
legitimacy in the EU and the possible involvement of NPs to reduce this has lead to a 
wide-ranging number of academic articles into the use of formal powers by NPs in the 
field of EU policies, often related to the delegation theory.  
NPs have formal powers in order to influence, amend or, occasionally, reject policy 
proposals from government144; they all have different powers to do so. NPs have similar 
rights to transform bills into law, amend government bills, and control ministers, but 
their ways of doing so differ greatly.145 In the past many scholars have made attempts to 
classify NPs depending on the kinds of formal powers they had as set out in their Rules 
of Procedure or Constitutions.146 Mezey distinguished three layers of policymaking 
powers: ‘strong’ (if they can modify and reject executive proposals), ‘modest’ 
(legislatures that have no capacity to reject policy proposals but can modify them) and 
‘little or no policy making power’ (legislatures that can neither modify nor reject policy 
proposals.147 Norton builds on this classification, but adds to the first, ‘strong’, 
legislature the capacity to formulate policies.148   
Based upon the different functions that NPs fulfil in EU decision-making, later research 
has classified NPs according to the different types of involvement: policy shaper, 
government watchdog, public forum, EU expert and European player.149 The first three 
categories correspond to the main parliamentary roles (legislation, control and 
communication) while the last two are more specifically focused on EU issues, such as 
gathering EU information (expert) and having direct dialogues with EU institutions - 
EU player.150 Other ways of ranking as set out by Karlas151, Winzen152, in addition to 
Auel, Rozenberg and Tacea153 show a division between a group of strong, mainly North 
European, parliaments including those of Denmark, Sweden and Finland, but also 
Germany, the Netherlands and Austria, and a group of rather weak parliaments (in 
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Southern member states such as Greece, Malta, Cyprus, Portugal and Spain, but also in 
Belgium and Luxemburg). France, Italy and the UK fall somewhere in between.154 
This research adds another classification of NPs and their formal powers in table 2. This 
table shows all 28 EU NPs, indicating their formal levels of influence and control 
mechanisms, depending on previously agreed indicators155 (as laid down in the national 
constitution or Rules of Procedure of the NP). These formal instruments can either 
precede the representative relationship via ex ante influence mechanisms or follow it via 
ex post control mechanisms. 
NPs with a greater number of ex ante influence mechanisms in table 2 are classified as 
conforming to the delegatory model (for example, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the 
Netherlands and Sweden). Those with more mechanisms to control their government 
are considered to be conforming to a trusteeship model (Belgium, Spain, the Czech 
Republic and the UK). That is, in a delegatory model, the opinion of the NP is superior 
to that of the government and NPs have stronger formal powers in the sense that they 
are able to adapt their government’s position.156 In the trusteeship model, by contrast, 
the government has more freedom to follow its own judgement.157 
Previous research has shown that if NPs really want to make a difference to EU 
policies, they must have powers to influence their government before the Council 
meeting.158 However, it has also been shown that increased use of QMV in the Council 
has complicated the ex ante commitments of governments to their NPs, as the decisions 
are taken based upon a majority.159 
Table 2 will be helpful in the empirical research by allowing for a comparison between 
those NPs with more formal powers and those with fewer, and to measure their impact 
on EU governmental policies when acting under different conditions. Both table 1 and 2  
are based upon Pitkin’s formal representation strand, which consists of the levels of 
accountability (control mechanisms) and authorisation (influence mechanisms). In that 
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sense, therefore, Pitkin serves as a bridge between the normative and empirical part of 
my research.160  
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Table 2 Formal powers of National Parliaments 
Ex ante powers Ex post powers 
Strong Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
Germany, Netherlands 
 
Strong  Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, UK 
Modest 
 
 
Belgium,  Croatia, Czech Republic, 
France, Greece, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden 
Modest Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Greece, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden 
Weak Bulgaria, Cyprus, Hungary, Ireland, 
Luxemburg, Malta, Poland, Spain, UK 
Weak     Slovenia 
 
Ex ante influence indicators 
Strong:  3 or more ex ante formal powers  
Modest: 1 or 2 ex ante formal powers  
Weak:    less than one ex ante formal power 
 
Ex ante influence indicators used:  
The involvement of sectoral committees in EU affairs, mandating rights, the right to add 
items to the agenda of the meetings with PM/Minister, and the attendance of the 
PM/relevant minister at an EAC/sectoral committee before the Council meeting.  
 
 
Ex post control indicators 
Strong:   3 or more ex post formal powers 
Modest: 1 or 2 ex post formal powers 
Weak:    less than 1 formal power 
 
Ex post control indicators used:  
The right to ask parliamentary questions, confidence votes, attendance of the 
PM/relevant minister at the EAC/sectoral committee after the Council meeting.161  
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2.4.1 Parliamentary committees and the EAC 
The above mentioned formal powers that NPs can have are based upon indicators used 
in previous empirical research in this field162 and the list is non-exclusive. Many NPs 
have different tools by which to hold their government to account (for example, the 
scrutiny reserve, reference to plenary). However, some formal powers are accessible to 
all NPs, such as the right to information and the right to ask questions. However, this 
right is used differently within the NPs. For example, since the Lisbon Treaty has come 
into force, all NPs will receive information directly from the EC. However, there exist 
huge differences in the timing and contents of government information to NPs, such as 
their own opinion on EU policy positions.163  
The next Chapter will elaborate in more depth on the empirical work that so far has 
been done in the field of parliamentary institutional powers. However, before moving 
there, it is useful to look at the different formal powers NPs can have.  
One other formal tool that all NPs have, but which varies amongst them regarding their 
use, requires some particular attention. It is the most important institutionalised 
monitoring tool, namely the committee systems.164  
Committees have been set up by NPs in order to deal efficiently with influence and 
control of EU affairs. Active committees have become standard in most West-European 
consensus-based parliaments, as they are used to the embeddedness of committees165 
and to having different parties working harmoniously together to establish a joint 
approach to a given issue. Committees are also described as compromise arenas, that is, 
their function is to resolve conflict between different political views.166 With these 
compromise decisions taken by the committee, they are able to promote influence. In 
majoritarian parliaments like Westminster, however, the work of the committees can 
sometimes cause friction.167 This is because the executive party is dominant in 
parliament as well and therefore more likely to simply rubber stamp government 
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proposals. Consequently, some theorists argue that proportional systems are more 
democratic than majoritarian ones.168  
All NPs in the EU have set up their own EACs. These are created to respond to EU 
issues which require certain levels of sectoral specialisation.169 EACs have two main 
tasks: influencing their government position in the Council (proactive) and controlling 
EU legislation (reactive).170 They mainly deal with the latter. EACs across the EU have 
different mandates and different control and influence mechanisms when it comes to 
submitting issues to the chamber(s) for deliberation during plenary debates, in addition 
to the degree to which the process of scrutiny is considered to be binding on 
government.171 Some EAC models are used to centralise all EU affairs (for example, the 
House of Commons in the UK), whereas others delegate different proposals to relevant 
sectoral standing committees depending on the topic – for example,  the Finnish and 
Dutch parliaments.172 The EAC is often considered to be more generalist with regard to 
the contents of the topics dealt with in EU legislative files, as they often have 
knowledge on EU affairs, but lack the technical expertise.173 
Delegating EU issues to sectoral committees is a way of decentralising EU issues and 
involving those with expertise in the respective topic. In addition, it stimulates all MPs 
to become routinely involved in EU affairs.174 Generally, those NPs using decentralised 
sectoral committees are considered to be the more active175, as they show that ‘Europe 
is everywhere’176. However, it has as a disadvantage the fact that EU issues could easily 
become fragmentised177; although in some NPs the EAC is responsible for the 
coordination of EU issues, whereas the sectoral committees deal with the actual scrutiny 
of the relevant EU legislative files (for example, the parliaments of Finland and the 
Netherlands). Besides, MPs in the sectoral committees are not often experts on EU 
affairs. In contrast to the EAC, the role of the plenary has so far been limited in 
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European issues (with the exception of the UK which is a debating parliament, and 
plenary is more important).178 
2.5 Concluding remarks 
This Chapter has conceptualised political representation and the role of NPs in the EU 
via the use of its formal powers, and it has classified NPs as forming part of the 
delegatory or trusteeship model based upon these powers. This classification, however, 
describes the relationship between the NP as the represented and the government as the 
representative as a static one, one that does not move. Pitkin’s political representation 
theory, however, shows how the relationship between the representative and the 
represented is not static, but rather can alter depending on different factors. She thereby 
distinguishes substantively from the formal model of representation. 
The next Chapter will discuss the different empirical theories of previous research in the 
field of institutional adaptation by NPs, and the extent to which NP powers can be 
influenced by the different conditions under which they operate, making their position 
on the delegatory/trustee matrix a fluctuating one. Chapter 2 will indicate that NPs are 
expected to operate on a continuum and that their position upon this depends on various 
factors and not solely on the formal powers as laid down in their Rules of Procedure. In 
other words, the strength or weaknesses of a NP cannot solely be considered to be one 
that is fixed and dependent only on formal powers, but rather the focus must be on the 
external conditions under which the NP operates as well.  
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Chapter 3  
The use of formal powers under different conditions: the theories 
3.1 Introduction  
Following on from the conceptual debate as addressed in the previous Chapter, the 
attention turns to the theoretical discussion which will be used to examine whether the 
norms applicable to representative democracy are also empirically-operationable via the 
involvement of NP involvement in EU policy-making. Over the past decade, and 
especially since the Lisbon Treaty, the possible role of NPs in reducing the EU’s 
democratic deficit has been a point of contention in both normative and empirical 
studies and this thesis, therefore, follows a deductive approach, based upon these 
previous theories.   
The aim of this Chapter is to explain the choice of impact as the dependent variable 
(DV), build on existing literature in the field of NPs and their use of formal powers in 
decision-making in EU legislative policies. These will be linked to a selected number of 
conditions under which NPs operate, which are the explanatory factors of this thesis.  
The theoretical perspectives will lead to arguments for each explanatory factor which 
will explain how the use of formal powers is expected to alter under certain conditions 
and their expected effectiveness (leading to impact). The hypotheses will result from 
these arguments and will be followed by a description of the expected causal process 
when the variable to be measured varies. The empirical part of the research is linked to 
the normative standards on political representation as discussed in the previous Chapter 
in that its aim is to show how the relationship between NPs and their governments 
during scrutiny of EU legislative files alters continuously and a whole spectrum of 
possible relationships exists between the trustee and delegate model.179 The NP can be 
characterised as either part of a trusteeship model or a delegatory one depending on the 
situation during which the scrutiny takes place. In other words, political representation 
is not only formalistic, but also substantive, i.e. referring to how the representative 
relationship works.180 More specifically, this research looks at the formal powers of NPs 
in EU legislative files, with which the NP is able to hold its government to account and 																																																								
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authorise it, normatively better known as the formalistic strand of representation (see 
Chapter 2). Secondly, it will look at the way NPs act when operating under certain 
conditions (the substantive strand of political representation) and whether this is 
effective. More specifically, it looks at a certain combination of factors that cause NPs 
to use their powers and also when governments are most likely to take over the NP’s 
position.  
Previous empirical research showed that NPs often chose not to use their formal powers 
when scrutinising their governments on EU affairs181, and in this regard could therefore 
be considered to form part of the trusteeship model.182 However, this thesis assumes 
that in EU issues, the use of formal powers by NPs will vary depending on the 
conditions under which they operate. When NPs do increase their efforts to have an 
impact on their government’s EU legislative file, which they are expected to do, they 
have chances of success. These are expected to increase under different conditions, such 
as a multi-party government or in relation to a salient topic. In these cases it is more 
likely that the NP acts as a delegatory NP which will give the government less freedom 
to follow its own judgement when negotiating in the Council of Ministers. However, in 
different circumstances, for example, when these external conditions are absent, the NP 
may refrain from using its formal powers, since using them may be ineffective (for 
example, few chances of the government taking over their position). This in turn could 
mean that it does act according to the trusteeship model (even if the Rules of Procedure 
gives it the so-called stronger ‘ex ante’ influence formal powers) and the government in 
such cases will have more leeway to act freely during meetings with other EU 
Ministers.  
Although empirical studies on the contribution of NPs to the EU’s democratic 
legitimacy are often more positive than the normative point of view183, the discussion 
on the possible role of NPs in reducing the EU’s democratic deficit has equally been a 
point of contention in empirical research. Broadly, the empirical literature on the role of 
NPs can be divided into two main prevalent arguments, one which is sceptical184 and the 
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other that is more positive.185 Next to a vast number of articles on whether the 
involvement of NPs in EU legislative decision-making could contribute to reducing the 
democratic deficit in the EU, publications examining NPs’ formal powers, and the 
extent to which these have been adapted as a consequence of Europeanisation, is even 
more extensive.  
Research in the field of institutional adaptation of NPs shows first of all that formal 
powers by NPs are relevant in shaping EU policies186, and that the varying impact of 
NPs across the EU are explained by these differences in formal powers. However, this 
thesis proposes that such powers are conditional and by adding other variables, the 
impact on their government’s position in the field of EU legislative policies will either 
increase or decrease.  
Secondly, scholars have also shown that other variables can be significant in measuring 
parliamentary strength on EU affairs, such as the salience of an EU topic187 and 
parliamentary provisions in the Lisbon Treaty188, but also partisan composition189 and 
Euro-scepticism.190 This Chapter will first give an overview of previous literature 
relating to formal powers of NPs in the EU, followed by a discussion on the choice of 
the DV impact. This will be followed by a discussion of other theories in the field of 
external conditions and how it is expected that the use of formal powers will lead to a 
variation in impact when NPs operate under different conditions. For each explanatory 
factor, the argument will be described, leading up to the hypotheses which are followed 
by the expected causal processes of parliamentary use of formal powers in the case 
where the variable in question is present and when it is absent.  
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3.2 Empirical research in the field of institutional adaptation 
The debate on EU integration and the accompanying democratic deficit is often linked 
to the formal powers of NPs. This link is explained because EU integration is frequently 
blamed for diminishing parliamentary control.191 Particularly in cases in which the 
Council votes with a qualified majority, NPs cannot use any control mechanisms over 
what their governments decide.192 Many scholars refer to this development as a ‘de-
parliamentarisation’.193 The increasing EU integration process and the fear that this 
would lead to further de-parliamentarisation resulted in many empirical studies on 
parliamentary institutional adaptation which began in the Nineties and continue 
today.194 This section gives an overview of the literature in this field. 
There are two dimensions to the literature on NPs in the EU: the first relates the formal 
powers of NPs to the democratic deficit debate in the EU, while the second is a group of 
scholars who either defend or reject the involvement of NPs in EU affairs.  
Roughly three different periods of studies about the formal powers of NPs can be 
distinguished in the first group. The first focused on institutional powers and any 
changes made by NPs as a consequence of EU integration, such as setting up EACs195, 
generally showing NPs as slow adaptors to the EU integration process196, but most have 
become better at controlling their governments in EU affairs197 and are fighting back.198 
This first phase showing that NPs, after a slow start, do matter in EU affairs199 is also 
known as the re-parliamentarisation thesis.200 NPs now have various formal powers 
with which they can influence EU decision-making. They can influence national 
negotiation positions in the Council of Ministers and shape final policy outcomes ex-
post.201 
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Secondly, the approval of the Lisbon Treaty led to a new wave of studies. Whereas the 
first period dealt with indirect parliamentary influence on EU affairs, this time it covers 
the real direct influence gained by NPs at EU level. During this wave, research focuses 
on whether NPs have adapted to respond to the new provisions in the revised Treaty 
(article 12 TEU) via either a different use of their powers (increase/decrease) or a 
change in the Rules of Procedure.  
The Lisbon Treaty announced concrete changes for NPs, amongst others their collective 
right to monitor the principle of subsidiarity, better known as the Early Warning 
Mechanism (EWM). In the case that one third of NPs send a RO to the EC, the 
threshold of the yellow card has been reached against the EC legislative proposal, 
meaning that the EC must review it.202 
The Lisbon Treaty furthermore attempts to strengthen the position of NPs by circulating 
information regarding new EU legislative proposals directly after publication. In other 
words, NPs will be less dependent on their governments for information. This 
empowerment will increase their chances of exercising control over government and 
ensures better access to EU documents.203 The NPs will, in addition, be in a better 
position to hold their governments to account after Council meetings, as the Lisbon 
Treaty includes an article (I-24(6)) specifying that when examining and adopting a 
legislative proposal, the Council must meet in public.204 These new provisions were a 
result of growing concerns about the democratic legitimacy of the EU.205 As discussed 
in Chapter 2, accountability and authorisation are the main processes of NPs in order to 
achieve political equality which is the core value of EU democracy. By its direct 
reference to the NPs, the Lisbon Treaty indeed strengthened the accountability process 
in order to improve the EU’s political representation and thereby increases its 
democratic legitimacy.206  
The new provisions in the Lisbon Treaty implied that NPs would no longer adapt their 
formal powers solely at national level to deal with EU integration, such as setting up 
EACs, but for the first time a collective right was also formally set up at EU level. 
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Thirdly, since the Lisbon Treaty has now been in force since 2009, different studies 
about formal powers have been published which examine two issues; institutional 
adaptation as a consequence of the Treaty and secondly, the use of the new Lisbon 
provisions as laid down in Treaty’s Protocol. This culminated in the publication of the 
Palgrave Handbook of National Parliaments and the European Union (2015) outlining 
the results of the collaborative research by the Observatory of Parliaments after Lisbon 
(OPAL).207  One of the findings of this book shows that most NPs have their own way 
of responding to EU integration; however, those that have adapted their mechanisms in 
such a way as to combine control of their own government together with increased 
contact with EU institutions have best adapted to the EU integration challenges.208 
When looking into formal powers, scholars often use the same type of indicators for 
describing NPs’ formal powers, such as asking questions, mandating rights, the use of 
specialised committees, agenda control, etc. and studies varied between comparing 
different formal powers of NPs.209 Andeweg and Nijzink build their classification of 
NPs on the famous ranking of Anthony King, and argue that there are three different 
modes of the government-parliament model in which both parties can act in different 
ways: a non-party mode which refers to the traditional government versus NP 
interaction, an inter-party mode (interaction between members of one government party 
and those of other government parties or with the opposition) and, thirdly, the cross-
party mode which consists of interaction between minsters and MPs across party lines 
to defend sectoral interests. The dominating mode depends upon the formal powers of 
the NP, but also on the context or political agenda.210 There are, furthermore, many 
relevant studies about the relationships between NPs and their governments in domestic 
affairs, such as that by Russell et al. (2015) which has been referred to for this thesis 
and mentioned in the bibliography. 
A second group of studies concentrated on either defending or rejecting an involvement 
of NPs in EU affairs. Initially, scholars’ opinions on the new provisions for NPs in the 
Lisbon Treaty were mainly hypothetical, varying from scepticism - NP agendas being 
too full to deal with the new powers and extra information211, and the main goal of MPs 
is re-election which will not happen by focusing on EU affairs since this is not in the 																																																								
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interest of voters212 - to more positive sounds, such as Cooper who expected that the 
EWM could give NPs the role of ‘virtual third chambers’, as they are now jointly 
involved in the scrutiny of EU legislative files.213 Kiiver expected that the Treaty and its 
provisions for NPs could work as a catalyst for real parliamentary action.214 
What all these studies have in common is that they almost exclusively focus on 
comparing institutional provisions, with the exception of Andeweg and Nijzink’s 
ranking which is more conditional and therefore closer to the normative 
categorisationon political representation such as those of Pitkin, and Elau’s division of a 
trustee, delegate and politico representation models (see Chapter 2).  
Some studies, however, looked into linking the formal powers to other explanatory 
variables in order to explain variations between NPs’ use of formal powers, such as the 
salience of integration, Euro-scepticism within parties and cabinet size.215 This has led 
to a huge amount of data on the topic of the formal powers and rankings of NPs based 
upon any changes as a consequence of EU integration. 
However, ranking NPs according to the frequency of committee meetings, levels of 
decentralisation to sectoral committees or involvement of MEPs in the scrutiny of EU 
legislative proposals at national level does not say much about political practice.216 It is 
for this reason that this thesis looks further than ranking NPs and comparing their 
formal powers, but rather attempts to discover the outcome of their use. This will be 
discussed in the next section. 
3.3 Impact as dependent variable 
As discussed above, most studies about NPs in the EU commonly examine the different 
institutional powers of NPs and whether they have changed as a consequence of EU 
integration. Based upon this, we have a clear idea of what NPs can and cannot do in 
relation to EU issues. This section will discuss why it has chosen impact as the 
dependent variable (DV) of this research. 
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Whatever the institutional or procedural set-up of the NP, the levels of scrutiny depend 
to a large extent on the willingness of MPs to spend time and resources to make use of 
their formal powers.217 Formal rules and their adaptation, therefore, only tell us part of 
the story, as until they are used, they are meaningless.218 There is still significant 
disagreement about the real impact of differences in formal powers and possible 
reform.219  
Pollak and Slominski, for example, show how the Austrian Nationalrat, an NP with 
strong formal powers on paper hardly ever uses them in EU affairs, resulting in minimal 
impact on EU issues.220 Other committees which have fewer formal powers are more 
active, such as the EAC in the House of Commons.221 For that reason, research must 
focus on the impact of NP on the EU policy of their governments.222  
Some scholars have attempted to measure parliamentary behaviour such as the level of 
involvement of sectoral committees223, and the number of EAC meetings224. Other 
research shows that there is a strong correlation between strong institutional rights and 
the general level of parliamentary activities.225 
However, although parliamentary behaviour says more about the use of formal powers, 
it still does not give any insight into the outcome of the use of such powers and whether 
their use varies when operating under different conditions. In other words, when 
studying the use of formal powers, we still do not gain any information on whether 
being active as a NP makes any difference. It does not tell us if it matters whether MPs 
ask many or few questions, or if they apply a scrutiny reserve.226 It is possible for a NP 
to be an active player, but this does not automatically mean that it subsequently has 
greater control over its government.227 Winzen, for example, shows how a NP with 
strong formal powers in the field of information and the use of sectoral committees 
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might still be confronted with a government that is opposed to having its opinion 
overruled.228  
It is for this reason that this research continues to drift away from the existing literature 
on formal powers and instead examines the actual outcome of the use of such formal 
powers. It has therefore selected the impact of the NP on its government’s EU 
legislative proposal as the DV. Of all the ways to measure the strengths and weaknesses 
of NPs (such as scope229, timing and management), the impact of the scrutiny of EU 
affairs can be considered to be the most important criterion to establish NP’s strength in 
EU issues. Besides, this is the variable that is most likely to show the highest levels of 
variation.230 Using the measurable impact of NPs on their government’s EU policy 
position in this thesis will be achieved by exploring any changes that have occurred in 
the government’s EU policy position as a consequence of the parliamentary use of 
formal powers. It will furthermore examine whether the level of impact changes when 
operating under different conditions.  
Based upon these scholars demonstrating a relationship between different types of 
explanatory factors and the impact of NPs on EU affairs, I agree with those who argue 
that if institutional rights are not used and taken up by MPs, they are worth little.231 
Levels of parliamentary impact do not only depend on formal levels of accountability 
and authorisation, therefore, but also on other factors such as its own political agenda. 
An MP can act differently in different contexts.232 Formal rules are important but not 
sufficient by themselves to guarantee greater substantive impact on EU policies. It is, 
therefore, important to look beyond them at real ‘influence’ rather than ‘power’.233 
By looking at what NPs really do234 instead of what they ‘can’ do based upon their 
formal powers, and assessing whether what they do has a visible effect, it is important 
to look at the formal parliamentary institution in relation to parliamentary activities 
when operating under external conditions (the independent variables (IVs) of this 
research). These will be elaborated upon below.  
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The operationalisation of the DV and an explanation on how this thesis will measure 
impact, including how to overcome the challenges of measuring impact, will be 
discussed in the next Chapter.   
3.4 The explanatory factors 
Next to comparative studies about formal powers, some scholars have tried to explain 
variation between strong, moderate and weak NPs according to external factors, such as 
the North-South condition, the Euro-sceptic sentiment in the NP and its electorate, 
public opinion, and the Catholic/Orthodox share of the population.235 Previous 
empirical studies show that parliamentary majorities often neglect the use of formal 
powers altogether in the scrutiny of EU legislative files or at least avoid scrutinising 
their government publicly in EU policies and often support them.236 Giving the 
government a mandate that is too strict on EU affairs can limit the government’s 
negotiation position resulting in the NP being criticised for undermining the 
government’s success.237 Put another way, it would not be in the national interest if the 
NP tightens the government too much to its position resulting in MPs feeling that they 
need some freedom to follow their own judgement during their negotiations in Brussels.  
However, it is expected that under certain conditions, MPs are more likely to increase 
their use of formal powers. They are more likely to do so if they believe that using them 
will be effective (if it will lead to impact). Their efforts will only lead to impact if their 
government is motivated to take over the NP’s position. It is expected that the impact 
here can even increase if the NP is considered to be part of a trusteeship model 
according to its formal powers (see Chapter 2).  
The overall argument of this thesis, as discussed in Chapter 2.2, looks at when NPs are 
most likely to use their formal powers and what the effectiveness of this is. The 
argument assumes that MPs with busy agendas carefully opt to use their powers only 
when using them is effective and likely to lead to benefit - which is when government 
takes over their position. Based upon the literature as discussed in Chapter 2, this is 
most likely to happen with certain incentives, such as policy shaping238, vote-seeking239 
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and overcoming contestation240. This brings us to the next section which is the selection 
of the conditions embedded in this wider argument.  
This thesis has selected the external conditions of partisan composition, Eurosceptic 
involvement in the coalition government, the salience of the topic and use of Lisbon 
provisions because it is expected that they most likely lead to different levels of impact 
and are applicable to a wide range of NPs in the EU (all NPs deal with salient and non-
salient topics and many deal with multi-party coalitions). More importantly, these 
conditions are examples of incentives which in the literature has been described as most 
likely to be effective (leading to impact), namely by overcoming contestation (this 
condition is dealt with in the partisan composition and Eurosceptic conditions), policy-
shaping and vote-seeking (dealt with in the salience condition). It has added a fourth, 
external condition, namely the Lisbon provisions.  
The next section will explain why it expects that the use of parliamentary powers is 
likely to vary when operating under these conditions, which could also have a varying 
impact as a result, even if the NP is considered to be part of the trusteeship model. That 
is, when discussing the different conditions under which NPs can operate, it looks at the 
use of formal powers and their effectiveness (impact) when operating under these 
conditions.  
3.4.1 Partisan composition 
Most literature on party composition published since the 1990s uses cross-national 
methods and comes from the neo-institutional rational choice strand on legislature. 
Literature from this strand argues that NPs whose governments consist of a greater 
number of parties are more powerful than those in single-party governments since such 
NPs use their formal mechanisms of influence and control more often and have greater 
impact on governmental policies.241 This is because government representatives need 
parliamentary support to overcome potential contestation in their coalition governments. 
Some authors within this strand establish a correlation between the number of parties in 
government and the number of issue dimensions.242 In other words, the greater the 
number of parties in government, the greater the number of different topics and varying 																																																								
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views on those topics within government. This makes it harder to find a compromise 
that pleases all members. Where there are more divergent opinions on issues, it is likely 
that there is more time spent in discussion in both the cabinet and NP. In such cases, the 
government will be more dependent on MPs from its own party for support because the 
coalition may be dominated by disagreement.  
Other scholars have demonstrated that there is a causal relationship between the number 
of parties in government and the power of the NP243; this has also been shown in 
research regarding the EU. In a study of opposition parties, for example, Holzhacker 
concludes that parliamentary power is strongest in minority governments, less strong in 
coalition and weakest in single-party governments. He argues that the broader and more 
diverse the coalition government, the stronger the use of control mechanisms by the 
NP244 because the government is more dependent on the NP to discuss and negotiate its 
position when the governing parties may not agree amongst themselves. In other words, 
the NP adapts the use of its formal powers according to its government’s composition. 
Raunio similarly argues that the fewer the number of seats held by government parties 
in parliament, the more the cabinet must take into account the preferences of MPs.245 
Saalfeld concludes that ministers in coalition governments often make deals with other 
parties in the NP because conflicts of interest increase when there is a coalition 
government.246 Multiparty governments are therefore often considered to be more 
responsive to their NPs than single party governments.247  
Single party governments may still see disagreements between the government and 
backbenchers in the NP, but it is more likely that both see themselves as team members 
since the majority in the NP belong to the government party, with the result that the NP 
is therefore more likely to support the government. Moreover, the government will be 
less likely to be dependent on the support of other parties as it does not have to make 
compromises between different coalition partners. Compromises are often further from 
the ideal point of the median voter of the various governing parties.248 This leads to 
increased use of formal powers by the NP as it is more likely that political parties in the 
NP are not supportive of the compromise, or the government must find support from 
opposition parties in the NP in order to gain approval of the compromise in the NP. The 																																																								
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partisan composition of the government, therefore, is likely to influence the impact of 
the NP on EU policies.  
There is a strong connection between party composition and the formal powers of the 
NP. As Saalfeld argues, in the case of a coalition government, the NP requires extra-
institutionalised accountability mechanisms to hold the government to account, as there 
is more likelihood that government decisions are based upon compromises and do not 
reflect the view of the median voter.249 These NPs are thus often considered to be strong 
or conforming to the delegatory model (Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Germany, The 
Netherlands). Such NPs normally scrutinise coalition governments which are more 
likely to consult their NPs in order to retain broad coalitions.250 The main characteristics 
of these NPs are their strong formal powers, such as agenda control or the involvement 
of sectoral committees. In contrast, the best-known example of an NP with frequent 
single party governments in the EU that is considered to be relatively weak (the House 
of Commons) has few formal powers to hold its government to account and authorise 
it.251 In single party systems, the government holds the majority in the NP and there are, 
therefore, fewer chances for disagreement. The levels of trust in the NP are expected to 
be higher in single-party governments as their interests will be more similar.252 Policies 
are often considered as ‘status quo’.253 This also applies to EU policies which are more 
often left to government in single party governments.254 
NPs, therefore, need less formal powers to change the position of government and most 
institutional choices are already under its control, for example agenda control or the 
committee system.255 A coalition government, on the other hand, implies less trust and 
must respect the interests of other political parties, and policies are often based upon 
compromise. Therefore, the formal powers of the NP have more parliamentary value 
since for agenda control and committee meetings, for example, compromise between 
different parties is required which gives MPs more voice.256 
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It has been previously argued that NPs in multi-party systems normally have more 
formal accountability and authorisation powers, as they are often part of a consensus 
rather than a majoritarian system where MPs are needed to get support for the 
compromises suggested in government.257 It might be expected, therefore, that those 
NPs with many formal powers and which are part of a multi-party system could be 
considered as conforming to the delegatory model. Going a step further, however, is the 
still un-researched link between those NPs with few formal powers but a multi-party 
government and their impact on government position on EU policies. They should have 
a greater impact on the governmental position in the EU than those NPs with few 
formal powers and which are part of a single-party government, because a government 
consisting of several parties is more dependent on parliamentary opinion to gain support 
for its position.  
I therefore expect that NPs will be able to increase their impact on their government’s 
EU policy position once they are part of a multi-party government, since it will be 
harder for those governments to reach agreement without the support of their NPs. Such 
governments are obliged, therefore, to take their NP’s wishes into account.   
My hypothesis is as follows:  
H1 Multi-party government is a favourable condition for NPs to increase their 
substantive impact on their government’s EU policy position. 
3.4.1.1 Causal process 
The following causal process is expected based upon the theoretical argument above: 
EU legislative proposal: sent to Council, EP and NPs ! Single party government and 
NP ! little discussion in government ! one view on EU proposal ! no dependence on 
NP ! NP: limited use of mechanisms to influence (majority in NP is government party) 
! NP agrees with government ! no parliamentary impact.  
Versus 
EU legislative proposal: sent to Council, EP and NPs ! multi-party government and 
NP use of formal powers ! lots of discussions in government ! government cannot 																																																								
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agree ! compromise ! asks for support from different parties in NP ! control and 
influence of government by NP through its formal powers of, for example, asking 
questions and threat of confidence votes ! government must take NP position on board 
to ensure sufficient support for proposal ! few formal powers do not stop the NP from 
having a say ! parliamentary impact.258  
3.4.2 Eurosceptic parties as coalition partners in the government 
As with the previous argument, the study of Eurosceptic parties and the manner of 
obtaining parliamentary majorities form part of the neo-institutionalist rational choice 
explanation of consensus politics.259 Recently, post-functionalist theorists have shown 
that the rise of Euro-scepticism leads to negative opinions in the field of supranational 
governance.260  
Until a decade ago, EU topics were hardly discussed in any government or NP in the 
EU. However, the rise of Eurosceptic parties in different member states has led to a 
politicisation261 of the EU and increased political competition.262 The increased Euro-
sceptic public opinion will impact the use of parliamentary activities. NPs are elected 
institutions which grant legitimacy to the EU when participating in its decision-making 
process. On the other hand, MPs could also use their powers to express the growing 
lack of confidence in the EU amongst voters.263 
It is mostly parties on either the extreme right or extreme left that raise issues regarding 
the EU.264 They can raise these issues, for example, to criticise their government for 
failing to defend the national interest during EU negotiations.265 Parties in the centre or 
to the left or right of centre normally prefer not to raise EU issues.266 They consider the 
EU to be a topic on which they cannot win any votes from the electorate. For these 
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parties, EU topics are often more like a liability than an asset and they normally avoid 
public activities related to EU issues, as they will not gain any votes with such topics.267 
The Eurosceptic party, on the other hand, depends for its votes upon the discussion of 
issues related to the EU and thus has an interest in politicising EU issues because this 
may win more voters - their position on the left/right dimension will most likely limit 
their potential voters.268 In other words, only those parties that are in tune with the 
electorate over EU issues will try to get the item on the agenda.269 Eurosceptic parties 
are ‘issue owners’ on policies related to cleavages about EU integration and will 
endeavour to make their issue central to the public debate by bringing topics to the 
table.270 
Re-election is one of the main goals of MPs and so they are more likely to increase 
debates on EU issues if the population (their voters) is more Eurosceptic.271 A 
Eurosceptic public opinion makes the existence of Eurosceptic parties more likely in the 
NP. It is expected that the same applies when the coalition government includes a 
Eurosceptic party: where different opinions on EU integration exist within the very 
coalition government, is likely to translate into different government members having 
different opinions on bringing EU issues to the table.  
Normally, political parties only begin debates on topics on which they have different 
positions to their counterparts as there is more to gain from discussions upon which 
parties show disagreement; further, it is a way for MPs to distinguish themselves.272 It is 
therefore also likely that when a Eurosceptic party gains more seats, the level of 
contention in EU affairs increases as they can raise this issue as one on which they 
disagree with the opposition in parliament or government. This assumption is supported 
by Vollaard who argues that the rise of Eurosceptic parties increases the possibility of, 
and need for, cooperation to obtain a parliamentary majority.273 That is, the EU 
becomes more salient in countries with more Eurosceptic support.274 This will lead to 
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increased scrutiny of EU issues in order to show voters that they defend their 
interests.275 
More specifically, NPs have the opportunity to use their formal powers more regularly 
in establishing their government’s EU policy position when a Eurosceptic party enters 
government, as the topic of the EU will appear more often on the agenda and the 
coalition may find it harder to find a compromise between the governing parties.  
Once a Eurosceptic party joins the government, it and its non-Eurosceptic counterpart 
together in government must find compromises based upon different views. They are 
obliged to share power and bridge their disagreements. The Eurosceptic party in the 
coalition is more likely to add EU issues to the government agenda which may hard to 
compromise on with other government partners. This activity will show voters that they 
are doing as promised, increasing the chances of being re-elected. 
Once on the agenda, both pro- and anti-EU parties have a chance to influence the EU 
debate. As coalition partners may disagree on the EU, the government is more 
dependent on the support of opposition parties in the NP and is more likely to seek 
backing for its views within parliament. The NP is more likely to use its formal powers, 
such as tabling more committee meetings on EU affairs and more parliamentary 
questions, which will give it more opportunity to exercise an impact on EU affairs.  
Therefore, I hypothesise:  
H2 The more the government depends on the support of a Eurosceptic party, the more 
likely the NP will have a substantive impact on the government’s EU policy position.  
3.4.2.1 Causal process 
The following causal process is expected based upon the theoretical argument above: 
Government with Eurosceptic coalition partner ! EU issues appear more often on the 
agenda of the government ! contention in government ! government requires support 
from NP ! discussions in NP by use of formal powers (committee meetings, plenary 
meetings coalition partners) ! parliamentary parties give advice with either several or 
few formal mechanisms ! Government is dependent on NP for support to gain a 																																																								
275 Auel & Höing, 2015:380; Auel et al., 2015a:290; Winzen, 2013:306.	
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majority ! NP position must be adopted by government to gain support for its 
compromise ! parliamentary impact. 
Versus  
Government without Eurosceptic coalition partner ! EU issues hardly appear on the 
agenda ! little contention ! status quo ! little discussion in government ! no 
discussion in the NP ! little advice needed ! NP does not give advice ! government 
does not have to take into account NP’s position ! No parliamentary impact.276 
3.4.3 EU salience 
Other factors have also been proven to indicate parliamentary strength in EU affairs, 
such as issue-specific variables which are more related to the vote-seeking and policy-
shaping incentives of MPs in order to use their power, and of the government to take 
over NP’s position (contrary to the previous two hypotheses which reflected examples 
of incentives to overcome contestation). 
Scholars have shown that the more salient the topic in the NP, the tighter the scrutiny. 
Actors are likely to bargain more keenly when the topic is salient to them277, as they 
expect to gain an electoral advantage by bringing them to the table.278 If the topic is of a 
non-salient nature, MPs are expected not to waste their time and are likely not to use 
their formal powers or, at least, reduce them to a bare minimum since there is no 
electoral gain to be won. Because of the high quantities of EU legislative proposals, 
MPs will weigh the costs and benefits of parliamentary activities before using their 
formal powers.279 As we have seen previously, re-election and policy influence are 
considered the primary goal of most MPs280 and they are, therefore, more likely to use 
their formal powers knowing they can make a difference to the debate only if their 
constituents care about the issues. Saalfeld expects that MPs sometimes choose to grant 
more discretion to their governments if they believe that this is politically-efficient and 
they will grant less discretion in other cases.281 MPs are more likely to grant discretion 
to the government when the salience of the EU topic is low.282 This implies that MPs 																																																								
276 See Chapter 4.4 for more information regarding the use of data during each step of the causal process. 
277 Slapin, 2014:35. 
278 Miklin, 2014:80. 
279 Saalfeld, 2003, quoted in Auel & Raunio, 2012a:14. 
280 Auel & Raunio, 2012a:14. 
281 Saalfeld, 2005:347. 
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choose per EU legislative proposal the extent to which they seek to tie the government 
to a certain mandate or the extent to which they can act freely. Depending on the 
salience of the topic, the NP shifts thereby between the different ends of the delegatory-
trustee continuum as described in Chapter 2.  
In his paper on the impact of NPs, Saalfeld has shown a positive link between the 
political salience of EU integration overall in EU member states and the formal powers 
of the NP to scrutinise its government over EU issues. He thereby examined both 
formal powers and the behaviour of MPs.283 It is expected that this link will also work 
for the actual attention paid to specific EU issues.284 That is, when citizens care more 
about a specific topic dealt with in the EU legislative proposal, MPs are more likely to 
increase their formal powers.  
Miklin suggests that the extra use of parliamentary powers in a salient case will increase 
the impact of the NP, as the minister is better informed about parliament’s 
preferences.285 Once a topic receives more attention from the NP, the government will 
have greater difficulty ignoring the voters’ representative (the NP) because it may be 
punished at the next election.286 The representative will act differently, therefore, when 
the wishes of the principal are known.287 It is in the government’s own interest to take 
the NP’s wishes on board during negotiations in Brussels as in ignoring them, it risks 
being questioned afterwards (and losing credibility). It might furthermore mean that the 
NP can delay implementation of the EU agreement afterwards.288  
Acting in accordance with the principal’s wishes could result in re-election. Netjes and 
Binnema confirm this and argue that MPs will use more of their influence and control 
mechanisms when they feel they can alter voter support in their favour.289 At the same 
time, as soon as they know that topics are of low salience to their voters, they will not 
consider asking questions about them as they normally select topics to discuss which 
are related to their re-election.290 EU policies are often of low salience, which is why 
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MPs do not feel they can score any points with voters.291 This is consistent with Pitkin’s 
argument regarding the formalistic relationship between the agent and principal, where 
the agent gains more freedom to act according to his/her own judgement when the 
principal has no explicit opinion on the topic.292 The represented is less likely to 
delegate liberally to the representative if salience is high, where this is not an issue if the 
salience is low.293 
Based upon research by scholars who looked further than formal levels of 
accountability and authorisation294, NPs can be expected to increase their efforts to 
influence and control their government if a topic is salient to it or if the issue is highly 
politicised, as MPs consider it an opportunity to discuss and justify their different 
views.295   
MPs will work harder on issues which they believe could influence voter support.296 
When an issue is non-salient, on the other hand, MPs will use less formal or informal 
mechanisms to influence and control, and the agent has the freedom to follow his or her 
own judgement. MPs will do more, therefore, to scrutinise the government if the topic is 
salient to them or their voters.297 It is important, as a consequence, to look beyond 
institutional factors and study the different formal and informal strategies used by MPs 
to have an impact on EU policies. Depending on the topic, MPs will use more than their 
formal powers to influence their government’s EU policy position as it may increase 
their chances of re-election. For similar reasons, the government is more likely to take 
over the NP’s position since salient topics are more likely to be followed by 
constituents. More specifically, formal powers, as laid down in the Rules of Procedure, 
become less relevant when salience comes into play as NPs will use different tools, 
knowing there are more chances that they will have an effect.  
As previous literature shows, even if NPs have a lot of formal powers, their use depends 
on other factors such as the salience of the topic. That is, salience makes the formal 
powers of the NP a less significant variable in the sense that NPs may use informal 
powers to exact an impact on government if the topic is relevant to them or voters.  																																																								
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This situation occurs mainly because the primary concerns of politicians (whether in 
parliament or government) is to be re-elected which will cause them to work harder 
knowing that that the voters care about a particular topic.298 NPs’ levels of formal 
influence and control, therefore, are not only a matter of fact decided by their formal 
representative status, but fluctuate depending on the importance of the topic. The formal 
powers of the NP are less relevant than the salience of the issue which is being debated. 
The NP can behave as either conforming to a trusteeship or to the delegatory model 
depending on the importance of the topic. In other words, the more salient the issue, the 
more instructions the government receives from its NP to act in a certain way. On the 
contrary, however, on issues with low salience, a strong NP does not give many 
instructions. This gives the government more freedom to follow its own judgement and 
can therefore considered a trustee in this instance.299 
I thus expect that MPs will work harder in order to influence EU policies if the voters 
they represent care about the topic and will ensure voters are made aware. At the same 
time, in cases that are more contentious, government’s actions will be more closely 
observed and scrutinised and greater pressure will be put on its position. Because this 
pressure tends to be public (as the MP wants their actions to be seen) and the 
government itself is also motivated by the desire to remain in power, it is more likely to 
take the wishes of MPs into consideration, resulting in a parliamentary impact on its EU 
policy position being more substantial.300  
I therefore hypothesise:  
H3 The more salient an EU issue is to parliament, the more likely the NP will have a 
substantive impact on the government’s EU policy position. 
3.4.3.1 Causal process 
The following causal process is expected based upon the theoretical argument above: 
NPs dealing with a salient topic ! NPs use more than their formal mechanisms to 
influence and control the government regarding the position of the EU proposal; for 
example outside of committee meetings, it will use publicity, party meetings or hold 
informal discussions with civil servants ! NPs show high level of visible influence and 																																																								
298 Auel & Raunio, 2012a:13.	
299 Blomgren & Rozenberg, 2012:14. 
300 Contrary to the first hypotheses, issue-specific indicators will be used (rather than parliament-specific 
ones).  
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control ! government wants to show it is willing to respond to its representatives and is 
put publicly under pressure ! government more inclined to adopt the NP’s position ! 
parliamentary impact.  
Versus 
NPs dealing with non-salient EU topic ! NPs do not fully use their formal mechanisms 
to influence ! MPs’ actions are not visible ! little pressure on government ! 
government responds to EU proposal based upon its own position ! no parliamentary 
impact.301  
3.4.4 Lisbon Treaty  
Several scholars have predicted different levels of NP involvement in their new roles 
depending on their institutional settings.302 Strong NPs are expected to make the most 
use of ROs, as they are the most active.303 Other researchers have shown that those NPs 
scrutinising a minority government are more likely to make use of a RO since the NP 
might be less worried about having a different opinion than its government regarding 
EU legislative proposal.304  
Initially, there were few expectations regarding a direct and concrete impact on EU 
legislation as a consequence of the EWM.305 Raunio, for example, expected NP 
timetables to be too tight306 to allow involvement in EU policies, and parliamentary 
resources to be scarce.307 
However, recently there has been a noticeable increase in positive literature regarding 
the potential impact of the Lisbon provisions in relation to NPs whereby most theorists 
expect that these provisions could indirectly increase parliamentary impact on EU 
affairs.308 Besides, scholars are more positive about the actual motives for MPs to make 
use of ROs. Although, initially worried about the little time and resources of MPs, later 
research shows that for political reasons NPs are quite likely to make use of this tool.309 																																																								
301 See Chapter 4.4 for more information regarding the use of data during each step of the causal process. 
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Whereas the previous three hypotheses - linked to the incentives of overcoming political 
contestation, policy-shaping and vote–seeking - are more rational, this current debate 
could be considered more as a functionalist argument. MPs are likely to use the RO, 
often in combination with other national tools, in order to achieve the desired impact on 
their government’s input to Council.  
Several scholars have effectively placed an association between the EWM and the 
ability of NPs to have an impact on EU affairs, as, the Lisbon Treaty creates for the first 
time a direct relationship between the NPs and EU institutions.310 Piedrafita, for 
example, is confident that the EWM article will give NPs enough tools to improve their 
capacities to control and influence their own government over EU affairs.311 Cooper 
argues that the EWM will influence the final outcomes of EU legislative proposals and 
expects these to be different than they were pre-Lisbon.312 He argues that the new 
powers for NPs will lead to a ‘virtual chamber’ of parliaments that are mostly in contact 
with each other via documents on the Internet or email. Although NPs might rarely 
make use of the EWM, it will increase their indirect ways to levy influence.  
Cooper further argues that even if it were difficult for NPs to ever reach the threshold of 
garnering one third of the votes313 against a new EU legislative proposal, the EC must 
respond to each NP upon the expression of its concerns. He therefore expects that the 
EC will have to take into account the wishes of NPs.314  
Kiiver is of the opinion that NPs now all get eight weeks to prepare their responses to 
the EC which gives a standard and equal period to prepare a response to both it and their 
own governments.315 Gatterman et al.316 and Cygan317 support this and argue that better 
access to information will help NPs to strengthen their ability to debate EU issues and 
control their governments in EU affairs. Although the EWM is a voluntary mechanism 
and the EC is not obliged to adopt opinions expressed by NPs, it is expected that strong 
opposition from NPs could lead to reluctance in the Council to approve a legislative 
proposal. Linked to this, Kiiver expects that where an individual government supports a 
legislative proposal but its NP adopts a negative RO, it may constrain the government in 																																																								
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the Council. The government could, as a consequence, bargain for better terms by 
referring to domestic opposition.318  
The EWM will give NPs an extra tool, in addition to their domestic ones therefore, to 
have an impact on their government’s EU policy positions. They are more likely to use 
this tool if they have political motivations319, meaning that they will probably use the 
RO in combination with other formal powers as well. As we have seen before, the main 
aims of MPs are re-election and to influence policies, so the RO could be an extra tool 
to be used if it is considered to make a difference.  
The EWM is a new ex ante formal right which creates a direct principal-agent 
relationship between the EC and NPs. However, because I am examining the impact on 
governmental EU policy positions, I consider the EWM as a conditional variable that 
may influence the final impact on government positions relating to EU policies in 
addition to formal powers, rather than considering it as part of the formal structure.  
The EWM establishes a formal right, creating a direct formal relationship between the 
EC as agent and the NP as principal. With the EWM, however, the NP can also 
influence and control its own government, as it not only increases its knowledge EU 
legislative proposals but can put pressure on its government by sending a negative 
reasoned opinion (RO) to the EC, even when its own government has initially agreed to 
the publication of the legislative proposal320. In other words, although the EWM is a 
formal European right for all EU NPs, it also creates a new tool for them to influence 
their EU policy position of their respective governments, additional to their domestic 
formal mechanisms. It is more likely to make use of this if there are political 
motivations to do so. More specifically, if the topic is politicised MPs may have more 
reasons to use formal powers as the parliament will want to show voters that it acts 
upon issues close to their interests. This increases the MP’s chances of re-election. If the 
NP uses the RO as a tool to impact its government on an EU issue, it is likely it will 
also use other formal tools to influence the position of the EU government regarding EU 
legislative proposals since its incentives are likely driven by political motivation to 
respond to a salient issue.321  
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Once the NP has sent a negative RO to the EC, it is likely that it will also increase the 
use of its domestic formal powers to influence government directly. This will not only 
lead to an increase in topic salience for the NP but, consequently, also for the 
government. More specifically, if the NP sends a negative RO to the EC stating that the 
topic should be dealt with at national rather than EU level, it will only do so if the topic 
is salient to it. It will be motivated by vote-gaining to use all its formal and informal 
mechanisms to influence and control (see under H3). The resulting increased pressure 
on its government, in turn, will make that body more likely to adopt its NP’s position.  
Based upon Kiiver’s findings322, therefore, I expect that a negative RO to the EC will 
bind the government even more closely to its NP when it is negotiating in the Council. 
I therefore hypothesise that: 
H4 Those NPs opposing an EU legislative proposal in a reasoned opinion under the 
EWM have greater substantive impact on their government’s EU policy position than 
those that do not oppose the proposal. 
3.4.4.1 Causal process  
The following causal process is expected based upon the theoretical argument above: 
EC proposal ! sent to EP, Council and NPs ! NPs decide to send a negative RO to the 
EC ! domestically: discussion with government ! NP uses domestic formal powers 
! pressure on government because of negative RO! government feels contentiousness 
of topic !increase of salience for  government ! government more likely to listen to 
NP as it fears negative publicity ! adoption of NP’s position ! parliamentary impact. 
Versus 
EC proposal ! sent to EP, Council and NPs ! NP uses formal mechanisms ! NP 
decides not to send RO to the EC ! NP does not attach salience to topic ! no need to 
discuss with government ! government is not aware of NP’s position ! government 
does not adopt NP’s position ! no parliamentary impact.323 
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3.5 Concluding remarks 
This Chapter has shown the relevance of NPs’ formal powers and their elaborate 
coverage in the academic literature. We have also seen the extent to which the outcome 
of the use of these formal powers is likely to vary when NPs operate under different 
conditions. Ranking NPs’ formal powers can be useful in order to understand whether it 
can be considered to be a strong, moderate or weak player regarding EU issues, and 
allows for measuring changes in these formal powers during the different steps in the 
development of EU integration. However, measuring formal powers on its own is not 
enough to discover whether the NP is more or less likely to use these powers and what 
the outcome of such use is.  
This Chapter has also shown that formal powers are not static as such, but that NPs can 
be ranked differently according to the use of their formal powers. A NP that, based upon 
rankings can be considered a ‘weak’ NP, can act as a ‘strong’ NP when it operates 
under different conditions, for example, when it deals with a salient topic. On the other 
hand, a NP that can be classified as strong according to its formal powers, can act 
weakly when operating under different conditions. This brings us back to Pitkin’s 
theory on political representation in which she argues that the relationship between the 
represented and representative is a continuum between the delegatory and trustee model 
and can be considered to be a bit of both, depending on external factors. In order to find 
out whether the NPs act differently according to other conditions, it is necessary to 
examine the outcome of their use of formal powers and compare these to their use when 
operating under different conditions. In other words, this research explores the impact 
of the NPs’ use of formal powers and whether one that, according to ‘static’ formal 
powers, can be considered part of the trusteeship model can act as though it is part of 
the delegatory model when the conditions under which it operates vary. It will also look 
at an NP which, according to ‘static’ formal powers, can be considered as forming part 
of the delegatory model but may behave as if it is part of the trustee model when it 
operates in different conditions.  
By testing the hypotheses using the different conditions as explanatory factors, two NPs 
have been tested in order to establish whether they are more or less likely to impact on 
the EU policy position of individual governments and secondly, under what conditions 
they are best able to do so. According to empirical research, NPs have become more 
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active in EU policy issues.324 However, whether this activity can be connected to their 
formal powers or if they are dependent on the conditions under which they operate will 
be tested by these hypotheses.  
Measuring the impact of the use of parliamentary powers under these conditions is a 
relatively new concept in literature regarding NPs in the EU and will be challenging for 
several reasons. The manner in which this thesis attempts to overcome these challenges 
will be elaborated in the next Chapter regarding the research design.  
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Chapter 4 
Research design 
4.1 Introduction  
The previous Chapter discussed the wide variety of studies in the field of parliamentary 
formal powers, whether or not linked to external variables under which NPs’ use of 
formal powers is most likely to have an effect, such as salience or the number of parties 
in government. It enabled the selection of explanatory factors and outcome325 which 
will be used to test the hypotheses based upon theories.326 Chapter 3 further explained 
why, in order to find out whether formal powers matter and whether the outcome varies 
when NPs operate under different conditions, it is important to look at the actual 
activities of the MPs and at their outcomes.  
Therefore, a qualitative comparative approach has been followed in which NPs form the 
unit of analysis. A qualitative study seemed appropriate in this research as by a 
combination of co-variation and process-tracing, the real outcome of NP influence and 
control mechanisms on government behaviour has been sought. As the object of interest 
is real (measurable) ‘impact’ rather than ‘power’, and this is often informal327, a 
combination of these different qualitative methods was used to overcome the political 
complexity of this phenomenon. This is a first exploration in a new field of explanatory 
factors, but quantitative studies can be followed up.  
The first section of this Chapter discusses how impact will be measured here, how it is 
defined and operationalised. It will be continued by a sub-chapter on the difficulties 
scholars have encountered when measuring impact and what will be done in this thesis 
to overcome these.  
It will continue to explain how the explanatory variables as explained in Chapter 3 will 
be conceptualised and operationalised, including the expected causal processes. This 
will be followed by a section regarding case selection and analysis, ending with a sub-
chapter on data collection.   
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4.2 Dependent variable 
In order to establish the levels of formal powers of NPs and to ascertain whether their 
powers depend on certain conditions, it is important to look more explicitly at the 
outputs of the NP and at what those formal powers mean in practice.328 The measurable 
impact of the NP’s influence and control mechanisms on governmental policy positions 
in the area of the OLP329  of the EU (henceforth ‘government’s contribution’), is 
therefore the DV in this research. The actual result of the use of their formal powers is 
verified by investigating documents and records associated with government 
contributions330 during negotiations in supra-national decision-making in the ministerial 
council. 
4.2.1 Definition impact 
To study impact, the effects of NP efforts on governmental contributions to an 
individual EU legislative file have been examined. The choice for this DV is based upon 
research in the field of both theorists and political scientists. Political pluralism 
theorists, such as Dahl, Lukes, and Polsby link ‘power’ - used interchangeably with 
‘influence’331 - and in this research with ‘impact’ to specific outcomes in decision-
making. Their focus, therefore, has been on the careful examination of concrete 
decisions.332  
Lukes describes different dimensions of power.333 The first is based upon Dahl’s 
definition: ‘A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B 
would not otherwise do’.334 According to Barry, political power is ‘the ability of a 
person or of a group to change the outcomes of a decision-making process from what 
they would otherwise have been in the direction desired by the person or group, where 
the decisions made are binding on some collectivity’.335  
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The indicated dimension corresponds to empirical interpretations of ‘power’, when it is 
described as ‘control over outcomes’.336 This is the interpretation used for this research, 
meaning that the NP, to some extent, has control over the position of its government in 
relation to the Council. The actor is hereby expected to be capable of shaping a decision 
in line with his or her position, even if it is (originally) not the opinion of the 
government. In other words, there is a causal relation between the actor’s position(s), in 
this case the NP, regarding a possible outcome and the actual outcome itself.337 To 
assess the success of an actor, it is necessary to measure the outcome of the legislative 
process and the positions of the actors.338 
This approach is also followed by Arregui and Thomson who measure the ‘bargaining 
success’ of member states by ‘the congruence between decision outcomes and states’ 
policy positions’.339 This research, however, looked at the substantive effects of 
parliamentary efforts on the government’s contribution as a consequence of NP 
preferences (for example, their position on EU legislative files). In other words, rather 
than looking at the outcome of the EU policy process, the result of negotiations between 
the NP and its government during the OLP is studied.  
Choosing parliamentary impact on the government’s EU policy position as the 
dependent variable in this study is relevant, as previous research shows how ‘decisive 
influence’ is a key to power instead of being just luck. Understanding power is helpful 
in order to know the extent to which an actor has opportunities to change outcomes in 
the way you want.340 In their study of the power of the EP in the EU’s legislative 
process, Selck and Steunenberg showed how differentiating between capabilities and 
preferences, and therefore between ‘power’ and ‘luck’, remains crucial in explaining 
political outcomes.341 An empirical analysis of the influence of different actors could 
confuse ‘power in action’ with its preferences.342 It is therefore important to distinguish 
between decisiveness and luck, whereby decisiveness can be understood as the impact 
the principal (in this case the NP) has on an outcome.343 This is why, at the start of each 
analysis, the different preferences of political parties in the NP on the EU legislative file 
in question have been set out.  																																																								
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Luck, on the other hand, can be understood as coincidence.344 For example, if it is 
unclear whether the position of the government on the EU file is a consequence of 
parliamentary input, or if it shared the same position anyway. You can still have the 
outcome you want without having power; namely by luck.345  In order to avoid 
confusing luck with power, only EU legislative files have been chosen on which 
different preferences between the government and the NP have been selected. This 
increases the chances of actually measuring parliamentary power instead of luck. As 
Barry shows in his article on power and luck the actor might not want to change a 
position if the position coincides with his or her own.346  The selection of these EU 
legislative files is elaborated below.  
Previous studies, such as the one by Selck and Steunenberg (2004), followed similar or 
slightly different paths when trying to distinguish between decisiveness (as an 
equivalent of power) and luck. They made explicit the mechanism according to which 
the EP, in this case, could affect the outcomes of EU decision-making in order to 
indicate the possible cause that had lead to the outcome being close to the preferred 
position of the EP.347  
Tsebelis also measures the power of the EP, but does so via examining the outcomes of 
decision-making in the three EU institutions (EP, Council and EC) through a 
quantitative study.348  All studies of power have not escaped different forms of criticism 
and Dür and De Bièvre indicate, in their article on measuring interest groups’ influence, 
that it has gradually become more difficult to study power empirically, with the 
theoretical literature becoming more elaborate.349 How to overcome the different 
challenges will be explained below. 
Based upon the above, impact is defined here as the concrete outcome of influence and 
control, that is, the de facto results of the input of the NP into its government’s EU 
policy position or the input of the government into a Council meeting. This is achieved 
by comparing the initial form of the government’s position to any possible changes 
during the scrutiny process. By examining each attempt by the NP to impact this 
position, it enables the researcher to establish whether their efforts have made any 
																																																								
344 Ibid,27.	
345 Barry, 1980: 184.	
346 Ibid, 28.	
347 Ibid,27.	
348 Tsebelis, 1994:128.	
349 Dür & De Bièvre, 2007:3. 
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difference. In other words, rather than measuring the abstract concept power, this thesis 
measures the ‘effect’ of power, namely the effects on actual public policy.350 
 4.2.2 Operationalisation 
As indicators, the match between the parliamentary position, that is, its preferences 
(expressed by the opposition351 during meetings or via correspondence) on an EU 
legislative proposal and the government’s contribution during ministerial Council 
meetings (as reflected in meeting documents and correspondence)352 are used. More 
specifically, impact will be recognised if government representatives refer at any point 
during the different OLP steps to the NP’s position in meeting documents as points that 
they have contributed to the Council meeting, which were not included in the 
government’s initial position (often referred to as ‘Explanatory Memorandum’ (EM).  
There are other forms of impact which are not measurable, such as soft forms of impact. 
These refer to situations in which the NP does instruct the government to do something, 
but without the intention of changing its actual position (for example in Chapter 8, in 
which the NP steers the government to attend the Council meetings). These softer forms 
of impact are not measured in this thesis, but have been noted.  
The reflection of the NP in the position of its government is classified into three groups. 
If all353 of the NP’s positions are reflected in its government’s contribution to the 
Council, the NP will be deemed to have a ‘strong measurable impact’. If only part of the 
NP’s positions have been adopted, this is classified as a ‘relatively measurable impact’ 
and where none of the NP’s positions have been taken into account, the level of 
measurable impact is assessed as ‘weak’.354 For example, in Chapter 6.2.4 (step 5), the 
Dutch Secretary of State, Schulz, reassures the opposition that her efforts in Brussels 
would focus on the issue that it is up to the member states to decide whether or not they 
will procure (after various attempts of the opposition to make a point about this). 
Knowing that this is not the government’s position - it is not reflected in the EM and the 																																																								
350 Ibid. 
351 A position by the opposition taken over by the government is a clear sign of ‘impact’, whereas if the 
position is taken over by an MP of the government’s own party, it could be seen as just the government’s 
position as well.  
352 The government can express its views during various stages of the EC consultation period, either via 
written statements and letters or orally during actual Council meetings. 
353 This may be only one if the NP has only made one point.	
354 Depending on each hypothesis, this classification will allow me to either confirm or challenge my 
hypothesised arguments.  
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Secretary of State belongs to the liberal party which is in favour of free market (see 
introduction of the same Chapter) - it can be considered that part of the NPs’ position 
(other points were not included) has been added to that of the government (relative 
measurable impact). If the coalition partners are divided, in other words part of the 
government agrees with the NP and part of the government disagrees with the NP, and 
the government in that case still decides to take over the NP’s position, then the NP is 
also considered to have an intermediate measurable impact on their government’s EU 
policy position.  
There are also cases in which the NP does not try to alter the government’s EU policy 
position (for example in the maritime case, Chapter 8). In these cases, measurable 
impact has been assessed as weak, but a reference is made to whether there is a possible 
link between the variable to be measured and an increased use of formal powers. In 
other words, parliamentary activity can still be increased, for example if the national 
interest is at stake. The use of these formal powers can be significant, if this is reflected 
in an increased use of feedback by the government. While the dependent variable of this 
research is measurable impact, it will still refer to an increased use of formal powers 
and the response of the government to these.  
In cases where the contribution of government refers directly to the different or 
oppositional stance taken by its NP, the NP’s position will be considered to be ‘fully 
reflected’. If the final government position reflects part of the position of its NP, it is 
considered to be ‘partly reflected’.355 If there is no reference made or no sign of the 
NP’s impact can be seen in the final government position, the NP’s stance will be 
assessed as ‘not reflected’. The reference of the government’s willingness to take over 
one or several points of the NP’s position must be reflected in one of the relevant 
meeting documents (so they are not taken into account if only found in a press release). 
Table 3 gives indications of instances where the NP’s position has been reflected. 
The analysis focuses on the legislative process of the EU.356 This is the area in (EU) 
policy-making where most documentation is publicly available. Furthermore, the OLP 
has a number of clear stages during which the NP can exercise its mechanisms of 
																																																								
355 An example could be if the government adopts an amendment by the NP or if it includes (part of) the 
same concerns as raised in the NP’s position.  
356 Only EU legislative proposals are selected in which there is a clear disagreement between the 
government and the NP.  
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control and influence on its government357. This facilitates the comparisons, as all cases 
follow a similar number of ex ante and ex post steps. It is expected that the OLP is the 
most tangible part of EU decision-making, with a great number of documents available.  
Table 3 Classification of impact 
Level of NP reflection in government’s contribution to the 
Council* 
Impact 
Government does not refer to any of NP’s points or explains why it has 
been unable to take them into account (not reflected). 
Weak 
Part of the NP’s points (this can be one ore several) are reflected, e.g. via a 
reference in the main position of government or, indirectly, during feedback 
in the meeting with the NP (partly reflected).  
Intermediate 
All NP’s points are reflected** into government’s position (fully reflected).   Strong 
 
*The position of the NP can consist of only one point or several.  
**This also includes if the NP only has one (major) point.  
Table 3. This table shows the classification of the impact based upon the level of 
reflection of the NP’s position (consisting of one or several points) into the 
government’s contribution to the Council of Ministers. This classification will enable 
confirmation of or challenge to the hypotheses. 
4.2.3 Challenges of measuring impact and how to overcome those 
Researchers have avoided dealing with the impact on EU affairs by NPs as it is 
extremely difficult to measure.358 Andreas Dür, who looked at the causality between the 
impact of interest groups and political outcomes, establishes three problems when 
measuring influence by interest groups, which are equally applicable to measuring the 
impact of NPs: the existence of different channels of influence, the occurrence of 
counteractive lobbying, and the fact that influence can be wielded at different stages of 
the policy process.359  
																																																								
357 See Appendices I and II for an overview of the seven steps of the OLP and the different chances NPs 
have to use their influence and control mechanisms during these steps. Appendix I  gives an overview of 
chances for the NP to use its control and influence mechanisms during the OLP, what methods will be 
used to trace the different steps and what counts as evidence during these steps. Appendix II explains 
what the different steps of the OLP entail.	
358 With the exceptions of Rozenberg (2002) who uses the variable ‘impact’ to measure the levels of 
Europeanisation of NPs, Saalfeld (2005) who quantitatively links institutions to outcomes, and Auel el al. 
(2015) who measure parliamentary strength based upon parliamentary activities. 
359 Dür, 2008:47. 
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Firstly, in the case of an EU legislative proposal, governments are not only influenced 
by their NPs, but also by many interest groups. It is therefore hard to establish which of 
these various influences have contributed to the final outcome. This is more likely in 
salient cases and/or when the position of the NP is supported by large groups of voters. 
According to Russell and Benton, there are so many ways in which influence can be 
exercised that it remains a slippery topic.360  
Secondly, the NP can still have influence, even if there is no visible impact on the 
outcome of EU decision-making. It might have limited a certain outcome by countering 
the lobbying of another interest group.361 Thirdly, influence occurs at different stages of 
the policy-making process and to have a proper understanding of influence, it is 
important to look at all different stages, from the publication to the adoption or 
clearance of the EU legislative file. 
In addition, influence is often informal and therefore not directly observable. As 
discussed above, in some cases NPs do not have to be explicit in their wishes, as their 
governments are already aware of them and have included them in their position before 
or during the agenda-setting phase.362 This is also referred to as the ‘rule of anticipated 
reactions’.363 This is a way to avoid public revolts by backbenchers to government 
positions.364 In other words, the absence of openly-expressed objections by the 
opposition could be a sign of parliamentary strength rather than weakness.365  
To overcome these obstacles, previous research has used different methods to measure 
influence or impact. Most scholars measuring the impact of the European Parliament, 
for example, have made use of quantitative studies of amendments.366  
Quantitative approaches have been equally dominant in research on the impact of 
member states in the Council of Ministers, as conducted by Thomson et al. and Golub, 
																																																								
360 Russell & Benton, 2011:96. 
361 Ibid. 
362 Lukes, 2005:22. 
363 Saalfeld, 2005:349; Russell & Benton 2009:4.  
364 As the EP is the parliamentary institution that votes on EU legislation, and not the NPs (see also 
Cygan, 2013:84), it is expected that the rule of anticipation is less pronounced when measuring ‘impact’ 
in this research, as governments are less dependent on their NPs in EU legislation. In other words, 
although I do expect NPs to be able to have an impact on their government when dealing with EU 
legislative proposals, it is not expected that governments would feel the urge to take into account their 
NP’s position before or during the agenda.-setting phase. 
365 Saalfeld, 2005:347. 
366 Kreppel, 1999, 2002; Tsebelis & Kalandrakis, 1999; Tsebelis et al., 2001.	
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with their dataset on EU decision-making (DEU).367 The DEU dataset is capable of 
addressing a range of research questions regarding the inputs, processes and outputs of 
the EU’s legislative system.368 It establishes thereby the powers of the EP, EC and 
Council of Ministers in the EU legislative process. Such a dataset is not (yet) applicable 
to NPs, however. Besides, it examines the successes of bargaining at EU level, whereas 
this research looks at the efforts of individual NPs to impact their domestic 
governments’ EU policy positions and their outcome. It would not be a suitable 
instrument, therefore.  
Others, particularly those measuring the impact of domestic legislatures or interest 
groups have opted for qualitative research, consisting of interviews369 and process-
tracing.370 Kalitowski explains his choice for process-tracing as a way of understanding 
the detailed process by which policy ideas evolve into legislation.371 Dorrenbächer et al. 
measure the impact of parliamentary control on transpositions of EU directives during 
coalition governments via process-tracing as well.372 
 4.2.4 How to measure impact 
  
We have just seen that previous research has used three main methods to measure 
impact: process-tracing373, quantitative studies of amendments or content analysis374 
and the DEU dataset.375  
This research applies a qualitative study, for several reasons. It not only looks at the 
outcome of an EU legislative proposal after the NP’s input, but also at the relationship 
between formal powers and other explanatory values. Qualitative methods, such as 
process-tracing can thereby help. Besides, a qualitative study will also enable the 
researcher to take into account the subtler role the NP can play376, for example, by 
asking interviewees about different forms of impact they have used or experienced 
during the scrutiny of the EU legislative file.  
																																																								
367 Thomson et al., 2012; Golub, 2012. 
368 Slapin, 2014:25; Thomson et al., 2012:604. 
369 Power, 2000; Smookler, 2006. 
370 Kalitowski, 2008. 
371 Kalitoswki, 2008:705. 
372 Dorrenbächer et al. 2015. 
373 Dür & de Bièvre, 2007. 
374 Kreppel, 1999; Klüver, 2010. 
375 Thomson et al., 2012; Golub, 2012. 
376 Russell and Benton 2009, p.6.	
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Therefore, a pair-wise comparison is complemented by process-tracing in a small-N 
case study in this research, which helps to overcome the obstacles as spelled out by Dür 
and ensure measurement of the actual impact of the NP.  
Dür’s first obstacle, regarding the different stakeholders that could have contributed to 
the final outcome of a government EU policy position, is one that this research has also 
encountered. Process-tracing is the most common method to overcome this, as it 
enables the researcher to look at attempts to influence, the responses of decision-makers 
to those attempts, and the degree to which preferences are reflected in outcomes.377  
By process-tracing the causal chain between the start of the consultation period and the 
government’s final position on the legislative proposal, it will be possible to establish 
whether certain types of impact have originated from interest groups rather than from 
the NP. This enables dealing with rival explanations.378  
Besides, as we have seen, cause and effect may be hard to prove if the government 
follows the NP’s line, as it might have taken that position anyway.379 It is therefore 
important to be able to distinguish the original positions of both the government and 
various political parties in the NP before the tracing of processes in order to know 
whether the chances are likely that they are on the same or opposing lines regarding an 
EU legislative proposal.  
Documentary evidence from different sources (for example, formal policy positions of 
the government and NP, meeting documents of NPs and government, correspondence 
between NPs and government and Council press releases380) is critical to process-
tracing.  
Interviews with MPs from relevant committees381 have been conducted, which helped to 
establish the level of counteractive lobbying that occurred to prevent some issues from 																																																								
377 Dür. 2008:49. 
378 As many interest groups use their NP as a forum through which they lobby the government, it is 
impossible to separate the influence of interest groups channelled through the NP, from the NP’s 
influence per se. Any impact channelled through the NP is therefore considered to be ‘NP’s impact’, even 
if the idea originates in interest groups. The effect is there because of the NP’s use of control and 
influence mechanisms which legitimises this as ‘NP’s impact’. This research therefore solely focuses on 
those actors with a formal role in the decision-making process, which is a plausible way to delimit the 
scope of analysis (see also Princen, 2012:629). 
379 Russell & Benton, 2011:71. 
380 Council press releases can be useful as they often refer directly to the contributions of individual 
government representatives.  
381 Those committees in the NP, which dealt with the EU legislative proposal. 
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being accepted. A series of questions have been asked to establish the level of formal 
and informal influences of the NP (obstacles two and three from Dür). These questions 
varied between finding out to what extent the agenda has been determined by both 
ministers and MPs (formal right) and the degree to which ministers consulted with MPs 
on certain EU legislative proposals (informal right).  
As previous research has illustrated the methodological difficulties of measuring 
impact, a pragmatic approach has been adopted382 and I am aware that no single 
analysis of impact is capable of fully reflecting parliamentary influence as much of this 
can often be invisible. Table 4 gives an overview of the challenges to measuring impact 
and what methods and evidence will be used to deal with them. How these methods will 
be applied will be discussed in sub-chapter 4.6 which deals with the analysis. 
																																																								
382 Dür & De Bièvre, 2007:3.	
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Table 4 Challenges to Measuring Impact 
Challenges to measure 
impact 
Methods in 
order to 
overcome the 
challenge 
Evidence 
Counteractive lobbying Process-tracing 
Interviews 
- Minutes Committee meetings (NP)  
- Minutes plenary meetings (NP) 
- Parliamentary questions and 
ministerial answers 
- Ministerial reactions to EC legislative 
proposals 
- Summaries on websites:  
www.IPEX.eu 
http://www.parliament.uk/commons 
http://www.parliament.uk/lords 
http://www.tweedekamer.nl/ 
- Websites of relevant ministerial 
departments 
Non-visible impact by 
countering lobbying of 
interest groups 
Interviews - MPs’ responses to open questions in 
interviews, e.g. to what extent they have 
tried to limit the impact of lobbying 
interest groups. 
Impact happens at various 
stages 
Process-tracing 
Interviews 
- Minutes Committee meeting (NP) 
- Minutes plenary meeting (NP) (during 
all 7 steps of the consultation period 
(see Appendix I and II) 
- Parliamentary questions and 
ministerial answers 
- Ministerial reactions to EC legislative 
proposals 
- Summaries on websites:  
www.IPEX.eu 
http://www.parliament.uk/commons 
http://www.tweedekamer.nl/ 
- Websites of relevant ministerial 
departments 
- Responses of both MPs and civil 
servants/ministers regarding semi-open 
and open questions in the field of the 
extent to which there has been any 
influence going on informally, e.g. via 
personal emails, phone calls, in the 
corridors, during coffees and/or lunch 
breaks.  
Rule of anticipated reactions  Interviews (limited 
outcome is expected). 
Responses of civil servants/ministers to 
questions regarding the extent to which 
they have already taken parliamentary 
views into account while drafting a first 
reaction to the EC draft legislative 
proposal. 
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4.3 The Explanatory factors: conceptualisation and operationalisation 
This sub-chapter examines how the four different explanatory factors are conceptualised 
and operationalised (see table 7 at the end of this Chapter for an overview of all 
variables, indicators and data used).  
4.3.1 Measuring partisan composition 
The first explanatory factor is the partisan composition which is conceptualised as the 
party composition of the government, i.e. the concentration of executive power in either 
a single party government or an executive power-sharing multi-party government.383 
This explanatory factor is operationalised via the following indicators: the effective 
number of parties in government (one versus two +).384  
4.3.2 Measuring euro-scepticism 
The second explanatory factor is the presence or absence of a Eurosceptic party on 
which the government depends to govern in a coalition. A Eurosceptic party is 
considered to be a political party which shows principled opposition to the EU and 
European integration and either thinks that its country should withdraw from 
membership385, or its policies on the EU are opposed to the whole project of European 
integration as it is currently conceived.386 Based upon this definition, the Conservative 
party is considered to be a Eurosceptic party since Cameron’s Bloomberg speech in 
January 2013. The participation or dependence of a Eurosceptic party in governing 
coalitions achieving a majority in parliament is used as indicator for the 
operationalisation.  
4.3.3 Measuring salience 
Salience will be used as the third explanatory factor, referring to the level of salience of 
an issue for political parties in government. This variable is conceptualised as the extent 
to which the governing parties consider an issue to be vital for their electoral appeal.387 
Salience is operationalised as the reference to EU topics in national party manifestos (if 																																																								
383 Lijphart, 2012. 
384 Ibid., 12 
385 as expressed in their party manifestos or described in/by the media. 
386 Szczerbiak & Taggert, 2008:6.	
387 Netjes & Binnema, 2007:40. 
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an issue get its own heading or a separate paragraph in a party programme, it is 
considered to be salient). Besides, the Euro-barometer  (question 7 of the Fieldwork of 
the Standard Euro-Barometer of the year in which the EU legislative file was published 
and where more than 20% of citizens considers this topic to be salient) for the selection 
of overall themes.388  
Different versions of salience can be distinguished; one is a salience for the electorate, 
while the other can be salient for legislative actors. In this research, salience is 
described as one that is salient to the electorate. In other words, an EU legislative 
proposal is considered to be salient if the electorate is concerned about it (for example, 
as expressed in the Euro-barometer). It is considered to be of low salience if the 
electorate is not directly worried about it, but it can still be politicised in the NP as a 
consequence of different ideological positions. 
4.3.4 Measuring Lisbon provisions 
The fourth explanatory factor refers to the presence or absence of negative ROs. This 
will be conceptualised as the right of NPs to send ROs to the EC in order to monitor 
subsidiarity as laid down in Protocols 1 and 2 of the Treaty of Lisbon.389 The indicators 
for the operationalisation are all forms of formal parliamentary objections to the EC 
regarding the publication of EU legislative proposals.390 
4.4 Operationalisation Causal mechanisms 
Before explaining the operationalisation of different causal mechanisms, table 5 gives 
first of all a summary of the causal processes for each hypothesis, as discussed in 
Chapter 3.  
																																																								
388 As most citizens in the Euro-Barometer in question 7 respond that the topics they are mostly worried 
about in their countries are related to the economic situation, unemployment and social security, topics 
covering those themes have been excluded from the research. 
389 Also known as the ‘Early warning mechanism’, as it gives NPs eight weeks to decide whether a new 
EU legislative proposal complies or not with the principle of subsidiarity.  
390 There is no specific format for reasoned opinions, as long as the NP explicitly refers to a breach of 
subsidiarity (Kiiver, 2012:135).  
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Table 5 Summary of Posited Causal Processes 
Variable Posited Causal Process 
 Partisan composition: 
Multi-party government 
 
EU legislative proposal: sent to Council, EP and NPs ! multi-party 
government and NP use of formal powers ! lots of discussions in 
government ! government cannot agree ! compromise ! asks for support 
from different parties in NP ! control and influence of government by NP 
through their formal powers of, for example, asking questions and 
threatening of confidence votes ! government must take NP position on 
board to ensure sufficient support for proposal ! few formal powers do not 
stop the NP from having a say ! parliamentary impact. 
 
Partisan composition: 
Single party government 
EU legislative proposal: sent to Council, EP and NPs ! Single party 
government and NP ! No discussion in government ! one view on EU 
proposal ! no dependence on NP ! NP: limited use of mechanisms to 
influence (majority in NP is government party) ! NP agrees with 
government ! no parliamentary impact. 
Eurosceptic government Government with Eurosceptic coalition partner ! EU issues appear more 
often on the agenda of the government ! contention in government! 
government needs support from NP ! discussions in NP by use of formal 
powers (committee meetings, plenary meetings coalition partners) ! 
parliamentary parties give advice with either several or few formal 
mechanisms ! Government is dependent on NP for support to achieve a 
majority ! NP’s position must be adopted by the government to get support 
for their compromise ! parliamentary impact. 
Non-Eurosceptic 
government  
Government without Eurosceptic coalition partner ! EU issues hardly 
appear on the agenda ! little contention ! status quo ! no discussion in 
government ! little discussions in the NP ! little advice needed ! NP 
does not give advice ! government does not have to take into account NP’s 
position ! No parliamentary impact. 
Salience NPs dealing with a salient topic ! NPs use more than their formal 
mechanisms to influence and control the government regarding the position 
of the EU proposal; for example, outside of committee meetings, it will use 
publicity, party meetings or hold informal discussions with civil servants ! 
NPs show high level of visible influence and control ! government wants 
to show it is willing to respond to its representatives and is put publicly 
under pressure ! government more inclined to adopt the NP’s position ! 
parliamentary impact.  
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Non-Salience NPs dealing with non-salient EU topic ! NPs do not fully use their formal 
mechanisms to influence ! MPs’ actions are not visible ! little pressure 
on government ! government responds to EU proposal based upon its own 
position ! no parliamentary impact. 
Lisbon provisions: 
Presence of RO 
EC proposal ! sent to EP, Council and NPs ! NPs decide to send a 
negative RO to the EC ! topic gets more salience ! domestically: 
discussion with government ! NP uses domestic formal powers ! pressure 
on government because of negative RO! government feels contentiousness 
of topic !increase of salience for the government ! government more 
likely to listen to NP as it fears negative publicity ! adoption of NP’s 
position ! parliamentary impact. 
Absence of RO EC proposal ! sent to EP, Council and NPs ! NP uses formal mechanisms 
! NP decides not to send RO to the EC ! NP does not attach salience to 
topic ! no need to discuss with government ! government is not aware of 
NP’s position ! government does not adopt NP’s position ! no 
parliamentary impact. 
 
The next section explains how the causal mechanisms of these processes are 
operationalised per hypothesis when the condition to be measured is present and which 
data is used.  
H1) The use of the formal powers of a weak NP during an EU legislative proposal in a 
multi-party government (versus single-party government) 
1) Publication of the EU legislative proposal. ! The government publishes its 
position ! The coalition government might not agree:  
This stage must measure to what extent the government felt the need for support 
from its NP as a consequence of contention within its own coalition (by 
comparing the causal process of a multi-party case with a single government 
case). Contention is measured by comparing the initial positions of the different 
coalition partners on the respective EU legislative proposal.  
Data: Interviews, meeting documents of EAC/sectoral committee and 
governmental documents referring to its position. 
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2) The government, as part of a coalition, is likely to have more difficulties to find a 
compromise. ! Consults with the NP to get support and directs to NP ! NP uses 
its formal powers to influence: 
This stage needs to measure any difficulties the government had to a majority in 
the NP to support the governmental position. To measure these difficulties, the 
level of contact is compared between the NP and government during this OLP of 
the respective EU legislative proposal. If this is more than in a single government 
case, the government is considered to be dependent on the NP to come to an 
agreement. The NP is considered to use more than its normal formal powers if it 
has at least one or more committee meetings with the government during one of 
the OLP steps in which it explicitly expresses its opinion on the file. A standard 
use of formal powers consists of one committee meeting after the Council 
meeting during which MPs ask questions and receive information. 
Data: Minutes of committee meetings, Minutes of meetings between government 
representatives and NP, correspondence between NP and government and 
interviews. 
3) Compromise in Council. ! NP uses formal powers to hold its government to 
account: 
This stage must establish to what extent government representatives have taken 
NP’s wishes into account because its input to the Council was based upon 
compromise and it expects more questions (use of formal powers) after the 
meeting. To measure the pressure of government to include the NP’s position into 
its contribution to the Council due to the compromise reached, the number of 
questions asked by the NP - and discussions between government and NP after 
Council meetings - are compared to the level of discussions in a single-party 
government.  
Data: Correspondence between the NP and the Minister regarding the outcome of 
the Council meeting and interviews. 
4) Final step: compare change in the position of the government on the EU 
legislative proposal (for example, via meeting notes) to the position of the NP and 
establish to what extent the NP’s positions have been adopted. If there is a link 
between the variable to be measured and increased parliamentary activities, 
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leading to an increased impact, the hypothesis is confirmed. If there is no link 
between the variable to be measured and the increased use of formal powers and 
impact, the hypothesis is refuted. If the increased use of formal powers can be 
linked to the variable to be measured, the hypothesis can still be confirmed, even 
if the NP has not directly had an impact on the scrutinised dossier. 
H2) The use of formal powers of a strong NP during an EU legislative proposal in a 
Eurosceptic multi-party government (versus non-Eurosceptic government) 
1) Publication of the EU legislative proposal. ! Eurosceptic party adds the item to 
agenda. ! Contention within government when it prepares its initial reaction to 
the EU legislative proposal. ! Government parties need support from NP 
therefore. ! NP gets to use its formal powers:  
It must be established to what extent the (partly) Eurosceptic government was 
keen to put the item on the agenda (compared to non-Eurosceptic government) 
and to what extent the government coalition partners disagree about the EU 
legislative proposal. The levels of contention are measured by comparing the 
initial positions of the different coalition partners on the respective EU legislative 
proposal (via interviews and party programmes).  
Data: Interviews, meeting documents of EAC/sectoral committee, correspondence 
between government and NP at this stage and government’s position on/reaction 
to EC, letter to NP, government memorandum.  
2) The government, in disagreement over the EU legislative proposal is likely to be 
open to input from the NP! NP’s use of strong formal powers to influence the 
government’s position.  
This stage needs to establish to what extent the government felt it was difficult to 
get a majority in the NP to support the governmental position (comparison 
between Eurosceptic and non-Eurosceptic government). To measure the 
‘difficulty’, the level of contact between the NP and government during the OLP 
of the respective EU legislative proposal is compared. The NP is considered to 
use more than its normal formal powers if it has one or more committee meetings 
with the government during one of the OLP steps in which it explicitly expresses 
its opinion on the file. Standard use of formal powers would mean one committee 
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meeting before the Council meeting during which MPs ask questions and receive 
information. 
Data: Minutes of committee meetings, Minutes of meetings between government 
representatives and NP, correspondence between NP and government and 
interviews. 
3) Government input into the Council: based upon a compromise ! more questions 
from NP afterwards. ! Threat ! Government: likely to adopt NP’s wishes. ! 
NP: use of formal powers.   
This stage establishes to what extent government representatives have taken NP’s 
wishes into account because its input into the Council was based upon a 
compromise. To measure the pressure on the government to include the NP’s 
position into its input into the Council because of the compromise reached, the 
number of questions asked by the opposition and discussions between government 
and NP after the Council meeting is compared. If this is more than in a single-
government case, it is expected that there is more control after the Council 
meeting in a (partly) Eurosceptic government. 
Data: Correspondence between the NP and Minister regarding the outcome of the 
Council meeting and the input of the government and interviews. 
4) Final step: See H1. 
H3) The use of formal powers by a weak NP in a salient EU legislative proposal (versus 
a non-salient EU legislative proposal) 
1) Publication of the EU legislative proposal. ! The government and NP confirm 
this document as a salient document. ! The NP increases the use of formal 
powers to influence the government on this topic (for example, via publicity).  
This stage must establish the extent to which MPs use more than their formal 
mechanisms to influence and control the government regarding the EU 
legislative proposal, and the extent to which the government is more likely to 
include NP’s position because of its saliency (compare to a non-salient case).  
Data: Interviews, meeting documents of EAC/sectoral committees, 
correspondence between government and NP at this stage, national press release 
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(salience), government position/reaction to EC, letter to NP, government 
memorandum.  
2) NP uses all its formal and informal powers and particularly visible 
powers to influence the government at this stage. ! Because of the 
increased public attention, government is put under pressure and is more 
likely to be open to NP’s position in a salient case.   
This stage seeks to establish whether there are more NP meetings and 
more correspondence between NP and government regarding the salient 
EU legislative proposal and compare these to the number of meetings 
and level of correspondence in the case of a non-salient EU legislative 
issue. The NP is considered to use more than its normal formal powers if 
it has one or more committee meetings with the government during one 
of the OLP steps in which it explicitly expresses its opinion on the file. 
Standard use of formal powers consist in having one committee meeting 
after the Council meeting during which MPs ask questions or receive 
information. 
Data: Minutes of committee meetings, Minutes of meetings between 
government representatives and the NP, correspondence between NP and 
government, Interviews. 
3) Because of the levels of publicity given to this topic by the NP, the 
government is more likely to accept discussion on the outcome of the 
Council meeting publicly, which gives the NP chances to use its control 
mechanisms. This stage will measure to what extent the NP does more to 
control the government in a salient than non-salient case and to what 
extent the government takes NP into account for that reason. 
 
Data: Minutes of meetings EAC, sectoral committee or plenary, any 
correspondence between the NP and the Minister regarding the outcome 
of the Council meeting and the input of the government, interviews. 
4) Final step: see H1. 
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H4) The use of formal powers of a strong NP during an EU legislative proposal after 
having sent a negative RO (versus a EU legislative proposal without having sent a RO 
to the EC).  
1) Publication of the EU legislative proposal. ! NP gets 8 weeks to decide 
whether the EC legislative proposal is at odds with the principle for subsidiarity. 
! The NP uses its formal powers including its right to send a RO to the EC.  
This stage has to establish to what extent the government is influenced in it is 
initial position regarding the EC legislative proposal by the NP’s negative RO 
(compare with a reaction of the government in case the NP did not send an RO 
to the EC).  
 
Data: Interviews, meeting documents of EAC/sectoral committee, 
correspondence between government and NP at this stage, government’s 
position/reaction to EC, letter to NP, government memorandum.  
2) After negative RO: NP uses all its formal powers to influence the government. 
! Government under pressure. ! Government: likely be open to NP’s position.  
This stage has to establish the extent to which the NP is better able to influence 
the government because of its RO and to what extent the government feels that it 
needs to take NP’s position into account because of the increased pressure after 
the negative RO (compare to the government’s reaction in case no RO has been 
sent to the EC). The NP is considered to use more than its normal formal powers 
if it has one or more committee meetings with the government during one of the 
OLP steps in which it explicitly expresses its opinion on the file. Standard use of 
formal powers consists in one committee meeting before the Council meeting, 
during which MPs ask questions and receive information.  
Data: The RO of the NP and a possible reaction of the government to this. 
Correspondence between NP and government, interviews.  
3) NP: a critical stance on this dossier. ! Use of all its formal powers to hold the 
government to account after the Council meeting.   
This stage has to establish to what extent the NP is better able to use its formal 
powers after sending a negative RO and to what extent the government has taken 
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NP’s wishes into account in the Council as a result of the negative RO, knowing 
that it will be held to account afterwards in the NP.  
Data: Minutes of EAC/sectoral committee meetings, plenary meetings, 
correspondence between government and NP and interviews.  
4) Final step: See H.1. 
4.5 Case selection  
4.5.1. Small-N case studies 
The research question under what conditions will NPs have an impact on their 
government’s policy on the EU? is investigated through a small-N comparison. This 
enables in-depth empirical analysis showing a deeper understanding of complex 
differences among and between European NPs.  
This thesis deals with new explanatory factors and the case studies explore how these 
interact with formal powers. This is done in a pair-wise comparison, in which each time 
two cases are studied and all conditions resemble each other in every respect but one.391 
As real measurable ‘impact’ is assessed rather than ‘formal powers’, it is expected that a 
combination of different qualitative methods (process-tracing of 16 cases and 8 
controlled comparisons)  are suitable to reflect the political complexity of this 
phenomenon, including informal levels of influence.  
The main theoretical argument is a conditional one: NPs’ formal powers make a 
difference on the impact of the government’s EU policy position, but only under certain 
conditions. 
The cases are legislative files and are looked at when being scrutinised by the same NP 
to establish whether their impact on the government’s EU policy position varies while 
operating under different conditions. This helps in exploring the causal relationships 
between different features of individual cases.392 That is, by changing only one variable 
and keeping all others constant (including the NP), increases the chances of measuring 
the impact of the respective explanatory factor on the outcome of interest.  
																																																								
391 George & Bennett, 2005:152. 
392 Tansey, 2007:765.	
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To analyse the different hypotheses, two NPs have been selected: one conforming to the 
trusteeship model, namely the House of Commons (UK) (for H1 and H3) and one 
conforming to the delegatory model - the Second Chamber (NL) (for H2 and H4). The 
comparisons establish whether there are any differences in scrutiny between the cases 
(EU legislative files) when these NPs operate under different conditions. 
4.5.1.1 The House of Commons in the UK and the Second Chamber in the 
Netherlands 
In order to perform the case studies, two NPs have been selected: the Second Chamber 
in the Netherlands (with strong ex ante influence mechanisms) and the House of 
Commons in the UK (with stronger ex post control mechanisms).393 Table 2 in chapter 
2 gives an overview of ex ante and ex post formal powers of the different NPs in the 
EU. The House of Commons in the UK thereby scored low on ex ante influence 
mechanisms and high on ex post control mechanisms, whereas the Dutch Second 
Chamber scored low on ex post control mechanisms and high on ex ante influence 
mechanisms. Even though the Dutch Second Chamber scored high on ex ante influence 
mechanisms, other NPs within that cluster scored higher, as the Dutch Second Chamber 
has not got the strong mandating rights, such as the Danish Folketing and Finnish 
Eduskunta. 
Both NPs are generally considered to have moderate powers compared to other EU NPs 
and therefore representative of the average powers of a NP in the EU.394 The main 
strength of the House of Commons is the right to apply a scrutiny reserve395 which has 
also been introduced by the Dutch Second Chamber since the Treaty of Lisbon has 
come into force. The scrutiny reserve gives NPs the right to further discuss EU 
legislation and ask for time from the government. It can also bind the government to 
keeping the NP informed on any developments regarding the issue in question.  
A significant difference between the formal power of the House of Commons and the 
Second Chamber is that the Dutch NP has completely decentralised EU legislative files 
to be dealt with by specialised committees and the EAC only deals with issues related to 
EU Treaty Changes and enlargement. 																																																								
393 The second matrix in Chapter 2.4 enabled the selection of one NP with high scores on ex ante 
influence indicators and another with lower scores on the ex ante indicators, but stronger scores on the ex 
post control indicators. 
394 Neuhold & Smith, 2015:670-671. 
395 The scrutiny reserve implies that ministers are not allowed to agree to EU legislation as long as the NP 
has the document under scrutiny.  
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This is considered an indicator of parliamentary strength, as it involves MPs’ own 
expertise of the policy area into the scrutiny process.396 In the UK, on the contrary, there 
is no systematic method of disseminating EU issues to sectoral committees and they are 
only transferred in the case that members of the EAC feel that the topic requires expert 
opinions.  
Next to selecting the two NPs based upon the Table for formal powers (Chapter 2), the 
two selected NPs give, furthermore, the possibility of comparing other explanatory 
factors. According to Lijphart, the UK is the least disproportional of the plurality 
systems with few political parties, while the Netherlands has the strongest 
proportionality system with strong multipartism.397  
The Dutch Parliament is also interesting, however, as although it does not have the 
same strong formal mandating rights as the Danish Folketing, it does exercise very 
strong agenda control. Furthermore, since the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty it 
has strengthened its ex ante influence mechanisms (such as meetings with the Prime 
Minister before the European Council) at the expense of ex post control mechanisms.398 
This is important, as previous research has shown that ex ante is the time when 
influence occurs.399 To control a government ex post, the Council meeting does not give 
the NP any opportunity to exercise an impact on the EU dossier. 
The empirical analysis of this research will only focus on the Lower Chambers of the 
NPs, in other words, the House of Lords in the UK400 and the First Chamber in the 
Netherlands are not included as they are normally the chambers with fewer formal 
powers than the Upper Chambers.401 
During the negotiations of the Lisbon Treaty both the UK and Dutch Government 
suggested to introduce a yellow card in order to reinforce the role of the NPs.402 The UK 
Government added a request for a red card for NPs during his negotiations on a 
																																																								
396 Holzhacker, 2005:437.	
397 Lijphart, 2012:154-156; Schmidt, 2006:158. 
398 Wessels & Rozenberg, 2013:36. 
399 Auel, 2007:488; Sprungk, 2013:554. 
400 The House of Commons and the House of Lords use different scrutiny procedures, whereby the House 
of Commons is known to be reactive, while the House of Lords, with its in-depth inquiries into EU issues, 
is known to be pro-active in EU affairs (Cygan, 2007:163). 
401 With the exception of the European right to send a reasoned opinion to the EC, which is a right that is 
allocated to both Chambers in bicameral parliaments. 
402 Carbone, 2010:153. 
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reformed EU Treaty in 2016. This is another reason why it is interesting to analyse how 
the NPs in these two member states perform when scrutinising EU legislative files.  
4.5.1.2 The scrutiny process in the House of Commons 
Most of the scrutiny of EU legislative files is undertaken by the European Scrutiny 
Committee (ESC) and few documents are decentralised to other select committees.403 
This means that the domestic agenda is still dominant for most UK MPs.404 The ESC 
consists of 16 members and the main purpose of the committee is to influence UK 
ministers and hold them to account after the Council meeting.405 It is therefore 
considered to be a moderate player in the scrutiny of EU issues.406 For each new 
proposal the committee has to decide whether the topic is of political or legal 
importance, whether the committee has enough information to make a decision, whether 
the document should be debated or whether it should be ‘tagged’ (noted as relevant to a 
particular or future debate) or transferred to a sectoral committee or one of the European 
Committees (A,B or C).407 
One of the formal rights of the ESC is to recommend EU documents for plenary 
debates, but it is in the end up to the government to decide which topics are debated on 
the floor.408  
Because of its few formal ex ante influence powers (see Table in Chapter 2.4), the HC 
has tried to compensate via the introduction of the right to a Scrutiny Reserve, which 
implies that the responsible minister cannot make a decision in the Council as long as 
the NP has not cleared the draft legislative proposal. This is the strongest formal power 
of the ESC and evidence shows that ministers do take the scrutiny reserve seriously, 
although it can be overridden at times.409 Other formal powers of the ESC include the 
right to send a topic to the floor of the plenary meeting of the House, where motions can 
be adopted.  
																																																								
403 Either to a Select committee or to one of the European Committees (A, B, C) which deal with certain 
expertise policy topics and meet on an ad hoc basis (Huff & Smith, 2015:316).  
404 Cygan, 2007:166.	
405 Huff & Smith, 2015:315. 
406 Neuhold & Smith, 2015:670-671. 
407 The European Scrutiny System in the House of Commons, Department of Chamber and Committee 
Services, 6th July 2009, p.9-10. 
408 Auel & Raunio, 2014a:20. 
409 Huff & Smith, 2015:318-319. 
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The composition in parliamentary committees represents the proportion of seats held by 
a party, which guarantees the governing party a majority within all select committees.410  
After the publication of an EU legislative proposal the UK government writes an EM 
outlining its first position which it forwards to the ESC. Although since the Lisbon 
Treaty has come into force, the ESC should receive the initial EU legislative proposal 
directly from Brussels, it does not deal with this until it receives the EM from its 
government. In other words, if the government is late in publishing its legislative 
proposal, there could potentially be little or no time left for the NP in case it wants to 
raise a yellow card.411 Moreover, the scrutiny of EU affairs is so highly centralised412 
and the ESC deals with more than 1,000 EU documents per year413 for which it must 
decide whether these should remain414 under scrutiny or can be cleared. As the ESC 
deals with so many documents per year, it must be very selective in choosing which EU 
legislative proposal it will follow, with the result that many only receive superficial 
attention.415  
4.5.1.3 The scrutiny process in the Second Chamber 
The Netherlands has a bicameral system and this research only looks at the stronger 
Chamber, namely the Second Chamber, also known as the House of Representatives 
which carries the right to initiate and amend legislation.416 The MPs who form part of 
this Chamber are directly elected every four years, using a system of proportional 
representation.417  
The SC is generally considered to be a moderate player, the so-called policy shaper.418 
Its formal rights are above the average of NPs’ formal powers, but it lacks strong 
mandating rights, such as those held by the Danish Folketing. Among its formal powers 
it has, amongst others, standard ones such as asking questions and receiving 
information, but also a more powerful one in the complete use of a decentralised 																																																								
410 Cygan, 2007:166.	
411 For more about the NPs’ right to send a yellow card, see Chapter 3.1 
412 Huff & Smith, 2015:314. 
413 Ibid.,315. 
414 If a case is salient or in the case that the ESC does not agree with the government’s view as expressed 
in the EM. 
415 For more information about the political parties in the UK and the members of the ESC and other 
involved committees in the scrutiny of the selected cases, see appendix III. 
416 Högenauer, 2015:252. 
417 For more information about the political parties in the Netherlands and the members of the involved 
committees in the scrutiny of the selected cases, see appendix IV. 
418 Neuhold & Smith, 2015:671, 679. 
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committee system, meaning that EU issues are scrutinised like domestic files419. The 
EAC, which consists of 25 members, deals solely with issues related to the overall 
coordination of EU issues.420 The EAC has a cross-departmental scope of competences 
and draws attention to different EU legislative proposals in the different sectoral 
committees.421 The scrutiny of EU legislative proposals happens in a similar way to 
domestic proposals.  
After the Lisbon Treaty, the Second Chamber increased the scrutiny of EU legislative 
files by allocating a scrutiny reserve, the strongest formal powers of the SC so far, to 
control its government over EU issues422 and meetings with the Council now take place 
before Council meetings.423 These changes have been carried out not only because of 
the Lisbon Treaty, but also because the Dutch population has become more Eurosceptic 
since 2009.424 One of the responses of the Dutch government after the ‘no’ vote against 
the EU Constitution in the Netherlands in 2005, was to increase the control on EU 
legislative acts and safeguard in particular the subsidiarity principle. 
Before the Council meetings take place, the responsible government department sends 
the meeting agenda to the relevant sectoral committee, after which a meeting is set up 
together with the responsible minister.425 It also sends a summary of the EU legislative 
proposal and the government’s (first) position (in the so-called bnc-fiche).426 
The committee at this stage can decide to formalise its position to put extra pressure on 
the government, by submitting the Minutes of the meeting to the plenary meeting after 
which motions can be tabled.427 After the meeting in the Council, the responsible 
government department sends a letter to the sectoral committee informing it of the 
outcome. After this, the committee can decide whether it has any more questions to 
raise to the government or if it is happy with the feedback.428  
 
																																																								
419 Högenauer, 2015:253. 
420 Ibid., 254.	
421 Kiiver, 2006:53. 
422 Högenauer, 2015: 253-257. 
423 Rozenberg & Wessels, 2013:36. 
424 Harryvan & Hoekstra, 2013:53.  
425 known as the ‘Algemeen overleg’. 
426 Which can be compared to the Explanatory Memorandum in the UK. 
427 Högenauer, 2015:255.	
428 These steps correspond to step 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the OLP, see appendix I and II for an overview. 
	 102	
 
4.5.2 Selecting EU legislative proposals  
The topics of EU legislative proposals are selected based on the explanatory variables 
and therefore vary in time and in content.429 Each case consists of one EU legislative 
proposal, whereby all-but-one of the variables are absent which decreases the chances 
of rival explanations (see table 6). In each case, the manner in which the formal powers 
of NPs operate under certain conditions has been studied.  
In addition, only topics over which there is obvious disagreement between the NP and 
government are selected.430 This increases the chances of measuring ‘impact’ rather 
than ‘just coincidence’.431 This decision also gives access to a greater number of 
publications per case (for example, minutes of meetings or correspondence between the 
NP and the government), which increases the quantity of data usable to verify the causal 
process.432   
It can be argued that selecting different EU legislative proposals interferes with the 
explanatory variables and makes comparison more difficult. However, a most similar 
design is applied for the pair-wise comparisons, whereby the cases resemble each other 
in all but one respect. All issues are comparable in the sense that they are all considered 
to be of equal (non-)salience433. They are all dealt with by the same governmental 
departments and the same policy areas (DEFRA434 in the UK and the Infrastructure and 
Environment (I&E) Committee in the Netherlands) in order to decrease the chances of 
rival explanations. EU legislative files are either related to fisheries (House of 
Commons) or infrastructure (Second Chamber), as these are topics that are not part of 
the most significant topics for citizens (so, no salience for the electorate)435, but are still 
																																																								
429 For example, they are selected based upon the period during which the government consisted of multi-
parties, a single party or when it included or excluded a Eurosceptic party. 
430 Based upon their party programmes or the contents of correspondence between the government and 
the NP. 
431 This is less obvious in the single-government case, as the NP consists mostly of MPs from the same 
party as the government, so the NP is more likely to agree with its government.  
432 Besides, only topics were selected, whereby the EC has a shared competence with the member states 
and NPs have the right to submit a reasoned opinion to the EC on conformity with subsidiarity and 
proportionality.  
433 With the exception of the case dealing with EU salience. 
434 Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
435 With the exception of case 5 (salience) which deals with the environment (a salient topic based upon 
the party manifestos of political parties and the Euro-Barometer of the year the EU legislative proposal 
was published). 
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salient for legislative actors, so disagreements between the government and NP are still 
expected to be found.  
This is why, in some cases, the salience variable is not completely absent. For example, 
regarding the use of the Lisbon provisions, only those NPs for whom this had salience 
made use of the EWM. Therefore, topics have been selected with at least equal salience 
to the government and NP and all outside the area of economic affairs436 or 
employment.437 In addition, none of the non-salient topics are referred to in national 
political party programmes under their own headings.438 
For the selection of EU legislative files some had to be disregarded, such as the draft 
Regulation regarding the allocation of fishing opportunities under the Fisheries 
Partnership Agreement between the EU and Morocco or the draft Regulation regarding 
a recovery plan for blue fin tuna, because the draft legislative files were of such little 
importance, that the NP cleared the document without scrutinising it. The NP, in these 
cases, opted out from using its formal powers altogether, as the topic was not important 
enough for the legislative actors either. A non-salient topic had to be selected, based 
upon party manifestos of government parties and the lack of levels of concern among 
EU citizens based upon the Euro-barometer, but nevertheless salient enough for the 
legislative actors to want to use its formal powers to scrutinise it (see also 3.2.3).  
All issues are part of the OLP439, whereby NPs adopt a similar path of influence over 
and control of their governments, which facilitates a pair-wise comparison (see table 6). 
The comparison of the cases looks as follows per hypothesis. In order to increase the 
internal validity of the analysis, each pair-wise comparison is supported by another, 
shadow pair-wise comparison, following similar steps of the OLP. 
H1 Multi-party government is a favourable condition for NPs to increase the 
substantive impact on their government’s EU policy position.  
Two EU legislative files have been selected as cases for this hypothesis, both dealt with 
by the House of Commons, an NP which conforms to the trusteeship model. Although 
this is an NP with few formal powers, it is expected to have a stronger substantive 																																																								
436 Avoiding files dealing with the financial crisis which, according the Euro-barometer (question 7 of the 
Fieldwork), is described as one of the major concerns of citizens in the UK and  Netherlands.  
437 According to the Euro-barometer, these are the most important issues for EU citizens (Euro-barometer 
80, December 2013, question 7, annex).  
438 For more information on the indicators of salience, Chapter 4.3.3. 
439 See more on the different steps of the OLP in Appendix I and II. 
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impact on the case in which it operates as part of a multi-party government. In the 
selected cases, all conditions (euro-scepticism, salience and Lisbon) are constant, with 
the exception of the partisan composition condition. This is present in the first case and 
compared to the second when absent (co-variation). Secondly, per case the different 
causal mechanisms are studied in order to discover how the process has been brought 
about per case.  
H2 The more the government depends on the support of a Eurosceptic party, the more 
likely the NP will have a substantive impact on the government’s EU policy position.  
Two EU legislative proposals are selected as cases, both dealt with by the Dutch Second 
Chamber. This NP conforms to the delegatory model with strong formal powers. As 
strength comes in gradations, it is expected that the NP’s impact can increase even 
further in the case in which its coalition government depends on the support of a 
Eurosceptic party. In the selected cases, all conditions (partisan composition, salience 
and Lisbon) are constant with the exception of the Eurosceptic condition. This is present 
in the first case and compared to the second when absent (co-variation). Secondly, per 
case the different causal mechanisms are studied in order to find out how the process 
has been brought about per case.  
H3 The more salient an EU issue is to parliament, the more likely the NP will have a 
substantive impact on the government’s EU policy position. 
Two EU legislative files have been selected as cases, both dealt with by the House of 
Commons. It is expected that the impact of this NP on its government’s contribution to 
the Council is low, unless it deals with a salient topic which should increase its impact. 
In the selected cases, all conditions (partisan composition, Euro-scepticism and Lisbon) 
are constant, with the exception of the salience condition. This is present in the first case 
and compared to the second  when absent (co-variation). Secondly, per case the 
different causal mechanisms are studied in order to understand how the process has 
been brought about per case.  
H4 Those NPs opposing an EU legislative proposal in a reasoned opinion under the 
EWM have greater substantive impact on their government’s EU policy position than 
those NPs that do not oppose it.  
	 105	
Two legislative proposals have been selected as cases, both dealt with by the Dutch 
Second Chamber. It is expected that its impact is intermediate, but in the case where the 
NP has sent a negative RO to the EC, it can increase its impact even further (strong 
impact). In the selected cases, all conditions (partisan composition, Euro-scepticism and 
salience) are constant - with the exception of the Lisbon provision condition. This is 
present in the first case and compared to the second when absent (co-variation). 
Secondly, per case the different causal mechanisms are studied in order to find out how 
the process has been brought about per case.  
 
Table 6 gives an overview of the hypotheses, what is compared and what is not per 
hypothesis, including the topics (and alternative topics) of the different cases selected 
for each hypothesis.  
	 106	
Table 6 Pair-wise Comparison and Case Selection EU legislative files  
Hypotheses  What to compare What not to 
compare 
Cases 
H1 Multi-party 
government is a favourable 
condition for NPs to 
increase their substantive 
impact on government’s 
EU policy position. 
The formal powers of an NP 
conforming to trusteeship 
during an EU legislative 
proposal dealt with by a multi-
party government versus one 
by a single-party government. 
Salience, Euro-
scepticism and 
Lisbon 
provisions 
Case 1: 
Reform Common 
Fisheries Policy 
Case 1a:  
Cod Stocks 
 
Case 2:  
Compliance 
Common 
Fisheries Policy 
 
Case 2a:  
Cod Recovery  
H2 The more the 
government depends on 
the support of a 
Eurosceptic party, the 
more likely the NP will 
have a substantive impact 
on the government’s EU 
policy position.  
The formal powers of an NP 
conforming to the delegatory 
model during an EU 
legislative proposal in a 
Eurosceptic government 
versus one without a 
Eurosceptic government.  
Salience, Euro-
scepticism and 
Lisbon 
provisions  
Case 3:  
The First Railway 
Package – 
Case 3a:  
EU Integrated 
Maritime Policy  
 
Case 4:  
The Fourth 
Railway Package: 
Interoperability –  
 
Case 4a:  
Port Services  
H3: The more salient an 
EU issue is to parliament, 
the more likely the NP will 
have a substantive impact 
on the government’s EU 
policy position. 
 
The formal powers of an NP 
conforming to the trusteeship 
model dealing with a salient 
EU legislative proposal versus 
a non-EU legislative proposal.  
Partisan 
composition, 
Euro-scepticism 
and Lisbon 
provisions 
Case 5:  
EU Water Policy - 
Case 
5a:European 
Maritime and 
Fisheries Fund  
Case 6: 
Ship Recycling  
Case 6a:  
Cod Stocks 
H4 Those NPs opposing 
an EU legislative proposal 
in a RO under the EWM 
have greater substantive 
impact on their 
government’s EU policy 
position than those NPs 
that do not oppose the 
proposal. 
 
The formal powers of an NP 
conforming to the delegatory 
model dealing with an EU 
legislative proposal after 
having sent a RO* to the EC 
versus a EU legislative 
proposal dealt with by an NP 
without any ROs. 
Partisan 
composition, 
Euro-scepticism 
and salience.  
Case 7:Maritime 
Spatial Planning 
 
Case 7a: 
The 4th Railway 
Package: open 
market for 
Railway 
passengers - 
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Case 8:  
Port Services 
Case 8a:  
The 4th Railway 
Package: 
Interoperability – 
 
This table gives an overview of what will be measured for each hypothesis and what variables will be 
absent in the pair-wise comparison. It also shows that a pair-wise comparison will take place between C1 
and C2, C1a and C2a C3 and 4, C3a and C4a, C5 and C6, C5a and C6a, C7 and C8, and C7a and C8a. 
* RO = reasoned opinion. 
4.6 Data analysis method: process-tracing 
To analyse the data, a combination of the comparative method with process-tracing has 
been applied. This helps to account for any differences between the outcomes of the 
cases.440 Co-variation has been used to get concrete results as a consequence of the 
variation in the explanatory factors (for example, ‘did these conditions lead to the 
increase or decrease of the NP’s substantive impact?’), whereas process-tracing can 
help to rule out any rival explanations by looking at whether the causal processes 
developed as expected.441 Process-tracing also helps to reach a more general 
understanding of the relationship between the formal powers of the NP, the 
parliamentary activities when using them under certain conditions and the outcome of 
the use of these powers. By reconstructing the whole policy process including all 
significant steps in the sequence that led to the outcome of that particular case, the 
causal process between the IV and the DV has been traced. This helped to narrow the 
list of potential causes of certain effects.  
With a pair-wise comparison, the causal processes between two cases of the same NP 
have been compared and it has been established whether the causal process differs if an 
explanatory factor changes. This has happened in a most similar system design, 
whereby in both cases to be compared all conditions are constant and only the 
explanatory factor varies (see table 6).  
Although the main purpose of undertaking a case study is to measure the causal effects 
and understand the use of formal powers under certain conditions, it is important to 																																																								
440 George & Bennett, 2005:81. 
441 Blatter & Haverland, 2012:p.24, 213.	
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know how these effects have emerged and causal mechanisms are presumed in every 
estimate of a mean causal effect.442 In other words, causal mechanisms help to explain 
how the outcome became possible.443  
Tracing the causal processes leading to a certain outcome enabled the elimination of any 
rival explanation by looking at the context during which the decision-making took place 
(for example, was it just before election time or could the economic crisis have 
influenced an increase or decrease in impact). Furthermore, different types of influence 
(formal and informal) can be identified during the various stages of the OLP of an EC 
legislative proposal. This allowed me to see whether the causal process hypothesised by 
the theory is in fact evident in the sequence, and values of the intervening variables in 
that case.444  
The process has been path-dependent, that is, it had to occur in a sequence of events. If 
the different observations during that period could be linked and are therefore 
connected, this was considered an explanation for why a certain case happened. The 
different attempts by the NP to achieve an impact, their governments’ responses to the 
impact attempts, the degree to which preferences were reflected in outcomes, and NPs 
statements of (dis-)satisfaction with the outcome445 have thereby been taken into 
account.446 
In order to establish whether the hypotheses hold, the theory has been pattern matched 
to empirical scrutiny in process-tracing447 have been matched to the observed 
sequence.448 The goal is to establish whether the hypothesised causal mechanism 
linking the condition (X) to the outcome (Y) is present and that it functioned as in the 
theory.449 
Although process-tracing is a well-suited method to test theories in cases with multiple 
interactions450, there are several weaknesses. First of all, it can only show causal 
inference if there is an uninterrupted causal path between causes and effect. This makes 																																																								
442 Gerring, 2007:44. 
443 George & Bennett, 2005:206-207. 
444 Bennett & Checkel, 2015:5. 
445 Dür, 2008:49. 
446 For example, the OLP consists of a seven-step process whereby NPs play a role at several stages (see 
Appendix I and II).  
447 George & Bennett, 2005:30. 
448 Rohfling, 2013:33; Yin, 2009:136. 
449 Beach and Pedersen, 2013:11.	
450 George & Bennett, 2005:206; Hall, 2013:27.	
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empirical data essential, but it can be missing sometimes, particularly in relation to 
government positions in the EU Council. In those cases, secondary sources have been 
referred to, such as the Minutes of meetings and/or interviews.  
Secondly, it is possible that more than one hypothesised causal mechanism is consistent 
with the process-tracing evidence. In these cases of equifinality, it has been important to 
discover whether any of the alternative explanations are complementary or if one is 
causal and another spurious: for example, by applying the same causal mechanisms to 
other cases.451  
Thirdly, it is tempting in process-tracing to overlook things that did not happen and only 
focus on positive evidence. For that reason, interviews have been conducted asking 
open- and semi-open questions which allowed respondents to give information that 
would not have been found when only examining archival documents.452  
Lastly, interferences are only based on a small sample and might therefore have lower 
external validity than large-N correlation studies and generalisability is therefore 
modest.453 
4.7 Data collection 
As evidence, documentary sources are used that were published during the seven steps 
of the OLP in order to compare the NP’s position to that of its government (see 
Appendix I and II for more information about the seven steps of the OLP and the 
methods and evidence that will be used per step). Interviews of MPs and civil servants 
are furthermore used to establish any informal ways of influencing, interviews with 
civil servants/ministers to establish the degree of pressure on the minister during the 
steps of the OLP during which he or she can be held to account.  
Essential documents are formal policy documents (of both NP and government), 
Minutes of parliamentary and ministerial meetings and correspondence between NPs 
and governments about EU legislative proposals, Minutes from the attendance of 
government representatives at EAC meetings or plenary meetings on EU affairs, from 
NP meetings, committees’ weekly press releases, reasoned opinions sent to the EC, 
																																																								
451 George & Bennett, 2005:92. 
452 Vennesson, 2008:238. 
453 Dörrenbächer et al., 2015:6, Berg-Schlosser, 2009:11.	
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Minutes or summaries of government meetings and positions. This data has been 
collected from databases from NPs (www.overheid.nl and http://www.parliament.uk) 
and IPEX454. Most scrutiny of Council meetings is carried out in writing in both the UK 
and the Netherlands which helped by sourcing relevant documents.  
These documents allowed the comparison of the input of the NP (while operating under 
certain conditions) to the position of its government on an EU legislative file.455 To 
observe the initial positions of the NP, reference was made to the minutes of the main 
responsible NP committee after the publication of an EC legislative proposal. Minutes 
of any following meetings and correspondence of the NP helped to establish the 
position of the NP and any possible changes within that. A greater challenge arose when 
collecting the initial and final position of the government, which in some cases were not 
made public. In such cases, reference was made to the governmental memorandum and 
minutes of meetings between the NP and government, and correspondence between 
these two institutions, all of which allowed the retrieval of the initial position of the 
government, including any changes to the memorandum during the scrutiny of the file. 
Moreover, interviews helped to interpret and augment the data (where, for example, a 
document is secret and withheld from public analysis). Besides, documents can show 
agreement between influencing NP and the government, whereas in reality there could 
have been disagreements between the parties. Conducting interviews is a way of 
triangulation to ensure that the data is not only collected from one source, which can 
increase the credibility of the findings.456  
Conducting interviews has furthermore given insight into the extent to which MPs are 
willing to influence and control their governments on EU affairs when the national 
interest is at stake. This may limit their room for manoeuvre and could complicate the 
measuring of NP impact.457 Conducting interviews with government representatives 
were assessed qualitatively to establish the extent to which they felt influenced in their 
decision-making by their NPs and whether there has been any change since the Treaty 
of Lisbon has come into force. To allow the interviewees to offer alternative causal 																																																								
454 IPEX is a database for the mutual exchange of information between NPs and the EP concerning issues 
related to the EU. 
455 In order to establish whether the government’s position has changed, it is hereby relevant to look at the 
initial and final position of the government and establish to what extent this has changed according to the 
position of the NP. 
456 Tansey, 2007:767. 
457 Cooper, 2012:449.	
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mechanisms, the interviews were semi-structured, including some open-ended 
questions.  
By taking a sample of each involved parliamentary committee during the interviews 
(reflecting the different political parties represented in the committee458), it has been 
possible to make inferences about the beliefs and actions of the whole committee 
without having to interview everyone.459 As a starting point, MPs were approached who 
were members of the EAC/sectoral committees during the period that the respective EU 
legislative proposal was dealt with in the NP. Secondly, interviews took place with 
relevant ministers and/or civil servants who dealt with the EU legislative proposal from 
the side of the government.  
The focus was thereby on first-hand participants working on the respective EU 
legislative proposal at the time and open-ended questions were asked which allowed 
respondents to talk more freely.460 Furthermore, interviews with clerks and clerk 
advisors were held and also with the permanent representative in the Netherlands who 
could give information on the wider perspective. Interviews were held with 
parliamentary representatives in Brussels from both the House of Commons and the 
Second Chamber who could also give a more general view on the scrutiny of NPs in the 
EU legislative process. Interviews with interest parties have been able to give a more 
independent perspective on the scrutiny of relevant EU legislative files. 
The references show an overview of those who participated in interviews (a total of 25, 
including two questionnaires).  
Table 7 gives an overview of the different explanatory factors: the indicators, necessary 
data and expected outcome per hypothesis. 
																																																								
458	Those with more than three seats in the committee. 
459 Tansey, 2007:766. 
460 Tansey, 2007:766.	
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Table 7 Variables, indicators, data collection and expected outcome  
Variable 
and 
hypothesis  
Partisan 
composition 
 
Multi-party 
government is a 
favourable 
condition for NP 
to increase its 
measurable 
impact on  gov’s 
EU policy 
position  
Dependence on 
Eurosceptic gov.:  
The more the 
government 
depends on the 
support of a 
Eurosceptic party, 
the more likely the 
NP will have a 
measurable 
impact on its 
gov.’s EU policy 
position 
Salience 
 
The more salient an 
EU issue is to a NP, 
the more likely the 
NP will have a 
measurable impact 
on its gov.’s EU 
policy position. 
Use of EWM 
 
Those NPs 
opposing an EU 
leg. proposal in a 
RO under the EWM 
have greater 
measurable impact 
on their gov.’s EU 
policy position than 
those NPs that do 
not oppose the 
proposal.  
Indicators The effective 
number of parties 
in gov. 
The participation 
or dependence of 
a Eurosceptic 
party in the 
governing 
coalition 
Reference to the topic 
in party manifestos 
and EU Barometer 
All forms of formal 
parliamentary 
objections to the 
EC regarding an 
EU legislative 
proposal 
Data  - Meeting 
documents  
- Press Releases 
-Correspondence 
- Interviews 
- Meeting 
documents  
- Press Releases 
- Correspondence 
- Interviews 
- Meeting documents  
- Press Releases 
- Correspondence 
- Interviews 
- Meeting 
documents  
- Press Releases 
- Correspondence 
- Interviews 
Expected 
outcome 
Case 1: 
Multi 
party:  
 
 
Strong 
impact 
Case 2:   
Single 
party:  
 
 
Weak 
impact 
Case 3:  
Euro-
sceptic 
gov.: 
 
Strong 
impact 
Case 4:  
Non-
Euro-
sceptic 
gov.: 
 
Interme
-diate 
impact 
Case 5:  
Salient: 
 
 
 
Strong 
impact 
Case 6:  
 
Non-
salient:  
 
 
Interme
-diate 
impact 
Case 7:  
With RO:  
 
 
 
Strong 
impact 
Case 8:  
No 
RO:  
 
 
Interme
-diate 
impact. 
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Chapter 5 
Partisan composition 
5.1 Introduction 
This first Chapter of the empirical analysis deals with the partisan composition 
condition (hypothesis one). The euro-scepticism, salience461 and Lisbon462 variables are 
absent for this case.  
The pair-wise comparison examines two legislative files, both being dealt with by the 
House of Commons (HC), an NP that conforms to the trusteeship model (according to 
Table 2 in Chapter 2). This means that the NP gives more leeway to the government in 
the absence of ex ante influence formal procedures and governments gain the freedom 
to act as trustees during the Council of Ministers. However, the NP retains formal 
powers to exercise control over its government afterwards. 
Although the HC has few ex ante formal powers, it is expected to exert a stronger 
measurable impact in the case in which it operates when scrutinising a multi-party 
government, consisting of a coalition between Cameron and Clegg (2010-2015) (C1) 
instead of a single party government led by Labour (Blair/Brown, 2005-2010) (C2).463 
In order to keep the number of competing explanations to a minimum, the two selected 
EU legislative files were both dealt with by the same government departments 
(DEFRA) and cover a similar topic, namely the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). The 
CFP has lead to much contestation during various revisions, which is why it is expected 
that there will be opposing views inside the NP and the government. 
To counterbalance for chances of confirmation bias, each pair-wise comparison not only 
consists of tracing the different steps during the OLP (which consists of 7 steps, see 
appendix I and II) per case added by evidence given by interviewees, it adds an 
alternative shadow pair-wise comparison in order to establish whether a similar causal 
path is followed per case and whether the outcomes are comparable to the first pair-wise 																																																								
461 References to party manifestos (i.e. if a topic gets a separate heading or paragraph in a party 
programme) are uses as indicators for ‘salience’, see Chapter 4.3.3.  
462 Although the legislative proposal was published after the Lisbon Treaty came into force, the NP does 
not make use of its new powers for this EU legislative file.  
463 For more information about the political parties in the UK and the members of the ESC and other 
involved committees in the scrutiny of the selected cases, see appendix III. 
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comparison (an elaboration of these shadow pair-wise comparisons can be found in 
appendix V). 
The Eurosceptic variable is absent in both cases, as the scrutiny of C1 ends before 
Cameron’s Bloomberg Speech464, namely on 4th July 2012. With regard to C2, at the 
time of the scrutiny of this EU legislative proposal, the single-party Labour party 
government was lead by Gordon Brown who wanted Britain to remain in the EU and 
thanks to him the Lisbon Treaty was signed without a referendum about it in the UK.465 
The topic in both cases can be considered as non-salient to the electorate, but salient to 
legislators466, as the party in government does refer to the need to reform of the CFP in 
their party manifestos of 2005467, but as part of a wider improvement of rural 
communities for the UK, which overall attracts limited attention, and not as a stand-
alone goal.468 Besides, the Euro-barometer of 2008469 shows that the majority of citizens 
do not include ‘fisheries’ as a main concern. Rising prices/inflation and the economic 
situation were the two most frequently mentioned national concerns. The political 
parties in the Cameron-Clegg coalition government spent a similar amount of attention 
to the CFP in the party manifestos of 2011470, and the CFP is not raised as a matter of 
concern in the Euro-barometer in 2011.471 Finally, the Lisbon variable is also stable for 
this case. Both cases are dealt with after the Lisbon Treaty has come into force, in 
neither case does the NP make use of sending a RO to the European Commission.472 
The absence of other possible variables is a way of increasing the internal validity and 
decreasing the chances of equifinality. 
This Chapter consists of three parts; first, it deals with the analysis of cases one and 
two, followed by the pair-wise comparison. The analysis consists of a combination of 
process-tracing, following the seven steps of the OLP with additional interview data, 
and begins with an overview of the different positions of the main political parties on 																																																								
464 January 2013, this is considered to be the time that the Conservative party gets a more Eurosceptic 
direction. 
465 For this research, I consider Labour and the Liberal Democrats as non-Eurosceptic parties. The 
Conservatives are considered to be non-Eurosceptic until January 2013, when Cameron presented his 
Bloomberg speech which can be described as the start of a more sceptical approach of the EU.  
466 More information about this can be found in Chapter 3.2.3. 
467 Setting out the policy plans for 2005-2009, during which the publication of this case took place.  
468 The Labour Party Manifesto, 2005 
469 Standard Euro-barometer, 70, annex question seven. 
470 Conservative Manifesto, 2010 and Liberal Democrat Manifesto 2010. 
471 Standard Euro-barometer 75, annex, question seven.		
472 Although the publication of the EU legislative proposal in Case 2 takes place just before the Lisbon 
Treaty has come into force, the actual scrutiny of the EU file takes place in 2009.  
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the CFP during the period of the publication of each EU legislative file. It will continue 
by giving a reminder of the expected causal process per case and at the end of the 
Chapter, it will provide an overview of any differences per step of the OLP per case and 
compare the results of the analysis of both cases. 
5.2 Case 1: the Regulation on the Common Fisheries Policy 
(COM(2011)425473) 
5.2.1 Party policy position on EU fisheries 
For a long time, political parties in the HC held different views on the CFP. The 
Conservatives (particularly during the Howard period474) sought to abandon the CFP all 
together, a more extreme viewpoint than those of other parties, like Labour and the 
Liberal Democrats who pleaded for reform instead.475 However, when David Cameron 
came into power, he also asked for a reform of the CFP, rather than its complete 
abolition, even though part of his party still favoured abolition of the policy 
completely.476 Because of this internal division and because MPs from fishery 
constituencies, such as those in Scotland, potentially have different ideas about the 
reform of the CFP than MPs representing regions not dependent on fisheries, it is still 
expected that there will be disagreements in the HC on this file. Table 8 gives an 
overview of the political views of the main political parties in the HC on the CFP during 
2011 (the year of publication of the CFP Reform proposal). 
																																																								
473 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/procedure/EN/2011_195 
474 2003-2005. 
475 Wanlin, 2005:1. 
476 Lynch 2015, p.189.	
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Table 8 Party policy positions on the CFP in the UK, 2010-2015 
Labour Conservatives Liberal-
Democrats 
SNP 
A Reform of the CFP, 
focusing on discards, 
but keep coordination 
at EU level.477 
A push for a reform of 
the CFP to promote a 
bigger say for local 
communities and end 
discards.478 Although 
the Conservatives 
wanted to pull out of 
the CFP during the 
Howard period, they 
softened their approach 
towards the CFP by 
asking for radical 
reform.479 
A reform of the CFP480, 
with a greater role for 
the devolved 
administrations and 
decisions should be 
made on a regional 
basis, with more 
powers being given to 
fishermen, scientists 
and communities.481 No 
reference is made to the 
CFP in the manifesto 
for the general 
elections.482 
Complete UK 
withdrawal from the 
CFP.483 
5.2.2 Expected Causal Process 
The hypothesis expects a positive relationship between the multi-party government and 
the increase of parliamentary impact on government’s EU policy position, as the 
government might depend on the NP in order to get a majority for its position, which 
potentially is based upon a compromise (see Chapter 3.4.1 for the theoretical argument). 
The following causal process in the case where the multi party condition is present is 
therefore expected: 
EU legislative proposal: sent to Council, EP and NPs ! multi-party government and 
NP use of formal powers ! lots of discussion in government ! government cannot 
agree ! compromise ! asks for support from different parties in NP ! control and 
influence of government by NP through its formal powers, for example, asking 
questions and threatening of confidence votes ! government must take NP position on 
																																																								
477 Party manifesto Labour 2010: A future fair for all. 
478 Conservative manifesto 2010. 
479 www.politics.co.uk, Common Fisheries Policy, http://www.politics.co.uk/reference/common-fisheries-
policy. 
480 http://www.libdemvoice.org/tag/common-fisheries-policy 
481 The Liberal Democrat Manifesto for the 2009 Elections to the European Parliament.  
482 Liberal Democrat Manifesto 2010. 
483 www.politics.co.uk, Common Fisheries Policy. 
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board to ensure sufficient support for proposal ! few formal powers do not stop the NP 
from having a say ! parliamentary impact. 
5.2.3 Background of the proposal 
In 2009 the EC published a Green Paper regarding the revision of the CFP in the EU, to 
which the UK government (with DEFRA as the responsible department) responded after 
consulting the HC and after an inquiry among different fishery stakeholders among 
others. The EU published a number of proposals in 2011 based upon the responses to 
the Green Paper and one of these proposals suggested a revised regulation in the field of 
the CFP. This draft regulation proposes radical changes to fisheries management in the 
EU. The proposal deals thereby with both the management of European fishing fleets 
and the conservation of fish stocks. 
5.2.4. Parliamentary scrutiny of the EU legislative file during the seven steps of the 
OLP484 
This section discusses all different steps of the OLP of the CFP reform and whether the 
HC used its formal powers to either influence and/or control their government’s EU 
policy position at any point of the scrutiny and if so, whether its attempts had any effect. 
Step 1: Publication 
On 13th July 2011 the EU legislative proposal is published and is sent to Council, EP 
and NPs. On 18th July, this document is deposited in the HC.485 This is later than in 
other NPs, as since the Lisbon Treaty has come into force, NPs should receive EU 
legislative files on the same day as the EP and Council, which is the day of publication. 
However, in the UK, the ESC decided to only deal with the EU legislative proposal 
once the government has published its explanatory memorandum (EM).486 On 19th July 
2012, a first debate in Council takes place487. 
At the end of this stage no evidence in the field of the use of any formal powers by the 
HC is found, as there has simply been no time to prepare the documents for discussion. 
This is as expected. 																																																								
484 For more information on these steps, see Appendix I and II. 
485 HC, ESC, 41st Report, 2010-2012, p.3. 
486 HC, ESC, Reforming the European Scrutiny System in the HC, Twenty-Fourth Report of Session 
2013-14, vol.1, p.11 
487 Press Release, European Council, 3108th Council meeting, Agriculture and Fisheries, Brussels 19th 
July 2011. 
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Step 2: NPs given eight weeks to respond to the EC (deadline 24/10/2011) 
To be able to confirm the main causal mechanism during this stage, evidence of an 
increased level of scrutiny by the HC must be found as a consequence of governments 
not agreeing with each other and therefore depending on the support of political parties 
in the HC. 
As expected, during this phase not a lot of evidence was found, other than some initial 
positioning of both the HC and government. During this period the NP has eight weeks 
to identify whether the EU proposal conforms to the subsidiarity principle or whether it 
should receive a yellow card. In this case, the HC does not make use of its (formal) EU 
power to send its objections against an EU legislative proposal by sending a RO to the 
EC. However, it does accuse the government for withholding this right, saying that it 
feels it did not receive government’s information on time.488 The government, on the 
other hand, argues that there was no right to send a RO in this matter anyway, as the 
topic is part of the exclusive competence of the EU (Art. 3 of the TEU).489 This will be 
discussed in more detail during the scrutiny of this legislative file. 
Secondly, as expected, during this stage the UK government published its EM490, 
including its own position (16th August 2011491), in which it shows some level of 
concern with the proposal. Whereas the UK government feels that the CFP should 
remain an EU competence: 
‘… [T]he UK is seeking genuine decentralisation and simplification of 
decision making, and is concerned that the proposal does not detail how 
Member States and stakeholders should work together to develop coherent 
regional plans ...’492 
The EM is the first official document since the consultation of the Green Paper that 
contains the UK Government’s official position on CFP Reform (considered as 
																																																								
488 HC ESC meeting, 2nd November 2011, European Committee A, 7th November 2011 
489 Ibid. 
490 Within ten working days of the deposit of a document, the government department, which takes 
responsibility for it, should submit an EM upon it (The European Scrutiny System in the HC, Department 
of Chamber and Committee Services, 6th July 2009). 
491 DEFRA Explanatory Memorandum Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy, 16th August 2011 
492 Ibid. 
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government’s initial position).493 During this stage, evidence of a potential disagreement 
within the government was expected to be found, as indicated in the causal process. 
However, there is no sign of internal disagreement in any documents published during 
this stage between members of government. This is confirmed during interviews. On 
both the government side and that of the HC, interviewees confirmed that there was no 
disagreement between the coalition partners on this file, as the Liberal Democrats did 
not have an explicit view on it. According to Clayton, the former head of the CFP 
reform at DEFRA, internally the Liberal Democrats and Conservatives had different 
views on issues related to the EU and also the reform of the CFP, but this did not come 
across in the scrutiny process. As far as ministers were concerned there was a consistent 
line on what we wanted to achieve. Clayton, the head of the CFP at DEFRA during this 
period, argued that as a matter of fact the more challenging scrutiny of the government 
in relation to UK/EU competence issues came from Conservative MPs. 
‘There was no great debate going on along party lines. It was more country 
interest rather than political interest’.494 
This is confirmed by Kelvin Hopkins MP, member of the ESC, who argued that 
Conservatives in the government coalition of 2010-2015 were more worried about their 
own, more Eurosceptic, backbenchers than the Liberal Democrats in the cabinet.495 
Richard Benyon MP, the Conservative parliamentary undersecretary for Fisheries in the 
UK since 2010, maintains a critical but pragmatic approach towards the CFP during the 
different stages of the scrutiny. These will be discussed below. 
The second stage of the scrutiny process of the OLP has ended here. No evidence has 
been found of coalition partners disagreeing with each other and for that reason needing 
more support from MPs for their EU policy position on the Reform of the CFP, other 
than the contents of the party manifestos and press releases. 
Step 3: Ex ante influence phase 
To be able to confirm the causal mechanism during this stage, evidence must be found 
showing increased levels of scrutiny by the HC as a consequence of the government 																																																								
493 An EM is submitted on every document (except, by agreement with the Scrutiny Committee, the most 
trivial) and therefore does not give as such an indication on the importance of the EU proposal.  
494 Clayton, 21st July 2015 
495 Hopkins, 30th June 2015 
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coalition partners not agreeing with one another on the contents of the legislative file, 
for example, minutes of meetings referring to opposing positions in government or at 
least between the different political parties in the government. 
Although the HC is a NP whereby the scrutiny emphasis is on its control function, it is 
possible to distinguish different types of contact during this ex ante phase496, such as 
written communication and minutes of meetings, which give the NP the chance to have 
a proper say on this legislative file. 
On 14th September 2011, the ESC publishes its first report for this dossier497 (first 
parliamentary position) and discusses the position of the EC, of government and of the 
environmental law firm Client Earth. This last organisation argues that the mandatory 
introduction of a system of transferable fishing concessions (TFCs), rather than the 
simple allocation of fishing quota/fishing opportunities, under the CFP proposal is 
unlawful. 498 
The ESC seeks to raise a question to the parliamentary undersecretary, as he appears to 
regard member state competence as having been respected in the case of transferable 
concessions, in marked contrast to the position taken by Client Earth, and the ESC 
shows that it would be interested to have the parliamentary undersecretary’s reactions to 
the points made by that organisation.499 It therefore indicates that it will recommend the 
documents for debate (which will take place on 7th November 2011 in the European 
Committee A500). The NP actively uses its formal powers here, as it normally involves 
one of the European Committees in cases where the topic is either technical or 
important.501 The ESC’s position does not differ from the government in this respect, 
but it questions its position.  
The ESC furthermore asked of the government that it receives a response in good time 
before the next meeting of 12th October 2012, in order that it could consider whether the 
draft regulation complies with the principle of subsidiarity, and whether to issue a 
																																																								
496 Whereby the emphasis is on influencing the government before the Council meeting. 
497 HC ESC, 41st Report 2010-2012, 14th September 2011. 
498 Ibid., p. 14. 
499 Ibid., par. 1.36. 
500 European Committees (formerly ‘European Standing Committees’) are appointed to consider the 
documents in detail and report their findings back to the HC, more information on the 
composition of this committee can be found in Appendix III.  
501 Groves, 3rd July 2015. 
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RO502. The NP has therefore made use of its formal powers (request for more 
information), but has not yet published its own position. 
The DEFRA parliamentary undersecretary, Richard Benyon, sent several letters to the 
HC regarding this file and the parliamentary requests on 11, 24 and 27 October 2011. In 
the letter of 11th October 2011, Benyon replied to questions raised by MPs of the ESC 
in the 41st Report: 
‘The Committee asked for additional information on Member State 
competence in the case of introducing Transferable Fishing Concessions 
(TFCs), with reference to a submission received by Client Earth on this 
issue. In response, the original position—as set out in the Explanatory 
Memorandum [of 16 August 2011]—is maintained.’503  
In other words, it does not agree with the argument of Client Earth, as raised by 
the ESC. 
On 12th October, the ESC holds a meeting504 in which it shows concern and asks for 
more information. It thereby uses its formal powers (the right to ask for more 
information), but it does not make an attempt to change the government’s position. 
During this meeting, the ESC shows regret about the late arrival of DEFRA’s letter of 
11th October, in which it answers the ESC’s requests for more information (for example, 
regarding the concerns raised by Client Earth505). Because of the late arrival, parliament 
missed its chance to submit a RO to the EC.506 
It furthermore does not agree with DEFRA’s point regarding the subsidiarity principle 
which, according to the parliamentary undersecretary, does not apply to areas of 
exclusive EU competence: 
‘… This depends critically upon whether the purpose of transferable fishing 
concessions is indeed the conservation of marine resources, or whether it is 
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503 HC ESC, 42nd Report 2010-2012, 2nd November 2011, par. 1.6 
504 HC ESC, 42nd Report 2010-2012, 2nd November 2011. 
505 This organisation lobbies DEFRA on CFP, but as they do so via the NP, the parliamentary remarks 
coming from Client Earth are considered as parliamentary scrutiny.  
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	 122	
geared more to fleet management, a point the Minister's letter had not 
addressed …’ 507 
The ESC therefore asks for a more considered response to this important issue (use of 
formal powers).508 The use of formal powers in this instance mainly consists of asking 
the government to behave in a certain way, and to re-consider its position as laid out in 
the EM. 
In a letter of 24th October 2011, DEFRA apologies for the delay in meeting the 12th 
October deadline.509 
In another letter of 27th October 2011, DEFRA explains how, after obtaining legal 
advice in the field of a possible application of the principle of subsidiarity to the CFP, 
the Minister maintains his original position: 
‘… Whatever you or I might wish, I remain of the view that the proposals on 
TFCs lie within the exclusive competence of the EU …’510 
On 2nd November 2011511, the ESC holds a meeting in which it expresses regret at the 
late arrival of the Government’s response to the parliamentary request for more 
information: 
‘Despite our very specific request that we should receive comments in good 
time before our meeting on 12 October, the letter in question reached us 
barely two hours before it was due to start. As a result, our first opportunity 
to consider it was on 19 October, meaning that there was then no chance of a 
Reasoned Opinion being issued before the eight week deadline in the 
Protocol.’512 
During the interview with Clayton, the former head of the CFP Reform at DEFRA, it 
was clear that getting documents on time to the House is one of the main challenges for 
civil servants, as they depend on the timetable of the EU.513 
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513 Clayton, 21st July 2015. 
	 123	
On 10th November 2011, the deadline to submit responses to DEFRA regarding the 
Fisheries Industry is reached. DEFRA receives 39 responses, including from devolved 
administrations which are responsible for carrying out the CFP514. In DEFRA’s 
response to the inquiry, it appears that most responses from stakeholders stress the need 
for a more regionalised future CFP: 
‘The responses to the consultation questions have shown that there is a 
wealth of support for genuine and radical reform of both the CFP and the 
CMO. In particular, I am pleased to see the support for a shift towards a more 
regionalised CFP and for working towards more sustainable targets and a 
reduction in discards. Likewise, on CMO proposals views were broadly 
aligned to the Government’s analysis with overall support for the 
Commission’s aims and recognition that some areas need further 
clarification, including around the increased responsibility of Producer 
Organisations.’515 
The need for more regionalisation is also the main view of the HC (as appears from 
minutes of meetings held at a later stage) and gets support from government: 
‘The UK is seeking genuine decentralisation and simplification of decision-
making where Member States are able to work together regionally to develop 
management plans, and implement measures which are appropriate to their 
fisheries.516 
Green Paper CFP 
The UK government’s position is in line with its response to the Green Paper regarding 
the CFP, which it published at the end of 2009.517 The UK’s response to this EC 
publication was drafted after consulting different fishery and other interest organisations 
and after discussions in Parliament with DEFRA Parliamentary undersecretary Huw 
Irranca-Davies MP (Labour). The UK’s response to these papers mainly focused on the 
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Policy (CFP) and the Common Organisation of the Market (CMO) on Fishery and Aquaculture Products, 
February 2012, p. 4. 
516 Ibid., p. 20. 
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need for decentralisation and to optimise the renewable wealth of marine fish 
resources.518 
The current position of the government may not only be influenced by the Green Paper 
consultation of 2009, but before the publication of the EC legislative proposal on 13th 
July 2011 the HC has already given a mandate to the government in this policy area. It 
was namely on 12th May 2011 that the HC adopted a motion which was inspired by a 
campaign against discards.519 The motion: 
‘… [C]alls on the government to vote against proposed reforms of the EU 
Common Fisheries Policy unless they implement an ecosystems-based 
approach to fisheries management, end discards in relation to all fish and 
shellfish with derogation only for species proven to have a high survival rate 
on discarding, require that all fish and shellfish are harvested at sustainable 
levels by 2015, ensure the involvement of fishers and other stakeholders in 
decision-making processes …’520 
This is the first parliamentary official position on the CFP since the publication of the 
Green Paper. Richard Benyon responds to this by saying:  
 
‘… Let me make a few things clear. The outrage that people feel about 
discards is shared by the government and Members on both sides of the 
House. ‘I can support a ban and I will be pushing for one—it is semantics 
whether we talk about an end to discards or a ban—but only if it is backed by 
genuinely effective, enforceable and affordable measures that encourage 
fishermen to be more selective about what they catch …’521 
This response indicates no sign of influence of the NP, as the motion regarding discards 
is supported across all political parties and is also government policy (as explained in 
the EM of 16th August 2011). Interviewees on the side of the government and on that of 
the NP confirm this. According to Richard Benyon, no massive changes were made to 
the government position as a consequence of NP scrutiny522 and the government’s 																																																								
518 UK response to the EC Reform Green Paper on the Common Fisheries Policy (COM(2009)163). 
519 HC, motion Fisheries, 12th May 2011. 
520 Ibid., 2.10pm. 
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position also focused on discards and regionalisation.523 According to Henry Smith MP, 
member of the ESC during the 2010-2015 period, the ESC steered the government’s 
active attitude in this dossier though did not change its position.524 However, 
government representatives also confirmed that they definitely did take the motion 
seriously and that the Minister attending the Fisheries Council meeting would have to 
take the contents into account.525 
Meeting with the European Committee A 
In a meeting with the Parliamentary undersecretary of DEFRA, Benyon, on 7th 
November 2011, the members of the European Committee A show regret that 
Parliament did not receive DEFRA’s information at an earlier stage (as specifically 
requested on 14th September 2011). Now, there is no chance for the HC to submit a RO 
to the EC. DEFRA thereby prevented Parliament from using one of its formal rights. 
Chris Heaton-Harris MP (Conservative) argues during this meeting: 
‘… As explained in the ESC’s report of 2 November 2011, the Government’s 
failure to provide these views in time meant that the deadline under the 
Lisbon treaty for submitting reasoned opinions could not be met …’526 
Benyon responds, saying: 
‘I regret that the advice was not given to the Committee in time. It is a very 
detailed technical issue. We were given three or four weeks to provide that 
information and it required not just getting a legal opinion, but discussing 
with the devolved Governments the impact it had on them and whether they 
wished to make a contribution to the debate.’527 
Fiona O’Donnell MP (Labour) asked the parliamentary undersecretary to give his views 
about the appearance of Richard Lochhead, the Scottish Minister for fisheries, before 
the Select Committee on Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (EFRAC)528, speaking 
about his preference of a repatriation of powers in the field of the CFP. Benyon 																																																								
523 This rules out the chance of an anticipated reaction in the EM of the government which focuses on 
discards and regionalisation as well. 
524 Smith, 2nd July 2015. 
525 Clayton, 21st July 2015. 
526 European Committee A, Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy, 7th November 2011, 4:30pm. 
527 Ibid., 4:33pm. 
528 Ibid. 
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responded that he was not aware of this appearance to the EFRAC. He adds, however, 
that he is in favour of more devolved control of fisheries, but not of completely 
withdrawing from the CFP (contrary to some Labour and Conservative MPs), as fish do 
not recognise borders.529 Benyon confirmed in an interview that he is known as a more 
pro-European conservative within his party and this is not related to any concessions he 
had to make to the Liberal Democrats during the coalition government: 
‘... I am pro-European, just like my Liberal Democrat colleagues. In the time 
that we worked together, we never had any different opinion on how deal 
with EU issues. We wanted to keep Britain in the EU, but we were 
committed to reform the CFP, because it was bad policy.’530 
Eilidh Whiteford MP (SNP) asked Benyon to be more explicit about the difficulties of 
regionalisation531, to which he responded:	
‘If we cannot crack the regionalisation issue, it will be a big blow for those of 
us—I think I speak for people on both sides of the House—who want a 
dramatic and radical reform of this failed policy. I believe that we can get 
what we want, which is a genuine regionalisation and a much more local 
management of our fishery.’532 
The interview with Benyon confirmed that the government was a strong supporter of 
regionalisation and that this has not been influenced by the NP. Some parties in the NP, 
such as the SNP and part of the Conservatives wanted to go further and have the UK 
removed from the CFP all together.533 
Gisella Stuart MP (Labour) argues that this is the first meeting on the CFP since the 
coalition government has come to power and that, so far, this topic is mainly dealt with 
by the Backbench Business Committee (BBC),534 whereas it should be government 
business.535 Other MPs argue that the UK would be better off to completely withdraw 
itself from the CFP.536 Benyon argues that the CFP has been a failure, but that it makes 																																																								
529 Ibid. 
530	Benyon, 25th June 2015. 
531 Ibid., column nr.6.	
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535 European Committee A, The Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy, 7th November 2011, session 
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sense to be involved.537 UK vessels, it was pointed out, have also been seen outside 
their own waters.538 There is a disagreement at this point between some Conservative 
MPs and the Conservative Minister on the actual existence and scope of the CFP.539 The 
remarks from Mrs Stuart MP also show that the government has not needed to increase 
discussions on this topic with parliament (so it might have no difficulties in finding an 
agreement within the coalition).540 Different interviewees from the side of the NP541 and 
that of government542 are of the opinion that the coalition government did not make it 
harder for government to come to an agreement on this issue and, therefore, did not 
make the coalition more dependent on the NP in order to find support for compromise. 
Richard Benyon continued to stress the importance of the regionalisation of the CFP, 
get rid of unnecessary regulation and abandoning discards for the UK government (as 
raised by different MPs from all political parties, including labour, the opposition).543 
This has been an important stage of the consultation period, during which MPs 
expressed their own views to government explicitly. With the exception of those MPs 
wanting to withdraw from the CFP all together, most focused on issues such as the 
importance of regionalisation and ending discards, in line with the government’s 
position and no attempts were made to change the government’s position. Interviews 
confirm this and Clayton argued that the positions of the NP and government were not 
that different (with the exception of those backbenchers wanting to leave) and that MPs 
mostly tried to make sure that the Minister would continue following this line in 
Brussels.544 
 
Parliamentary Inquiry into the CFP 
 
On 24th February 2012, the HC published the outcome of its inquiry into the reform of 
the CFP (issued by the EFRAC).545 During the inquiry the HC received evidence from 
34 different fisheries and other stakeholders. It directs its attempts to influence the new 
EU legislative proposals via government: 																																																								
537 European Committee A, The Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy, 7th November 2011, session 
2010-2012, column nr. 4. 
538 Ibid., column 10. 
539 E.g. the contribution of Barry Gardiner MP. 
540 European Committee A, The Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy, 7th November 2011, session 
2010-2012, column 13. 
541 Hopkins MP, Smith MP, Rees-Mogg MP. 
542 Benyon MP, Clayton. 
543 Ibid., column 5. 
544 Clayton, 21st July 2015. 
545 HC, Inquiry into the proposals for reform of the Common Fisheries Policy - Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs Committee (12th Report, 24th February 2012). 
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‘DEFRA has a once-in-a-decade opportunity to reform the Common 
Fisheries Policy … We direct our conclusions and recommendations 
principally at DEFRA to guide them in their ongoing negotiations with the 
EU’.546 
The HC thereby clearly outlines its own position as well: 
‘We are convinced that a more effective system of European fisheries 
governance could be achieved if high-level objectives only are set centrally 
by the European institutions while day-to-day decisions are delegated to 
regional groupings of Member States. However, the draft Regulation does 
not provide a clear, practicable mechanism for regionalisation. This lack of 
clarity creates anxiety among stakeholders and risks derailing the process of 
improving the CFP's governance ...’547 
According to Clayton, the EFRAC was more active in influencing government. It had 
the technical expertise that the ESC lacked, and could therefore go into more detail.548 
Even though the government did not change its position after the lengthy contribution 
of the EFRAC, it did take the suggestions of the Committee on board.549 Clayton is of 
the opinion that throughout discussions with the different committees, its position did 
not change, although it was important to government to explain itself to the committees 
and get to the right result with regard to its feedback to the Council. In this way, the HC 
is influential.550 
A motion gets adopted 
On 19th March 2012, a Fisheries and Agriculture Council debate takes place to discuss 
the EC legislative proposal551 and on 15th March this document is discussed in the 
plenary meeting of the HC in the presence of Minister Richard Benyon552. During the 
meeting MPs got a chance to influence DEFRA’s input into the Council meeting of 19th 
March 2012 and also discuss the outcome of the parliamentary inquiry into the CFP. 
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The HC therefore uses a formal power that on paper it does not have (ex ante influence 
powers) 553 
During this plenary session a motion is accepted. The parliament: 
‘… [C]alls on the government to use the current round of Common Fisheries 
Policy reform to argue for a reduction in micro-management from Brussels, 
greater devolution of fishing policy to Member States, the introduction of 
greater regional ecosystem-based management and more scientific research 
to underpin decision-making in order to secure the future of coastal 
communities and the health of the marine ecosystem …’554 
During the debates a further demand for a need for regionalisation in this field is made, 
for example, by Dr Eilidh Whiteford (Banff and Buchan) (SNP).555 The discussion 
about the CFP becomes at times a more politically- rather than contents-based 
discussion, particularly after the intervention of Austin Mitchell MP (Labour): 
‘… The common fisheries policy remains a folly that will not work, cannot 
be made to work and should be ended. The one thing I cheered when the 
Conservatives won the election—there was only one thing—was that they 
promised to repatriate powers from Europe. That, presumably, has been 
diluted by the coalition with the Liberal Democrats, who will probably 
smuggle those powers back across the channel in the boots of their cars 
…’556 
This intervention indicates that the UK government has a divided view on the reform of 
the CFP, but (part of) the opposition would support the Conservatives in a further 
dilution of the CFP (unlike the Liberal Democrat coalition partner). This is confirmed 
by Hopkins MP who argued in the interview that as a Eurosceptic Labour MP, he felt 
his views on the Reform of the CFP were better reflected during the Cameron-Clegg 
coalition government of 2010-2015 than when his own party was in power during the 
Blair government, as the single party government was united in a pro-EU approach.557 
In other words, influencing the government on EU issues might have been easier during 
the Conservative era because the Conservative party was so divided on the EU and this 																																																								
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might not have been due to the coalition with the Liberal Democrats. Interviews 
confirm this. Benyon argues that he and the Liberal Democrats have similar (pro-
European) views on the EU and this was supported by Caroline Spelman MP (Secretary 
of State at DEFRA at the time). 
Fiona O’Donnell (Labour) criticises the government for not investing more time in this 
topic: 
'Fisheries are a government-held public resource, so we think it right that 
government decide who should be able to access them, but, as the Hon. 
Member for Thirsk and Malton has pointed out, astonishingly the 
government do not even know who owns the quota that they hand out.’558 
In his response Richard Benyon assures the House that he will defend the need for 
regionalisation in the CFP and that he will inform Parliament after the Council meeting: 
‘On Monday I am going to Brussels, where I will be discussing, not least, 
regionalisation, as well as the external dimension, on which we are making 
some progress, although it has not yet got to where I want it to be ...’559 
The first stage during which the HC had a chance to impact  government policy position 
in the field of the reform of the CFP ends. The first Fisheries Council meeting regarding 
the CFP has passed and the government has been able to either in- or exclude 
parliamentary input into the negotiations in Brussels. 
The HC made an increased use of its formal powers (by including the European 
Committee A, several ESC meetings, an inquiry by the EFRAC and a discussion during 
a plenary meeting of the HC before the Council meeting). However, although there is 
evidence of a high level use of even ex ante influence mechanisms by the HC, which in 
the case of the UK Parliament shows an increased use of its (formal) powers (as it 
normally only holds meetings after the Council meeting), there is no proof that this has 
been caused by a government consisting of various parties. In conjunction with the 
absence of evidence reflecting this causal mechanism, interviews confirm that the 
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coalition government and its different views on the Reform of the CFP did not play a 
role in NP’s increased use of formal powers.560 
Step 4 Ex post control phase 
A Fisheries Council to discuss the Reform of the CFP takes place on 19th March 2012. 
No evidence of any meeting or correspondence has been found that shows any contact 
between parliament and government at this stage. This is contrary to the expected causal 
process. 
Step 5 Ex ante influence phase 
To be able to confirm the causal mechanism here during this stage, evidence is needed 
showing increased levels of scrutiny by the HC as a consequence of the government 
coalition partners not agreeing with each other on the contents of the legislative file. 
The day before the next Fisheries and Agriculture Council561, during which the draft EU 
regulation was again on the agenda, the Parliamentary undersecretary of DEFRA sent a 
letter to inform the ESC (11th June 2011) on the agenda of the Fisheries Council.562 
During the Fisheries Council meeting on 12th June 2012563, a partial agreement was 
reached on the draft regulation. The UK government supported this agreement. After 
the Council meeting had taken place, the ESC sent a letter on 14th June to the 
Parliamentary undersecretary of DEFRA. In this letter the ESC supported the 
Parliamentary undersecretary, but in so doing remind him of some important changes in 
the sector.564 
The government informed the HC before the Council, which is more than it should do 
according to its formal powers, but there is no opportunity for the HC to have an impact 
at this stage. While scrutiny can be considered as ‘more than expected’ (normally the 
government would only inform the HC after the Council meeting), there is no evidence 
that this is the consequence of a multiparty government. 																																																								
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Step 6 Ex post control phase 
At this stage it is expected that the government will feed back to the Parliament the 
input it has given into the Council meeting and to what extent it has been able to include 
NP’s priorities, which would count as evidence of impact at this stage. 
On 12th June 2012, another Fisheries Council takes place. 
On 24th June 2012, DEFRA sent a letter to the ESC with information regarding the 
outcome of the Fisheries Council565. This is a form of ex post control. The contents of 
the letter are simply informative and explain the points which the UK government 
supports, and those with which it disagrees, therefore, not useful as evidence to show 
whether the points made by the UK government during the Council stemmed from 
Parliament. 
On 24th June 2012, the Secretary of State Mrs Caroline Spelman MP (Conservative) 
published a statement regarding the outcome of the Council meeting. According to the 
government, thanks to the UK there has been progress made in the field of discards and 
regionalisation (some of the main priorities of the HC). 566 
The ESC holds a meeting on 4th July 2012567 during which it discusses the outcome of 
the Council meeting and notes its satisfaction with the government’s information, but 
there is no indication that the government included the HC’s position. The document is 
cleared. This document disconfirms that the government has taken into account the 
position of the HC. 
The evidence found at this stage does not show any signs of the government needing the 
support of the NP, as it might possibly disagree internally. 
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Step 7 Adoption 
The file is adopted on 17th December 2013. In the final compromise, EU member states 
agreed that fishing quotas should fully respect scientific advice in order to have healthy 
fish stocks and higher quotas. Discard of fish stocks is no longer allowed to prevent 
wasting food, which was also a strong wish of the HC.568 There will be furthermore 
ecosystem multi-annual plans for the management of fisheries and fisheries will be 
regionally managed. These were issues the HC had strong views on.  
Rather than consisting of the usual seven steps in total of the OLP, during which the NP 
has a chance to influence the impact of government’s EU policy position, this case 
consists of two readings. However, because the HC has cleared the document, it no 
longer scrutinises its government regarding this file. No more relevant evidence is 
expected of increased levels of scrutiny by the NP as a consequence of the government 
coalition partners not agreeing with one another on the contents of the legislative file 
during these stages. In December 2013 the document is accepted in a second reading. 
5.2.5 Concluding remarks 
The different steps of the OLP of this EU legislative file show various signs of 
influence by the HC on government. While there are signs of ‘increased parliamentary 
activity’, there is no real evidence of ‘impact’. Even without real impact it is interesting 
to establish whether the increased parliamentary activity is a consequence of the 
partisan composition of the government. According to the theoretical argument we 
expected to observe an increased use of formal powers by the NP, leading to higher 
levels of measurable impact as a consequence of the different views of the coalition 
partners in government. These different views require coalition partners to find a 
compromise, for which they need to find a majority, as no single party has a majority in 
the NP. The increased use of formal powers was clearly visible during the analysis of 
the process-tracing. However, interpreting these steps raises different challenges. 
First of all, there is the challenge of equifinality.  Although the salience, Eurosceptic 
and Lisbon variables are absent based upon the indicators used for the 
operationalisation of these variables, they are all to some extent still present in this case. 
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First of all, the ‘salience for the electorate’ variable569 is absent, as the party manifestos 
of the three main political parties (Conservatives, Labour and Liberal Democrats)570 do 
not refer to the CFP in 2010. Nevertheless, one can argue that for some MPs (especially 
those representing constituencies in which fisheries are still an important source of 
income for many voters such as the Shetland Isles, Scrabster and Peterhead in Scotland, 
Brixham and Plymouth in southwest England, and Ardglas in Northern Ireland) this is a 
very salient topic, not only for the legislative actors, but also for the electorate. To 
overcome this possible form of equifinality, a case from the same policy area is selected 
to compare the scrutiny by the NP in a single party government (the EU legislative 
proposal in the field of the CFP 2008). If there are a similar number of meetings before 
or after the Council meeting, it can be concluded that ‘salience’ is the variable that is 
dominant in increasing the NP’s activities. 
When looking at the Eurosceptic variable, however, this is absent as there is no 
Eurosceptic party element in government. However, the Eurosceptic attitude of 
Conservatives is well known and although not part of the coalition government, UKIP’s 
extreme anti-EU position does have an impact on the Conservatives approach to the 
EU.571 This could therefore give rise to the salience of the case that not only deals with 
fisheries, but is also about the deeper question of the extent to which the EU should be 
involved in this policy at all. 
Many MPs showed negative feelings towards the EU during the scrutiny of the EU 
legislative file, and interviews show that many Conservative MPs are against the CFP 
because of anti-EU feelings.572 However, the responsible Minister in government, 
Richard Benyon MP, claims to be pro-European573 and confirmed this during his 
interview574; thus, we can be confident that the Eurosceptic condition is absent575, but 
the ‘salience’ one is not, as the EU angle seems to be an incentive for MPs to increase 
the use of their formal powers in this field.576 Interviewees all confirm the importance of 
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this topic, mainly because of the timing (it only began to attract more attention in 2011) 
and also because of link to the debate on EU integration overall.577 
According to Benyon it was especially because he was so pro-European that he felt 
personally motivated to make a success of the reform. 
‘If we cannot do this right in the EU, then how can we reform the rest of the 
EU?’578 
A civil servant at DEFRA argues that 
‘MPs have a significant interest in the overarching CFP and see it as 
symptomatic of failed EU policy and hence an ideal object for 
criticism/reform. Fisheries are also an issue that impacts on a large number of 
constituencies where the majorities are very tight so local MPs tend to be 
more pro-active in those circumstances.’579  
Also, the variable of the Lisbon provisions cannot be overlooked here. Some MPs 
would have considered sending a RO if they had had a chance. These MPs feel that the 
topic should have been dealt with at national and not EU level. 
In other words, different conditions, such as salience, Euro-scepticism and the Lisbon 
provisions all played a role in increasing the use of parliamentary formal powers to 
some extent. The only condition that does not seem to be related to the increased use of 
formal powers is that of partisan composition. Neither in the minutes of the meetings 
nor in the interviewees is any evidence found of a link between the increased use of 
formal powers and the partisan composition. On the contrary, the UK government 
seems to be well united on this file and expressed clear views on it from the beginning. 
It is only the party manifestos of the two coalition parties that illustrate different views 
(see table 8). All interviews undertaken for this case confirm that there was no 
disagreement between the two coalition partners in the field regarding this dossier580, 
and that getting to an agreement was hard as a compromise had to be reached with the 
more Eurosceptic conservative backbenchers. The more Eurosceptic element of the 																																																								
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Clayton, 21st July 2015 and Luk, 5th August 2015. 
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opposition backed the Conservatives in this field.581 This is a clear example of what in 
previous research has been described as national mainstream parties; ideologically less 
cohesive on integration than traditional socio-economic issues. It is clear how the issue 
of EU integration can threaten the internal cohesiveness of political parties.582  
More specifically, the scrutiny of the CFP file by the HC is related to an increased use 
of formal powers, but the independent variable of the partisan composition cannot be 
linked to this.  
The HC had already adopted a motion on the CFP on 11th May 2011, which was before 
the publication of the actual EU legislative proposal, setting a mandate to the 
government. The contents of this motion is reflected in the government’s EM, but the 
interviewees indicated that the government position was very clear from the beginning 
until the end of the scrutiny process and that anticipated reactions have not been taken 
place in this field.583 
Measurable impact 
When examining the minutes of meetings and comparing the position of the 
government as stated in the EM compared to its feedback to the ESC there are no clear 
signs of parliamentary impact at any point during the scrutiny of the file. The main 
differences between the government and the NP consisted either in the degree to which 
the CFP should remain an EU policy or whether this policy should be given back to the 
member states (position of the backbenchers, but not a majority of the NP).  
Interviewees confirmed that although the HC increased the use of its formal powers in 
this case, this was only partly a consequence of the importance of the publication. Other 
issues also played a role, such as the composition of the ESC, which consisted of a high 
number of Eurosceptic members. All these factors combined to put pressure on the 
government584 to keep the HC updated and informed regularly. It did not, however, 
change the contents of the EU legislative file, and in some cases even had to overwrite 
its own position.585 
																																																								
581 E.g. Hopkins, 30th June 2015. 
582 Auel & Raunio, 2014b:7. 
583 Benyon, 25th June 2015. 
584 Benyon, 25th June 2015, Clayton, 21st July 2015. 
585 Benyon, 25th June 2015. 
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During conversations with government representatives and MPs about the use of any 
forms of informal impact, it was argued that MPs did informally try to influence the 
government’s position in this field. Unofficial meetings took place with parliamentary 
experts in the area but the government position did not change.586 However, it did have 
the effect of making civil servants and ministers think about their position, and made 
them more alert. The government could also explain why it could not take over specific 
requests, for example, in the field of coastal community interests.587 MPs felt slightly 
different about informal ways of influence and stated that these do not work unless 
originating from by Bill Cash MP (Conservative), chair of the ESC 2010-2015, who 
carried authority in the government.588 
As none of the points raised by the HC were reflected into the government’s input to the 
Council, the measurable impact can be considered to be weak here. This, however, does 
not mean that increased parliamentary activity does not make a difference. During the 
various steps of the OLP scrutiny process, the government increased its feedback to the 
NP by attending meetings and keeping them informed on discussions in the Council. 
Interviewees confirmed that discussions in, for example, the European Committee A 
does put pressure on the government to keep the HC in the loop. Although the HC did 
not manage to change the government position and thereby its input into Council, it still 
increased its control function and thereby tightened the relationship with the 
government in this case.  
The next case looks at an occurrence that was scrutinised during the single party 2005-
2010 government of Blair/Brown. The case also deals with the CFP and it will check 
the different steps made by the HC in order to impact the government’s position in this 
case. 
5.3 The EU Regulation on establishing a Community control for ensuring 
compliance with the rules of the CFP (COM(08) 721589) 
5.3.1 Party position on the CFP 
Although the political parties in the HC have similar views on the CFP like they did 
during the Cameron-Clegg coalition from 2010, the party manifestos during the 																																																								
586 Clayton, 21st July 2015, DEFRA civil servant, 21st May 2015. 
587 Clayton, 21st July 2015. 
588 Hopkins, 30th June 2015. 
589 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32013R1380	
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Blair/Brown single party government in 2005-2010 showed slight differences (see table 
9). 
Table 9 Party policy position on the CFP in the UK 2005-2010 
Labour Conservatives Liberal- 
Democrats 
SNP 
A Reform of the CFP, 
led by the UK, not the 
EU. 
From 2005, the 
Conservatives pleaded 
for a reform of the CFP 
rather than complete 
withdrawal which was 
the general policy line 
during the Howard 
leadership590. Its main 
focus lies thereby on 
the ending the fish 
discards.591 
A reform of the CFP592 
with a greater role for 
the devolved 
administrations and 
decisions should be 
made on a regional 
basis with more powers 
being given to 
fishermen, scientists 
and communities.593 
Complete UK 
withdrawal from the 
CFP.594 
5.3.2 Expected causal process 
As the scrutiny of this EU legislative file takes place during a single party in 
government, the expected causal process for this case is as follows: 
EU legislative proposal: sent to Council, EP and NPs ! Single party government and 
NP ! Little discussion in government ! one view on EU proposal ! Little 
dependence on NP ! NP: limited use of mechanisms to influence (majority in NP is 
government party) ! NP agrees with government ! no parliamentary impact. 
																																																								
590 Wanlin, 2005. 
591 The Conservatives, Vote for Change, European Election Manifesto, 2009. 
592 http://www.libdemvoice.org/tag/common-fisheries-policy 
593 The Liberal Democrat Manifesto for the 2009 Elections to the European Parliament.  
594 www.politics.co.uk, Common Fisheries Policy. 
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5.3.3 Background of the proposal 
This draft regulation brings together in one measure all the control elements of the CFP, 
addressing the issues highlighted by the European Court of Auditors (ECA). Its aim is 
to limit and control catch volumes by setting total allowable catches and national quotas 
coupled with technical rules and effort schemes. The European fisheries control policy 
is at the heart of the CFP because its credibility depends on effective application of this 
control policy. Despite some progress, the control system continues to suffer from 
substantial shortcomings.595 
5.3.4 Parliamentary scrutiny of the EU legislative file during the seven steps of the 
OLP596 
This section discusses all different steps of the OLP of the EU legislative file regarding 
the Compliance with CFP Rules and whether the HC used its formal powers to either 
influence and/or control their government’s EU policy position at any point of the 
scrutiny and if so, whether its attempts had any effect. 
Step 1 (Publication) and 2 (NP has 8 weeks to respond/not relevant) 
At this stage, no evidence is expected to be found as the NP needs time to prepare the 
EC legislative proposal. 
The EC publishes its draft regulation on 14th November 2008.597 It is deposited in the 
HC on 20th November 2008.598 On 18th November 2008 the Council599 discusses the 
topic for the first time600, but the HC has not had any time to prepare any input into its 
government’s position. 
Step 3 Ex ante influence phase 
To be able to confirm the causal mechanism during this stage, evidence must be found 
showing that little discussion about this topic was undertaken by government and, as a 
																																																								
595 See COM(08) 721. 
596 For more information on these steps, see Appendix I and II. 
597 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal content/EN/TXT/?qid=1436207868034&uri=CELEX:52008PC0721 
598 HC ESC, 12th Report, Session 2008-2009, 18th March 2009.  
599 Press Release, 2904th meeting of the Council, Agriculture and Fisheries, Brussels 18-20 November 
2008. 
600 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/HIS/?uri=CELEX:52008PC0721&qid=1436207868034 
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consequence of it being a single-party administration, there is little need for it to seek 
parliamentary input. 
On 10th February 2009, DEFRA publishes its EM601 (initial position of the government). 
From the EM it appears that the UK government supports this new control regulation, 
but needs to ensure that new burdens on industry and administrations be proportionate. 
Besides, the Minister, Mr Huw Irranca-Davies, argues that: 
‘The mandate of the Community Fisheries Control Agency would be 
extended beyond its current facilitating role into one of policing Member 
States' activities: he believes that it is not appropriate for the Agency to carry 
out this sort of function, which should be the sole responsibility of the 
Commission.’602 
The Minister outlines that the government continues to work with industry and will 
draft an Impact Assessment (IA), including the financial impact of the control 
regulation for the UK.603 
The ESC considers this proposal to be a combination of importance604 and complexity, 
which is why it decides to forward the document for scrutiny by European Committee 
A.605 This committee is one of the three ad hoc European Committees (A, B and C) 
dealing with certain topics606. It thereby uses its formal powers to include another, more 
specialised, committee in the scrutiny of this case. In addition, the committee uses it 
formal powers by asking questions to government in the field of costs relating to the 
measures proposed and shows its concerns about the public acceptability of this control 
proposal. Involvement of Committees (A, B, C) is normally undertaken in an important 
case. This is confirmed in interviews: 
‘The scrutiny gets transferred to Committee if they want something debated. 
That is a parliamentary mechanism, whereby they say that we collectively 
																																																								
601 HC ESC, 12th Report, Session 2008-2009, 18th March 2009.	
602 DEFRA, Explanatory Memorandum on European Community Legislation, COM(2008)718, 10th 
February 2009, par. 7 
603 Ibid., par. 8. 
604 Based upon the indicators in the Research Design Chapter, this refers to importance for the legislative 
actors, not necessarily for the electorate. 
605 HC, European Scrutiny System in the HC, May 2015, p.21). 
606 HC ESC, 12th Report, Session 2008-2009, 18th March 2009, par. 2.14. 
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think that this is a major issue, and the government needs to be given a bit of 
a serious questioning on this’.607 
However, data for this stage indicates that the NP does not show its own opinion about 
the contents of the EU legislative proposal and does not try to create an impact on the 
government’s position. This is as expected, but there is no sign that this is a 
consequence of the single party government. Interviewees confirm that it is the contents 
of the topic that are relevant here and not the single party government. According to 
Benyon, the debate on the CFP was not yet so controversial at that stage608 and the 
scandal of the discards, which made the reform so urgent, only became relevant in 
2011.609 In other words, it was the timing of the process rather than the single party 
component. This is confirmed by ClientEarth, an environmental law organisation, 
which lobbied the government on the CFP but only started to work with the UK 
government intensively in 2010-2011 as the real reform of the CFP became an issue.610 
The first three stages of scrutiny have finished here. The minor use of formal powers by 
the NP and the small amount of contact with the government at this stage - neither the 
government party, Labour, nor the opposition intend to spend more time on this topic 
than the basic scrutiny requires (with the exception of the referral to European 
Committee A) - is as expected. Although the ESC meeting of 18th March 2009 is 
included here, this should not be considered an ex ante influence attempt, as the ESC 
does not intend at any time to influence the government. It is, rather, an attempt to hold 
the government to account ex ante. The next Council meeting, during which the draft 
regulation would be discussed again, would not be until June 2009. A meeting with the 
government, which would be held just before the Council meeting, would allow the HC 
to have a proper influence on the topic, as the exact contents of the Council meeting 
would be clearer. A meeting taking place in the middle of the OLP (five months after 
the publication and three months before the next Council meeting) should be considered 
more as an ‘exploratory’ meeting, during which the NP asks for and receives more 
information about the case rather than exerting its influence. 
Step 4 Ex post control step 
																																																								
607 Benyon, 25th June 2015. 
608 Benyon, 25th June 2015. 
609 Benyon, 25th June 2015. 
610 Luk, 5th August 2015. 
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On 23rd June 2009, the Council reaches a common position on this file. 
To be able to confirm the causal mechanism at this stage, evidence must be found of the 
NP using its normal formal powers611 to hold government to account after the EU 
Fisheries Council and not to increase its efforts. 
On 17th July 2009 the government published a second EM, including the IA612. In the 
EM, DEFRA shows concern over the impact of the proposal on recreational fisheries, 
the consequences for direct sales to processors and merchants, and the position of the 
Community Fisheries Control Agency (CFCA).613 The IA gives an indication of the 
costs (one-off costs of about £4.3 million and an average annual cost of £531,000) and 
benefits (between £2.027 and 2.701 million).614 
On 10th August 2009 the DEFRA Minister sent a letter to the HC to inform it about the 
latest version of EC regulation, including the remaining concerns for the UK 
government (provisions on recreational fishing would now focus on data collection, 
with additional management measures applying only if there is shown to be a specific 
problem).615 The EC has agreed to amend the provision which would have required fish 
under quota to be sold only through auction.616 
After the Council meeting, the government did not inform parliament on the discussion 
outcomes and to what extent the UK’s input reflected any previous discussions it had 
had with the HC. The HC, therefore, does not get a chance to hold its government to 
account on this, and there is no evidence that any questions are raised by MPs at a later 
stage, to get clarifications about the outcome of the Fisheries Council. 
However, the government does inform the HC by means of a second EM with an IA 
and it also sends the HC another letter, later in August, to inform the HC of the latest 
version of the EC regulation which the latter adopted after the Council meeting of June 
2009. However, there is no evidence found of any active forms of parliamentary control 
(such as the right to ask questions). 
																																																								
611 One meeting at the ESC, with attendance of the responsible minister, took place after the Council 
meeting. 
612 HC ESC, 28th Report of session 2008-2009, 10th September 2009. 
613 Ibid., par. 1.7. 
614 Ibid. 
615 Ibid., par. 1.8. 
616 Ibid. 
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Interviews confirmed that MPs chose not to use their formal powers in this case as there 
was no real division in this field and other topics were of  priority.617 
Step 5: Ex ante influence phase 
To confirm the causal mechanism during this step of the OLP, little or no attempt618 by 
the HC to achieve an impact on its government’s EU policy position is anticipated. The 
HC is a NP, where any possible impact on government takes place via controlling its 
actions after a meeting. 
On 10th September 2009 the ESC discusses the draft control regulation for a second 
time.619 It brings the draft regulation to the attention of the House. No attempts to create 
an impact are made during this meeting (no use of formal powers).620 
On 13th October 2009, the case is discussed by the European Committee A, which is 
attended by the Minister, Huw Irranca-Davies (the parliament therefore makes use of its 
formal powers).621 
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for DEFRA (Huw Irranca-Davies, Labour) 
informs the Committee: 
‘In March last year, this Committee, under my predecessor, debated a report 
by the European Court of Auditors, which was highly critical of what it saw 
as widespread failings in the Community fisheries control system. At that 
time, the Committee approved a motion supporting the Government’s aim of 
contributing positively to discussions for further improvements in fisheries 
management and control, thereby contributing to the long-term sustainability 
of fish stocks. I very much welcomed the deliberations of the Committee at 
that time on that subject’.622 
The Minister apologises furthermore for taking so long in discussing this topic with the 
Parliament (the HC has no agenda-setting rights) which is due to the complexity of the 
																																																								
617 Rees-Mogg, 22nd June 2015, Hopkins, 25th June 2015, Smith 2nd July 2015. 
618 No more than one ESC meeting, asking for information and no attempts to have an impact on the 
contents. 
619 HC ESC, 28th Report of session 2008-2009, 10th September 2009. 
620 Ibid. 
621 HC, European Committee A, 13th October 2009, session 2008-2009. 
622 Ibid., column 4. 
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topic, he explains (this prevents parliament from using its formal powers). However, 
this meeting takes place before the Council meeting, giving parliament the chance to 
offer proper input into the UK government’s position (ex ante influence was, thus, 
created by the government). Irranca-Davies also points out the remaining priorities for 
the UK government and that it will push hard to address these issues before the final 
proposal is adopted: 
‘We are very concerned about the proposal in article 82 that would require us 
to impose minimum penalties for serious infringements. In our view, that 
proposal goes beyond similar provisions establishing maximum penalties in 
the regulation on illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing.’623 
The Minister concludes, commenting that he looks forward to hearing the views of the 
committee members. Several members of the European Committee asked questions 
about the contents of the draft regulation. 624 
On 14th October 2009, a reference was made to the Fisheries Council of 19th and 20th 
October 2009 which would discuss the Common Fisheries Control Regulation during 
the plenary session of the House (as a written ministerial statement by the Secretary of 
State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Hilary Benn MP). No reference to the 
contents of the regulation is made.625 
The European Committee A, a specialised committee, has been designated by the ESC 
to deal with this EU legislative proposal because of its technical expertise in this field. 
The government meets up with this Committee less than a week before the actual 
Fisheries Council and offers Parliament a real chance to shape government input into 
the Council meeting. However, the minutes of the meeting between the European 
Committee A and the Minister indicates no evidence of MPs using this chance to have 
an impact on the government’s EU policy position. This is, however, in line with the 
causal process which expected that the MPs would make little use of their formal 
powers. Interviews confirmed that no use was made of formal powers, but that was a 
consequence of the topic of the debate. CFP was just not so relevant at the time.626 
Step 6: Ex post control phase 																																																								
623 Ibid., column 5. 
624 Ibid., column 6. 
625 HC, written ministerial statement, Hillary Benn, 14th October 2009, column, 32WS. 
626 Rees-Mogg, 22nd June 2015, Hopkins, 30th June 2015, Smith, 2nd July 2015. 
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To confirm the causal mechanism at this stage, it is expected that the NP does little to 
hold government to account. It is possible that the HC will follow standard procedures 
to control its government at this stage, but it is expected that it will not be active627 in 
finding out what the government has contributed during the Council and to what extent 
this is in line with Parliament’s position. As the government consists of only one party, 
the majority of MPs will be of the same party often holding the same views. The 
government also holds a unified position and is therefore less dependent on the approval 
of the HC. It can therefore act as a trustee in this case, which it clearly does. The 
relationship between the government and the NP is basically limited to the government 
giving feedback of its actions to the NP. It has the total freedom to act according to its 
own judgement, and formal powers are used passively (reception of information). 
On 19th October 2009 a debate takes place in the Council. 
On Tuesday 10th November 2009, the Secretary of State for DEFRA (Hilary Benn MP) 
sent a written statement to the HC to inform it about the agreement reached at the 
Agriculture and Fisheries Council of 19th and 20th October 2009 regarding the Common 
Fisheries file.628 In the statement Benn explained that before coming to an agreement, 
the EC held trilateral meetings with many members and the UK had its first trilateral 
meeting during which it focused on 
‘… [T]hree significant priorities that had to be resolved, which comprised an 
offending provision on recreational fishing; demands on weighing tolerance; 
and the removal of the provision on minimum levels … The final 
compromise included all the points prioritised by the UK. In a final table 
round, the compromise was adopted by unanimity.629 
The HC does not raise any questions about this information. It opts out on 
using its formal powers.630 
As expected, the NP does not take any action to check the government’s 
contribution to the Fisheries Council at this stage. The government sends 																																																								
627 It is expected that the NP will receive information from the government, without asking more 
questions about it.  
628 HC, Written Ministerial Statement, 10th November 2009, Column 15WS. 
629 HC, Written Ministerial Statement, 10th November 2009, Agriculture and Fisheries Council, column 
16 WS. 
630 Ibid. 
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information to the HC regarding the outcome of the meeting, but that is the 
end of the scrutiny process. 
Step 7: 20th November 2009 
The act is adopted in the Council.631  Member states agree upon a point system for 
serious infringements, which can lead to fishing licensing being suspended. Inspection 
procedures will be standardised and harmonised. The EC will be granted with new 
inspection powers.632  
5.3.5 Concluding remarks 
The scrutiny process of this case is intermittent, where only step five shows clear signs 
of ex ante influence chances. The other meetings of the ESC and contacts with the 
relevant Minister are not clearly timed before or after EU Council meetings. However, 
even during step five when the Minister attends a specially organised European 
Standing Committee meeting, the discussion consists solely of asking for clarification 
of the proposal and a justification of the UK’s support for it rather than of an input by 
the NP regarding priorities and possible changes. The parliamentary use of formal 
powers is thereby limited to receiving information, but no attempts to have an impact 
were made. Based upon the theoretical argument the use of formal powers was expected 
to be limited during the scrutiny of a single party government, as with a majority in the 
NP and without the need to find a compromise with other coalition partners, the 
government has more freedom to act according to its own judgement. This is indeed 
reflected in the scrutiny of this case.  
It can therefore be concluded that the causal chain of this case is confirmed. However, 
interviewees argued that MPs chose to make less use of their formal powers in this case, 
as a choice must be made when scrutinising the vast number of EU legislative files it 
deals with, and the reason for limiting the use of formal (and informal) powers is a 
result of different factors which are not related to the single party government. The main 
reason is the timing of the process. The CFP received a lot of criticism, also in the 
media, particularly once the scandal of the discards came to light. However, this was not 
																																																								
631 Press Release, 2976th Council meeting, Agriculture and Fisheries, Brussels, 20th November 2009. 
632	European Commission, press release, 31st December 2009, MEMO/09/571. 
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until 2010-2011.633 In other words, the absence of salience in case two seems to be the 
main explanatory factor for the NP to not make use of its formal powers in this case. 
Measurable impact 
During the OLP, the HC has not tried to influence the government’s EU policy position 
and therefore there has been no impact in this case (weak). Interviews confirm that the 
government has followed its own position in this field634 (so, no anticipated reactions 
either). Although the NP shows the importance of the case by referring it to the 
European Committee A and for a debate in plenary, the use of formal powers by the HC 
is limited to the seeking of clarifications and extra information which the government 
provides. Impact is not visible and the HC has no control over the position of the 
government to the Council, but this has not the objective of the HC. The HC wanted to 
check the government, not change its position. The different steps of the process-tracing 
analysis has shown that the EM (the first position of the government) did not change at 
any point as a consequence of any input of the HC. 
5.4 Pair-wise comparison C1 to C2  
When the scrutiny of this case is compared to that in C1, during which the HC 
scrutinised a multi-party government of a similar type of EU legislative file, the 
differences in the levels of debates and active use of formal powers by the HC (such as 
asking questions and discussions in sectoral committees) are obvious (see also table 10).  
In both cases, the HC increased the use of its formal powers, as it involved the 
European Committee A and it holds meetings with the government before Council 
meetings. 
However, the main difference between the scrutiny of the two files is that in the multi-
party case, the HC made many attempts to convince government from its own opinion 
by actively expressing its own views. In the case of the single party government, 
although it shows forms of ex ante formal powers, it limits them to control the 
government’s actions in this case and to receive information. At no point did it attempt 
to impact the government position. However, as discussed during the different steps of 
the OLP, according to interviewees the factors explaining this increased use of formal 																																																								
633 Benyon, 25th June 2015, Luk, 5th August 2015. 
634 Clayton, 21st July 2015, Smith, 2nd July 2015. 
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powers in order to create an impact are diverse, but none are related to the coalition 
government. According to Clayton, head of the CFP Reform at DEFRA at the time, the 
Liberal Democrats and Conservatives had no real opposing views on the Reform of the 
CFP (externally).635 According to the opposition in the NP, the main goal of the Liberal 
Democrats at the time was to stay in government.636 This is confirmed by other MPs637 
and civil servants working on Fisheries files at DEFRA.638 According to Rees-Mogg 
MP (Conservative), there was a simple reason for increased scrutiny of the reform of the 
CFP: 
‘The CFP has a direct effect on the livelihood of people of certain 
constituencies doing fishing. This affects fishermen across the country.’ 
Other fish topics have less direct effects on people’s livelihoods. Therefore it 
is less likely for MPs to be active on. It does not mean that other topics are 
not important. This is how a selection is made. We scrutinize about 1000 
documents a year, only a limited number (35) gets to be discussed in the ESC 
and an even smaller number makes it to the House (half a dozen). We select 
issues that MPs have direct links with through their constituencies and 
therefore would like to get involved.’639 
This is supported by Hopkins MP (Labour): 
‘The CFP dealt with the overall policy, it affected much more. Other issues, 
such as the Compliance file and Cod Recovery were more about the detail. 
We deal with so many topics and have limited time. We knew that the CFP 
would do so much damage, so we chose it to work hard on it.’640 
This assumes that the salience condition has been the main explanation for the variation 
in the use of formal powers and that the number of political parties in government, as 
discussed during the theoretical argument in Chapter 3, does not necessarily lead to 
increased powers of the NP. In other words, although on paper it seems that all 
conditions but one in both cases are constant, in C1 the salience condition is more active 
than in C2. 																																																								
635 Clayton, 21st July 2015. 
636 Hopkins, Labour, 30th June 2015. 
637 Smith, Conservative, 2nd July 2015. 
638 21st May 2015. 
639 Rees-Mogg, 22nd June 2015. 
640 Hopkins, 30th June 2015. 
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According to Benyon and others, there are additional reasons which explain the 
increased activity of the ESC during 2010-2015. The ESC, under the chairmanship of 
Bill Cash MP (Conservative), was a very active and Eurosceptic committee at the time. 
It was more aggressive than previous committees.641 However, when comparing C1 to 
another multi-party government case, namely the cod recovery case (C1a, see appendix 
V), the use of formal powers by the same 2010-2015 ESC is limited compared to the 
scrutiny of the reform of the CFP, which makes this factor less relevant than that about 
timing and salience (see also table 11). According to MPs, the Reform of the CFP was 
much more contentious than other Fishery files and had become politicised and 
Europeanised.642 
For the first two years of the 2010-2015 coalition government, DEFRA did not have a 
Liberal Democrat Minister which meant that the Conservatives with Caroline Spelman 
MP, as Secretary of State, and Richard Benyon MP, as the Minister, did not have to find 
a common position with them in this file. Clayton (former head of DEFRA CFP 
Reform) argues that the fact that the NP scrutinised a single party government did not 
play a role in the increased scrutiny of the NP in this file.643 This is confirmed by 
several MPs.644 
Hopkins MP (Labour) who calls himself Eurosceptic argued about this period: 
‘The Blair/Brown Labour government was very pro-EU. They made it 
difficult for MPs like me to have a say. In 2010 a few more Eurosceptic left-
wingers have come in.’645 
In other words, for Hopkins it appeared even harder to impact his “own” single party 
government on EU issues, as he was one of the few Eurosceptic outliers. As the 
Conservative party has become more divided, Hopkins felt it easier to impact this 
government instead of the single party Labour administration. In other words, the 
increased chances for MPs to have a say on EU issues is not so much related to the 
number of parties government, but more to the different views on the EU. This is also 
shown in the contribution by Austin Mitchell (a Eurosceptic Labour MP) during the 
ESC meeting of 15th March 2012 when he argued that the only reason why he had been 																																																								
641 Benyon, 25th June 2015, Smith MP, 2nd July 2015. 
642 Rees-Mogg, 22nd June 2015, Hopkins, 30th June 2015, Smith, 2nd July 2015. 
643 21st July 2015. 
644 Rees-Mogg, 22nd June 2015, Hopkins, 30th June, Smith MP, 2nd July 2015. 
645 30th June 2015. 
	 150	
happy that the Conservatives had won the 2010 election was because of their views on 
Europe.  
Influencing the current single party government of David Cameron (2015-present) 
could therefore be equally easy when it comes to EU issues, as although the government 
consists of only one party, this Conservative party is highly divided on EU-related 
topics. The extent to which a government divided on EU issues can lead to increased 
parliamentary impact on its EU policy position will be dealt with in the next Chapter.  
Shadow pair-wise comparison 
In order to increase the outcome of this evidence, another pair-wise comparison has 
been added during which again two shadow cases are compared: one is scrutinised 
during the multi-party government and the other during the single party administration 
of 2005-2010. Both topics are typical cases dealing with EU fisheries policies and are 
dealt with by DEFRA in the UK and are of similar salience as C1 and C2. The outcome 
of this comparison can be seen in table 11 (see appendix V for an elaboration of the two 
alternative cases). 
The shadow multiparty condition case (1a) examines the Cod Stock proposal of the 
EC646 during the coalition government 2010-2015 while the alternative single party case 
(2a) looks at the scrutiny of the Cod Recovery Plan647 during the Labour government of 
2005-2010.648 From the comparison of the use of formal powers during the seven steps 
of the OLP in C1a and C2a, it appears that during the single party government the ESC 
increased its use of formal powers (see table 11). When talking to interviewees about 
these files, it appears that the increased use of formal powers in the Cod Recovery Plan 
is that there was more at stake in the first file compared to the second.649 However, 
compared to the Reform of the CFP these files are both considered to be of minor need 
to use formal powers as there was less at stake and it was considered to be a less 
worrying topic amongst constituents: 
‘The CFP is a much more contentious, political issue in the country. It’s 
more political. It had been for some time. There is a higher level of attention 
																																																								
646 COM(2012)21.	
647 COM(2008)162. 
648 For more information about the different steps of the scrutiny process of these cases, see appendix V. 
649 Rees-Mogg, 22nd June 2015, Hopkins, 30th June 2015, Clayton, 21st July 2015, Luk, 4th August 2015. 
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and scrutiny. Other issues, like cod recovery are more standard issues, 
relative obscure.’650 
‘This topic was getting more flag in 2011, we got alarmed about it. The fish 
stocks were devastated.’ 
‘There was a library note, produced by the HC Library office on how serious 
it was. Terrible devastation of fish stocks.’651 
‘The cod recovery plan had already been dealt with before and there was less 
at stake than in the reform of the CFP.’652 
When comparing C1a and C2a, it is evident again that the multi-party condition does 
not make a difference with regard to the use of formal powers by the NP. This pair-wise 
comparison also confirms that salience seems to be a more relevant condition for NPs to 
make use of  formal powers than the partisan composition condition. In conclusion, all 
different used methods show that the hypothesis arguing that a multi-party government 
is a favourable condition for NPs to increase their measurable impact on government 
EU policy position cannot be confirmed with any evidence. 
This shadow pair-wise comparison also compared the case of a file that was adopted 
after the Lisbon Treaty had come into force (C1a), while the second took place before 
the Lisbon Treaty (C2a). When comparing C2a (single party, pre-Lisbon) to C2 (single 
party, post-Lisbon), there seem to be similar levels of formal powers used in both cases 
(C2 refers the file to a European Committee A) and both committees use some ESC 
meetings before the Council meetings. The Lisbon factor has not changed the levels of 
scrutiny in these files. The four different cases used to analyse the partisan composition 
condition show very clearly which conditions are at work (salience) and which are not 
(partisan composition, Eurosceptic government and Lisbon).  
However, as we have seen, the interviewees also indicated that other reasons, such as 
the more Eurosceptic ESC during the multi-party government increased the use of 
formal powers. This is in line with the expected causal process in the second hypothesis 
of this thesis which looks at the relationship between the use of formal powers leading 
																																																								
650 Smith, 2nd July 2015. 
651 Hopkins, 30th June 2015. 
652 Benyon, 25th June 2015.	
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to an increased impact where the government depends on a Eurosceptic party. The next 
Chapter will look into the presence of this Eurosceptic condition.  
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Table 10 Outcome of the Pair-wise Comparison between Case 1 and Case 2 
Seven steps of OLP 
 
Use of formal powers 
CASE  1 (multi-party 
gov) 
Use of formal powers 
CASE 2 (single party gov) 
1: publication X X 
2: eight weeks - Reception of EM (right to 
information) 
X 
3: first influence phase - Different meetings with 
government (including 
expression of opinions) 
- Inclusion of sectoral committee 
(Committee A) 
- Several requests for further 
information 
- Reception of several letters 
(right to information) 
- Expression of opinion 
regarding the procedures. 
- Inquiry EFRAC 
- Reception of EM 
- Meeting ESC 
- Involvement of sectoral 
committee 
- Question to government 
(contents) 
 
4: first control phase X - No information on outcome of 
Council meeting. 
- Reception of second EM + IA 
- Letter from government. 
5: second influence phase - Reception of government letter 
(information) 
- Letter to Gov. 
 
- Meeting ESC 
- Plenary meeting 
- Meeting European Committee 
A with Gov. 
6: second control phase - Correspondence with 
Government 
- Letter about the outcome of the 
Council meeting. 
7: adoption X X 
IMPACT Weak Weak 
Table 11 Outcome of the Pair-wise Comparison between Case 1a and Case 2a 
Seven steps of OLP 
 
Use of formal powers 
CASE IA (multi party) 
Use of formal powers 
CASE IIA (single party + 
pre Lisbon) 
1: publication X X 
2: eight weeks X X 
3: first influence phase EM 
ESC meeting 
X 
4: first control phase X EM 
Letter government 
Meeting ESC 
 
5: second influence phase X X 
6: second control phase X Letter government 
IA government 
Extra influence phase X ESC meeting 
Extra control phase X 2 letter government 
ESC meeting 
7: adoption X X 
IMPACT Weak Weak 
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Chapter 6 
Euro-scepticism 
6.1 Introduction 
Turning to the next explanatory factor, this second Chapter of the empirical analysis 
deals with the use of formal powers by the Dutch Second Chamber (SC) when 
scrutinising a government depending on Eurosceptic support (the Rutte I coalition 
2010-2012) in a pair-wise comparison with the use of formal powers by the same NP, 
and a government that does not depend on Eurosceptic support (Rutte II 2012 -
present).653 The partisan composition variable will be constant654 and the salience655 and 
Lisbon656 variables are absent for both cases in this comparison. The Dutch NP is 
considered to be a policy-shaper (see Chapter 5.4.1.1) with moderate formal powers 
which, however, consists mostly of ex ante influence mechanisms, allowing the NP 
more chances to impact its government’s EU policy position. The NP is, however, 
expected to increase its impact even further in the case of the scrutiny of a coalition 
government which is dependent on a Eurosceptic party. 
The cases have been selected on the independent variable. In other words, they have 
been chosen based upon the presence in the first case and absence in the second of the 
Eurosceptic condition. The topics that were scrutinised both cover the European 
Railways Policy, but during different governments. 
More specifically, the first selected EU legislative file (C3) had to start during the Rutte 
I government, 2010-2012, which consisted of the VVD, the liberal party, the CDA, 
Christian-Democrat Party, along with the so-called ‘tolerating’ support of the PVV657 
																																																								
653 For more information on the political parties in the Netherlands, see Appendix IV. 
654 In both cases the parliament scrutinises a multi-party government.  
655 No references are made to this topic in any of the governing party manifestos (Liberals, Christian 
Democrats with the support of the Party for Freedom) which are used as an indicator to measure ‘salience 
of the electorate’, and transport does not appear to be one of the major concerns of Dutch citizens in the 
years of publication of EU proposals according to the Euro-Barometer (Standard Euro-barometer 74, 
2010, and 78, 2012, question 7 the Netherlands). 
656 Although the Lisbon Treaty came into force in 2009, a year before the publication of this EU 
legislative proposal, the NP does not make use of its new powers for this EU legislative file. This is the 
same for case 4 which stabilises this variable.		
657 A Eurosceptic anti-Islam party (Kanne, 2011:31). 
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and the Party for Freedom658. None of these parties gave any attention to the First 
Railway Package in their political party manifestos, making the file non-salient to the 
electorate based upon the indicators (see Chapter 4.3.3). However, the VVD and CDA 
differ from the PVV principally when it comes to issues such as an internal market for 
railways - the PVV does not want the EU to deal with anything related to the EU659,  
although in 2010 its party programme is still mostly anti-Islam focused, it also opposed 
EU integration660 - which is covered by this topic. It therefore seemed to be a topic 
where the chance of having different opinions within government and between 
government and the NP, is highly likely. 
The second case (C4) also deals with European railways, but this time it is the Fourth 
European Railway Package being scrutinised by the NP during the coalition government 
of Rutte II which came into power in 2012 and consists of a coalition between the 
liberals (VVD) and social-democrats (PvdA). Again, none of the political parties in the 
coalition government661 refer to the importance of railways in their party manifestos, but 
as the topic covers issues related to the free market of railways, it is expected that the 
coalition partners in government and the NP have opposing views on this topic (as the 
coalition consists of a left wing and right wing party) which might facilitate the attempt 
to distinguish parliamentary impact (or its lack).  
The first section of this Chapter begins with the analysis of the first case (C3), 
consisting of tracing the processes during the seven steps of the OLP added with data 
extracted from interviews. It is followed by a similar analysis of the second case (C4), 
and will be concluded by a pair-wise comparison between the two cases. In order to 
increase the internal validity of the analysis, the outcome of the comparison is compared 
to the use of formal powers in two other cases, one dealing with the scrutiny of the 
Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP), which was scrutinised during Rutte I (2010-2012) 
and the other case covered the Port Services Directive (PSD), which was scrutinised 
during Rutte II (2012-present). 
																																																								
658 After the Dutch General Elections of 2010, the VVD became the biggest party. It tried to form a 
coalition with the CDA, but as it ended up in a minority government, it needed the support of a third 
party. The PVV did not physically enter government, but did form part of it by actively giving support. In 
other words, it ‘tolerated’ the government. This was the first, and so far only, time in Dutch political 
history that such a construction had to be invented to create a ‘stable’ coalition between different political 
parties.  
659 Kanne, 2011:243. 
660 Rijksuniversiteit Groningen (RUG), Documentation Centre for Dutch Political Parties: 
http://dnpp.ub.rug.nl/pp/pvv 
661 VVD Verkiezingsprogramma, 2012, PvdA Verkiezingsprogramma 2012.	
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6.2 The Draft Directive on the First Railway Package 
(COM(2010)475662) 
6.2.1 Party policy positions on EU Railway Packages 
Although none of the major (those with two seats or more in the NP) political parties in 
the SC refer to the first Railway Package in their party manifestos in 2010, opposing 
positions during the negotiations on this file are expected due to the varying positions of 
the political parties in parliament on the extent to which the internal market should 
further develop and in what areas. This is part of the contents of this legislative file, see 
also table 12. 
Table 12 Party policy positions on the European Railways in the Netherlands.663 
VVD CDA PVV PvdA D66 GL SP 
 
In favour of 
more 
internal 
market and 
more 
competition 
in the field 
of 
railways.664 
In favour of 
more 
internal 
market and 
more 
competition 
in the field 
of 
railways665 
In favour of 
competition 
of 
railways666, 
but against 
further 
transfer of 
powers to 
EU.667 
Pro EU 
integration, 
but against 
transfer of 
public 
procurement 
to EU 
level668, like 
the railways. 
This should 
remain in 
hands of the 
member 
states.669 
Pro EU 
integration 
and pro- 
compe-
tition. 
Supports 
internal 
market for 
railways. 
670 
Pro EU 
party, but 
believes that 
public 
services, 
such as the 
railways, 
should 
remain 
under the 
control of 
the member 
states.671 
Anti-EU party 
and against 
internal 
market and 
competition. 
Public matters, 
such as the 
railways are a 
matter for the 
member states 
to decide 
upon.672 
   
																																																								
662 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1436351018980&uri=CELEX:52010PC0475 
663 As no change in the positions of the political parties took place in this field since 2010, only one 
overview of party political positions for the two cases is given. 
664 www.vvd.nl/standpunten 
665 WRR, Dertig jaar privatisering, verzelfstandiging en marktwerking, Amsterdam University Press, 
Amsterdam 2012, p.35. 
666 www.deondernemer.nl , 24th November 2010, Tweede Kamer wil af van Prorail. 
667 Although the PVV was in 2010 mainly an anti-Islam party, it also pleaded for a return of powers from 
the EU back to the member states (see its party manifesto, 2010, p. 17).  
668 TK, 21 501-33, nr. 341, 6th October 2011. 
669 PVDA, verkiezingsprogramma 2010, 2010, p.46. 
670 TK, 21 501-33, nr. 329, 8th July 2011, p. 16-17. 
671 WRR, Dertig jaar privatisering, verzelfstandiging en marktwerking, Amsterdam University Press, 
Amsterdam 2012, p.51.	
672 TK, 21 501-33, nr. 329, 8th July 2011, p.3. 
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6.2.2 Expected causal process 
Because the NP must scrutinise governments depending on Eurosceptic support 
(hereafter: ‘Eurosceptic government’), it is expected that the NP will have more chances 
their government’s EU policy position, since the three coalition partners in this case do 
not agree on EU issues generally and are therefore more likely to have to accept 
compromises for which they need parliamentary support. The following causal process 
in this case is therefore expected: 
Government with Eurosceptic coalition partner ! EU issues appear more often on the 
government agenda ! contention in government! government needs support from NP 
! discussions in NP by use of formal powers (committee meetings, plenary meetings 
coalition partners) ! parliamentary parties give advice with either several or few 
formal mechanisms ! Government is dependent on NP for support to gain a majority 
! NP’s position must be adopted by government to get support for its compromise ! 
parliamentary impact. 
6.2.3 Background of the proposal 1st Railway Package 
The current draft directive was published to revise the First Railway Package published 
in 2001. The new proposal deals with suggestions to improve an adequate finance 
system of, and charging for, all railway infrastructures, the conditions of competition on 
the railway market, and the organisational reforms needed to ensure appropriate 
supervision of the market. The overall objective of the proposal is the removal of 
obstacles for an improved functioning of the internal market in the European Railways. 
This will have to improve the competitiveness of goods and international passengers 
transport via the railways.673 
6.2.4 Parliamentary scrutiny of the EU file during the 7 steps of the OLP674 
This section discusses all different steps of the OLP of the EU legislative file regarding 
the First Railway Package and whether the SC used its formal powers to either 
influence and/or control their government’s EU policy position at any point of the 
scrutiny and if so, whether its attempts had any effect. 																																																								
673 See COM(2010)475.	
674 For more information on these steps, see Appendix I and II. 
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Step 1: Publication 
 
The draft directive is published on 17th September 2010675 and forwarded to the EP and 
NPs. It is published under the OLP. 
Step 2: NPs have eight weeks to respond (deadline: 16 November 2010) 
To be able to confirm the causal mechanism during this stage, evidence must be found 
of increased levels of scrutiny676 by the NP as a consequence of the Eurosceptic 
government. During this stage, not much concrete evidence is expected to be found, 
other than potentially the initial government position. This is not published until 27th 
October 2010 during the first round of the ex ante influence phase. However, from the 
different coalition partners it is known that the VVD677 and CDA678 are in favour of a 
further liberalisation of the internal market by the EU, including the field of railways.679 
However, the third party upon which this coalition government depends, the PVV680, is 
a more Eurosceptic one, and opposes interference from the EU.681 From the opposition 
parties in parliament, it is known that the majority of parties are against further 
liberalisation (PvdA682, SP683, GroenLinks684 and the pro-animal party) while other, 
smaller opposition parties, such as D66685 and the SGP686 are supportive of further 
liberalisation. 
The NP shows no objections against the publication of this EU legislative file (none of 
the EU NPs show any objections). 
																																																								
675 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/HIS/?uri=CELEX:52010PC0475&qid=1436383048067 
676 More than one meeting between the NP and government, during which the NP reveals its opinion and 
tries to influence the government to include this opinion into the Council negotiations.  
677 The Liberals and the biggest party in the coalition. 
678 The Christian Democrats. 
679 For more information on the political parties in the Dutch SC, see appendix IV.  
680 Party for Freedom. 
681 http://www.parlement.com/id/vhnnmt7m4rqi/partij_voor_de_vrijheid_pvv 
682 Social Democrats. 
683 Socialist Party.  
684 Green Left. 
685 Democrats (centre). 
686 Reformed Protestant Party.	
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Step 3: Ex ante influence phase 
To be able to confirm the causal mechanism during this stage, evidence must be found 
showing increased levels of scrutiny by the NP (extra use of formal powers)687; a 
consequence of the government coalition partners not agreeing with each other on the 
contents of a legislative file. 
On 11th October 2010 the government sends the agenda of the Transport Council of 15th 
October 2010 to Parliament.688 It reports that at this stage the recently published First 
Railway Package will not be discussed in great detail as yet.689 
Following on from that, on 12th October 2010, the I&E Committee sent several 
questions to the Secretary of State, including questions related to the draft directive 
regarding the revision of the First Railway Package.690 These questions include opinions 
expressed by MPs and are therefore considered to be the first position of the SC in this 
case. 
The Liberal party691 (which is in government) show support for the revision of the 
directive, but has a few questions to the Minister (therefore using its formal powers to 
gain more information). The party queries whether it would be better to make a clear 
distinction between the European railway routes and the more local and regional ones. 
The party, furthermore, is of the opinion that it would be better to separate infrastructure 
and railways, such as is done between ProRail692 and the NS693 in the Netherlands.694 
This is a clear sign of a party trying to have an impact on the government’s position. 
Interesting though, is that it is made by the party already in government and not by the 
opposition. 
The PVV, the Party for Freedom (Eurosceptic party which supports the government) 
welcomes the EU proposals to increase European supervision.695 There are member 
																																																								
687 The NP is considered to use more than its normal formal powers if it has one or more meetings with 
the government during one of the OLP steps whereby it explicitly expresses its opinion on the file. 
688 TK, 21 501-33, nr. 295, 11th October 2010. 
689 Ibid., p.2. 
690 TK, 21 501-33, nr. 297, 12th October 2010. 
691 VVD. 
692 Organisation in the Netherlands responsible for the railway network.  
693 Dutch National Railways. 
694 TK, 21 501-33, nr. 297, 12th October 2010, p.3. 
695 Ibid., p.4.	
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states which now do not invest enough in the maintenance of railways.696 The PVV, 
however, asks of government to what extent the current proposals will be able to 
enforce these newer suggestions.697 The PVV supports the anchoring of EU directives 
into national legislation, but only when there is a guarantee that sufficient actions will 
be taken against member states that are not doing enough.698 
It is remarkable that the only two political parties that ask questions of the Minister are 
those parties which are in government and that they did so even before the publication 
of the first position of the government. The opposition does not take advantage of the 
different views of two coalition partners and makes no attempt to influence the 
government. When speaking about this to Mr Atsma, the responsible Minister at the 
time, he argued that this was a technical dossier which did not really cut along party 
lines. MPs chose therefore to raise questions about technical details rather than 
changing the whole EU proposal. 699 
Although the Eurosceptic party intervenes, it does not do so in order to question the EU 
as such and supports the proposal. It only wishes to improve it. In other words, despite 
the attempts to create parliamentary impact, this is unlikely to be due to the Eurosceptic 
support on which the government depends. 
The Secretary of State gives the following answers to MP questions by letter. According 
to the Dutch Government of the time, the EC does not distinguish between international 
and more local and regional railway routes.700 It is, however, possible for member states 
to exclude regional networks from the Directive. Besides, the Secretary of State does 
not think it useful to draw such a distinction, as doing so would hinder an optimal train 
service.701 
With regard to the separation of the railways and the management of the infrastructure, 
the EC has begun legal procedures against those member states that have not yet 
correctly implemented the previous first Railway Package. Some of these procedures 
deal with the independence of the infrastructure manager. In other words, at this stage it 
																																																								
696 Ibid., p.4 
697 Ibid. 
698 Ibid. 
699 Atsma, 29th May 2015 
700 TK, 21 501-33, nr. 297, 12th October 2010, p.8. 
701 Ibid.	
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does not choose to include additional legislation in this field, but rather enforce 
compliance via the European Court of Justice.702 
Because of these existing cases against failing member states, the government does not 
think it would be appropriate to raise the issue now in the Council.703 The Secretary of 
State does not support parliamentary attempts to influence, even if it comes from one of 
the government’s own parties. 
Publication of the EM 
On 27th October 2010, the Dutch government publishes its ‘fiche’704, hereafter EM, 
regarding this legislative file which includes its own opinion and an assessment of 
implications for the Netherlands.705 This is considered to be the first governmental 
position in this case.  
There could be financial consequences for the Netherlands, as some of the costs could 
be paid for by the state and the Dutch Government would need to further assess this, 
including the consequences for business and citizens (such as ticket prices).706 The 
Dutch government is in principle positive about the proposal. In the evaluation of the 
domestic railways, similar topics emerged, such as capacity management, compensation 
for use and supervision of interests. 707 
In the European negotiations, the Dutch government says it will focus on the several 
issues, such as limitation of administrative burdens, sovereign influence of member 
states on further regulation of the directive, and in particular the question of financial 
implications for the state.708 The state needs to keep the space in which to direct railway 
companies through shareholders and supervision of the railways needs to increase in the 
field of non-discrimination of railway companies. The member states also need to keep 
																																																								
702 Ibid., p.8. 
703 Ibid., p.8-9. 
704 A fiche is the Dutch version of an explanatory memorandum. It includes the first position of the 
government regarding an EU proposal and refers to possible financial and juridical consequences for the 
Netherlands.  
705 TK, 22 112, nr. 1073, 27th October 2010.  
706 Ibid., par.5. 
707 Ibid., par. 9. 
708 Ibid.	
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enough space to buy certain tools with the aim of improving their own railways.709 No 
reference is made to any of the issues raised by the MPs on 12th October 2010. 
The first stage for the NP to influence its government with its views on the First 
Railway Package ends here. As this case was dealt with after the Lisbon Treaty came 
into force, the Dutch SC scrutinises its government before the Transport Council710. The 
MPs make use of this right in this case but, interestingly, it is not the opposition that 
exercises its right but rather, two of the coalition parties in government. The PVV and 
the VVD - two parties from which opposing views on the contents of this legislative file 
were expected - ask the government some more technical questions and there is no 
proof of disagreement (at parliamentary level). In other words, although the governing 
parties hold opposing views on EU liberalisation, in the NP the scrutiny of the 
government is limited to technical issues (rather than political ones). There is evidence 
of the NP making extra efforts to scrutinise the government on this file (as it writes a 
letter with its views and questions to the government even before the EM has been 
published). However, the points raised in these questions are mostly of a technical 
nature or request clarification. Interviews confirm that the issue of the European 
Railways was not such a hot topic during the First Railway Package. It only received 
more attention during the Fourth Railway Package. According to Van Dongen, 
government representative of the Railways, the First Railways Package was not a 
controversial debate and there was only criticism on the execution of the file, but not on 
the contents. During the First Railway Package no real competences were transferred to 
the EU level, according to Van Dongen.711 
Step 4: Ex post control phase 
After the Transport Council of 15th October 2010712, the Government informs the SC 
about the outcome of the Council meeting via a letter written on 23 November 2010713 
(part of parliamentary formal powers), but no reference is made nor questions asked 
about the First Railway Package. 
																																																								
709 Ibid., par. 9. 
710 After the Lisbon Treaty came into force, the scrutiny of the Dutch government was changed from after 
the Council meeting to before it. 
711 Van Dongen, 3rd June 2015. 
712 Press Release, 3037th Council meeting, Transport, Telecommunications and Energy, Luxembourg, 15th 
October 2010.	
713 TK, 21 501-33, nr. 300, 23rd November 2010. 
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During this stage extra scrutiny was expected which would check whether the 
government had taken into account the position of the NP, but no more than formal 
procedures are followed which is contradictory to the expected causal process. 
Step 5: Ex ante influence phase 
To confirm the causal mechanism at this stage, evidence is needed showing increased 
levels of scrutiny714 as a consequence of the government coalition partners having 
different views on the EU. This is mainly because the coalition government is 
dependent upon a Eurosceptic party. This increases the likelihood of EU topics being 
discussed compared with a coalition government which only consists of traditional 
political parties. This would favour the maintenance of the status quo regarding EU 
issues (see Chapter 3.4.2). 
On 26th November 2010, the government sends a letter to parliament to inform it about 
the agenda of the 2nd December Transport Council715 (part of the parliamentary formal 
powers consisting of receiving timely information). On 30th November 2010, the I&E 
Committee meets with the Secretary of State to discuss the government’s input into the 
Council meeting. Regarding the revision of the First Railway Package, a progress report 
is due for publication by the EC.716 
Mr Monasch MP (PvdA717, opposition) argues that the social democrats are not in 
favour of further liberalising the domestic railway market.718 The Dutch market is 
considered too small to be dominated by a few players, especially if these would be 
state companies from other countries. The Dutch councils, provinces and the national 
authorities will have to decide themselves how to procure passenger transport. The main 
railway line, being in the hands of the state, should, according to the Social Democrats, 
not be subject to procurement at all.719 Monasch, therefore, argues that the Minister 
should give a clear signal to Brussels. The secretary of state should make it clear in 
Brussels that the SNCF and the Deutsche Bahn would not be able to claim the Dutch 
																																																								
714 The NP is considered to use more than its normal formal powers if it has one or more meetings with 
the government during one of the OLP steps whereby it explicitly expresses its opinion on the file (see 
Chapter 3.3 regarding the operationalisation of the causal mechanisms). 
715 TK, 21 501-33, nr. 301, 26th November 2010. 
716 TK, 21 501-33, nr. 303, 30th November 2010. 
717 Social-Democrats. 
718 TK, 21 501-33, nr. 303, 30th November 2010, p.3-4.	
719 Ibid. 
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main railway network. It seeks firm promises in this respect from the Secretary of 
State.720 
The PvdA supports the rules for noise reduction, but it wishes to keep the possibility of 
tariff differentiation to itself.721 This could result in paying more for noisy trains. 
This contribution contains clear left wing signs from the opposition, trying to slow 
down its right wing government. However, it also shows signs of further EU integration 
debate, namely the extent to which it is up to the EU or the member states to discuss 
public procurement issues.722 
The social democratic arguments provoked a discussion between the CDA723 
(government party) and the PvdA at parliamentary level.724 The CDA has no problem 
with private procurement at all and does not agree with the PvdA that the NS should 
always receive the concession. The viewpoint of the CDA is that if the NS does not 
supply as asked, the contract should be given elsewhere. The CDA hereby brings the 
discussion along the left-right division and away from EU integration division725 (which 
could potentially create a division in coalition of which the CDA is a member). 
The CDA MP, Mr Rouwe, asked the Secretary of State to give the government’s 
opinion on procurement.726 The Secretary of State is a member of the liberal party 
(VVD) which is known for its positive views on open markets including in the field of 
public procurement. The CDA is backed by the government on this.727 Besides, Mr 
Rouwe asked the Secretary of State to give more information on the current government 
position on separating railway management and actual transport.728 The CDA does not 
support the ‘economic balance’ as suggested in article 10 and 11 of the regulation and 
would like to hear the Secretary of State’s position.729 The CDA MP furthermore refers 
to some capacities that should not be in hands of the EC.730 The CDA MP used its 
formal powers to gain more information and push for some technical changes, but (as a 
coalition partner) it does not challenge the government’s input or widen the debate 
along the principle right/left pro/against further EU integration cleavage. 
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The Secretary of State, Mrs Schulz, replies that procurement is not on the agenda of the 
next Transport Council. However, since it might come on the agenda later, it is good to 
know the views of MPs already.731 Domestically, she primarily wants to give the 
concession to the Dutch National Railways (NS), but only if its offer is good enough. 
This answer contains a compromise, as she meets the opposition halfway without 
leaving her own party’s ideological convictions (private procurement if the NS can not 
deliver).732 
With regard to the question of Monasch in relation to the rules for noise reduction, she 
supports decreasing the reductions for noisy trains. She adds that she will do her best for 
this in Brussels. In other words, the Minister takes the point of the Christian Democrat 
party (party in government), but also does not rule out including the position of the 
opposition once the item appears on the agenda.733 
The compromise as suggested by Schulz does not go far enough for the opposition. The 
PvdA comments that it still wants to underline that Dutch authorities should decide who 
is responsible for the main rail line.734 Such decisions should not be in hands of the EC, 
a very important point for them.735 The Eurosceptic partner in government follows a 
neo-liberal agenda when it comes to liberalising public services736, but might support 
the opposition in its point that it is up to the national member state to decide on 
domestic railways and that the EC has nothing to do with this. This is a clear attempt to 
try to have an impact, as the opposition insists on this one point and therefore uses more 
than its standard formal powers. 
The CDA reacts to the PvdA by saying that the Secretary of State has already indicated 
that it will be in discussion with ProRail and the NS. She also correctly says that she 
will not give the contract to the NS unconditionally. That is the best attitude in the 
opinion of the CDA.737 The coalition government partner here also uses more than its 
formal powers by basically responding on behalf of the government and thereby 
adapting her wording and defending the government position.738 In other words, rather 
than having a debate between the government and the NP, it is a debate that clearly cuts 
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along party lines in which the government parties defend the liberalisation view and 
(part of) the opposition opposes this. 
The Secretary of State, Schultz, replied that her efforts in Brussels would focus on that 
it should be up to the member states to decide whether or not they will procure. Schulz 
agrees that this should remain a national choice:739 
‘The PvdA can be convinced that I will not accept compulsory 
procurement’.740 
The Secretary of State agrees with the opposition here and it can be argued that the 
efforts of the opposition have been successful. 
At the end of this stage, it can be seen that there are different views between coalition 
and opposition parties within the NP. The government, however, is eventually open to 
the viewpoint of the opposition, in the sense that it will not agree with the EC gaining 
responsibility for all procurement issues, even if that means (part of) her ideological 
views. Although there seems to be an intermediate impact here (one part of the NP’s 
wishes are taken over), there are no signs that this could be a consequence of the 
government not internally agreeing with the Eurosceptic party supporting the coalition. 
Interviews showed that the government did not change its position as a consequence of 
the NP, but did take parliamentary views on board, of which it was aware during the 
Council meetings. Government representatives also argued that they were more inclined 
to take parliamentary views on board as it was a minority government and therefore 
more dependent on the support of the opposition.741 
Step 6 Ex post control step 
At this stage, it is expected that the government will give feedback to the Parliament 
regarding the input it has given to the Council meeting, and to what extent it has been 
able to include the NP’s priorities. 
On 2nd December 2010 a Transport Council takes place.742 On 19th January 2011, the 
government sends a letter to parliament to inform it about the outcome of the meeting 
(part of the NP’s formal powers).743 The Council meeting also discussed the First 																																																								
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Railway Package. According to the Dutch government, it is important to set up a long-
term strategy for infrastructure development. All member states point out the 
importance of maintaining their own budget system. With regard to the second point, 
the Netherlands indicated that decreasing the noise levels is important, also because the 
differentiation of usage compensation. A crucial element for the Netherlands is getting 
‘LL-brake blocks’ which are less noisy.744 This point had been raised by the opposition 
at several points during the scrutiny process, but is also part of the government’s initial 
position.745 The Netherlands furthermore underlined the importance of research to 
prohibit the use of noisy railway material by 2020.746 
With regard to the third point, the EC suggests a compulsory temporary reduction for 
train engines equipped with ETCS. The Netherlands, like many other EU member 
states, does not support such a compulsory reduction. It does, however, think that 
reduction could be an option to be applied when it is effective. 747 
The Dutch government has shown that it has done its best to include parliamentary 
concerns, such as the reward of noiseless material. No reference is made to public 
procurement, as this was not part of the agenda of the Council. 
Extra ex ante influence phase 
During this case the NP gets extra stages during which it has a chance of having an 
impact on its government’s position regarding EU Legislative files. However, this is a 
consequence of the EU procedure, which for this case consists of two readings and more 
transport councils during which the case is discussed. In other words, it is not the 
consequence of higher activity levels of the NP. This stage will look for evidence of 
higher levels of scrutiny as a consequence of the Eurosceptic coalition government not 
agreeing on files related to EU integration. 
On 30th May 2011, the Secretary of State wrote a letter to parliament to inform it about 
the next Transport Council to be held on 16th June 2011 which would deal with the First 
Railway Package as well.748 
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The Council tries to reach a general orientation on the First Railway Package. In this 
last phase of negotiations, there are two remaining priorities for the Netherlands. First of 
all, there are the conditions for giving access to additional services, and secondly, 
stimulating the use of noiseless railway material through the possibility of 
differentiation of the usage compensation.749 
On 9th June 2011, the I&E Committee and the EAC meets with the Secretary of State to 
discuss the upcoming Transport Council of 16th June 2011.750 Some MPs refer to the 
First Railway Package during this meeting. The VVD (coalition partner), for example, 
expresses its worry about the usage compensation in the EC proposal for the First 
Railway Package.751 This is very different from the situation in the Netherlands. The 
VVD asks the Secretary of State for clarification.752 The noise issue is also a problem, 
but there does not seem to be a majority to deal with this among member states.753 
D66754 (opposition) also refers to the First Railway Package; it would also like to know 
of any updates in the field of compensation for the use of more quiet material. It asks 
the Minister to indicate what the objections are amongst other member states.755 The 
MP from D66, Van Veldhoven, also asks if it would be possible to set up bilateral 
agreements with some member states as long as there is no agreement at EU level on 
this matter.756 
The Minister replies that the issue about reducing noise is only shared by the 
Netherlands and Germany. Reasons for not wanting this vary by member state. The 
Dutch government is in favour of making noisy material illegal. In the end, the Council 
decides to keep applying this differentiation nationally, which has been successful.757 
During this meeting, only technical points are raised and the concerns of the Social 
Democrat opposition, namely the compulsory procurement, are no longer referred to. 
Evidence is found of technical comments made by MPs, whereby most of these 
outstanding issues seem to be cross-cutting cleavages. There is no written evidence of 
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any extra input by MPs. No attempt to influence or control, which means that the causal 
mechanism is not confirmed at this stage. 
Extra ex post control phase 
On 7th July 2011, the government sends a letter to parliament to inform it about the 
outcome of the 16th June 2011 Council.758 The Council reached a general orientation on 
the Revision of the First Railway Package and included only a short discussion 
regarding the compensation of usage and how to calculate this. The compromise of the 
EU Presidency includes a transfer period of five years, during which the EC will play an 
important monitoring role.759 The Secretary of State points out in her letter that during 
her intervention, she stressed the importance of further rules regarding the access to 
additional services. She is also disappointed about the lack of ambition regarding noise 
nuisance. She indicates that she will endeavour to establish bilateral agreements with 
neighbouring countries to deal with this issue. 760 
This seems to be an ordinary ex post control stage, during which the NP is informed on 
the outcome of the Council and the input made by the Dutch government. The NP does 
not react and there is no evidence of increased scrutiny by the NP at this stage. This is 
probably due to the switch to a more technical debate at this stage and the opposition 
may have felt that there is less to gain, as these are issues on which the coalition most 
likely will agree anyway. However, the Secretary of State does indicate that she will do 
her best to set up bilateral agreements on noise reduction with neighbouring countries, 
as requested by the opposition. There is a sign of intermediate impact here, as the 
government directly gives a follow-up to an initiative of the opposition (D66). As 
interviewees indicated, the government felt the need to do so because of the minority 
government, not because of the PVV (this topic was not a topic where the PVV had any 
objections, as step 3 shows as well.761 In other words, although the causal process is 
confirmed here, it cannot be linked to the Eurosceptic variable.  
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Extra ex ante influence step 
During this extra ex ante influence stage for the NP, evidence must be found showing 
that the NP makes use of extra possibilities to scrutinise its government because of 
internal disagreement within government about the extent of further liberalisation in this 
field as a consequence of having a Eurosceptic coalition government. 
On 20th September 2011, the government sends a letter to the SC to inform it about the 
agenda of the Transport Council of 6th October 2011.762 On 30th September 2011, the 
I&E Committee sends some questions to the Minister regarding the First Railway 
Package and other items to be discussed at that meeting.763 
The Social Democrats764 (opposition) show concern about the level of space that the 
government has given the Council with regard to opening up the Dutch Railway 
market.765 The Secretary of State had previously indicated that a condition for opening 
up the market is that there should be enough space to make national choices with regard 
to public procurement.766 The Social Democratic MP now asks the Secretary of State to 
indicate whether she meant that it is always up to the member states to decide how the 
main railway network will be procured. The party furthermore supports the government 
in its efforts to seek attention for noise nuisance.767 
The Party for Freedom768 (tolerating coalition partner in government769) makes more 
general comments about the government’s contribution to the Transport Council of 6th 
October 2011. The MPs of the PVV had supported the critical position of the 
government during the last Transport Council after being pushed by the PVV 
fraction.770 It might have been surprising that it gained support from many other 
member states. The PVV argued that it is happy that the Dutch Secretary of State has 
had the courage to open her mouth, contrary to many of those ‘Europhile nodding 
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politicians’, but not every Minister in the EU is blessed with the advice of a sensible 
and critical party as the PVV on her side.771 
The Minister responds in a letter that the majority of the member states do not support 
the Dutch priority of tackling noise. She will endeavour to cooperate bilaterally with 
some other member states in this field. She is not more explicit about the public 
procurement request from the opposition.772 
Parliamentary activity in this field is shown and the government displays interest in the 
inclusion of parliamentary comments into future negotiations in the Council 
(bilaterally). The discussion has been reduced to a technical one and no longer deals 
with issues over which the opposition can score points or widen any possible gaps 
between the coalition partners, such as those along the left/right or pro/against EU 
cleavage. 
Extra Ex post control phase 
On 26th October 2011773, the Secretary of State sends a letter to the SC to inform it 
about the outcome of the Transport Council of 6th October 2011. No reference is made 
to any discussions about the First Railway Package. 
No evidence is found at this stage showing any attempts by the NP to hold its 
government to account on any discussions after the Transport Council. 
Extra step of ex ante influence 
On 1st December 2011, the government sends the agenda of the next Transport Council 
to Parliament.774 It thereby explained that the Dutch government supported the 
compromise proposal on the First Railway Package in general lines.775 
On 6th December 2011, the I&E Committee met with the Secretary of State, Schultz, to 
discuss the next Transport Council scheduled for 12th December 2011 which would 
table the First Railway Package to the Agenda.776 The VVD wants to know from the 																																																								
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government whether the Netherlands already complies with other proposals of the EC, 
such as those of long-term contracts for infrastructure management. 777 
The Social-Democrats778 (in opposition) move the discussion away from the technical 
debate and ask more about the views of other member states regarding the levels of 
liberalisation of railways.779 The Dutch Social Democrats are sceptical about the 
separation of Prorail and the NS, and now that the EU has come up with similar 
proposals, it might be good for the Minister to tell other member states about the Dutch 
experience.780 
The Socialist Party781 (in opposition) was mainly worried about the attendance of the 
upcoming, important, Transport Council meeting. 
‘The next Transport Council meeting will discuss the future European 
transport network of the EU, which will cost the EC until 2020 at least 31.7 
billion Euros ... For that reason it is important that the Netherlands will send 
a political representative, so not like the Transport Council of 6th October. I 
would like to hear from the Minister whether this is the case’.782 
The opposition shows that it wishes the government to attend the Council meetings, 
which is a clear sign of a delegatory relationship during this stage of the scrutiny (use 
of formal powers). 
The Secretary of State, Mrs Schulz (VVD), responded to these questions. There will 
not be a new discussion about the contents of the First Railway Package during the 
second reading, she states.783 She further explained that she does not expect that the 
separation between transport and structure will lead to any problems. The Netherlands 
already fulfils the standards of current EU proposals. For the Dutch government it was 
a priority to deal with the noise nuisance but is pretty much alone in this, as other 
member states are worried what this could mean for their material.784 
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The last Council meeting did not discuss member states’ views on liberalisation, as the 
current proposal does not cover this.785 
The opposition does not accept the postponement of the discussion regarding 
liberalisation and the Social Democrat MP repeats his request to share the bad 
experiences of the Netherlands in the Council as a consequence of the separation of the 
NS and Prorail, as the EU might make the same mistake.786 The opposition thereby 
uses more than its formal powers, as it continues to stress the importance of this topic. 
The Secretary of State argues, however, that not everybody agrees that the separation 
of ProRail and the NS has been so bad.787 Some think that it is working really well and 
that maybe some parts need to be repaired. Schulz refuses to say that it has been 
unsuccessful because she does not believe that story.788 Once they discuss the domestic 
issue of the railways, it is possible that the SC adopts a different position. She thereby 
rejects the request of the opposition. She has already told the Chamber that she has not 
managed to get an agreement about noise nuisance.789 She is now trying to set up some 
bilateral rules in this field (the corridor Rotterdam-Genova) with Germany, Switzerland 
and Italy. During their previous discussions in the Council about the First Railway 
Package, she mentioned the need for space to make national choices for or against 
procurement (impact) and that far-reaching opening of the market can only happen if 
there is enough clarity about the staff.790 From the Secretary of State’s responses, it 
appears that there is room for contributions from the opposition, after making extra use 
of their formal powers. Although her party favours an open market, she does raise the 
issue of public procurement in the Council as requested by the opposition and is also 
supportive of setting up bilateral agreements. 
On 7th December 2011, the clerk of the I&E Committee sent a letter to the Secretary of 
State, Mrs Schulz, and the Minister Atsma to complain about the late arrival of the 
agenda of the Transport Council of 12th December 2011.791 On behalf of the 
Committee, it requested that the relevant documents be sent in time so that the 
Committee will at least have a week to discuss the relevant Council meeting with the 																																																								
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Chamber.792 This is another sign of the delegatory relationship between the NP and its 
government. The government cannot just act freely, but must inform the NP on time. 
The discussions showed increased levels of scrutiny, as the MPs are expressing their 
views and give clear instructions on what they expect from the government during the 
Council meetings. There is an obvious sign of impact after the NP uses its formal 
powers (the Secretary of State told the Council that procurement needs to be a national 
choice) and there is a sign of holding the government to its responsibility of informing 
on time. This corresponds to the expected causal process. 
Extra ex post control phase 
During the Transport Council of 12th December 2011, a political agreement is reached 
about the First Railway Package.793 This can be considered as the end of the scrutiny 
by the NP of the government relating to this legislative file. The file is not tabled on the 
agenda of any Transport Councils anymore and further scrutiny during the second 
reading is limited to discussions in the EP. 
On 13th January 2012, the Secretary of State writes a letter to Parliament to inform it 
about the outcome of the Transport Council of 12th December 2011 during which the 
First Railway Package was adopted. The letter states that the adoption took place 
without any discussion. Negotiations on this topic will continue with the EP during the 
Danish EU Presidency in 2012.794 
From this stage on, the NP no longer takes part in the active scrutiny of the case and is 
only informed regarding the progress made in the field of the First Railway Package. 
No written evidence is found that confirms the causal mechanisms. 
Step 7: Adoption 
On 29 October 2012 the Act is approved by the Council in a second reading.795 This is 
the start of a single European Railway area, opening up the railway sector to 																																																								
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competition at EU level. Member states agreed on simplifying and modernising the 
regulatory framework for an EU railway sector. 796 No reference was made to the issue 
of noise reduction and the details of public procurement will be elaborated in the Fourth 
Railway Package (see also case 4). 
6.2.5 Concluding remarks 
This case looked at whether the dependence of a coalition government with Eurosceptic 
support increases the chances of a NP to have an impact on its government position on 
an EU legislative file. The case uses the standard, post-Lisbon procedures of scrutiny 
during which the emphasis lies on the use of ex ante influence mechanisms by the NP. 
Scrutiny focused in this case mainly on technical issues and to some extent to wider 
political matters, such as the extent to which the state should support the widening of 
the internal market in the field of the railways. These issues can be cut along the 
traditional left-right cleavage, but could also to be increased as a consequence of 
Eurosceptic presence in the coalition government (the PVV might not want the EU to 
decide about domestic railways). The PVV MP, however, does support the draft 
regulation and makes no attempt to increase the scrutiny of this file, nor does the 
opposition. In other words, the EU file does not lead to substantial different opinions, 
making it hard for the coalition partners to find a compromise. The opposition is active 
on this file (for example, it expresses its opinions and repeats them on various occasion 
with the intention to have an impact), but contributions are mostly of a technical nature 
and the use of formal powers is therefore more related to the salience variable (the MPs 
seem to worry about the contents of the legislative file as published by the EC, for 
example, regarding the noise levels) than to the Eurosceptic variable. On some 
occasions, contributions were of left/wing and pro/against EU nature (the scope of 
liberalisation) which could be a sign of making use of a divided government on EU 
integration. Data extracted from interviews confirm that the extra use of formal powers 
used by MPs in this file is explained by the fact that as the NP scrutinised a minority 
government, the chances of being effective when using mechanisms of influence and 
control are more likely, as the government needs the support of the opposition in order 
to achieve a majority.797 In other words, even without a dependence on the PVV during 
the 2010-2012 coalition, the government would still have aimed at limiting the transfer 
of competences to the EU. This contradicts the theoretical argument, explained in 																																																								
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Chapter 3, in which the dependence by a coalition government upon a Eurosceptic 
partner increases parliamentary chances to have a measurable impact on government 
EU policy position.  
Measurable impact  
Although there were various signs of impact during the scrutiny of this file, according 
to interviewees this is not a consequence of the dependence of a Eurosceptic party but 
an overall Eurosceptic direction of most established political parties after the ‘no’ in the 
Dutch referendum against an EU Constitution.798 No evidence is found showing that 
Eurosceptic involvement increases the NP’s impact on government’s position.  
Interviews with government representatives show that there have not been any informal 
types of influence in this file and that the government followed its own line when 
writing the EM without anticipating the possible position in the NP. It also did not 
change the EM as a consequence of the use of formal powers by the NP, but did take the 
position of the NP on board during the Council meeting.799 
‘As a government representative you would be very naïve to ignore the 
position of the NP when they make it so explicitly.’800 
As only part of NPs’ position reflected in the government’s input into the Council801, 
one can consider that during the scrutiny of this legislative file there has been an 
intermediate measurable impact. The point taken over from the NP was related to the 
extent to which procurement should be either a national or European choice. This issue 
is both Europeanised (to what extent should the EU decide upon this) and covers the 
left/right dimension (open market versus government’s responsibility). According to 
interviews with MPs, they are more likely to become active on dossiers covering 
Europeanised or political issues and leftwing and rightwing parties have different views 
about issues covering liberalisation.802 Interviews with the government showed that they 
had to take over the position of the opposition, partly because it was a majority in the 
NP and partly because the government was weak in the sense that it was a minority 
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government.803 The input of the SC taken over by the government came from the 
opposition and was not the government’s original position. Anticipated reactions and 
impact via party group meetings can therefore be ruled out. I am thereby confident in 
stating that measurable impact is observed in this case, which was a consequence of the 
NP using formal powers with the intention of adapting the government’s EU policy 
position. The NP has increased its chances of doing so, as it scrutinised a minority 
government. The Eurosceptic condition is more or less absent in the analysed process.  
6.3 Case 4: The Fourth Railway Package: Directive for Interoperability when 
scrutinised by the SC during the Rutte II coalition (between Liberals and Social 
Democrats) (COM(2013)30804)805 
6.3.1. Expected causal process 
As in this case, the Eurosceptic condition is absent and all other explanatory factors 
(partisan composition, salience and Lisbon are constant) the following causal process is 
expected: 
Government without Eurosceptic coalition partner ! EU issues hardly appear on the 
agenda ! little contention ! status quo ! little discussion in government ! little 
discussions in the NP ! little advice needed ! NP does not give advice ! government 
does not have to take into account NP’s position ! No parliamentary impact. 
6.3.2 Background EU proposal 
As part of the Fourth Railway Package the EC has published a proposal with regard to 
the Directive about the interoperability of the railway system in the EU. The purpose of 
this proposal is the decrease of administrative and technical obstructions by developing 
an EU approach with regard to security and interoperability procedures. In this 
particular proposal, the EC proposes conditions which must be followed by an 
interoperable railway system in the EU. It furthermore suggests ways to make the 
submission of permissions more efficient via a bigger role for the ERA. Technical 
norms and conformity judgement rules need to be clearer and updated.806 
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6.3.3 Parliamentary scrutiny of the EU legislative file during the seven steps of the 
OLP807 
This section discusses all different steps of the OLP of the EU legislative file regarding 
the Fourth Railway Package (Interoperability) and whether the SC used its formal 
powers to either influence and/or control their government’s EU policy position at any 
point of the scrutiny and if so, whether its attempts had any effect. 
Step 1: Publication 
30th January 2013. The documents are forwarded to the EP, Council and NPs. 
Step 2: NPs get eight week to oppose the EU legislative proposal 
Although the Dutch SC sent a RO to the EC on 28th March 2013 regarding the proposal 
concerning the opening of the market for domestic passenger transport services by rail, 
which is also part of the Fourth Railway Package808; it does not have any problems with 
the proposal regarding the interoperability (it is only the Swedish and Lithuanian 
parliaments which sent ROs to the EC with regard to this proposal). 
Step 3 First ex ante influence phase 
As evidence to confirm the causal mechanism, this stage must establish whether the NP 
gets and takes chances to use its mechanisms of control and influence and whether this 
is more or less than it would do during a Eurosceptic government. It is expected that the 
evidence to be found shows an NP taking a passive approach, during which it will 
receive information from the government without taking any steps to actively influence 
the government’s position.809 
Before the Council meeting of 11th March 2013, the Dutch government sends an agenda 
and letter810 to the I&E Committee on 19th February 2013. In the agenda, the Minister, 
Mrs Mansveld, outlines that this Package is part of the Single Market Act II. The Dutch 
government informs the SC that at the point of writing it is still studying the proposals 																																																								
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market towards passenger by rail, one on safety, one on an EU Agency for Railways, one on a Single 
European Railway Area and one on interoperability.		
809 A possible meeting with the government before the Council will therefore mainly focus on gaining 
information rather than exerting influence.  
810 TK, 21.501-33, nr 407, 19th February 2013. 
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to get a better understanding of the consequences for the Netherlands and that once this 
is finished, it will publish its EM. The government is in favour of improving the mode 
of travel for passengers and will critically study the rules which will be necessary at EU 
level, further stating that competences should remain at national level.811 When 
speaking to the government representative working on this file, the Minister confirms 
the disparities in views on the Fourth Railway Package between the coalition partners 
(the liberals and the Social Democrats). 
‘The VVD was happy with opening the market, while the PvdA wanted the 
railways to remain a public service and thought that the EU legislative 
proposal was opposing the principle for subsidiarity.’812 
She also confirmed that a divided government is more dependent on the support of the 
NP, as it needs to come up with a compromise which requires the support of the NP.813 
On 25th February 2013 the I&E Minister writes a letter to the NP to inform it that the 
governmental memorandum will not be ready before 1st March 2013.814 On 1st March 
2013, the government sends the EM to the NP, in which it indicates that it will further 
elaborate on the national consequences of the proposals in an IA. This will be sent to the 
SC in due course. The Dutch government is of the opinion that any changes to the main 
railway line should not start until 2025 and not 2022, like the EC wants, as contracts 
will still be running then.815 The EM is considered as the first position of the 
government on this file. 
On 7th March a meeting takes place between the I&E Committee, the EAC and the I&E 
Minister which deals with the scrutiny reserve of the Fourth Railway Package. The 
Minister agrees to inform the SC on every agenda of the Transport Council dealing with 
this topic, on every draft position of the Council including government opinion and on 
any changes in that or in the EU proposals. During this meeting no reference is made to 
the interoperability regulation. 
																																																								
811TK, 21.501-33, TK, 407, 19th February 2013.  
812 Van Dongen, 3rd June 2015. 
813 Ibid. 
814 TK, 33.546; 22.112, 25th February 2013. 
815 TK, 33.546, nr 3, Fiche, 1st March 2013. 
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Besides, it is agreed that a plenary session will take place on 21st March. During this 
meeting, MPs get a chance to submit motions.816 
The NP takes an active approach towards the Fourth Railway Package in general, as it 
sets clear tasks to government at the beginning of the scrutiny process and applies a 
scrutiny reserve which thus shows the importance of this file to the NP. 
Step 4 First ex post control phase 
To be able to confirm the causal mechanism at this stage, evidence must be found 
showing that few attempts are made by MPs to hold government to account after the 
Transport Council has taken place. 
On 11th March, the first Transport Council takes place. On 21st March 2013, the SC 
discusses the Fourth Railway Package during the plenary meeting. During this meeting 
four motions are submitted817, but none apply to the Interoperability Directive.818 
On 22nd March the Secretary of State for I&E, Mrs Schulz, sends a letter to the Chair of 
the SC to give feedback about the Council meeting of 11th March 2013.819 Most 
references that are made to the Fourth Railway Package relate to the free market of 
railway passengers and none in the field of the interoperability regulation. 
No evidence is found of any signs of parliamentary activity aimed at impacting the 
interoperability regulation. Causal mechanism confirmed at this stage. 
Step 5: Second ex ante influence phase 
To confirm the causal mechanism during this stage, evidence needs to be found 
showing that the NP has had no extra chances820 and had not tried actively to use 
standard procedures to influence the government’s position, as the non-Eurosceptic 
government does not want or need to spend too much time on EU discussions. 
																																																								
816 TK, 33 546, nr. 9, 7th March 2013.  
817 One by Hoogland (Social Democrat), two by Bashir (Socialist party) and one by Van Tongeren (Groen 
Links).  
818 TK, 33 546, nr. 4, 21st March 2013. 
819 TK, 1 501-33, nr.412, 22nd March 2013.	
820 More than one meeting or one form of correspondence with the responsible minister, whereby it 
actually intends to exert influence. 
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On 22nd May 2013, the Dutch government sends the agenda of the Transport Council to 
the I&E Committee. It informs the committee that the draft regulation regarding 
interoperability will probably be adopted during the next Council meeting of 10th June 
2013.821 
On 5th June 2013 a meeting takes place between the I&E Committee, EAC and the 
Secretary of State for I&E, Mrs Schulz (Liberal). 822 The VVD MP (coalition partner) 
argues that with regard to the interoperability regulation, this regulation should not lead 
to increased administrative burden and there should be a clear division between those 
who look after the railways and those responsible for the trains.823 Mrs Schulz replies 
that concern about administrative burdens is shared by several member states. She also 
agrees about the separation of transport and the management of the railways.824 
Only one reference to the interoperability regulation is found. This point is taken by the 
Secretary of State but as the point was made by an MP who is part of the same political 
party as the Secretary of State, this cannot be considered to be an impact. Causal 
mechanism is confirmed. 
Step 6: Second ex post control phase 
During this stage, evidence is expected to be found showing few attempts by the NP to 
hold its government to account. It will use a passive approach during which it receives 
information, but does not increase the use of formal powers by asking for any 
clarification concerning regulation in the field of the interoperability of European 
railways. 
On 10th June 2013, another Transport Council takes place. During this meeting 
agreement is reached on the Interoperability part of the Fourth Railway Package. The 
final agreement has decreased the number of issues that would be dealt with at EU 
level, such as a centralised procedure to allocate permissions. Member states agree to 
keep this at the national level, as there is concern that at EU level it could lead to an 
increase in financial and administrative burdens. There will be a transition period of five 
instead of two years (as proposed by the EC).825 The SC receives a letter from its 																																																								
821 TK - 21.501-33, TK, 423, 22nd May 2013. 
822 TK, 21 501-33, nr. 430, 17th July 2013. 
823 Ibid.  
824 Ibid.	
825 Press Release, Council for Transport, Telecommunications and Energy, 6-10th June 2013, 10457/13. 
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government regarding the outcome of the Council meeting on 24th June 2013.826 It also 
gives an overview of the discussion regarding the agreement reached on the 
interoperability file: 
‘The Council finished a general orientation about this proposal regarding a 
directive for interoperability of the railways, which is part of the technical 
pillar of the Fourth Railway Package … The Netherlands was already in 
favour about the original technical pillars about interoperability, but had 
initially some minor concerns about the practical workability of this 
proposal. This has been taken into account in the compromise proposal. 
During the Council meeting the Netherlands has emphasised the importance 
of the technical pillar, and according to the views of the SC, the Dutch 
government has suggested to not make an agreement on the technical pillar 
dependent on the other proposals of the Railway Package..’827 
On 28th June 2013 the I&E Committee requested the government  to give a reaction to 
the quick scan828 which will be executed by Twynstra Gudde on behalf of the 
Federation Mobility Companies the Netherlands (FMN). 
On 11th November 2013 the I&E Minister writes a letter to the SC with the national IA 
regarding the Fourth Railway Package. On 26th November 2013 the Minister for I&M 
sends a letter to the I&E Committee to give a reaction to the Quick scan. 
In the letter to the NP, the government shows how it has put forward the parliamentary 
wishes to the Council meeting. However, as this position is in line with the 
government’s position (see EM, 1st March 2013) this cannot be considered as impact. 
Step 7: Adoption 
Although the Fourth Railway Package as such is not yet finally adopted by the Council, 
during the meeting of 5th June 2014, a political agreement is reached about the three 
proposals regarding the technical pillar of the Package (the interoperability, railway 
safety and Railway Agency). With the agreement of the technical pillar of the Fourth 
Railway Package, member states agreed to set up a dual system of vehicle 																																																								
826 Ministerie van I&M, 24th June 2013, Report of the Transport Council of 10th June 2013.	
827 Ibid. 
828 This is a form of impact assessment.  
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authorisations and safety certifications. Member states furthermore agreed that there 
will be a choice between submitting a request for authorisation to the European Railway 
Agency or to the national safety authority for those vehicles involved for national 
transport only.829 The adoption of this new Railway Package will decrease the 
administrative burden in this field, which is supported by the SC.   
The Dutch government feeds this back to the SC: 
‘Many member states showed their appreciation for the result on the 
Technical pillar of the Fourth Railway Package. Some member states did not 
want to continue with the proposals regarding the opening of the market, 
because of the subsidiarity issue and the risks for smaller railway markets. 
EU Commissioner Kallas was happy with the result and the compromise 
reached in this field. During the second half of this year he wants to continue 
with the proposals regarding the opening of the market.’830 
6.3.4 Concluding remarks 
The scrutiny of this file seems to be a pretty standard one, as the NP reacts to  
government correspondence and during meetings asks for clarifications. At no occasion 
during the OLP does the NP use more than its formal powers and only once does the 
government show that it has taken the NP’s position on board (step 6). This is in line 
with what was expected. The theoretical argument in Chapter 3 links the scrutiny of a 
government not depending on a Eurosceptic party in order to get a majority in the NP to 
a limited use of formal powers. Although, this case shows the use of limited powers 
indeed, this seems to be a consequence of the topic content and not of the absence of the 
Eurosceptic element of the coalition government.  Interviewees all argued that the 
parliamentary activities would not have been higher on this topic if the coalition 
government had been more Eurosceptic, as the topic did not cover the issue of EU 
integration.831 According to the government representative on this file, however, the 
limited amount of formal powers used by the NP is due to the contents of the topic.832 
The topic of interoperability is quite technical and less controversial and political (in 
																																																								
829 Press Release, Council of the European Union, 5th June 2014.	
830 TK, 21 501-33, nr. 495, 5th June 2014.	
831 Van Dongen, 3rd June 2015, Den Boer MP, 4th June, Hoogland MP, 4th June 2015. 
832 Van Dongen, 3rd June 2015. 
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other words, less salient) than others (such as the freedom to provide domestic 
passenger services by rail, see case 7).833  
Measurable impact 
During the process of the OLP, there has not been any moment during which the 
government shows it has adapted its position as a consequence of the NP’s use of 
formal powers. Data extracted from interviews confirm this.834 Accordingly, it can be 
argued that none of the NP’s positions are reflected in the government’s viewpoint or in 
its input to Council meetings; the impact here can therefore be classified as weak. 
Data from interviews835 also confirm that no use of informal influence has taken 
place.836 The government confirms furthermore that it has retained its own position (as 
explained in the EM) and has not drafted its opinion with the views of the NP already 
taken on board. It has on one occasion included the NP’s position into the Transport 
Council meeting (regarding the Quick scan) but as this was a position shared by 
government (see EM, 1st March 2013) and so cannot be considered as impact. It can 
therefore be concluded that during the scrutiny of this file, the impact was weak and 
even less than expected. The SC, however, did not really intend to change the 
government in this field and mostly asked for clarifications, which it received. In 
conclusion, although the SC had a weak impact on the government in this case, it also 
did not intend to have a stronger control over the government’s position.  
6.4 Pair-wise comparison between a coalition government depending 
on support of a Eurosceptic party and a coalition government not 
dependent on Eurosceptic support 
When comparing the scrutiny and use of formal powers in C3 (presence of the 
Eurosceptic condition) to C4 (absence of the Eurosceptic condition),  ignoring the extra 
chances for the NP to use its formal powers as a consequence of the increased number 
of Council meetings in C3 (due to the two readings, which is not related to the 
relationship between the NP and government), there is roughly a similar amount of 																																																								
833 Van Dongen, 3rd June 2015, Den Boer MP and Hoogland MP, 4th June 2015, Hartkamp, 7th July 2015. 
834 Van Dongen, 3rd June, Den Boer MP and Hoogland MP, 4th June 2015. 
835 Kisters, 19th May 2015, Van Dongen, 3rd June 2015, Den Boer, 4th June 2015. 
836 In the Netherlands, there is a rule that makes informal contact between the government and NP illegal 
during the scrutiny process. This was introduced during the Kok government in 1998, better known as the 
‘Oekaze’ rule.	
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attempts by the NP in both cases to use its formal powers (see table 13). When 
examining in more depth the different discussions it becomes clear that, although during 
both cases, mostly technical remarks are made, the discussions during the First Railway 
Package include many more attempts by MPs to intend to have an impact. MPs are 
trying to change the government’s views. Although the debates about the 
Interoperability file in C4 follow a similar pattern during the ex ante and ex post 
attempts of influence and control, the remarks by MPs are solely focused on 
clarification of technical issues. On no occasion do MPs try to convince the government 
to change its perception. 
This is in line with the expected causal processes in both cases. However, the 
discussions in C3 between MPs and the government are very much focused on issues 
related to the extent to which railways should be liberalised and to which the EU should 
have control over the Dutch Railway Network. These are politicised and Europeanised 
issues, in which the Eurosceptic party plays a minor role (it does not raise the floor on 
many occasions and has no major objections against the proposal). In other words, 
although the use of formal powers is increased during the case where the Eurosceptic 
condition was present, there is no evidence that this is a consequence of the coalition 
government’s dependence on a Eurosceptic party. Data extracted from the interviews 
disconfirm a relationship between the Eurosceptic dependence of the coalition 
government and the increased use of formal powers by the NP.837 According to Atsma, 
I&E Minister during the Rutte I cabinet, the PVV had no views on technical issues, 
such as railways. Therefore, it could not be considered to be an obstacle in this 
dossier.838 This is confirmed by the head for railway issues at the I&E Department: 
‘Obviously, because of the dependence of the PVV to get a majority, the 
government has got less room to manoeuvre freely in EU issues. Both 
coalition partners had to water down their EU policies slightly for the sake of 
it. It is possible that the opposition has exploited this, knowing that the main 
coalition partners in fact agreed with them, but could not openly say so 
because of their relationship with the PVV. However, this was more visible 
																																																								
837 Kisters, 17th May 2015, Atsma, 29th May 2015, Van Dongen, 3rd June 2015, Den Boer MP and 
Hoogland MP, 4th June 2015, Hartkamp, 7th July 2015, Keulemans, 15th June 2015. 
838 29th May 2015. 
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in issues related to EU integration, not in technical dossiers such as 
Railways.’839 
Both Koolmees MP (D66) and Monasch MP (PvdA) confirm that as members of pro-
European opposition parties in issues related to EU integration, the Rutte I coalition 
partners VVD and CDA often had to get support from the opposition since the PVV 
would oppose anything from Brussels.840 
‘The PVV was against anything that came out of the EU. As a cabinet you 
could not work with that.’841 
According to several MPs, such as Den Boer and Hoogland, the dependence of the PVV 
during the Rutte I cabinet has not increased the parliamentary opportunity to effect an 
impact. According to Hoogland MP, other factors play a more significant role in the 
increased scrutiny of EU dossiers, such as higher levels of Euro-scepticism (since the 
‘no’ vote in the Referendum against the EU Constitution in 2005) and public opinion.842 
This is confirmed by Monasch MP843 and Keulemans, EU Advisor at the SC844, who 
argued that the whole spirit of times became more Eurosceptic, it was not really related 
to the PVV.  
‘Being euro-sceptic has sort of become part of the DNA of the SC’.845 
‘The PVV is quite weak in the sense that it does not raise the floor about the 
contents of transport dossiers. This is because these issues do not deal with 
the EU as such, but it is more about the contents. In these cases they are only 
skeptical because they can be skeptical.’846 
The dependence on the PVV by the coalition government during the Rutte I cabinet, 
limited the government’s the freedom to act freely, but increased the freedom to the 
opposition in the NP. According to the government representative, this is related to the 
lack of a majority which weakened the cabinet of Rutte I.847 In other words, according 																																																								
839 Van Dongen, 3rd June 2015. 
840 Koolmees MP, 6th July 2015, Monasch MP, 16th June 2015. 
841 Monasch MP, 16th June 2015. 
842 4th June 2015. 
843 16th June 2015. 
844 15th June 2015. 
845 Monasch MP, 16th June 2015. 
846 Hoogland MP, 4th June 2015. 
847 Van Dongen, 3rd June 2015. 
	 187	
to the government, this was a consequence of the minority government and not because 
the tolerating party of the PVV was Eurosceptic. Rutte I always had to look for a 
majority in the NP (which it did not always get from the PVV, particularly not on EU 
issues). This gave power to the opposition.848 
The increased use of formal powers in C3 is, therefore, most likely linked to the 
politicisation of the topic which cuts along the right/left cleavage of the political parties 
in the NP (this was a clear example of a divided NP)849 and the minority government (in 
other words, the partisan composition condition). More specifically, as MPs seem to 
really care about the government’s position in C3, we can confidently deduct the 
salience condition to be more relevant in this case than the Eurosceptic condition. This 
is confirmed by MPs who argued in interviews that the Interoperability file was of a 
more technical nature, and coalition partners and opposition in the NP came to an 
agreement without too many difficulties.850 
Besides, the opposition in the NP would probably not have had so many chances to 
impact the government’s position if the latter had a stronger majority in the NP. 
Interviews confirm this: 
‘With this tolerating construction, the cabinet frankly had no majority. Rutte 
I had to look for support. One could see his cabinet was vulnerable for that 
reason. This would equally have been the case if the coalition of Rutte I had 
depended on another political party. It was not related to the PVV as 
Eurosceptic tolerating party as such.’851 
In other words, just because the coalition partners could not always depend on support 
of the Eurosceptic ‘tolerating’ party, the support of other parties in the opposition was 
required in order to gain support for its position. It was not so much the Eurosceptic 
component here that made the government listen to the opposition, but the need for a 
majority in support of its position that forced the government to listen to the opposition 
in order to gain a majority for its input to the Council. The outcome of this pair-wise 
comparison is thereby in line with previous literature in the field of partisan 																																																								
848 Koolmees, 6th July 2015, Atsma, 29th May 2015, Van Dongen, 3rd June 2015. 
849 Although the First Railway Package mainly deals with harmonisation, and not as such with an opening 
of the market, many MPs were already worried that this would happen eventually: it did indeed happen 
under the Fourth Railway Package, which explains the increased use of formal powers already in C3 (Mrs 
Kisters, 19th May 2015). 
850 Den Boer, 4th June 2015, Hoogland MP, 4th June 2015, Hartkamp, 7th July 2015. 
851 Van Dongen, 3rd June 2015. 
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composition, such as that of Holzhacker (2005) which argued that parliamentary power 
is strongest in minority governments. Interestingly, when looking back at the pair-wise 
comparison in C1 and C2, the partisan composition condition was clearly not 
responsible for an increased use of formal powers, but in this case the minority 
government clearly is, as seen in the contents of the meeting documents and interviews. 
Shadow pair-wise comparison  
In order to increase the internal validity of this pair-wise comparison outcome, two 
other cases have been compared, one dealing with the EU Integrated Maritime Policy 
(IMP) - which was scrutinised during the Rutte I 2010-2012 coalition government 
which depended on the support of a Eurosceptic government - and the Market Access 
for Port Services (PS) scrutinised during the Rutte II government which consisted of a 
coalition between the liberals and Social Democrats.852 More information on the 
outcome of the use of formal powers in all four cases can be found in table 13 and 14. 
The contents of both EU legislatives files are of similar typical and technical nature 
whereby they are salient to the legislators, but not to the electorate. A comparison 
between C3a and C4a show that the use of formal powers by the NP is a lot higher in 
the case where the Eurosceptic condition is absent. This is contrary to the expected 
causal process.  
Interviewees853 also confirm in the case of the IMP and PS that there were no attempts 
made by MPs to informally influence the government in this field, as this was not 
allowed.854 According to Abspoel, the government writes its first position (in the so-
called ‘fiche’) in which it looks at subsidiarity and proportionality, its agreements on 
policies and possible sensitivities in the SC. It does not adapt its position to the wishes 
of the Chamber in the beginning. The NP only comes out with its position after this first 
opinion of the government, as it is the task of the NP to control government.855 
The same can be said for the Ports Directive, according to the government 
representative in this file. 
																																																								
852 For more information about this pair-wise comparison, see appendix V. 
853 Abspoel, 3rd June 2015. 
854 Rule for External contacts with Civil Servants, better known as the ‘Oekaze Kok’, introduced by Wim 
Kok in 1998. 
855 Abspoel, 3rd June 2015. 
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‘Writing the position of the government happens based upon the agreement 
in the government, less on the SC. In this case, we first published our 
position, and after that the NP decided to apply a scrutiny reserve on this 
case.’856 
Although both cases cover a similar topic and are dealt with by the same government 
department (I&E), the use of formal powers is clearly higher in the case where the 
Eurosceptic condition is absent (C4a). Interviewees indicate that in the case of the Port 
Directive, MPs felt that there was more at stake as it touched directly upon the Dutch 
main interest.857 According to Abspoel, the IMP did not lead to significant changes to 
the member states.858 
In case of the IMP, the government did not change its position according to the wishes 
of the NP, as there were not many. This is confirmed in interviews.859 
According to De Boer MP, the Ports Directive is an important dossier. 
‘Many ports in the EU are still financially supported by their governments. 
This is not the case in the Netherlands, so we argue that there needs to be a 
level playing field.’860 
According to Kisters of the Permanent Representation of the Netherlands in Brussels, 
many left wing parties in the NP were lobbied by trade unions on this dossier.861 This 
made MPs extra active, knowing the consequences would be directly noticeable 
amongst constituents.862 This is confirmed by De Vries MP.863 
Also in this dossier, the position of the government has not changed after negotiations 
with the NP.864 
According to interviewees, as also became clear during the pair-wise comparison 
between C3 and C4, the first Rutte government was simply more Eurosceptic than 
previous administrations. This was not a consequence of the PVV, but of a general 																																																								
856 Pol, 4th June 2015.	
857 De Boer MP, 4th June, Abspoel, 3rd June, De Vries MP, 8th June 2015. 
858 3rd June 2015. 
859 Abspoel, 3rd June 2015. 
860 De Boer, 4th June 2015. 
861 19th May 2015. 
862 19th May 2015. 
863 8th June 2015. 
864 De Boer, 3rd June 2015, Pol, 4th June 2015, De Vries, 8th June 2015, Keulemans, 15th June 2015. 
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timeframe which had changed since the negative outcome of the Referendum on the EU 
Constitution in the Netherlands.865 
‘The position of the PVV in the transport dossiers it not relevant. They have 
no views on these topics. The government has come up with its own position 
on this, which was later on backed by the NP. This would have happened on 
the same way if the government had not depended on the support of the 
PVV.’866 
‘The PVV chose strategically. It would not have an opinion on technical 
issues, such as Maritime Policy, but would focus more on political and real 
European topics, such as EU migration.’867 
In other words, other variables such as salience, but also the partisan composition 
(minority government), prevail over a Eurosceptic government in two pair-wise 
comparisons. It seems that MPs increased their efforts in C3 as it was felt that there was 
more at stake and that they had higher chances of having an impact on their government 
as a consequence of its need to find a majority for its position. C4a really shows the 
importance of salience, as in the case of the Port Services Directive, MPs had support 
from interest groups such as trade unions which strengthened their position. The push 
from interest groups appeared to have increased the use of formal powers by the NP, as 
public opinion would likely put pressure on the government to listen to the NP and take 
its position. Based upon the outcome of the two pair-wise comparisons, it can be 
concluded that at least in technical EU dossiers, the presence of a Eurosceptic party, 
upon which the government depends in order to achieve a majority in the NP, does not 
increase the NP’s ability to effect an impact. The hypothesis can therefore not be 
confirmed. The outcome of this analysis could have been different, however, if one of 
the cases had been more Europeanised (during which, for example, the future of the EU 
would be discussed). This conclusion is in line with Auel and Raunio’s argument, 
stressing the very fact that it is upon EU issues that Eurosceptic parties can win votes 
(not technical dossiers, such as railways or ports).868 It is the content of the EU file that 
is relevant. 
																																																								
865 Abspoel, 3rd June 2015, Pol, 4th June 2015, Kisters 19th May 2015.	
866 Kisters, 19th May 2015. 
867 Abspoel, 3rd June 2015. 
868 See Chapter 3.4.2	
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The next Chapter follows on from this conclusion, as it will look at a comparison 
between a case selected on the salience condition and a second which can be considered 
a non-salient one. It is expected that the case where the salience condition is present 
(C5) will follow a similar causal process as shown by C3 and C3a. 
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Table 13 Outcome of the Pair-wise comparison between Case 3 and Case 4 
Seven steps of OLP 
 
Case 3 (Eurosceptic gov) Case 4 (Non-Eurosceptic 
gov.) 
1: publication X X 
2: eight weeks X X 
3: first influence phase EM government 
2 letters government 
Letter NP + attempt to influence 
 
2 letters government 
EM government 
Meeting gov. + NP 
Scrutiny Reserve 
4: first control phase Letter government Plenary meeting 
Letter government 
5: second influence phase Letter government 
Meeting NP with gov. 
(attempts to influence) 
Letter government 
Meeting government and NP + 
expression of opinions 
6: second control phase Letter gov. Letter government 
Letter NP 
Extra influence phase Letter government 
Meeting NP + gov. (attempt to 
influence) 
Not applicable 
Extra control phase Letter government Not applicable 
Extra influence phase 2 letters government 
1 letter NP 
Not applicable 
Extra control phase 1 letter government Not applicable 
Extra influence phase Letter government 
Meeting NP + gov. (attempts to 
influence) 
Not applicable 
Extra control phase Letter government Not applicable 
7: adoption X X 
IMPACT Intermediate Weak 
Table 14 Outcome of the Pair-wise Comparison between Case 3a and Case 4a 
Seven steps of OLP 
 
Use of formal powers 
CASE 3a (Eurosceptic 
gov) 
Use of formal powers 
CASE 4a (non-
Eurosceptic gov) 
1: publication X X 
2: eight weeks X X 
3: first influence phase EM government 
Letter gov. 
Meeting NP-gov. 
 
EM government 
2 meetings I&E Committee, 
EAC and government (1 about 
scrutiny reserve) 
4: first control phase X X 
 
5: second influence phase Letter gov. 
Questions to gov.. 
Answers from gov 
 
Letter gov. 
Meeting EAC, I&E and gov. 
Letter gov. 
 
6: second control phase Letter gov. Letter gov. 
Extra influence phase X Letter gov. 
Meeting NP and gov. 
Extra Control phase X Letter gov. to ESC 
Meeting NP and gov. 
7: adoption X X 
IMPACT Weak Weak 
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Chapter 7 
Salience 
7.1 Introduction 
Following on from the previous Chapters in which we have seen how causal processes 
tend to confirm the salience condition, it will be interesting to measure the very salience 
condition itself this time. 
This Chapter deals with a pair-wise comparison between a salient case (EU Water 
Policy) when scrutinised by the HC during the coalition government of Cameron-Clegg 
from 2010-2015, and a non-salient case (Ship Recycling) also scrutinised by the same 
NP during the same coalition government in the 2010-2015 period.869 Although the HC 
is a NP with moderate formal powers focused on ex post control mechanisms, it is 
expected that in a salient case the NP will be able to increase its impact on the 
government’s EU policy position. 
The Chapter consists of three main parts, where the first part traces the different steps of 
the OLP during the scrutiny of the EU Water Policy in which evidence is added by data 
from interviews, while the second part of the Chapter follows similar steps during the 
scrutiny of the Ship Recycling Regulation, and the third part consists of a comparison 
between the two cases. 
When selecting the salience case, a distinction has been made between salience for the 
electorate and for legislators (see also Chapter 4.3.3). Although in some cases the 
salience condition had to be absent, as another condition was measured, the topic could 
still be salient to legislators (they are less politicised as there exists a gap between the 
voters and MPs on an issue, this happens particularly in EU files). However, in this 
pair-wise comparison in which a comparison has been made between a salient and non-
salient case, the case where the salient condition is present is found to be so for the 
electorate. In other words, although the topic of water as such is not part of any party 
manifestos, it is part of public health, the wider EU environmental agenda and 
protecting the environment has an essential place in manifestos of the Liberal 																																																								
869 For more information about the political parties in the UK, ESC members and other involved 
committees in the scrutiny of the selected cases, see appendix III. 
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Democrats870 and Conservatives871 (the coalition partners). Besides, the Euro-barometer 
of 2012872 shows the commitment of European citizens to the environment873, and a 
press release by the EC shows that European citizens call for stronger EU action on 
water.874 
C6, on the other hand, is non-salient to the electorate based upon the used indicators and 
is hardly salient to legislators. However, it was still discussed in the NP and is a topic 
on which disagreement between the political parties is expected;  such disagreement 
between the government and NP is likely to ensure that the lack of salience is measured 
here and not a pure coincidence. 
Other conditions are constant in both cases. The partisan composition variable is stable, 
as in the pair-wise comparison this case to another scrutinised post-Lisbon and during 
the Cameron coalition government. Besides, as the salience condition is the only one to 
vary between C5 and C6, any variation in parliamentary activity and the measurable 
impact is therefore most likely to be linked to the salience condition and not to that of 
partisan composition. The analysis of the partisan composition condition has also been 
shown in Chapter 5 not to be relevant for any variation in parliamentary activities, but 
that salience is. The presence of the multi-party government in both cases, therefore, 
should not intervene with the independent variable here.  
Both the Eurosceptic and Lisbon variable are considered to be absent, as the coalition 
government does not depend on Eurosceptic support875 and the NP does not send any 
ROs to the EC regarding a subsidiary objection. 
																																																								
870 Liberal Democrat Manifesto 2010. 
871 Conservatives Manifesto 2010. 
872 Standard Euro-barometer 78, 2012, annex question 7. 
873 European Commission, DG Environment: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/water/water-
framework/info/intro_en.htm 
874 European Commission, press release, Environment: Europeans call for stronger EU action on Water, 
22nd March 2012. 
875 David Cameron held his Bloomberg speech on 23rd January 2013 which can be considered as the start 
of a more Eurosceptic Conservative party attitude. This case deals with an EU draft directive, of which 
the scrutiny mainly takes place before the Bloomberg speech (the document is cleared in June 2013).		
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7.2 Case 5: The EU Water Policy Directive (COM(2011)876)876 
7.2.1 Policy positions EU water policy 
It is expected that the contents of this EU legislative file will lead to some level of 
disagreement between the different parties in Parliament (and government) on the extent 
to which the scope of the directive should reach, which could lead to an increased use of 
formal powers. Tony Juniper writes in The Guardian about the views of MPs on EU 
environmental issues: 
‘Some ministers see EU laws, including the Habitats directive and the Water 
Framework directive877, as constraints to "growth" and believe they need to 
be weakened in order to promote economic activity.’878 
Besides, the UK government has done very little to respond to the EU Water 
Framework Directive (WFD)879 and different conservation and environmental groups, 
such as the WWF and RSPB880 have lobbied the EC and UK government to improve the 
situation. The NP also put pressure on government to do more to implement the WFD:  
‘Mr Richard Benyon MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at DEFRA, 
quoted the figure of 27% of rivers as fully functioning ecosystems, and added 
that there was "a desperate need to improve this situation. We pressed Mr 
Benyon and his officials on whether the UK was approaching 
implementation of the WFD with sufficient ambition.’881 
The friction between the UK government and other interest groups during the 
implementation of the WFD has been largely one of getting the right balance between 																																																								
876 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1436526352676&uri=CELEX:52011PC0876 
877 The current EU water policy directive is a proposal to amend the WFD (2000/60). This directive has 
the following as its main aims:  
Improvement of drinking water across the continent,  
Reduction in water pollution, in particular groundwater,  
Protect and enhance the status of wetlands and water ecosystems,  
Lessen the effects of flooding and droughts. (BBC, ‘Consumers face new water torture’, 30th March 
2006).  
878 Juniper T., ‘David Cameron's EU speech is grave news for our environment, The Guardian, 25th 
January 2013. 
879 Burns, J. UK rivers failing new EU standard, BBC, 21st September 2009. 
880 Lightwater, ‘Facts that are presented to scare and shock’, 31st August 2010. 
881 House of Lords, European Union Committee, 33rd Report of 25th April 2012.	
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costs (UK government concern) and the environmental value of the directive (concern 
of part of the opposition).882 It is evident that at the start of the coalition government, 
during which the scrutiny of this file takes place, the emphasis was, at least for the 
Conservatives, mainly focused on financial cuts.883 Another EU directive which could 
increase governmental expenditure has most likely not been in the interests of just the 
Conservatives. On the other hand, the Liberal Democratic coalition partner has during 
its campaign strongly focused on the benefits of the EU884 and the importance of the 
environment.885 For that reason, it is likely that the coalition partners have different 
views on this directive than their Conservative coalition partner. Also in the opposition, 
similar levels of disagreement might be expected. Labour will potentially be interested 
in following the recommendations of this legislative file, as this is in line with its 
environmental views of its party manifesto.886 It is therefore likely that the HC will do 
its best to use more than its formal powers here since the main coalition partner, the 
Conservatives, are not expected to accept any of the proposals in the directive linked to 
more public spending. As the different political parties in the HC have no specific views 
on water policies, table 15 gives an overview of the main British parties in the NP on 
wider environmental policies, to which this Directive belongs. 
Table 15 Party policy positions on environmental policies in the UK, 2010-2015 
Labour Conservatives Liberal -Democrats UKIP 
Environmental policy is 
focused on creating 
more green jobs and 
lower fuel bills.887 
Encourages sustainable 
water management.888 
Tougher limits on 
pollution across 
Europe.889 
Not part of UKIP’s 
party manifesto.890 
However, on 
environmental and 
climate change 
issues, UKIP MEPs 
have failed to show 
up.891 
																																																								
882 Kaika, M. ‘The Water Framework Directive: A New Directive for a Changing Social, Political and 
Economic European Framework’ European Planning Studies, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2003, p. 306. 
883 Nicholas Watt, ‘Spending cuts will make me unpopular admits David Cameron’, The Guardian, 14th 
February 2011. 
884 Civitas, ‘UK Political Parties Positions on the European Union’, 2014. 
885 Clements, B., ‘Greener than thou?’ Party Supporters and the Environment in Britain’, University of 
Leicester, http://www.britpolitics.co.uk/academic-articles-all/greener-than-thou-party-supporters-and-the-
environment-in-britain 
886 Labour Manifesto: General election 2010, Chapter 8. 
887 Labour Manifesto: General election 2010 party policy. 
888 Conservative Manifesto: General election 2010 party policy. 
889 Liberal Democrat Manifesto: general election 2010 party policy.  
890 UKIP Manifesto, April 2010.  Empowering the people.	
891 Casson, L., Will the UKIP ‘earthquake’ shake up EU environmental policy?’, British Influence, 12th 
June 2014. 
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7.2.2 Expected causal process 
 
Previous research has shown that the more salient a topic is in the NP, the tighter the 
scrutiny of the government. Actors are likely to bargain more keenly when the topic is 
salient to them.892 This makes it more likely that the NP will have an impact on its 
government’s EU policy position. 
I therefore expect to see the following causal process in this case: 
NPs dealing with a salient topic ! NPs use more than their formal mechanisms to 
influence and control the government regarding the position of the EU proposal; for 
example, outside of committee meetings, it will use publicity, party meetings or hold 
informal discussions with civil servants ! NPs show high level of visible influence and 
control ! government wants to show it is willing to respond to its representatives and is 
put publicly under pressure ! government more inclined to adopt the NP’s position ! 
parliamentary impact. 
7.2.3 Background of the proposal 
 
The Water Policy directive will revise the WFD by adding 12 new substances to the list 
of those that should be monitored during water quality checks, such as E2 and EE2.893 
The EU agreed about the WFD after increasing demand by citizens and environmental 
organisations for cleaner rivers and lakes, groundwater and coastal beaches. The 
European Water policy intends to clean polluted waters and makes sure that clean 
waters remain clean.894 
7.2.4 Parliamentary scrutiny of the EU file during the seven OLP steps895 
 
This section discusses all different steps of the OLP of the EU legislative file regarding 
the EU Water Policy and whether the HC used its formal powers to either influence 
and/or control their government’s EU policy position at any point of the scrutiny and if 
so, whether its attempts had any effect. 
																																																								
892 Slapin, 2014:35.	
893	http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1436526352676&uri=CELEX:52011PC0876	
894 Euractiv, ‘New chemicals, drugs added to EU water pollution watch list’, 4th July 2013. 
895 For more information on these steps, see Appendix I and II. 
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Step 1 
The proposal is published on 31st January 2012.896 The document is only deposited in 
the HC on 7 February 2012.897 
Step 2 NPs have eight weeks to respond 
 
The deadline to submit subsidiary objections to the EC is 28th March 2012.898 The HC 
shows no objections against the publication of the proposal (none of the other EU NPs 
have objections either). 
Step 3 Ex ante influence phase 
As evidence to confirm the causal mechanism during this stage, it must be established 
whether during this salient case, the levels of scrutiny by the NP are higher than in non-
salient cases.899 Consequently, evidence must be found linking these extra levels of 
scrutiny to higher levels of impact by the NP on the government’s EU policy position as 
a consequence of the salient topic. 
On 20th February 2012, DEFRA publishes its EM for this legislative proposal900 (initial 
position). The government welcomes the review of the WFD and the proposal to adapt 
the list of priority substances in order to ensure that the environment is protected from 
significant harm.901 The government will publish an IA soon, but the Minister does 
expect that costs will be dependent upon the inclusion of particular substances, so these 
could change during discussions.902 The Environment Agency (EA) has estimated that 
installing the necessary advanced waste water treatment plant in England and Wales to 
deal with some of the pharmaceuticals being classified as new priority substances could 
cost about £27 billion over 20 years and, thus, have a major impact on the water 
industry and consumers.903 DEFRA therefore suggests that consideration should be 
																																																								
896 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/HIS/?uri=CELEX:52011PC0876&qid=1436529127884	
897 HC ESC, 56th Report of session 2012-2013, 22nd February 2012. 
898 See website of IPEX: http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/dossier/document/COM20110876.do 
899 More than one meeting and/or correspondence with the minister, during which the NP shows its own 
opinion with the intention to influence the government.  
900 HC ESC, 56th Report of session 2012-2013, 22nd February 2012. 
901 Ibid., par. 5.4. 
902 Ibid., par. 5.6. 
903 Ibid. 
	 199	
given to regulating these through the extensive body of EU legislation on 
pharmaceuticals.904  
On 22nd February 2012905, the ESC discusses the EU Water Policy file during its 
meeting.906 MPs focus thereby mainly on the government’s EM.907 They do show 
concern, however, especially about the very high water treatment costs.908 These would 
arise if certain pharmaceuticals were to be included in the list of priority substances. It 
will wait for the government’s IA and brings the file to the attention of the House. It 
keeps the draft directive under scrutiny.909 
Discussion in the House of Lords 
Although only the scrutiny of the HC is followed during the different steps of the OLP 
for this case, it is worthwhile examining the House of Lords in this instance as well, as 
it shows a more neutral, and independent from government, context of the UK’s dealing 
with this directive. The House of Lords debates this file on 25th April 2012.910 The 
meeting deals particularly with the implementation of the WFD in the UK. It becomes 
clear that the UK has not been able to implement the WFD and other related ones to the 
expected standard: 
‘Existing directives have already brought into force measures that are 
relevant to the implementation of the WFD. These include some under which 
the UK has previously been subject to infraction proceedings, such as the 
Urban Waste Water Treatment (91/271/EEC), Shellfish (79/932/EEC) and 
Nitrates (91/675/EEC) Directives. Other directives also clarify and co-
ordinate WFD objectives to be in RBMPs, such as the Environmental Quality 
Standards Directive (2008/105/EC), which sets out limits on concentrations 
of the priority substances in surface waters; the list of priority substances is 
currently under revision.911 
																																																								
904 Ibid., par. 5.6. 
905 HC ESC, 56th Report, 22nd February 2012 session 2012-2013. 
906 For more information on the ESC and its members, see appendix III. 
907 HC ESC, 56th Report, 22nd February 2012, session 2012-2013, par. 5.4-5.6. 
908 Ibid., par. 5.7. 
909 Ibid., 
910 House of Lords, European Union Committee, An Indispensable Resource: EU Freshwater Policy, 33rd 
Report of Session 2010–12, 25th April 2012. 
911 House of Lords, European Union Committee, An Indispensable Resource: EU Freshwater Policy, 25th 
April 2012, par. 4.	
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The House of Lords concludes that the objectives of the WFD review are too rigid and 
unrealistic, as Mr Benyon explained to the House that 100% of UK waters would not 
attain a good status by 2027, and that the provisions in the current WFD on 
disproportionate cost and technical feasibility meant that a lower level than 100% was 
in keeping with the Directive.912 
Further discussions in the ESC 
On 19th December 2012, the ESC publishes a report913, in which it notes that the ESC 
had been informed by the government about a significant shift in views during 
discussions in the Council. Initially, the UK had been isolated in its opposition to have 
certain substances included914, but other member states now seem to share this view. 
The EP, however, is still of the opinion that these should be included. Negotiations on 
this topic should probably start in the New Year, with the aim to complete the file by 
the summer after the first reading. 915 
The government also promised to have a final IA916, which would be forwarded once 
the outcome of the negotiations  became clear (in order to have a clearer idea of 
possible costs implications). 917 
From the publication of the EU draft directive at the beginning of the year until the first 
Council meeting about this topic (11th June 2012)918, the ESC discusses the file twice. 
During the meetings, it mainly focuses on the contents of the new proposals and there is 
no attempt to have an impact. No increased use of formal powers has been found, which 
could eventually lead to a higher impact. The ESC in fact takes a very reactive attitude 
by waiting for further information and does not show an own position. 
																																																								
912 Ibid., par. 44. 
913 HC ESC, 4th Report, Session 2013–14, 19th December 2012. 
914 E2, EE2 and diclofenac. 
915 HC ESC, 4th Report, Session 2013–14, par. 19.5. 
916 This, however, is not published during the scrutiny of the EU legislative file. 
917 Ibid. 
918 Press Release, 3173rd Council meeting Environment, Luxembourg, 11 June 2012.	
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Step 4 Ex post control phase 
 
On 11th June 2012919 the Water Policy Directive is discussed by the Environmental 
Council. After this meeting, no follow-up takes place between the HC and government. 
To confirm the causal mechanism at this stage, evidence needed to be found showing 
more attempts than normal by the NP to hold its government to account.920 However, 
there are no signs of any scrutiny at all at this stage. 
Step 5 Ex ante influence Phase 
To confirm the causal mechanism at this stage, evidence needs to be found showing that 
the NP has increased its scrutiny as a consequence of the high salience of the topic. To 
do so, the HC is expected to use more than its normal formal powers (for example, not 
only asking questions, but a more active approach, such as showing its own opinion 
and/or including sectoral committees with more expertise). 
Because of its technical character, the HC forwards the draft directive to the Science 
and Technology (S&T) Committee.921 This committee organised an inquiry into the 
quality of water as a result of the new draft directive regarding Water Policy.922 On 27th 
February, 4th March, 6th March and 13th March 2013, the S&T committee receives 
different witnesses who give oral evidence in this field. The involvement of the S&T 
committee can be considered as an increased use of formal powers, as it is a choice for 
the NP in cases of salient or technical files. The decision of the S&T Committee to hold 
an inquiry on the topic can be considered a clear sign of salience. After all, the S&T 
committee thereby shows that it is interested in the topic to such an extent that it makes 
time and resources available to hear witnesses give their views on the matter. It would 
not make such a decision on a non-salient topic. This is confirmed in interviews.923 
According to Hywel Williams MP, the NP has higher chances to effect an impact on its 
government in one of these select committees instead of the ESC. The ESC will only 
																																																								
919 Ibid.  
920 I.e. not only receiving information, but a more active form of control, such as asking questions.  
921 For more information on the composition of the S&T Committee, see appendix III. 
922 The S&T Committee gives the government scientific and engineering advice. It is an unusual 
committee amongst departmental select committees, as it also scrutinises the Government Office for 
Science (GO-Science) which is a "semi-autonomous organisation" based within the Department for 
Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS).  
923 Benyon, 25th June 2015, Williams MP, 25th June 2015, Smith, 2nd July 2015.	
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involve a select committee if it wants to influence or control the government on an 
issue: 
‘Select committees make recommendations, which the government then 
consider and accept or reject. If an EU file goes to a select committee, there 
are more chances to influence the government than in the ESC. 
In the ESC they deal with issues fairly quickly, often only one meeting about 
a certain topic. Select committees sometimes have three or four or even more 
evidence sessions, taking views from experts, to give technical advice.’924 
First of all, Thames Water, the Environmental Industries Commission and the 
Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry (BPI) give evidence on 27th February 
2013.925 All three organisations oppose the inclusion of the new substances to the WFD 
as suggested in the new Water Policy Draft Directive.926 There is not enough evidence 
that these substances will do any harm and adding them will lead to extra costs 
according to the witnesses.927 The BPI stresses that in particular the three 
pharmaceuticals should be excluded, as there is no evidence of any population effect in 
the environment that could be attributed to the low levels of these pharmaceutical 
residues which are found in the environment.928 
On the same day, the Centre of Ecology and Hydrology, Natural Environment Research 
Council and a representative of the Blueprint for Water Coalition is heard to give 
evidence.929 All witnesses plead this time for an inclusion of the new substances to the 
WFD, contrary to the three witnesses heard during the morning of the oral evidence 
session.930 However, they do agree with the previously heard witnesses that some of the 
substances require more research by the EC. 931 
Thames Water (TW) continues to lobby against the inclusion of the new substances to 
the WFD. In its written evidence, received by the S&T Committee on 4th March 2013, 
the proposals are described as ‘unsubstantiated’ and ‘unlikely to have any 
																																																								
924 Williams MP, 25th June 2015. 
925 HC, S&T Committee, Water Quality, 1st Report of session 2013-2014, 27th February 2013. 
926 Ibid., Q3. 
927 Ibid. 
928 Ibid. 
929 HC, S&T Committee, Water Quality, 1st Report of session 2013-2014, 27th February 2013. 
930 Ibid., Q.38. 
931 Ibid.	
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environmental benefit’. TW is therefore mainly worried about the extra costs which will 
have an impact on customers.932 
On 4th March 2013, the EA gives evidence in front of the S&T committee.933 It does not 
see an added value of including extra substances to the WFD.934 It suggests, however, to 
include a watch list of substances which could be monitored more uniformly across the 
EU in order to gather improved data around the substances in question before adding 
them to the list.935 It furthermore suggests the improvement of innovation in this field, 
and argues that it is important to find ways to manage waste water.936 It is thus 
supportive of the UK government’s proposals in the Water White Paper.937 MPs ask the 
EA for its opinion regarding the level of engagement of the UK government with the 
EU in the drawing up of these proposals.938 
The EA is very positive about government involvement: 
‘It is fair to say that the government has probably led the way in terms of 
mounting an evidence-based challenge against some of these proposals. 
They have always pressed for an evidence-based approach within Europe 
...’939 
On 6th March 2013, the EC comes to give evidence before the T&S Committee.940 The 
EC representative explains why it has selected an extra 12 substances to be added to 
the directive. Mr. Gammeltoft states 
‘The patterns of use of chemical substances change over time; the emissions 
to the environment change over time. Therefore, it is natural that the list of 
priority substances will have to evolve over time, and this can, in principle, 
include adding new substances and taking substances off the list. I consider 
this to be a routine matter.’941 
																																																								
932 HC, S&T Committee, Written Evidence Submitted by Thames Water, 4th March 2013. 
933 HC, S&T Committee, Water Quality, 1st Report of session 2013-2014, 4th March 2013. 
934 Ibid., Q.100. 
935 Ibid., Q.38. 
936 Ibid., Q.110. 
937 HM Government, Water for Life, December 2011. 
938 To be discussed in the EP in May 2013. 
939 HC, S&T Committee, Water Quality, 4th March 2013, Q.110. 
940 HC, S&T Committee, Water Quality, 6th March 2013.	
941 Ibid., Q138. 
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MPs ask the EC how to sell these new plans, which will lead to increased costs, to a 
sceptical public and how to communicate the benefits of what is done in a way that is 
understandable to the wider public.942 Although MPs do not show any attempts to alter 
the proposal, the active questions it raises on communicating its implications shows a 
genuine interest by the Committee. In other words, it does not only want to be 
informed by the different witnesses, it also considers itself to play an active role in that 
(communication to the public). This might not imply impact, though it does surely 
show signs of salience and parliamentary activity. 
The EC answers that, just like explaining the benefits of biodiversity, it is a challenge 
to do so. 
‘… [W]hat we will have is cleaner water; probably fewer costs in drinking 
water treatment; and fewer costs in treating things like polluted sediments, 
because a lot of these substances will end up in sediments and may have to 
be cleaned up for other purposes … There is a whole series of benefits. Some 
of them are easier to visualise than others …’943 
The committee also asks about the levels of contact between the government and EC on 
this matter.944 The EC replies that the UK government has been quite active on priority 
substances and co-chaired some of the expert groups. It has also been responsible for 
developing the environmental quality standards proposed for E2 and EE2.945 The MPs, 
however, insist and want to know whether the UK government has pulled its weight 
when comparing it with other European countries.946 This question shows that the 
relationship between the government and NP is more than solely one belonging to the 
trusteeship. The HC is active in finding out to what extent the government has been 
doing its job. This is a way of holding government to account in this file. The EC 
answers positively: 
																																																								
942 Ibid., Q.156. 
943 Ibid. 
944 Ibid., Q.177. 
945 Ibid. 
946 Ibid., Q.178.	
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‘Yes, definitely. In terms of participation in the preparatory work, yes, the 
UK has definitely pulled its weight. It has probably been more active than 
the average member state.’947 
On 13th March, finally, DEFRA is heard for oral evidence and Richard Benyon and two 
civil servants attend the S&T Committee.948 To the question asked by one of the MPs as 
to whether DEFRA thinks that the new substances should be listed, the Minister replies 
affirmatively with regard to most of them.949 Some of them, however, seem to have 
been unnecessarily added to the list, in the Minister’s opinion.950 They pose no form of 
unacceptable risk. The committee goes on to ask what the Minister considers to be an 
‘unacceptable risk’, to which the Minister replies: 
‘When unacceptable risk might be faced by people or the environment, 
government and regulators should intervene. The government’s role is to 
protect people and the environment, and for chemicals we need to balance 
the value of being able to use a substance against its potential human and 
environmental impacts …’951 
The committee also wants to know why the UK lags behind other European countries 
when it comes to innovation and water treatment.952 This is a critical question, which 
goes further than the solely passive form of being informed. It is a way of holding the 
government to account. The government responds that the UK is catching up rapidly 
and that the new approach to the price review in 2014 is encouraging more innovation 
with water companies.953 This answer is not sufficient for some MPs who continue to 
ask about some of the evidence received by the Committee, which shows a lack of 
political support regarding the importance of water policy. It asks clarification of the 
government to find out whether water policy is a priority for its administration.954 
The government responds that water policy is a massive issue across the government. 
																																																								
947 Ibid. 
948 Ibid. 
949 Ibid., Q.189. 
950 Ibid. 
951 Ibid., Q. 191. 
952 Ibid., Q.213.	
953 Ibid. 
954 Ibid., Q.215-216. 
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‘This is about growth, jobs, the bills households are paying, public health, 
safety and particular issues of social deprivation. How do we enable people 
who are in water poverty to pay their bills? It is massive.’955 
MPs continue to ask why the UK has not been more involved in this within the EU and 
why it has been absent from some of the EU negotiations.956 Benyon says that DEFRA 
does attend the meetings. He is backed up by his civil servants who say that this 
suggestion has no evidence and that the UK has always played an active role in this. 
The UK has only been inactive in the European innovation partnership.957 But that is 
not just for the government to attend. Benyon continues: 
‘What we are concentrating on is where we think we can bring about change, 
with the right proportionate evidence-based decisions to how we do stuff.’958 
Finally, the committee wants to know about the involvement of the public and how 
much it is aware of the issue of substances.959 DEFRA replies that in its Water for Life 
White Paper, the government set out several proposals on this issue. Within the paper, it 
outlines proposals on how to reduce burdens, simplify and deregulate existing 
regulation.960 
The contents of the questions raised by the HC show that the topic is indeed salient. It is 
obvious that the relationship between the government and the HC increases towards the 
level of delegatory during which the HC uses more than its normal powers of being 
informed, but goes further and holds the government to account by asking about the 
(lack of) achievements in the UK within this field, even though the NP does not try to 
change the position of the government. 
Letter from government  
On 20th May 2013, the DEFRA sends a letter to the ESC. Mr Richard Benyon informs 
the committee that a compromise has been reached with the EP.961 This compromise 
sees the three pharmaceuticals which caused concern for the UK being removed from 																																																								
955 Ibid., Q.216. 
956 Ibid., Q.217. 
957 Ibid., Q.217. 
958 Ibid., Q.219. 
959 Ibid.	
960 Ibid., Q.220. 
961 HC ESC, Fourth Report, 2013-2014, 5th June 2013.  
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the list of priority substances.962 They will now appear on some kind of watch list, as 
has also been requested by the S&T committee963 (however, this request is also made in 
the governmental EM). The Minister furthermore notes that as a consequence of the 
compromise the EC must now develop a strategic approach regarding the pollution of 
water by pharmaceuticals. This could result in new priority substances to be added in 
the next review of Directive 2008/105/EC in 2017.964 
Finally, the Minister notes that the proposed lowering of the Environmental Quality 
Standards (EQS), to which the ESC had drawn attention during a previous meeting, had 
for some substances been accepted. According to the Minister, there still remains 
uncertainty around the costs involved: 
‘These substances had for the most part already been restricted under source control 
legislation, and technological means of removal are currently limited and 
expensive.’965 
This letter includes direct references to the issues raised by the NP. Although there are 
no signs of impact (there is no proof that the issues discussed during the Council 
meeting come from the UK and could indirectly be influenced by the HC), the contents 
of this letter show that the government is aware of the HC’s position and feeds back 
about it. In other, less salient cases, a letter would just refer to the adoption of the file, if 
mentioned at all (as we have seen, for example, in the cod recovery (C2a). 
ESC discussion  
On 5th June 2013, the ESC published a report in which it shows its relief for the 
agreement between the EP and Council to remove the famous three pharmaceuticals as 
this would have led to a significant increase in costs in the UK.966 The ESC clears the 
scrutiny of this file. Again, this shows the HC’s opinion on the topic and its relieved 
because its concerns, known by DEFRA, were solved. 
																																																								
962 Ibid., par. 19.7. 
963 Ibid., par. 19.7. 
964 Ibid.	
965 Ibid., par. 19.8. 
966 Ibid., par. 19.9. 
	 208	
During this stage, more scrutiny than normal was expected to be found (so, active 
influencing instead of solely being informed about the topic, as is expected in a 
trusteeship relationship). 
The HC indeed shows signs of actively wanting to know about the contents, the 
consequences and its own role as a communicator to the public in this. Therefore the 
causal mechanism seems to be confirmed at this stage. The ESC has involved the S&T 
committee in the scrutiny of this legislative file, because of its technical and salient 
nature. This committee organised an inquiry into the suggested changes of the WFD and 
put in a lot of effort to obtain more information about the contents of the draft directive 
and the actions of the government. 
Although from the meetings it is not directly clear that the HC has actively tried to 
convince the government of its own opinion, in the last ESC report, the government is 
quoted as referring to some of the points to which the ESC attached importance. 
Another aspect accepted in the Council, according to government, is the introduction of 
a watch list of some substances, as was supported by the S&T Committee. However, 
this watch list was already part of the government EM and cannot therefore be 
considered as impact. 
It is remarkable that the active approach only began during the second influence stage. 
This corresponds to Chris Heaton-Harris MP and Robert Broadhurst’s opinions about 
MP’s contributions during the scrutiny of EU files: 
‘A clear opinion of MPs on an EU proposal is often not produced until the proposal has 
progressed a considerable way through EU decision-making. This means the influence 
the House can have on the formation of an EU law or other commitment is much 
reduced.’967 
Step 6 Ex post control phase 
 
The next Council meeting, during which the draft Water Policy Directive is discussed 
and adopted, takes place on 22nd July 2013.968  
																																																								
967 ESC, submission to the ESC of the HC for its enquiry into the HC European Scrutiny system, ESI 07, 
submitted by Chris Heaton-Harris MP and Robert Broadhurst. 
968 Press Release, 3254th Council meeting, Foreign Affairs, Brussels, 22nd July 2013.  
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Evidence was expected to be found showing the government being held to account after 
the Council meeting. However, no follow up meeting is held or correspondence has 
taken place after the Council meeting. 
The causal mechanism cannot be confirmed at this stage. 
Step 7 
Adoption of the legislative file on 22nd July 2013.969 The Council adopts a revised list of 
chemicals, which present a significant risk to the environment in order to continue with 
sustainable water management.970 However, it also agreed to the proposed to lower the 
Environmental Quality Standards (EQS), which was also suggested by the HC. 
7.2.5 Concluding remarks 
For this case, a legislative file was selected which, according to both UK citizens and 
politicians, can be regarded as a topic of high salience. According to the theoretical 
argument, an EU legislative file which can be considered to be salient for the electorate 
will lead to the increased use of formal powers by the NP and, as a consequence, an 
increased impact on the government.  
We can indeed infer from meetings and correspondence between the government and 
the HC that the latter has used more than its formal powers at this stage, as it has given 
its own opinion to the government before the actual Council meeting. The HC has 
therefore tried to influence the government by showing a huge concern over the 
inclusion of certain substances and over the actual commitment of the UK government 
to water policies. The interviewees confirmed the importance of the file and that MPs 
were appalled by the poor performance of the UK in this field.971 In other words, both 
data extracted from the meeting documents and the interviews show that salience is the 
variable at work here, leading to an increased use of formal powers by the NP with the 
aim to impact (push for removing three pharmaceuticals) and control (ensuring active 
involvement of the government). This corresponds clearly to the theoretical argument, 
linking the salience of a topic to tightening the scrutiny of the government. The NP had 
a clear view on this file and on the way it expected the government to behave in this 
																																																								
969 Ibid.	
970 Ibid.	
971 Benyon, 25th June 2015, Williams MP, 25th June 2015, Smith, 2nd July 2015. 
	 210	
case which led to the tightening of its relationship with government to a delegatory 
one972, rather than having the intention of changing the government’s position.  
Although no evidence is found of the government taking on any parliamentary  
suggestions, the government does refer back to the NP’s positions when discussing the 
outcome of the Council meeting (5th June 2013).  
Measurable impact 
Interviewees confirmed that the government has followed its own position in this case, 
although government representatives do believe that they ‘tweaked’ their input to the 
Council as a consequence of the NP’s efforts. This was a consequence of the many 
questions raised and technical advice offered during meetings, but not informally.973  In 
other words, by increasing the use of formal powers in this case, the HC did raise 
awareness among government representatives and endeavoured to show how committed 
it is to EU water policy. More specifically, the increased use of parliamentary activities 
leads to an increased use of actions by the government.  
As none of the HC’s positions are reflected in the government’s position or input into 
the Council, impact can therefore be considered weak. The increased use of formal 
powers were used to instruct the government to act in a certain way, but not to change 
the contents of its position vis-à-vis the EU Water Policy. A word of caution is 
necessary, as impact is extremely difficult here. The HC had many difficulties with the 
inclusion of certain substances, but this was shared by the government. Government 
representatives confirmed in interviews that they pressed the Council to have these 
substances deleted from the list because of the administration’s own concerns about 
financial consequences and not because of the NP’s worries.974 However, government 
had been taken to court due to failing previous EU water rules. It therefore wanted to 
show the HC that it was taking the topic seriously.975 In other words, although 
measurable impact is not visible here, some softer forms of impact are noticeable in this 
case (such as making sure that the government does take this topic seriously).  
																																																								
972 See also Saalfeld, 2005, Chapter 2.3.	
973 Benyon, 25th June 2015. 
974 Ibid. 
975 Ibid. 
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7.3 Case 6: The EU regulation on Ship recycling (COM(2012)118976) 
7.3.1 Policy positions on (ship) recycling 
Disagreements are expected to be found between the different parties in parliament and 
between parliament and government. Ship recycling is part of the wider environmental 
and, in particular, waste agenda of the UK government and its implementation is also 
being dealt with by the EA. In 2004, the poor dismantling of ships in the UK had lead to 
objections from both the public and environmental groups because companies without 
the necessary permits were carrying out the work. This carried the risk of both health977 
and environmental consequences and both the EA and DEFRA (during the Labour 
government) carried out different reviews in order to learn from those lessons.978 
Political parties representing different regions, but also different interests, are likely to 
have opposing views on how to legislate ship recycling in the EU. In other words, 
political parties in which the environment and/or health and safety issues of employees 
play a prominent role - such as the Greens, Labour and the Liberal Democrats - might 
have opposing views than, for example, the Conservatives who are more likely to 
prevent companies dealing with ship recycling from being submitted to too much (EU) 
regulation.979 Besides, next to this probable left/right wing cleavage, it is likely that 
those MPs representing constituencies depending on fisheries and marine resources, 
such as Cornwall, Devon, Wales and Scotland, are more likely to have an interest in this 
topic than others. 
That is, although in this research this EU legislative file is considered to be of non-
salience, it is still a topic on which certain MPs will use their formal powers to either 
influence and/or control their government. It is simply expected that the number of MPs 
doing so will be limited and that therefore, the parliamentary impact on the government 
is to be weak. Table 16 shows the views of British political parties on waste based upon 
their party programmes from 2010. 
																																																								
976 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/procedure/EN/201456	
977 Many UK ships are dismantled in Asia where health and safety protection for workers are often 
ignored or even non-existent (HC, Environment, Rural Affairs and Food Committee, Dismantling defunct 
Ships in the UK, Eighteenth Report, 2003-2004, p.3). 
978 EFRAC, Dismantling defunct Ships in the UK, Eighteenth Report, 2003-2004, p. 5 
979 Conservative Party European Election Manifesto, 2014, p.9. 
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Table 16 Party policy positions on waste in the UK, 2010-2015 
Labour Conservatives Liberal -Democrats UKIP 
- Working rights is one 
of its priorities 
- Focus on generating 
sustainable growth and 
new jobs in and 
through the waste 
industry.980 
- Higher recycling and 
greater re-use of 
materials 
- Exporting materials 
for recycling can be 
more profitable 
than retaining them in 
the UK. 
Keen to consider views 
on how government 
can help promote ‘fair 
trade’ recycling.981 
- Working towards zero 
waste 
- Providing incentives to 
recycle.982 
- Work with other 
countries to develop an 
international labelling 
system for the 
environmental impact of 
products, helping 
consumers choose those 
with the least impact on 
resource use and 
pollution. 
 
Support a global fund for 
social protection to help 
developing countries 
build viable welfare 
systems. 
 
Set targets for ‘zero 
waste’, aiming to end the 
use of landfill.983 
 
No policy on recycling 
in general, but in 
favour of leaving the 
EU landfill Directive 
to cut refuse disposal 
costs.984 
7.3.2 Expected causal process 
When scrutinising a non-salient file it is expected that the NP will use few formal 
powers, which will lead to the following causal process: 
NPs dealing with non-salient EU topic ! NPs do not fully use their formal mechanisms 
to influence ! MPs’ actions are not visible ! no pressure on government ! 
government responds to EU proposal based upon its own position ! no parliamentary 
impact. 
7.3.3 Background of the proposal 
In 2006, the EU adopted a Regulation in order to control waste shipments and improve 
environmental protection. It also attempted to include the Basel Convention on the 
Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal.985 Despite this 
regulation, the concerns about health and environmental issues in this field have 																																																								
980 Labour’s Policy Review, Resource Security: Growth and Jobs from Waste Industries, 2012. 
981 Ibid., 5.	
982 Conservative manifesto: 2010 general election party policy. 
983 Liberal Democrats, Manifesto 2010 
984 Jones, P. Should the waste sector vote UKIP? 22nd May 2014. http://www.isonomia.co.uk/?p=2988 
985 HC ESC, 64th Report of session 2012-2013, 24th April, 2012, par.8.1.	
	 213	
remained. After the publication of a few Green Papers (2006, 2007) and a Commission 
Communication (2008), the EC published two further documents in 2012; one draft 
Council Decision regarding the ratification of the Hong Kong Convention986 and a draft 
Regulation on ship recycling which would replace the 2006 Regulation and, amongst 
other things, implement the key elements of the Hong Kong Convention. This draft 
regulation is used as this section’s non-salient case.987 
7.3.4 Parliamentary scrutiny of the EU legislative file during OLP steps988 
This section discusses all different steps of the OLP of the EU legislative file regarding 
EU Ship Recycling and whether the HC used its formal powers to either influence 
and/or control their government’s EU policy position at any point of the scrutiny and if 
so, whether its attempts had any effect. 
Step 1 
The EC document is published on 23rd March 2012. 
Step 2 NPs have eight weeks to respond (deadline: 21st May 2012) 
Parliaments have until 21st May 2012 to send their objections against the proposal in the 
case that they consider it to be inconsistent with the subsidiary principle. The HC 
withholds from sending a RO to the EC regarding this legislative file, just like all other 
NPs. 
Step 3 Ex ante influence phase 
As evidence to confirm the causal mechanism during this stage, meeting documents 
were expected to be found showing that MPs do not use anything other than their 
formal powers989 to scrutinise government. No evidence showing that MPs try to have 
an impact on their government’s position on this EU draft regulation is expected to be 
found. 
																																																								
986 Adopted in May 2009 by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO). 
987 HC ESC, 64th Report of session 2012-2013, 24th April 2012, par.8.2. 
988 For more information on these steps, see Appendix I and II. 	
989 No more than one meeting and/or form of correspondence with the responsible government 
department, which consists of receiving information but not showing its own opinion with the aim of 
achieving an impact. 
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On 11th April 2012, the government publishes its EM.990 This includes the government’s 
position on the draft regulation and is therefore considered to be the initial government 
position. The responsible Minister for State for Agriculture and Food at DEFRA, Mr 
James Paice, argues in the EM that a new regulation in this field is necessary because 
the 2006 regulation has been proven to be difficult to enforce with respect to ships.991 
The Minister welcomes the publication of the new draft regulation, as it encourages 
Member States to implement the Hong Kong Convention. However, the government 
expresses some concern about the regulation:992 
‘For example, it is looking very carefully at the provisions on penalties, 
noting that, whilst — as is appropriate — these do not require the imposition 
of criminal offences and/or penalties, it will still be necessary to ensure that 
they respect the allocation of EU competence in this field, that they are 
appropriate, and that they properly respect the UK's view that the setting of 
penalties should be primarily a matter for Member States.’993 
The Minister argues as well that only member states can become a part of the HK 
Convention, thus, not the EU. Member states will therefore play an important role in 
the ratification of the Convention.994 The Minister continues to explain in the EM that 
differences could exist between member states in the legal requirements for EU-
flagged ships, as the ratification of the Convention might not have the same priority 
for all member states.995 The UK government is therefore of the opinion that the 
Convention should be incorporated into EU legislation to ensure a harmonised 
implementation across all member states.996 
Finally, the Minister is concerned about the ratification of the Convention 
within a specified deadline. 
‘… The government does not consider this to be appropriate, and, if the 
Decision stands, it will seek modification to its wording to ensure that it 
																																																								
990 HC ESC, 64th Report of session 2012-2013, 24th April 2012, par.8.7. 
991 Ibid.	
992 Ibid., par.8.10. 
993 Ibid., par.8.8. 
994 Ibid., par.8.9. 
995 Ibid. 
996 Ibid. 
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"authorises" ratification of the Convention in respect of areas within the 
external competence of the EU, rather than "requires" it.997 
On 25th April 2012, the ESC998 holds a meeting, during which it discusses the draft 
regulation on ship recycling and the government EM (use of standard formal 
powers).999 
The ESC refers to the environmental concerns associated with ship recycling. It 
therefore decides to draw attention to the file. However, even if the UK government is 
of the opinion that a less prescriptive requirement is necessary, according to the ESC 
the contents of the draft regulation, including the HK Convention, do not raise any 
fundamental issues. The ESC therefore clears the document and does not express its 
own views.1000 It will not be forwarded to the House or any other (specialised) 
committee, such as the EFRAC which has dealt with this topic in the past.1001 Based 
upon the lack of salience, the parliament will no longer need to use any formal powers 
to impact the EU file. It gives the government leeway to act as a trustee in this file. 
As expected, the ESC dealt with this file in a minimal way. Although they pointed out 
the risks associated with the recycling of ships and the challenges the EC would have to 
deal with, it sees no need to further scrutinise this legislative file. If the legislative file 
were to have been considered more salient, the HC would most likely not have cleared 
the file but would have held the document under further scrutiny under which the 
government-parliament relationship would have been a delegatory one with more 
chances to effect an impact. In this case, the HC chooses not to have any impact. The 
causal mechanism is accepted. 
Step 4 Ex post control phase 
Although the HC is considered to be a NP, which is part of the trusteeship model in 
which the emphasis of the scrutiny is focused on holding government to account after 
Council meetings, the parliament has already cleared the document before it even made 
it to the Council meeting. This lack of use of formal powers corresponds to the expected 
causal process. Causal mechanism is confirmed. 																																																								
997 Ibid., par. 8.10.	
998 For an overview of the composition of the ESC, see appendix III. 
999 HC ESC, 64th Report of session 2012-2013, 24th April, 2012 
1000 Ibid., par. 8.11. 
1001 Ibid.	
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Step 5 Ex ante influence phase 
As the HC has cleared the EU legislative file after one meeting, there is no 
parliamentary attempt to have an impact on the government’s position before the 
Council meeting. This absence of use of formal powers by the HC confirms the causal 
mechanism. 
Step 6 Ex post control phase 
The next Council meeting at which the draft Ship Recycling Regulation is adopted is 
held on 25th October 2012.1002 It was expected that there would be little use of control 
mechanisms after this meeting to establish whether the government had acted according 
to parliamentary expectations. As parliament cleared the document during its first 
dealing with this draft regulation, it basically gave the government the freedom to 
follow its own judgement in this case. The causal mechanism is thereby confirmed. 
Step 7 
Adoption of the legislative file on 15th November 2013.1003 Member states agreed to 
regularly update the European list of ship recycling facilities. All ships must have on 
board an inventory of hazardous material contained in the ship structure, combined with 
an overview of their location and quantities.1004 
7.3.5 Concluding remarks 
For this case, a non-salient EU legislative file was  selected to examine the extent to 
which the NP used its formal powers to be able to have an impact on government’s EU 
policy position. Based upon the theoretical argument, it was expected that the HC would 
not use any more than its formal powers in a non-salient case and that the impact 
therefore would be weak. When looking at this case, the NP has used even less than its 
formal powers, as it basically decided to clear this document after one discussion in the 
ESC. In doing so, the parliament gave the government the total freedom to follow its 
own judgement, which confirms the theoretical argument that in a non-salient case the 
government is more likely to act as a trustee and the NP will less-likely have a 																																																								
1002 3271st Council meeting of the Council of the EU, Economic and Financial Affairs, Brussels, 15th 
November 2013. 
1003 Ibid.	
1004 Ibid. 
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substantive impact on the government’s EU policy position. This corresponds to 
Saalfeld, arguing that the represented does not mind delegating to the representative 
when salience is low.1005 
Measurable impact  
Interviews confirm that no informal influence had taken place for the scrutiny of this 
file and that when drafting the EM, the government only took into account the position 
of the coalition partners.1006 The MPs have not introduced any points during the scrutiny 
of the EU legislative file and have shown no attempts to control the government’s input 
into the Council meeting. As a consequence, the government has not changed its input 
into the Council regarding this file, nor has it increased its feedback to the HC. It can 
therefore be concluded that the parliamentary impact on this file in weak, but this is in 
line with the intentions of the HC. 
7.4 Pair-wise comparison between case 5 (salience) and case 6 (non-
salience) 
This pair-wise comparison very clearly shows different causal processes in the cases 
where in one case the salience condition is present and absent in the other, even though 
in both cases the impact can be considered as weak. The expected causal processes are 
thereby confirmed in both cases when examining the scrutiny of the salient EU dossier 
and that of the non-salient one. Table 17 shows very clearly how in the salient case MPs 
are more active than in the non-salient one, particularly during the second influence 
stage. Interviews confirm that the NP chooses carefully when to use its formal powers, 
as it is so busy. It will only do so if the topic is of importance to its constituents or if 
there is a lot at stake for the country.1007 This was clearly not the case in the Ship 
Recycling file1008 as seen in the following quotes: ‘Ship Recycling is just not a 
controversial issue’.1009 ‘The EU Water Policy was important and the Ship Recycling 
file clearly was not’.1010 The Water Policy, and especially its scientific underpinning, 
																																																								
1005 Saalfeld, 2005:354. 
1006 Cowperthwaite, questionnaire, 13th July 2015. 
1007 Benyon, 25th June 2015, Rees-Mogg, 22nd June 2015. 
1008 Rees-Mogg MP, 22nd June 2015, Hopkins, 30th June 2015, Sowrey, 6th July 2015, Cowperthwaite, 
14thJuly 2015. 
1009 Rees-Mogg MP, 22nd June 2015. 
1010 Hopkins MP, 30th June 2015.	
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was considered to be of ‘huge importance’ by MPs and their government, that’s why the 
S&T committee spent three meetings on it’.1011 
‘We were taken to Court, as there were a few issues the UK had not complied 
with during the Habitat and Water Framework Directive. Many 
organisations, like WWF and Anglian Trust and Client Earth were on top of 
this file, which put the UK under pressure. We were given £100 million by 
the Treasury to improve our rivers. That is a lot of money, taxpayers money. 
This increased scrutiny in the House.’1012 
‘This is how a selection is made. We scrutinise about 1000 documents a year, 
only a limited number (35) gets to be discussed in the ESC and an even 
smaller number makes it to the House (half a dozen). The number that gets 
deep discussion, are quite small.  We pick select issue that MPs have direct 
links with through their constituencies and therefore would like to get 
involved.’1013 
According to Gammeltoft, former head of the Water Unit at the EC, the UK considered 
the Water Policy an important topic: 
‘I think the UK government gave a lot of importance to it. There was quite a lot of 
discussion on it. The UK government played an important role and there was a lot of 
discussion in the HC.’1014 
The evidence from the meeting documents, the interviews and this pair-wise 
comparison all show salience as the responsible factor for increased parliamentary 
activities, which is furthermore emphasised by the fact that the other possible rivalling 
variables were either constant or absent in this pair-wise comparison.  
Shadow pair-wise comparison 
In order to be more confident about confirming the hypothesis, another pair-wise 
comparison of two typical cases has been added; a salient case (the European Maritime 
and Fisheries Fund, EMFF), C5a, is compared to a non-salient case (Cod Stocks), 																																																								
1011 Benyon, 25th June 2015, Williams MP, 25th June 2015, Smith MP, 2nd July 2015, Gammeltoft, 4th 
August 2015. 
1012 Benyon, 25th June 2015. 
1013 Rees-Mogg MP, 22nd June 2015. 
1014 4th August 2015.	
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C6a.1015 An overview of the use of formal powers during those cases can be found in 
table 18.1016 Just like in C5 and C6, this pair-wise comparison shows very clearly how 
the use of formal power increases when the case is salient. 
Interviews confirm that the EMFF was a more salient case, as there was money 
involved and that this leads to an increased scrutiny. It was also a major issue in the 
ESC, and this lead to serious questioning of the government.1017 Benyon’s opinion 
about the reform of the EMFF: 
‘This was an important topic. The European Fisheries Fund was outdated and 
together with some other countries, Germany, Netherlands and Scandinavian 
countries, we pleaded very hard for reform. We wanted a new fund to be 
spent on sustainability.’1018 
‘The Cod stocks file was just less contentious. However, the chairman of the 
ESC, Bill Cash MP, was very keen to pursue the EMFF, it was almost a 
personal issue. The EU was seeking greater competences in an area that ESC 
felt it was unwarranted. This is a good example of why personalities in the 
ESC matter.’1019 
‘Anything related to funding is important. Funding tends to be scrutinized 
more than anything else. Inevitably, because this is about tax payers’ 
money.’1020 
According to Smith MP, however, of all these files, the CFP was the most important 
one in the sense that it was mostly known among the voters: 
‘If you would ask people on the street, they would have a view on CFP, but 
not on the EMFF.’1021 
However, also on the EMFF, the government did not change its position as a 
consequence of input from the NP. The UK government and the NP shared the same 																																																								
1015 As the selection of this case is the same as that from C1a (a non-salient case whereby no use of the 
Lisbon provisions was made and which is scrutinised during the multi-party government of Cameron-
Clegg) the same file has been selected.  
1016 For more information regarding the scrutiny of these files, see appendix V. 
1017 Benyon, 25th June 2015, Sowrey, 6th July 2015, Hopkins, 30th June 2015. 
1018 Benyon, 25th June 2015. 
1019 Smith MP, 2nd July 2015. 
1020 Rees-Mogg MP, 22nd June 2015.	
1021 Smith, 2nd July 2015. 
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opinion on the importance for Britain of this dossier.1022 However, the government did 
take the NP’s position on board. 
‘We negotiated a position in the Council that was slightly different from the 
House’s position, after the meeting we have to justify that. You have no time 
to clear that position in advance. The House already gave us that freedom 
before starting the negotiations. Before going to Brussels, you make sure that 
you get that flexibility to negotiate effectively.’1023 
As there seem to be no rival variables at work during the different steps of the OLP in 
all four cases, and the evidence of process-tracing show that salience is the reason for 
increased parliamentary activities, we can therefore conclude that salience does imply 
an increased parliamentary activity. Although this does not automatically lead to more 
impact by the NP (the NP had no intention to change the contents of the government’s 
policy position), the government’s relationship is certainly tightened in salient cases, 
which decreases its leeway when negotiating in Brussels. The government gets clear 
instructions and is expected to give feedback to the HC after the Council meeting. The 
hypothesis expecting that the more salient an EU issue is to the NP, the more likely the 
NP will have a substantive impact on the government’s EU policy position is therefore 
confirmed. Tables 17 and 18 give overviews of the outcome of the pair-wise 
comparisons used to measure the salience condition. 
																																																								
1022 Benyon, 25th June 2015, Rees-Mogg MP, 22nd June 2015, Smith, 2nd July 2015. 
1023 Sowrey, 6th July 2015.	
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Table 17 Outcome of the pair-wise comparison between Case 5 and Case 6 
Seven steps of OLP 
 
CASE 5 
(salient) 
CASE 6 
(non-salient) 
1: publication X X 
2: eight weeks X X 
3: first influence phase EM government 
2 x ESC meeting 
Reception of information 
 
EM government 
ESC meeting 
4: first control phase X 
 
X 
 
5: second influence phase Letter government 
Involvement of Sectoral 
Committee 
Inquiry with different 
organisations, including gov. and 
EC 
Questions about procedures 
Meeting ESC 
X 
6: second control phase X X 
7: adoption X X 
IMPACT Weak Weak 
 
Table 18 Outcome of the pair-wise comparison between Case 5a and Case 6a 
Seven steps of OLP 
 
CASE 5A (salient) CASE 6A (non-salient) 
1: publication X X 
2: eight weeks X X 
3: first influence phase EM government 
ESC meeting 
 
EM government 
ESC meeting 
4: first control phase 2 letters government 
1 letter NP 
ESC meeting 
 
X 
 
5: second influence phase Letter government 
European Committee A +gov 
X 
6: second control phase X X 
7: adoption X X 
IMPACT Weak Weak 
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Chapter 8 
The Lisbon provisions 
8.1 Introduction 
In this final Chapter of the empirical research, the use of the NP’s right to submit a RO 
to the EC if it objects to an EU legislative proposal (also known as the EWM), 
introduced in the Lisbon Treaty, is studied. This Chapter consists of a section analysing 
a case in which the NP makes use of this right and a section where the NP scrutinises 
the government when it has not submitted a RO. 
The multi-party and salience variables are constant for this case and the Eurosceptic 
variable is absent. 
The multi-party variable is constant, as in both cases (C7 and C8) the NP scrutinises the 
same government.1024 The Eurosceptic variable is absent because the scrutiny of both 
cases took place during the Rutte II cabinet (2012-present) which consists of the 
Liberals and Social Democrats, both pro-European parties, and the cabinet no longer 
depends upon the Eurosceptic PVV1025 as it did during the Rutte I cabinet. It is expected 
that the NP, with moderate influence mechanisms, is able to increase its impact on the 
government’s EU policy position when it decides to send a RO to the EC. 
The topics of both cases are considered to be of non-salience to the electorate, as there 
are no references to the EU maritime policy in the national party manifestos of the 
governmental parties1026 and the Euro-barometer of the year before publication does not 
refer to the Maritime Policy as being any of the major concerns of the citizens.1027 It is, 
however, expected that the cases (Maritime Spatial (C7) planning and Port Services 
(C8)1028) are salient to the legislative actors on which the political parties in government 
and parliament have opposing views. Some of the political parties in the SC believe that 
the topic of maritime policies should be dealt with at national level (such as the VVD, 
PVV and CDA1029). Other political parties feel less worried about the EU intervening in 																																																								
1024 For more information about the political parties in The Netherlands and the members of involved 
committees in the scrutiny of the selected cases, see appendix IV. 
1025 Party for Freedom. 
1026 PvdA Party Manifesto, 2012 and the VVD Party Manifesto, 2012. 
1027 Standard Euro-barometer 77, July 2012, and Standard Euro-barometer 78, appendix, question 7. 
1028 As the necessary conditions for this file (multi-party, non-salient, no use of Lisbon) are identical as 
for C4a, the same EU legislative file has been selected. 
1029 For more information on the different political parties in the Dutch SC, see appendix IV. 
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issues related to maritime issues, including ports (such as D66, Green Left (GL), and the 
PvdA). In its political manifesto for the European Elections, the PvdA indicates that it 
expects the EU to deal with sea and maritime issues and to what extent it should do 
so.1030 The VVD, on the contrary, does not refer to the need for fishery and maritime 
policies at all in its 2009 EU manifesto, but does stress the need for less EU legislation 
in general.1031 CDA follows a similar line. It does not refer to maritime policies, but 
sees the EU mainly as a helpful institution in the field of the internal market.1032 Other 
parties, such as GL, see a very explicit role for the EU in the field of maritime and 
coastal policy, for example, in order to promote more wind energy and reduce state aids 
for ports.1033 D66 and the SP follow a similar role for the EU in this policy.1034 The 
extent to which maritime and coastal policies should be dealt with at either EU or 
national level, could therefore be a topic on which the NP and the government have 
different views.  
The Chapter follows the same structure as the previous empirical Chapters and starts off 
by tracing the process of each case. This will be followed by a pair-wise comparison 
between the cases and analyses whether the use of formal powers change when the NP 
does make use of this ‘Lisbon-right’ compared to when it does not. The SC is a NP with 
ex ante influence powers and is expected to increase its impact on the government’s EU 
policy position even further in the case where it has sent a RO to the EC. 
8.2 Case 7: the EU Framework for Maritime Spatial Planning 
(COM(2013)133)1035 
8.2.1. Policy Positions political parties 
Although the topic of Maritime and Coastal policies cannot be considered to be one of 
direct salience for the electorate, the topic is important for the Netherlands and political 
parties have different opinions about them. According to Abspoel, the government 
representative responsible for drafting the government position in this file: 
																																																								
1030 PvdA, Verkiezingsprogramma Europees Parlement, 2009-2014, p.18. 
1031 VVD-verkiezingsprogramma 2009 – 2014. 
1032 CDA, verkiezingsprogramma, 2009-2014. 
1033 Groen Links, Verkiezingsprogramma Europees Parlement 2009-2014. 
1034 D66, Verkiezingsprogramma voor het Europees Parlement, 2009 and SP Verkiezingsprogramma voor 
het Europees Parlement, 2009-2014. 
1035 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/procedure/EN/202463	
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‘The government was divided on this issue, as the PvdA wanted the coastal 
management to be included in the directive and the VVD wanted this to 
remain part of the national policies. However, when drafting the government 
position, it came out with a united view on this … Although the PvdA did not 
agree with the VVD on this, it was convinced that coastal management 
should be out of the directive and that was its line as well once the EM was 
drafted.’1036 
According to Kisters who is responsible for transport dossiers at the Dutch Permanent 
Representation in Brussels: 
‘The government could understand the position of the SC to send a negative 
RO about this. Spatial planning is a national matter. The Dutch government 
includes the SC from the beginning by forwarding the Council agendas to the 
NP before the meetings and have a meeting before each Council meeting.’1037 
Table 19 gives an overview of the different positions of the political parties on Maritime 
Policies. 
Table 19 Party policy positions on EU maritime policies in the Netherlands 
VVD 
 
PvdA CDA PVV D66 GL SP 
EU 
legislation 
in the field 
of 
maritime 
and 
coastal 
policies 
should be 
limited.1038 
More 
legislation in 
the field of 
maritime and 
coastal 
policies is 
important for 
protection 
ports and 
stimulating 
environmental 
protective 
measures.1039 
No position, 
but considers 
the EU to be 
an institution 
to promote 
the internal 
market, but 
not to 
increase more 
legislation.1040 
No position 
in this field, 
but wants 
the 
Netherlands 
to 
completely 
leave the 
EU.1041 
Wants more 
legislation in 
the field of 
maritime and 
coastal 
policies, as 
this can 
stimulate 
more equality 
between ports 
and stimulate 
economic 
growth and 
environmental 
protection.1042 
EU 
maritime 
and coastal 
policies 
are 
beneficial 
for wind-
mills and 
sharing 
energy 
between 
member 
states and 
environ-
ment.1043 
EU 
maritime 
policies can 
help to 
create fairer 
competition 
between 
ports and 
new 
measures to 
protect the 
environ-
ment.1044 
																																																								
1036 Abspoel, 3rd June 2015. 
1037 Kisters, 19th May 2015. 
1038	TK, 33.601, nr. 6, 24 July 2013.  
1039 Ibid. 
1040Ibid. 
1041 PVV, Verkiezingsprogramma, 2012-2017.	
1042 TK, 33.601, nr. 6, 24 July 2013.  
1043	Ibid. 
1044	Ibid. 
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8.2.2 Expected causal process 
Once the NP has sent a negative RO to the EC, it is expected that the salience will 
increase for that NP and as a consequence for its government (see the salience causal 
process in Chapter 6). More specifically, if the NP sends a negative RO to the EC 
stating that the topic should be dealt with at national rather than EU level, it will only do 
so if the topic is salient to the NP (it considers it to be important to keep control over the 
topic and for that reason, the topic should be decided upon at national level). The NP 
will be motivated by vote-gaining to use all its formal and informal mechanisms to 
influence and control. The resulting increased pressure on its government will in turn 
cause that body to be more likely to adopt its NP’s position. 
Based upon Kiiver’s findings1045, therefore, it is expected that a negative RO to the EC 
will bind a government even more closely to its NP when it is negotiating in the 
Council: 
EC proposal ! sent to EP, Council and NPs ! NP decides to send a negative RO to the 
EC ! topic gets more visibility! domestically: discussion with government ! NP 
uses domestic formal powers ! pressure on government because of negative RO! 
government feels contentiousness of topic !increase of visibility for the government ! 
government more likely to listen to NP as it fears negative publicity ! adoption of 
NP’s position ! parliamentary impact. 
8.2.3 Background EU proposal 
The proposal concerns a framework with minimum standards for maritime spatial 
planning and strategies for integrated coastal management. The overall objective is to 
promote sustainable growth of maritime and coastal areas and the sustainable use of 
natural sources on the sea and coast.1046 
																																																								
1045 Kiiver, 2012, p.144. 
1046 TK, 33 601, nr. 3, 12th April 2013. 
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8.2.4 Parliamentary scrutiny of the EU legislative file during the different steps of 
the OLP1047 
This section discusses all different steps of the OLP of the EU legislative file regarding 
the EU Maritime Policies and whether the SC used its formal powers to either influence 
and/or control their government’s EU policy position at any point of the scrutiny and if 
so, whether its attempts had any effect. 
Step 1: Publication 
The proposal is published on 12th March 2013.1048 
Step 2: NPs given eight weeks to oppose the EU legislative proposal 
The deadline to submit ROs to the EC is 13th May 2013. Many NPs, including the 
Dutch SC, decide to do so1049, but in the end there are not enough parliamentary 
objections for a yellow card.1050 
Step 3 First ex ante influence phase 
During this phase it is expected that the NP will increase its scrutiny levels as a 
consequence of sending a RO to the EC. It is expected that this RO has alerted the NP 
about the legislative proposal and will want to follow its proceedings as a consequence. 
In other words, the fact that the NP has sent a RO to the EC makes the EU legislative 
proposal a more salient one. It is expected that this will increase the scrutiny of the NP 
by using more than its normal formal powers.1051 
On 27th March 2013, the I&E Committee decides during a procedure meeting that it will 
put the item on the agenda during a general discussion about the North Sea (scheduled 
for mid-April) and will do a subsidiarity check on the proposal.1052 
																																																								
1047 For more information on these steps, see Appendix I and II. 
1048 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/procedure/EN/202463 
1049 Next to the Dutch SC and Senate, the Belgian Senate, the Finnish Parliament, the German Bundesrat, 
the Irish House of Oireachtas, the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, the Polish Senate and the Swedish 
Parliament sent ROs. 
1050 For a Yellow Card, at least a third of NPs need to send a negative RO to the EC. 
1051 More than just holding an ex ante meeting with the government, the NP is explicit in showing its 
opinion to the government with the intention to impact its position. 	
1052 TK, 33 601, nr. 1, 27th March 2013. 
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On 12th April 2013, the Dutch government publishes its ‘BNC Fiche’1053, hereafter the 
EM (first government position). In the EM, it shows disapproval about the legal base of 
the proposal and will ask the EC to explain this in more detail. It will also ask legal 
advice of the Legal Service of the Council. The government argues that proposals with 
regard to the sea achieve a positive subsidiarity judgement, but it tends to be negative 
towards coast proposals. 
In the current version, it would judge both proposals towards the coast and sea to be 
negative in respect of proportionality. Although the government supports the procedural 
objective of the proposal to promote economic growth for the sea and coastal areas 
based upon an ecosystem, the proposal goes too far with regard to its proposed 
regulation in the field of spatial planning on the sea and decentralised tasks on land 
which will increase the administrative burden. The Dutch government will in its 
negotiations try to adapt the proposals to the interest of the Netherlands. It will thereby 
focus on getting a compulsory legal framework for the procedures for the sea and coast, 
but states that the proposal will not lead to any obligations and the coast will only be 
included in case of an integral link to the activities on the sea.1054 
On 18th April, the Chair of the EAC sent a draft letter to the EC to the Chair of the SC to 
ask the agreement of the Chamber to submit a negative RO to the EC.1055 On 24th April 
2013, the I&E Committee held a meeting to discuss this draft directive. The Committee 
decided to propose that the SC introduce a scrutiny reserve on this file. The scrutiny 
reserve is discussed during a plenary meeting of 14th May 2013 and is approved.1056 On 
25th April 2013 the SC voted about a concept letter to the EC regarding a negative 
subsidiarity judgement. With the exception of the fraction of the D661057, the SC 
adopted the proposal to send a letter to the EC.1058 On 14th May 2013, the SC voted 
about sending a letter to the I&E Minister about a scrutiny reserve on this legislative 
file. It is approved.1059 
																																																								
1053 TK, 33.601, nr 3, Fiche, 12th April 2013. 
1054	TK, 33.601, nr 3, 12th April 2013. 
1055 TK, 33 601, nr. 2, 18th April 2013. 
1056 TK, 33.601,  nr. 4, 24th April 2013. 
1057 Democrats 1966. 
1058 TK, 33.601, nr. 80, item 18, p. 95, 25th April 2013, including a courtesy translation letter to the EC. 	
1059 TK, 33.601, 14th May 2013, nr. 81, item 11, p.26. 
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Scrutiny reserve 
On 4th June 2013 a general discussion takes place about the scrutiny reserve regarding 
this draft directive between the NP and government.1060 During this meeting MPs 
clearly show their own views on the EU proposal, which are considered to be the first 
position of the SC. 
Mr Houwers (VVD, coalition partner) is of the opinion that this topic should be dealt 
with at national level, as there are no shared interests with other member states. That is 
why the VVD wants to send a RO about this proposal.1061 The VVD fraction is of the 
opinion that there is already sufficient regulation in this field as well and therefore asks 
the opinion of the Secretary of State in this field. Specifically, it asks the government to: 
‘Keep the SC informed in writing during the negotiations in the Council, but 
also in the Council working groups and in the Committee of Permanent 
Representation on those issues that could have implications for the 
Netherlands, and particularly in the field of the delegated competences for 
the EC … Once there is a common position, the SC would like the 
government to send this to us together with an appreciation before it gets 
discussed in the Council, in both a first and second reading’.1062 
The VVD wants the Secretary of State to ensure that it only concerns those member 
states which have borders on the North Sea.1063 
The PvdA (Social democrats, coalition party) also takes the floor. Mr De Vries is less 
worried about the proposal than the VVD. According to the PvdA, this proposal could 
lead to a long-term investment, which is necessary, as it will be easier to set up sea 
routes and wind parks.1064 According to the PvdA, the regulation offers the necessary 
supervision by governments to deal with new economic activities and the regulation is 
therefore more like an addition to existing national legislation.1065 More sceptical is De 
																																																								
1060 TK, 33.601, nr. 6, 24 July 2013.  
1061 Ibid., p.2. 
1062 Ibid., p.2-3. 
1063 Ibid. 
1064 Ibid., p.3-5. 
1065 Ibid.	
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Vries about the fishery activities and the PvdA considers submitting a motion to 
regionalise the fisheries and increase the involvement of parties directly concerned.1066 
Mr. Van Gerven from the SP (Socialist Party, opposition) is in favour of a maritime 
policy in which member states work together to protect their seas and coastal areas and 
support the government’s approach of adapting the directive to limit the new rules to 
have a legal embedded process for spatial planning on the topic of the sea.1067 With 
regard to the scrutiny reserve, the SP specifically asks the government for the following: 
‘To be fully informed and to discuss the Dutch approach in this before the 
negotiations enter a decisive phase ...  
Most importantly, the SP wants to be kept informed on the obligations to 
formulate spatial planning designs, designs for integrated coastal 
management, and goals to which these plans must contribute … The 
Secretary of State has to inform the SC if it needs to deviate from its position. 
We want to be updated each term, including being informed on the progress 
of the negotiations in both the Council and the EP.1068 
Minister Schultz replies that she shares most comments made by the MPs. She argues 
that the government has always been critical towards regulation in this field. The Dutch 
position is to stress its desire to limit the regulation of procedural agreements, but not to 
have any obligations with regard to the contents.1069 Schultz also mentions that the 
government agrees with a negative subsidiarity judgement in the field of coastal 
management, but is positive with regard to cooperation on sea, but only under certain 
conditions. According to the Secretary of State, the main concerns are in fact about 
proportionality. Schultz argues that the proposal suggests more regulation in the field of 
energy provision, fisheries and nature, whereby some issues, like the extraction of sand, 
gain priority.1070 There are issues which are hugely important in the Netherlands which 
it would prefer to keep control over. The Dutch government is of the opinion that 
cooperation in the field of spatial planning should happen on a voluntary basis. With 
regard to the specific questions by MPs, she responds: 
																																																								
1066 Ibid. 
1067 Ibid., p.5. 
1068 Ibid. 
1069 Ibid., p.6-8. 
1070 Ibid.	
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‘I was asked whether I agreed that there was already sufficient EU and 
national legislation in the field of maritime spatial planning. I do agree, but 
there is no legislation yet to make binding agreements cross borders, whereas 
we do need this. That is why I am in favour of procedural agreements … 
Although the Netherlands uses good governance in this case, other member 
states will only follow rules if they are coming from the EU.  
… I will try to stop the directive from going too far into the contents. The EC 
has not responded to our request for a voluntary instrument. Together with 
other member states with the same views and the EP, I will stress the 
importance of a cross-sectoral cooperation in this field, but on a procedural 
basis.  
Obviously, I will keep the SC informed on any further developments in this 
field …’ 1071 
Some of the MPs take the floor again, like Houwers (VVD, coalition partner) and Van 
Gerven (SP, opposition) who would like to clarify the promise by the Secretary of State 
in providing regulation information on this directive. 
Mr De Vries (PvdA, coalition partner) continues on the subject of the contents: 
‘… It seems that the Secretary of State sees further fundamental effects as a 
consequence of this directive than the MPs did. This is worrying. It might be 
worth to have a discussion with the EC about this … With regard to fisheries, 
we did not get an elaborate response. We are not a party that believes that 
everything should be regulated by the EU …’1072 
Schultz reiterates that the Dutch government is in favour of having agreements in the 
field of cross-border spatial planning. However, she states that it should not go further 
than that. She explains that going further is what the Dutch government opposes.1073 
Other member states follow the same line as the Netherlands.1074 
																																																								
1071 Ibid. 
1072 Ibid., 10.	
1073 Ibid., 10-11. 
1074 Ibid. 
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At the end of the meeting, the chair summarises the agreements by the Secretary of 
State in the field of the scrutiny reserve on this legislative file: 
‘The Secretary of State will inform the SC about important developments in 
the Council and other discussion groups and also when the Council forms a 
position; The Secretary of State will inform the SC on important changes in 
the position of the government.1075 
The Secretary of State agrees with these points and the meeting comes to an end. 
On 18th June 2013, the SC votes regarding the end to its scrutiny reserve on this file on 
the condition that the Secretary of State of I&E will inform the SC on: 
- Any movements in the Council and other discussion forums, such as the 
COREPER, which will have consequences for the Netherlands … 
- Any positions adopted by the Council; 
- Information on these issues by the Secretary of State needs to happen in time, 
for example, before the negotiations in the Council and other discussion forums 
have reached a final stage in order to still have a chance to debate this issue in 
the SC. 1076 
Correspondence with the government  
The Secretary of State of I&E sent a letter to the SC on 26th August 2013 to inform it on 
the state of affairs of the draft directive. She therein mentions that the Council aims to 
come to a general agreement during the Council of October 2013. This will be discussed 
during the Transport Council meeting of 5th September 2013.1077 
It is expected that the EP will decide upon its position in September and send this to the 
Council. In case the Council and the EP are not able to reach an agreement, it will be 
discussed during a second reading.1078 On 2 September 2013 the Secretary of State for 
I&E (Schulz) sent a letter to the SC to inform it about the agenda of the Informal 
Transport Council of 15th and 16th September 2013.1079 The main topic of the agenda 
																																																								
1075 Ibid. 
1076 TK, 33.601, TK, 6, 18th June 2013. 
1077 TK, 33.601, nr. 7, 26th August 2013.	
1078 Ibid. 
1079 TK, 21 501-33, nr. 432, 2nd September 2013. 
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will be the Single European Sky (SES). No information is given on Maritime Spatial 
Planning. 
On 6th September 2013 the VVD fraction (the Liberals, coalition partner) sent a few 
questions to the I&E Department regarding the informal Transport Council of 15th and 
16th September 2013.1080 With regard to the EU draft directive on European Maritime 
Spatial Planning, the VVD fraction has a question: 
‘The VVD fraction wonders whether more is known about the ‘lightened 
regime’ of the integrated coastal management. It wants to know what this 
exactly means and the extent to which this deviates from the Dutch 
position?’1081 
On 11th September 2013, the I&E Department sent a reply confirming that the position 
of the Dutch government is still the same as that during the EM which corresponds to 
the EC approach to coastal management (so no impact by the NP). Other member states 
seem to support the idea to make the coastal management proposals optional in the case 
that a member state chooses to consider coast-sea interactions as part of the process of 
the maritime spatial planning. However, at this stage, the Dutch government thinks it is 
too early to be more specific on indicating what will happen during the negotiations.1082 
During this phase, evidence was expected to be found of the NP making use of extra 
formal powers as a consequence of sending a RO. There are indeed several indications 
that show extra use of formal powers, such the use of the scrutiny reserve and the 
insistence on being informed. There is furthermore the use of the RO, the formal power 
via the EC as laid down in the Lisbon Treaty. In particular, during the meeting 
regarding the scrutiny reserve, MPs give very clear messages to the Secretary of State 
including their opinions and what they expect the government to do during the Council 
negotiations. However, the use of formal powers consists here mainly of tightening the 
government to keep the NP informed and to focus in the Council meetings on issues 
which are relevant for the Netherlands as a country. This is confirmed by one of the 
interviewees: 
																																																								
1080 TK, 21.501-33, nr. 434, 13th September 2013.  
1081 Ibid., p. 4. 
1082 TK, 21.501-33, nr. 434, 11th September 2013.	
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‘Applying a scrutiny reserve to this file was a way to show the government to be 
kept informed pro-actively. This increases the relationship between the government and 
NP in this respect. As a civil servant you have to pay more attention to informing the 
SC and not take actions which have not been agreed with the SC beforehand.’1083 
The government representative about the scrutiny reserve in this file: 
‘On 18th June the Chamber lifted the scrutiny reserve, as long as they would be kept 
informed. It is useful to get such an instruction by the NP. The NP controls what we are 
doing. They will increase these controls with a scrutiny reserve. This helps us as well in 
the negotiations with the permanent representation in Brussels. We come with a double 
mandate.’1084 
In other words, in this case the NP does not try to change the position of the 
government as such, but is more focused on making the government behave in a certain 
way. This corresponds to data extracted from interviews: 
‘The SC agreed with the conclusions of the government, which is the mandate for the 
government. However, the SC indicated that it wanted to be kept informed. There is 
only one position of the government, that will not be changed. We had different views 
on what should be covered by the directive. The SC concluded that both the sea and the 
coast should be excluded from the directive. The government’s position was ‘sea should 
be covered, but not the coast. This led to discussions, but did not change our opinion. 
Only if they would have come up with a motion, we would have to include it in our 
position.’1085 
Causal mechanism of an increased use of formal powers after sending a RO is 
confirmed during this stage. 
Step 4 First ex post control phase 
As evidence it is expected that extra attempts by the NP are found to hold the 
government to account on this file, as it explicitly requested to be kept informed on this 
dossier). 
																																																								
1083 Keulemans, 15th June 2015. 
1084 Abspoel, 3rd June 2015.	
1085 Abspoel, 3rd June 2015. 
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On 15th and 16th September 2013 an informal Transport Council meeting takes place.1086 
On 26th September 2013 the SC receives a letter from the government with a report of 
the discussions during the informal Transport Council, but no reference is made to the 
Maritime Spatial Planning Directive, as the Council meeting focused mainly on the 
topic of a Single European Sky.1087 
Although the NP did not hold the government to account after the Council meeting, this 
is likely because the topic of Maritime Spatial Planning was not on the agenda. 
Step 5: Second ex ante influence phase 
During this phase, evidence is expected to be found of the NP using more than its 
formal powers as a consequence of having sent a RO to the EC, an action which has 
increased the salience of the topic. 
On 29th November 2013 the Secretary of State for I&E, Mrs Schulz, sends a letter to the 
SC, in which she gives an overview of the developments of the draft directive in the 
field of Maritime Planning.1088 A majority of the member states seem to be in favour of 
a procedural framework directive which includes interactions between activities on the 
sea and on the coast. There was not enough support for an obligatory integrated coastal 
management. The Dutch government welcomes this outcome which is close to its own. 
The Presidency hopes to come to a final agreement during the Council of General 
Affairs of 17th December 2013.1089 This letter is referred to during the meeting of the 
I&E Committee regarding navigation on sea on 3rd December 2013, but no questions or 
references about the contents are made. 1090 
On 6th December 2013, the government writes a letter to the SC including the agenda of 
the Council of General Affairs of 17th December 2013.1091 This agenda is discussed 
during a meeting on 12th December by the Foreign Affairs Committee, the EAC and the 
																																																								
1086 Press release, ‘EU Transport Ministers aim at faster and more comfortable travelling by air’, 
Lithuanian Presidency of the Council of the EU, 2013. 
1087 TK, 21 501-33, nr. 437, 26th September 2013.	
1088 TK, 33.601, nr 8, 29th November 2013. 
1089 Ibid. 
1090 TK, 31 409, nr. 58, 3rd December 2013. 
1091 TK, 21 501-02, nr. 1310, 6th December 2013. 
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Minister for Foreign Affairs, Timmermans, but no reference to Maritime Spatial 
Planning is made.1092 
It was expected that the SC would have increased the use of its formal powers now that 
the draft directive had reached such a crucial phase and as it had asked to be involved in 
any crucial developments. It seems, however, that the SC hardly deals with this topic at 
this stage, probably because the directive seems to go in the direction that the majority 
of the SC had hoped for; although some political parties, such as the PvdA and D66 
would have liked to go further on this. Mrs Schultz’s letter in that sense must have been 
a sort of reassurance for parties, such as the VVD (main political party in the SC and 
coalition party). 
Step 6: Second ex post control phase 
During this stage, it is expected that evidence of the NP making extra efforts of holding 
the government to account will be found, since, according to the NP, this topic should 
have been dealt with at national level which would have implied a stronger involvement 
of the NP. 
On 17th December 2013, a Council Meeting of General Affairs takes place which 
discusses this legislative file. The Council reaches a general agreement and it asks the 
Lithuanian EU Presidency to start negotiations with the EP in order to reach an 
agreement between the two institutions.1093 On 19th December 2013 a letter from the 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Timmermans, is sent to the SC about the outcome of the 
Informal Council, but no reference is made to the Maritime Spatial Planning 
Directive.1094 
Step 7: Adoption 
On 12th March 2014, the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER)  agrees 
a compromise between the Greek EU Presidency and the representatives of the EP. The 
																																																								
1092 TK, 21 501-02, nr. 1328, 11th February 2014.	
1093 Press Release, 3287th Council meeting General Affairs, 17th December 2013. 
1094 TK, 21 501-02, nr. 1316, 19th December 2013. 
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text still needs to be adopted formally during a plenary session of the EP and a Council 
meeting. 1095 
Final adoption of the regulation during the Council of General Affairs occurs on 13th 
May 2014.1096 Member states agreed upon some new initiatives with consequences for 
European’s seas and coasts (contrary to the wishes of the SC). Member states will get 
10 to 20 years to implement these. The agreement furthermore contributes to the plans 
of the EC to develop ‘Europe’s Blue Economy’.1097 
On 16th May 2014, the SC receives a letter from the Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, Mr. Timmermans, regarding the outcome of this Council meeting for General 
Affairs, but no reference is made to the adoption of the Maritime Spatial Planning 
directive.1098 
8.2.5 Concluding remarks 
Although an agreement is reached on this EU legislative file during the first Council 
meeting about this topic, the NP makes many attempts to impact the government and 
reminds the Secretary of State of the delegatory relationship in this case, as the 
government cannot change its position without consulting the NP first. The use of 
formal powers is mainly focused on ex ante Council meetings and there are little signs 
of the NP holding the government to account afterwards. This is partly because the topic 
did not change direction and the government could stick to its original position 
regarding this file, but also because agreement on this topic was reached in the Council 
for General Affairs.1099 This means that it had to compete with other topics, with higher 
salience for both government and MPs, such as climate change, energy and the 
European Semester.1100 
According to the theoretical argument, the use of formal powers was expected to be 
higher in a case in which the NP makes use of a RO and this would lead to an increased 
measurable impact on the government’s EU policy position. The outcome of the 																																																								
1095 Council General Affairs, press release, ‘Council confirms deal on maritime spatial planning Brussels’, 
12th March 2014, Press 132. 
1096 TK, 21 501-08, nr. 509, 22nd April 2014. 
1097 Council General Affairs, press release, ‘Council confirms deal on maritime spatial planning Brussels’, 
12th March 2014, Press 132.	
1098 TK, 21 5021-02, nr. 1386, 16th May 2014.	
1099 This topic was discussed during the Council for General Affairs as various governmental departments 
are involved, such as Transport, Environment and Economy. 
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process-tracing analysis shows that, for example, by applying the scrutiny reserve, the 
NP indeed increases its parliamentary activities and makes it clear to the government 
that it needs to be involved in this case. 
Tracing the different steps of the scrutiny process during this case, it seems that 
although the NP increased the use of its formal powers, it did not change the 
government’s position. This is confirmed in interviews whereby Abspoel, a government 
representative in this field, argued:  
‘The position of the coalition did not change after the scrutiny of the 
government. This dossier was in the interest of the country and the SC 
followed our position in broad lines. The NP did work on these dossiers, 
probably more than other NPs. In the end, if it is in the interest of the 
country, the NP will give the government enough freedom to act according to 
its own judgement, as long as we keep them informed.’1101 
The government and part of the SC’s disagreement is limited to the extent to which this 
topic should be dealt at national or EU level. This leads to debates in meetings, not the 
RO as such. This is confirmed in interviews whereby it is argued that the RO is a 
legislative tool, not one to impact the government.1102 However, the SC applies formal 
powers, such as the scrutiny reserve in this case, not so much because it wants to change 
the opinion of the government, but mainly because the SC wants to be kept informed on 
case developments. As the positions of the SC and government are pretty close together, 
it is more likely that it wants to be kept in the loop because it sent a RO to the EC. This 
would imply indeed that the use of the RO does lead to an increased use of 
parliamentary activity, which is in line with the expected causal process. Data extracted 
from interviews show that because the NP felt that this topic should have been dealt 
with at national level, MPs felt strongly about the subject, resulting in the application of 
a scrutiny reserve.1103 
According to Abspoel, the government representative for this file, the majority in the 
SC wanted this topic to be dealt with at national level. That makes them more involved 
in the scrutiny process.1104 In other words, even if it is not the tool of the RO that 																																																								
1101 Abspoel, 3rd June 2015. 
1102 Abspoel, 3rd June 2015.	
1103 De Vries, 8th June 2015. 
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increases the use of formal powers, the reasons behind it, namely the subsidiarity issue, 
is indeed linked to the increased use of formal powers which corresponds to the 
theoretical argument.  
Measurable impact 
Interviews with government representatives and MPs in this field make clear that no 
forms of informal influence have been used and that the government did not include the 
NPs position when drafting the government EM, but took on board the political 
agreement and interest of the Netherlands when drafting the Dutch position: 
‘When I drafted this fiche1105 the position was based upon a subsidiarity and 
proportionality check and the position of the coalition. The SC then has a 
task to control the government. They will only do so after the EM has been 
published, so they will not try to influence the fiche of the government before 
this has been published.’1106 
As the government did not change its position in this file, it can be concluded that no 
measurable impact has been found. The majority in the NP wanted to go further than the 
government in keeping this topic a national one, and tried to convince it of this need, 
although it did not make any attempt to change the contents of the government’s 
position. The impact the NP tried to effect in this case consisted more of tightening the 
government to the NP with regard to giving feedback. This is another form of ‘soft’ 
impact, but not the measurable one this thesis uses as a measurement. The measurable 
impact can therefore be concluded to be weak.  
8.3 Case 8: the EU Regulation on Port Services (COM(2013)296)1107 
8.3.1 Policy Positions of political parties 
Although the main political parties consider this topic to be of national interest, rather 
than one that cuts along left/right cleavages,1108 there are some disagreements to be 
found in the Ports Services (PS) case. This is mainly because the PvdA wanted labour 
issues to be part of the PS file, and the more liberal parties such as the VVD - the other, 																																																								
1105 The EM. 
1106 Abspoel, 3rd June 2015.	
1107 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/procedure/EN/202670 
1108 Pol, 4th June 2015, Abspoel, 3rd June 2015, De Vries, 8th June 2015. 
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bigger coalition partner - wanted to keep this out.1109 The main positions of the political 
parties are part of the maritime and coastal policies and an overview of these can be 
found in Table 19 (7.1.1). 
8.3.2 Expected causal process 
If the NP decides not to send a RO to the EC, it is of the opinion that it agrees that this 
topic will be dealt with at EU level, a level on which the NP has few mechanisms to 
exert influence or control. In other words, if the NP is happy for the EP in this case to 
deal with the scrutiny, it will consider the file to not be of enough national salience to 
control it itself and will therefore not use many formal powers to influence and control 
the government on this file. It is therefore expected that the following causal process in 
the scrutiny of government will take place if the NP sends no negative proposal to the 
EC: 
EC proposal ! sent to EP, Council and NPs ! NP uses formal mechanisms ! NP 
decides not to send a RO to the EC ! NP does not attach salience to topic ! no need to 
discuss with government ! government is not aware of NP’s position ! government 
does not adopt NP’s position ! no parliamentary impact. 
8.3.3 Background EU proposal 
The regulation applies to all ports of the Trans European Network for Transport (TEN-
T), which are together responsible for more than 90% of all forms of transport via the 
sea. It deals with ports management, pilots, towing, mooring, dredging and terminal 
services (goods and passengers). The regulation sets up a framework for access to the 
market for ports services and requires the transparent financing of ports. The harbour 
manager is allowed to set minimum standards to the service provider and can limit the 
number of providers of a specific service only in case that there is not enough space.1110 
The national supervisors are required to exchange information to ensure a uniform 
implementation of the regulation. Member states must set up sanctions for those who 
violate the rules and they must ensure that they will be executed. The topic of the labour 
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market in seaports will be left to social dialogue for the time being. This regulation will 
not harm the social and labour laws of the member states.1111 
8.3.4 Parliamentary scrutiny of the EU legislative file during the different steps of 
the OLP1112 
This section discusses all different steps of the OLP of the EU legislative file regarding 
the Port Services and whether the SC used its formal powers to either influence and/or 
control their government’s EU policy position at any point of the scrutiny and if so, 
whether its attempts had any effect. 
Step 1: Publication 
On 23rd May 2013, the draft legislative proposal is published. 
Step 2: NPs have eight weeks to oppose the EU legislative proposal 
The deadline for NPs to submit a RO to the EC about this is 30th July 2013. Although 
many NPs do indeed decide to send a RO about this1113, the Dutch Second and First 
Chamber decide not to do so. 
On 14th June 2013, the Dutch government publishes its EM1114 which includes its first 
opinion. It supports the application of freedom of services, also in ports. This draft 
regulation offers sufficient space to continue the ways in which the Netherlands has 
executed these services in its harbours. The regulation suggests making financial 
transparency compulsory. The Dutch government agrees that this is a condition, 
although not yet sufficient to tackle state aid which could have a distorting effect on 
competition. The Netherlands will support this proposal as long as the current 
commercial freedom of the port manager can continue and as long as the current Dutch 
harbour policies, which have proven to be successful, will not be affected1115. 
																																																								
1111 Ibid.	
1112 For more information on these steps, see Appendix I and II. 
1113 French National Assembly, the Italian Senate, Saeima Parliament of Latvia, the Polish Sejm, the 
Spanish Cortes Generales and the Swedish Parliament. 
1114 TK, 22 112 33 677, 14th June 2013. 
1115 Ibid., 5.  
	 241	
Scrutiny reserve 
On 5th September 2013 a meeting takes place between the I&E Department and the 
Secretary of State, Mrs Schulz (VVD).1116 This meeting is mainly held to discuss the 
parliamentary scrutiny reserve on this file1117, but can also be considered to be the first 
position of the SC, as MPs clearly express their own views during this meeting.1118  
During this meeting, Mr. De Vries (PvdA1119, coalition partner), argues that his fraction 
is positive about the manner in which the government approached the Port regulation in 
its EM. However, in its view, the marginal comments that the government makes on the 
draft regulation, could be broadened significantly.1120 The PvdA agrees with the 
government with regard to adding more legislation in order to increase transparency and 
improve the equal playing field between European harbours. In the regulation, however, 
there are no rules to harmonise modal shifts, state aid, labour law, external security and 
environment.1121 
The Social Democrat fraction is furthermore worried about the attempts by the EC in 
this draft regulation to put forward proposals for liberalisation in the ports, even in areas 
which are part of semi-public services. In the Netherlands, there exists a sort of 
concession system with free access. The concession must guarantee quality and 
availability.1122 
The Dutch government writes in its EM that the pilot services do not form part of the 
regulation. De Vries would like to know why the Secretary of State thinks so and why 
she does not further investigate whether this is really true.1123 
The PvdA is also against a new system of independent supervision, as the current 
supervision of the Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM) works well. If the 
regulation only has the aim of changing the competence of the ACM into a compulsory 
duty to deal with complaints, then we will not object, especially if this means that also 
																																																								
1116 TK, 22 112, nr. 1699, 30th September 2013.  
1117 This is why this meeting is not included in the first ex ante influence step. 
1118 Ibid. 
1119 Social Democrats 
1120 TK, 22 112, nr. 1699, 30th September 2013, p.2-3.	
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in other member states there will be a compulsory supervision.1124 There are, however, 
different interpretations of this regulation possible.  
According to De Vries, labour law has previously been an issue for a European Ports 
legislative proposal. He does understand that this has now been kept outside the 
regulation and that it will be left to the social partners to decide upon. However, the 
PvdA does notice that there are some issues with the labour law of seamen and asks the 
Secretary of State to keep actively following any developments in this field. The PvdA 
will ask parliamentary questions about this matter in due course.1125 This is an issue that 
is not included in the first position of the government.  
De Vries furthermore asks some questions about competition: 
‘The Dutch harbours experience direct competition from neighbouring 
countries, as the governments in other member states pay for many issues, 
which in the Netherlands are financed by the harbour companies. This is 
reflected in the ports tariffs. We ask the Secretary of State to plead at the 
European Commission to stop these inequalities.’1126 
Mrs De Boer (VVD, liberal, coalition partner) does support the government approach as 
explained in its EM, but her party does have a few comments and questions.1127 It thinks 
the focus should be much more on competition between the ports. The current proposal, 
however, is too focused on compensation for the use of the infrastructure which should 
be set up by port managers. This is something that should not be regulated when the 
market between ports is opened up. Ports can only compete if there is no such 
regulation. There should, however, be transparency about user costs, for example, 
transparency about investments. Currently, governments in the South of Europe invest 
money in their ports, while here, the ports are responsible for their own financing. This 
is a form of state aid.1128 De Boer continues: 
‘The approach of the Dutch government should be focused on the 
transparency about this. There should be a level playing field about 
competition of ports in Europe. As long as ports receive government money, 																																																								
1124 Ibid. 
1125 Ibid.	
1126 Ibid. 
1127 Ibid., 3-4. 
1128 Ibid., 3-4. 
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this will not be possible. That is why it is important that this will be the main 
input of the Dutch government.’1129 
De Boer also refers to the parliamentary scrutiny reserve, and argues that parliament 
asks (amongst other things) the following from government: 
o That it receives written updates regarding any developments during the 
negotiations which have consequences for the Netherlands,  
o Transparency of financial relations, including state aid; 
o The delegated competence of the EC to elaborate upon the principles to 
establish port dues (articles 14.5 and 21); 
o Issues related to the feasibility of the regulation, especially with regard to the 
wishes and possibilities of member states to implement such regulation; and 
o Substantial new elements added to the regulation during negotiations.’1130 
Mrs de Boer adds that, contrary to Mr. De Vries (PvdA), she does not agree that 
labour issues of seamen should be regulated at EU level. The VVD is therefore 
happy that these issues are excluded from the regulation.1131 The VVD shows 
thereby support for the government’s position. She does ask the government to send 
a copy of the concept agreement before the negotiations take place in the Council to 
the SC (including an appreciation), both during the first and second reading.1132 
Besides, it asks of the government that it will be kept informed during every 
term/half year, depending on what is on the agenda.1133 
Mr De Rouwe (CDA1134, opposition party) mentions that the EU is very much 
focused on details. However, particularly in this field, it is important to stress the 
importance of international competition. Previous proposals from the EC in this 
field (2007) were more focused on transparency and access to markets, but the EC 
has also admitted that these plans never worked, and in fact had an adverse 
effect.1135 The CDA therefore wonders whether these decisions will be reversed. 
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De Rouwe asked whether Dutch companies are ready to receive some money from 
this area.1136 He continues about the supervision: 
‘Supervision is necessary, but how will supervision look like? This can 
happen at either EU or national level. Supervision needs to be applied 
uniformly (just like with the truck drivers). We do not want that only our 
captains will be controlled, whereas they will not supervise captains from 
their own country.1137 
Bashir (SP1138, opposition party) wants to know whether this regulation has any 
consequences for the pilot service and what such consequences will be.1139 According to 
the SP, this should remain as it is as the services offered by the pilot service are not 
suitable for competition. This concerns a public service. Bashir asks the secretary of 
state to give a reaction. Bashir also asks why the Dutch government supports the 
necessity of this regulation instead of, for example, a directive. A directive would give 
the member states more freedom to implement the new agreements according to their 
own circumstances.1140 
Mrs Schultz, the Secretary of State, replies to the contributions of the MPs. She argues 
that the government welcomes the draft EC proposal, but that it is also hugely critical of 
it.1141 The seaports are of huge importance for the European economy. It is important, 
therefore, to create a level playing field which also serves as an example to other 
continents. Member states are not able to do this by themselves, she states.1142 She 
continues, summing up for the Dutch government the various positive points from the 
regulation: 
‘The draft regulation is in line with the freedom of services, which we 
support. Positive points are the coordinating role for the ports manager. This 
will pave the way for financially independent ports management. Even more 
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important is the proposal for transparency of financial relations between 
public authorities.’1143 
Schultz continues to answer the questions of individual MPs: 
‘Mr Bashir asked about the real issue of this regulation. There is a difference 
between our ports, which are completely financially self-supporting without 
any financial support of the government, and there are ports who still need a 
contribution.’1144 
Schultz’s comments are not just positive about the draft regulation, however. Most of 
her concerns are similar to those mentioned by the MPs in the I&E Committee.1145 The 
Dutch government will try to deal with these issues, for example, with regard to its 
arrangement concerning the pilotage service. In the Netherlands, there is a good 
arrangement for this. The Dutch government deliberately chose a monopoly in this field 
a few years ago, but in such a way that there would be enough supervision on tariffs 
which must be transparent.1146 According to Schultz, it is dangerous to ask a member 
state to change the arrangement while there is as yet no competition. The Dutch 
government will focus on maintaining the option to decide what type of arrangement 
works best.1147 
A second point of concern for the government is the delegated competence of the EC to 
make new provisions with regard to the differentiation of port dues and common levy 
principles. Ports should have the freedom to offer an attractive arrangement to 
companies in difficult economic times. Therefore, the Dutch government will plead for 
this proposal in the regulation.1148  Schultz also responds to the request made by De 
Boer (VVD, coalition partner) to keep the SC informed and agrees to the list of 
requirements by the SC. She also mentions that the EC will set up some guidelines in 
this field to deal with state aid.1149 
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De Rouwe (CDA, opposition) responds that these guidelines should be integrated in the 
regulation and asks the Secretary of State to plead for this.1150 Mrs Schultz responds that 
the Dutch government will ask that both the regulation and guidelines will be in line 
with each other. There will be no time to include them in the draft regulation (she goes 
on to explain why she cannot support the position of a member of the opposition).1151 
Mr De Vries (PvdA coalition partner) explains the state aid issues which affect the 
southern ports of the Netherlands, as those in Belgium receive much financial funding. 
Dutch ports have to compete with this. This cannot be solved with guidelines, but 
should be laid down via proper regulation.1152 
Mrs Schultz responds that issues, such as financial transparency must be laid down in 
the regulation and uniformly applied across all EU member states. With regard to the 
state aid rules, this will be looked at from a wider angle.1153 Other issues in the 
regulation are also more suitable for a guideline, such as the arrangement issue. The 
Dutch government will request that this proposal be removed from the regulation.1154 
She continues to talk about the TEN-T network and mentions that the Dutch 
government decided to focus on the core network (rather than nine multi-modal 
corridors) and that Rotterdam, Amsterdam and the Westerschelde are included. 
Mr De Rouwe (CDA) responds to Mrs Schultz’ comments about the TEN-T that the 
situation has been changed since the adoption of amendments in the European 
Parliament.1155 There are many ports in the Netherlands which would qualify for 
funding. It would be strange if the Netherlands would then simply say that it only 
accepts the funding for the three main ports. De Rouwe asks for the opinion of the 
Secretary of State on this.1156 
Mrs Schultz says that it is the other way around. The Dutch government has always 
focused on the big corridors. A few of the smaller ports are also part of these big 
corridors. The Dutch government is aware of the EP amendments, but thinks that 
spreading all the funding would lead to a dilution of the available funds.1157 Mr De 																																																								
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Rouwe and Mrs Schultz continue their discussion about which ports are part of the 
TEN-T and Schultz agrees to get this on paper to him, but does not change her 
position.1158 
At the end of the meeting, the chair summarises the promises made by the Secretary of 
State during the meeting (a map of the TEN-T corridors including the Dutch ports that 
will form part of that, regular updates on any progress of the negotiations that have 
implications for the Netherlands). 
Although this meeting was not directly related to the official ex ante influence stages as 
known under the OLP, there are several attempts by MPs to impact the government. 
This is not as expected, as the NP has decided not to send a RO but nevertheless spends 
a lot of time on the scrutiny of the file and uses more than its normal formal powers 
(scrutiny reserve) to tighten the delegatory relationship with the government in this 
field. Causal mechanism cannot be confirmed at this stage. 
Step 3: First ex ante influence phase 
During this phase, evidence is expected to be found of the NP not using anything more 
than its standard formal powers1159, as the topic is of no salience and no use of an RO is 
made. 
On 15th November, the SC receives the agenda for the next Transport Council (5th 
December 2013) from government.1160 
On 28th November 2013, a meeting takes place between the I&E Committee, the EAC, 
Secretary of State, Mrs. Schultz, and Minister Van Mansveld.1161 During this meeting 
the Ports regulation is also discussed. Mrs Kuiken (PvdA, coalition partner) emphasises 
during this meeting that the PvdA can only support an EU ports directive if the 
commercial freedom of port service provision will continue to exist. It is her view that 
this is important for the monopoly of the pilotage service1162 
Mrs Schulz responds: 
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‘In my opinion, we will support and maintain this monopoly of the pilotage 
service, which is an example for the rest of the EU. It is supervised by the 
ACM, which determines its tariffs. I will plead to continue with this 
arrangement. The opinion of the EP in this field goes in the right direction. 
The discussions on the contents of the regulation have not yet started, but I 
will show that this is what we want.’1163 
Although the Ports Regulation is not on the agenda for the next Council meeting, the 
Social Democratic fraction still tries to impact the government’s position in this field. It 
not only asks the government for information, but actively tries to impact the 
government’s position by stating a condition under which the fraction can give its 
support. This goes further than the NP was expected to do at this stage and therefore the 
causal mechanism cannot be confirmed at this phase. 
Step 4: First ex post control phase 
Another Transport Council takes place on 5th December 2013. No feedback on the Ports 
regulation is given, as this was not on the agenda. This is as expected and this stage sees 
the causal mechanism of the NP not using any extra formal powers as it has not made 
use of a RO here. 
Step 5: Second ex ante influence phase 
During this phase it is expected that evidence is found of the NP not using anything 
more than its standard formal powers1164, as the topic is of non-salience and no use of 
RO is made. 
On 20th May 2014, the Secretary of State for I&E sent a letter to the chair of the SC to 
inform MPs about the agenda of the next Transport Council to be held on 5th June 2015. 
On 28th May 2014 a meeting takes place between the I&E Committee, the EAC and the 
I&E Minister, Mansveld, to discuss the forthcoming 5th June Transport Council 
meeting. During this discussion, various references are made to the Ports Regulation.1165 
Mrs Visser (VVD, coalition partner) shows her support for the Dutch government’s 
position in this field. She asks the minister, however, what will happen with the 																																																								
1163 Ibid., 10.	
1164 The use of formal powers is limited to receiving information and clarifications. 
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amendments and how likely it will be that those amendments focusing on less 
administrative burdens will be accepted.1166 She also stresses the importance to keep 
pushing for guidelines for state aid, as some member states, including the Italian EU 
Presidency, have different views on this.1167 
The Minister, Mrs Mansveld, reacts to this and mentions that during the previous Greek 
EU Presidency no real discussions about the contents of the ports regulation had taken 
place.1168 However, she expects that the amendments in the field of the pilotage service 
provision and its supervision will be accepted.1169 With regard to the guidelines in the 
field of state aid, Mrs Mansveld says that these will not be part of the Ports regulation, 
but that the EC will publish some guidelines in this field at a later stage. 1170 
Although the issue of the Port regulation is raised, the contribution is not seeking to 
change or impact the government’s position. This is as expected and the causal 
mechanism is accepted at this stage. 
Step 6: Second ex post control phase 
In order to confirm the causal mechanism at this stage, it is expected that evidence is 
found showing no use of extra formal powers by the NP and any information provided 
by the government will be accepted without raising questions or leading to any debates 
about the contents of the file. 
On 5th June 2014 the Transport Council takes place. On 4th July 2014, the SC receives a 
letter from the government regarding the outcome of the Transport Council. It also 
includes an update on the Ports regulation: 
‘The Council has taken note of the progress report. A few member states 
emphasized that it was important to better take into account the large 
diversity of ports and that unnecessary bureaucracy has to be avoided. EU 
Commissioner Kallas stressed the importance of efficient seaports for growth 
and jobs and he expressed the wish for more transparency in the sector.’1171 
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The NP receives this information, but does not raise any questions about the ports 
regulation. This is as expected and the causal mechanism is accepted during this 
stage. 
Extra ex ante influence phase 
During this phase, evidence is expected to be found of the NP not using anything more 
than its standard formal powers1172, as the topic is of non-salience and no use of RO is 
made. 
On 18th September 2014, the SC received a letter from government with the agenda of 
the Transport Council meeting of 8th December 2014.1173 
On 30th September 2014 a meeting takes place between the I&E Committee, the EAC, 
the Secretary of State for I&E, Mrs Schultz, and the I&E Minister, Mansveld.1174 
During this meeting, the EU Ports directive is also discussed. 
Bashir (SP, opposition) asks what kind of objections other EU member states have 
against this regulation since the regulation has not been positively received in many 
member states (as it says on the agenda).1175 Bashir also queries whether, in general, 
member states are in favour of opening up the market to the pilotage services. The SP is 
of the opinion that this should not happen and hopes that the government will oppose to 
this idea.1176 
Mrs De Boer (VVD, coalition partner) also refers to the Ports directive. The VVD will 
support the position of the government, but would like to know what will be discussed 
in this field during the Transport Council.1177 De Boer is also of the opinion that TEN-T 
corridors will broadly be part of the regulation. All ports in the Netherlands should be 
part of it.1178 
Mr Hoogland MP (PvdA, coalition partner) also seeks clarification about the pilotage 
service provision and whether the Dutch government can protect this against the open 
																																																								
1172 The use of formal powers is limited to receiving information and clarifications. 
1173 TK, 21501-33, Nr 500, 18th September 2014 
1174 TK, 21 501-33, nr. 512, 11th November 2014. 
1175 TK, 21501-33, Nr 500, 18th September 2014 
1176 TK, 21 501-33, nr. 512, 11th November 2014, p.4. 
1177 Ibid., p.6. 
1178 Ibid. 
	 251	
market.1179 It furthermore stresses the importance of a European level playing field in 
this regulation. At the moment there are many inequalities between European ports.1180 
Schultz replies: 
‘During our meeting of September 2013, the SC showed me their concerns. 
All these concerns seem to have been solved by now. The Dutch arrangement 
of pilotage services is protected. Freedom of services in Dutch ports is a fact, 
with the exception of the pilotage service. The Dutch government does 
support the current version of the regulation and it happy that this remains a 
regulation and will not become a directive, as this allows us to have a 
separate arrangement for the pilot service. In the regulation the EC is asked 
to come up with some guidelines in the field of state aid. We are on top of 
that.1181 
Bashir interrupts when Schultz wants to continue to a discussion of the next topic, as 
Schultz has still not responded to his question asking why so many other member states 
object to this proposal. He asks again if there is anything that these countries know that 
the Dutch do not.1182 Schultz responds that now the Council working group has come to 
an agreement during the Italian EU Presidency. The difficulties that many EU member 
states had with the proposal have now been removed.1183 
Several political parties, including the opposition, expressed their views at this stage, 
with the intention to impact the government’s position. MPs show what is important for 
them and give the Secretary of State clear instructions on what should be included. 
Causal mechanism cannot be confirmed at this stage. 
Extra ex post control phase 
In order to confirm the causal mechanism at this stage, evidence is expected to be found 
that no use of extra formal powers by the NP occurred and any information provided by 
the government will be accepted without raising any questions or leading to any debates 
about the contents of the file. 																																																								
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On 8th October 2014, a Transport Council took place.1184 After this meeting, the SC 
received a report from the government with an update on the Transport Council:1185 
‘During this meeting, most bigger EU member states pushed to have an 
exception on the TEN-T Network for smaller ports with regard to some of 
the transparency rules. This is to prevent disproportional administrative 
burden for smaller ports … Finland and the Netherlands regretted this 
weakening of transparency rules, which increases the risk of abuse. In a 
written declaration together with Denmark and Estonia, they will confirm 
this in the hope that the EP will take this over.’1186 
Attendance of the government  
On 27th November 2014, another meeting takes place between the I&E Committee, the 
EAC and Secretary of State Schultz. During this meeting, the Transport Council of 8th 
October is also discussed, but is mostly focused on the actual attendance of the 
government at Council meetings.1187 
Mr Bashir (SP, opposition) argues during this meeting that there is no point in asking 
the government anything, as it hardly ever attends the Council meetings.1188 Mr Van 
Helvert (CDA, opposition) reacts to this and asks the Secretary of State to inform the 
SC whether she will attend the next Transport Council. He refers thereby to news 
articles in the press, stating that the Dutch Minister and Secretary of State rarely attend 
the Transport Council meetings.1189 
Mrs Hachchi (D66, opposition) continues to stress the point further, pointing out the 
Telegraaf1190 article discussing the absence of the government at Transport Councils.1191 
The press article mentioned that during the past two years, only once had a Minister or 
Secretary of State attended a meeting.1192 Hachchi is worried about this situation: 
																																																								
1184 Council Press Release, 3335th Council Meeting Transport Council, 8th October 2014. 
1185 TK, 501 33, nr. 512, 11th November 2014.  
1186 Ibid. 
1187 TK, 21 501-33, nr. 523, 10th February 2015. 
1188 Ibid., 4.	
1189 Ibid. 
1190 Dutch newspaper, 3rd December 2014. 
1191 TK, 21 501-33, nr. 523, 10th February 2015, p.6. 
1192 Willems, M., De Telegraaf, 3rd December 2014. 
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‘If this is true, then I am worried. Even if civil servants are extremely good, it 
is a sign that the Netherlands does not consider these meetings to be 
important. This weakens our negotiation position. I would like to know 
whether this press article is true and if so, what the reasons have been for the 
Minister and the Secretary of State not attending more often?’1193 
Schultz first responds to the questions regarding the contents of the EU dossiers. In 
relation to the attendance of the Secretary of State or Minister at the Transport Council, 
Schultz comments as follows: 
‘It is true that we are not always present, but the numbers are not exactly 
right. The Transport Council takes place four times a year and two times 
there is an informal Council. The past two years, we have been present four 
times. Is this important? No, what is important, is the result … However, I do 
always keep the time free in my agenda, so Brussels does get my attention. I 
did also attend one of the informal Councils this year ... As the Netherlands 
will take over the EU Presidency in 2016, attending the Council meetings 
will be increasingly important.1194 
Bashir (SP, opposition) is not satisfied with this reply. He argues that the I&E 
Committee has regular discussions with the government about the positions of the SC 
on EU policy dossiers and he, therefore, is of the opinion that the Minister or the 
Secretary of State should attend each Transport Council.1195 Bashir is happy that the 
Secretary of State has promised to attend the Transport Councils from now on, but has 
also said so in the past without fulfilling this promise.1196 
Mrs Schultz replies: 
‘I assume that it is publicly known when we cannot attend a Transport 
Council meeting, but I think it is fine to include this in the reports. I still 
believe that there is no need for us always to attend. The Transport Council is 
not the place where so much information gets shared.’1197 
																																																								
1193 TK, 21 501-33, nr. 523, 10th February 2015, p.6. 
1194 Ibid., 14. 
1195 Ibid., 15. 
1196 Ibid. 
1197 Ibid.  
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Bashir still does not agree with the Secretary of State and argues that sometimes 
unannounced issues might be discussed. The Netherlands is a transport country and the 
government should therefore attend meetings.1198 Mrs Mansveld (Minister, PvdA) also 
responds to the allegations in the field of the government attendance at the Transport 
Councils. She argues that she has a broad international agenda and you have to choose 
the right moment to be present and discuss important issues with colleagues.1199 
During this meeting, which took place after the Transport Council, many more 
contributions to the outcome were made than expected. The MPs use many formal 
powers to hold government to account, both on the contents of the topic (ex post 
influencing) and on procedures (attending the Transport Council). This is much more 
than was expected to be found and therefore the causal mechanism cannot be confirmed 
at this stage. 
Step 7: Adoption 
The legislative file was informally adopted during the EU Presidency on 29th June 2016, 
whereby member states agreed on how to make ports more efficient and competition 
between them fairer.1200 Outstanding issues were the social aspects as raised in the EP, 
but also in some of the NPs (such as the SC), which were discussed and solved in 
trialogue meetings between the Council, EP and EC. They were included in the Ports 
Regulations, as the PvdA in the SC had also stressed during meetings with the 
government about this topic.1201 
8.3.5 Concluding remarks 
The Ports Regulation was selected as a case to compare to another maritime transport 
case (C7) whereby the NP decided to make use of a RO. With regard to the Ports 
regulation, the SC decided not to do so and, as a consequence, based upon the 
theoretical argument, evidence was expected to be found of the NP using less formal 
powers to impact the government’s position on this EU file. However, the expected 
causal process is not reflected in this case in which the NP uses many formal powers, 
including more than standard (such as the use of the scrutiny reserve). During various 
stages of the OLP, the NP tries to impact the government’s position and on one 																																																								
1198 Ibid. 
1199 Ibid.	
1200 https://felixstowedocker.blogspot.co.uk/2016/06/eu-council-approves-new-port.html 
1201 TK, 21 501 33, nr. 611, 14 July 2016.	
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occasion it even does so after the Council meeting. The use of formal powers is greater 
than expected and although this file was described as a non-salient one to the electorate, 
based upon party manifestos of the coalition parties in government and the Euro-
barometer, the topic of ports is still of major concern for many MPs, because of the high 
economic and employment contribution of different ports in the Netherlands (such as 
Rotterdam, Amsterdam and the Westerschelde). Interviews confirm the importance of 
this file.1202 According to data extracted from the interviews, many MPs were lobbied in 
this file by trade unions because of the potential impact on labour law which increased 
the importance and, as a consequence, the need to increase scrutiny.1203 
In other words, the different steps of the OLP do not follow the expected causal process 
for this file and this case shows that even without sending a RO, the content of a file is 
enough for an MP to increase the use of formal powers.  
Measurable impact 
Interviews with government representatives and MPs confirm that no informal ways of 
influence took place in this field and that the initial position of the government as set 
out in the EM was not based upon the NP’s position.1204 
‘The government’s position is written based upon the positions in the 
coalition government, the NP’s scrutiny reserve only comes after that.’1205 
The government did not change its position after influence by the NP (regarding labour 
issues) with the exception of raising some points on behalf of MPs (state aid and an 
exception for pilotage services). 
‘We had requested the government to ask the Council to include State Aid 
into the Regulation. The Minister did ask this on our behalf. It was not in 
their original position. I am not sure whether the Council took it over or 
not.’1206 
It also rejected MPs’ criticism on the attendance of the government at the Council 
meetings and the measurable impact can therefore be considered weak. 																																																								
1202 De Boer MP, 4th June 2015, De Vries, 8th June 2015, Pol, 4th June 2015, Keulemans, 15th June 2015. 
1203 Keulemans, 16th June 2015, Kisters, 19th May 2015.	
1204 De Boer MP, 4th June 2015, Pol, 4th June 2015, Keulemans, 15th June 2015. 
1205 Pol, 4th June 2015. 
1206 De Vries, 8th June 2015. 
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8.4 Pair-wise comparison between the use and the non-use of Lisbon 
provisions 
When looking at the use of formal powers by the SC in both cases, they seem to have 
been increased on similar levels, mainly by applying a scrutiny reserve in both cases, 
and in C7 this is added by a RO to the EC. 
However, as mentioned in the concluding remarks of C8 and as shown in table 20, 
sending a RO to the EC, does not seem to be a guarantee for NPs to increase the use of 
formal powers. They can be equally active in other cases. For example, if MPs believe 
that this topic has enough importance to increase their use of formal powers, they will 
tighten the delegatory relationship with the government by giving it clear instructions 
on what to say during Council negotiations and what feedback it expects, as seen in C8. 
Interviewees confirmed that the RO as such does not lead to higher chances of 
impacting the government and is no reason for the NP as a consequence to increase the 
use of its formal powers. 
‘In the government we are not really worried about the RO as such. It is 
another tool, like the scrutiny reserve. When we were going to discuss this 
with the NP, a majority in the NP (VVD, PvdA and CDA) wanted to have 
scrutiny reserve on this file and they told us about the RO, so the government 
is made aware of the importance of the topic to the NP.’1207 
As expected in the theoretical argument in Chapter 3.4.4 the RO is used here 
together with other tools. According to interviewees1208, the RO is considered by 
MPs to be a tool to test the principle of subsidiarity.1209 The scrutiny reserve is 
considered to be stronger way to nationally tighten the government to the NP’s 
wishes: 
‘The scrutiny reserve makes MPs active. They will then think about whether 
to follow the government position or to go further.’1210  
																																																								
1207 Abspoel, 3rd June 2015. 
1208 Abspoel, 3rd June 2015, Van Dongen, 3rd June 2015. 
1209 This is also confirmed during interviews in the UK (e.g. with Alison Groves, representative of the HC 
in Brussels, 3rd July 2015). 
1210 Abspoel, 3rd June 2015. 
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‘The scrutiny reserve means that the government will take us more 
seriously.’1211 
‘A scrutiny reserve makes a difference. The government includes the NP 
from the beginning. As a government representative you are more aware of 
the position of the NP and takes this into account during the negotiations in 
the Council. Although materially the scrutiny does not make a big difference 
(the position of the government remains the same), you know that this topic 
is important for the NP and we keep them involved.’1212 
‘A scrutiny reserve is a strong instrument to check the government and to 
make sure the government does as agreed and keeps the NP informed on 
crucial developments in Brussels or if the direction of the government’s 
position needs to be adapted. This is a way for MPs to increase their 
knowledge on what is going on in Brussels.’1213 
According to De Boer MP (Liberals), the NP was more active in the PS file than in the 
Maritime Spatial Planning case, as it was so important for the country: 
‘This dossier is of huge importance, that is why we applied a scrutiny 
reserve. Other ports (mainly in southern Europe) are still getting state aid, 
which is not fair for our ports. When we ask for a scrutiny reserve, the 
government does take that serious.’1214 
This is confirmed by De Vries MP.1215 
According to Kisters, Transport Advisor at the Dutch Permanent Representation in 
Brussels, the PS case was more political than the Maritime Spatial Planning file, as 
there is a social angle included in the PS file. The left wing parties in the NP were 
lobbied on this by the trade unions. This increased the importance for the public 
opinion’, according to Kisters.1216 She added that the RO is not directly a way to 
influence the government. The topic had a national interest, so the NP and government 
stood more or less on the same side, similar to the PS case, although this was more 																																																								
1211 De Vries, 8th June 2015.	
1212 Pol, 4th June 2015. 
1213 Keulemans, 15th June 2015. 
1214 De Boer MP, 4th June 2015. 
1215 8th June 2015. 
1216 19th May 2015. 
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political because of the potential social implications. That is why the NP wanted a 
scrutiny reserve on this file. The interests for parts of Dutch citizens were at stake here, 
according to Kisters.1217 More specifically, the NP did use the RO, not to impact 
government, but to impact the EC on this topic of national interest. However, as a 
consequence of its views that it should be a topic dealt with at national level, it did 
increase the use of formal powers at the domestic level as well. In conclusion, whereas 
the use of formal powers is increased in C7 as a consequence of having sent a RO to the 
EC, it has equally increased the use of formal powers in C8, when it did not send the 
RO. Salience seems to have been the variable at work here. 
Shadow pair-wise comparison 
In order to increase the internal validity of the outcome of this case, another pair-wise 
comparison has been made whereby in the scrutiny of one case, the Opening of market 
for domestic passenger transport services by rail1218 (C7a), the NP made use of a RO. 
This is compared to another case during which the NP did not make use of a RO, the 
Interoperability directive1219 (C8a).1220 This pair-wise comparison indicates more clearly 
a difference in the use of formal powers which increased in C7a. An overview of the 
formal powers used in both cases can be seen in table 21.1221 The use of the formal 
powers is hugely increased in the case where the NP has made use of a RO compared to 
that in which the NP has not. However, when tracing the processes of both files, it 
appears that a lot more is at stake in the case where the NP has decided to make use of a 
RO. In other words, salience seems to be rivalling with the use of the RO here. C7a 
deals with the opening of the market for railway passengers, a topic dealing with the 
extent to which a public service should be liberalised. This issue touches the main 
ideologies for parties like the PvdA (Social Democrats) and the VVD (the Liberals). As 
a consequence, one can expect increased use of formal powers. C8a which also deals 
with the railways, however, is a technical dossier in which no controversies amongst 
political parties are found.1222 This is confirmed during interviews.1223 
																																																								
1217 Ibid.	
1218 COM(2013)028. 
1219 COM(2013)030. 
1220 As the necessary conditions for this file (multi-party, non-salient, no use of Lisbon) are identical as 
for C4, the same EU legislative file has been selected. 
1221 For an elaborated tracing of the different steps of the scrutiny carried out on this case see Appendix 
V. 
1222 For more information about the political parties’ positions on the European Railways, see Chapter 5, 
table 12. 
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According to Koolmees MP, MPs tend to become more active in political dossiers, such 
as opening up markets, but also when dealing with EU integration issues when the topic 
covers rescinding pieces of sovereignty to the EU.1224 This is confirmed by Hartkamp, 
the Deputy Director Corporate Strategy at ProRail1225, and by Keulemans, EU advisor 
to the Dutch SC: 
‘The interoperability dossier is one that deals with technical issues. Political 
parties have no different views on this. However, once you start to talk about 
opening up the market, it becomes more political.’1226 
‘When a file has big political consequences it gets more discussed in the SC 
and it can lead to applying a scrutiny reserve. This happens on important 
dossiers. A scrutiny reserve is a clear signal to the government.’1227 
This is supported by Van Dongen, the government representative responsible for the 
railways, De Boer MP and Kisters from the Dutch Permanent Representation in 
Brussels: 
‘The coalition in government is divided on this file. The VVD is happy to 
open up the market, but the PvdA prefers to keep this a public service. This 
increases the chances for the opposition, as the coalition is divided and its 
needs a majority for its position.’1228 
‘The open market for railways is a sensitive file. Very political. It touches the 
middle of the left/right division. The interoperability dossier is more 
technical and the different political parties agree upon them generally and the 
NP is less likely to give instructions to the government.’1229  
																																																								
1223 Van Dongen, 3rd June 2015, Hoogland MP, 4th June 2015, De Boer MP, 4th June 2015, Hartkamp, 7th 
July 2015, Koolmees, 6th July 2015.	
1224 Koolmees MP, 6th July 2015. 
1225 Organisation in the Netherlands responsible for the railway network. 
1226 Hartkamp, 7th July 2015. 
1227 Keulemans, 15th June 2015. 
1228 Van Dongen, 3rd June 2015. 
1229 De Boer MP, 4th June 2015. 
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‘The SC is more interested in the political part of this dossier and much less 
in the technical part. Most parties are not really worried about transport 
dossier, unless it deals with transport of passengers.’1230 
These contributions show that the contents of the topic, in other words, the salience, is 
at work here. The government representative for the railways in the Netherlands 
considers the RO to be another (useful) tool for the NP. 
‘It does help to make us realise that this is an important file for the NP. That 
makes us extra careful. This was mainly because of  the sensitive contents of 
the dossier, but the RO helps. However, it did not have to be a RO, the NP 
could have used different methods to show us that this dossier is important. 
The contents are guiding. The topic deals with changing our system. That is 
what is important.’1231 
According to interviewees, the RO is more a juridical instrument to indicate whether the 
subsidiarity principle has been breached. The topic can be equally salient or even more 
salient if this is not the case. In other words, the RO is used as a technical tool, not a 
political one.1232 Despite these contributions, others - such as Hoogland MP who 
initiated the negative RO in name of the Dutch SC - do attach more value to this 
parliamentary power and argues that it is a useful tool: 
‘It is a way to force the government to feedback carefully to the NP, because 
they know that we will remain alert. The feedback to the NP in such cases 
will be more precise. This does not mean that the government will change its 
position, but they will feel the pressure to report back, which keeps us 
involved during the further scrutiny.’1233 
In other words, although the RO is a useful instrument, not only to influence the 
government, but it can also pressure it to act according to the wishes of the NP when its 
negotiating in Brussels. It does not increase the measurable impact of the NP, but it 
does lead to an increased alertness and as a consequence, it does increase the delegatory 
relationship between the government and the NP. 
																																																								
1230 Kisters, 19th May 2015.	
1231 Van Dongen, 3rd June 2015. 
1232 Dongen, 3rd June 2015, Abspoel, 3rd June, Pol, 4th June 2015. 
1233 Hoogland MP, 4th June 2015.	
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‘Sending a RO makes the NP more alert, and this makes the government 
more alert. They have to think more carefully about their input into the 
Council.1234 
This is confirmed by Keulemans who argued that both the scrutiny reserve and the RO 
to the EC are instruments used by the NP to increase alertness within the government to 
keep the NP on board during the scrutiny of certain files.1235According to Nollen, 
Representative of the SC in Brussels, the government will take the position of the NP 
more into account once it has sent a negative RO to the EC.1236  
According to Hartkamp, it was the susceptibility of the government to include the NP’s 
position into its own here as a consequence of the majority in the NP in favour of 
keeping the opening of the market in national hands. 
‘With another majority, the government would have decided differently. The 
RO as such has not influenced the government.’1237 
The outcome of this case shows a clear example of intermediate impact by the NP. 
Although the main party in the coalition government is in favour of opening up the 
railways to the European market, it follows the majority position of the NP, which is 
against freedom to provide domestic passenger services by rail. According to 
interviewees, this topic was of huge importance to MPs and political parties have very 
different views on the extent to which this topic should be opened up to the market and 
the extent to which this topic should be kept at a national level. This explained the 
increased use of formal powers.1238 The interview with the government representative 
of the Railways confirmed that although the coalition partners had different opinions 
on this issue, it followed the NP’s position, as it was such a clear majority. 1239 
In conclusion, sending a RO is considered to be another tool to impact EU legislation 
and is normally used as a legislative instrument to assess whether an EU legislative file 
is in breach with the subsidiarity principle.  
																																																								
1234 Hoogland MP, 4th June 2015 
1235 Keulemans, 15th June 2015) 
1236 Nollen, 8th July 2015. 
1237 Hartkamp, 7th July 2015. 
1238 De Boer, 4th June 2015, Hoogland, 4th June 2015. 
1239 Van Dongen, 3rd June 2015.	
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In spite of these opinions on the RO, it seems from tracing the processes in C7 and C7a 
and the extracted data from the interviews that sending a RO to the EC makes the topic 
salient as such, as the NP is of the opinion that it is a topic that needs to be dealt with at 
national level. In this sense, sending an RO can at least be linked to an increase in 
parliamentary activities since the fact that the NP considers it to be of national level 
importance causes it to tighten up the delegatory relationship with the NP, even if the 
topic is of non-salience to the electorate. Although the RO is not really used for political 
motivations, as stated in the theoretical argument, the subsidiarity issue linked to a topic 
increases the scrutiny at home as well. In other words, the subsidiarity issue is a form of 
salience that motivate the NP to give clear instructions to government and it will request 
to be informed. However, other variables do so as well, as the pair-wise comparison 
shows in C7 and C8. In both cases parliamentary activities were increased, but for 
different reasons (RO and salience). In conclusion the two pair-wise comparisons partly 
confirm the hypothesis that those NPs opposing an EU legislative proposal in a RO are 
more likely to impact their government’s EU policy position. 
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Table 20 Outcome of the Pair-wise Comparison between Case 7 and 8 
Seven steps of OLP 
 
Use of formal powers 
CASE 7 (use of RO) 
Use of formal powers 
CASE 8 (no use of RO) 
1: publication X X 
2: eight weeks Yes X 
3: first influence phase - Procedure meeting 
- EM government 
- Letter EAC to gov. (RO) 
- Meeting I&E 
-RO SC to EC 
- 2 Meetings scrutiny reserve 
with gov. 
- Meeting I&E, EAC and gov. 
(expression of own opinion) 
- Letter gov. to SC (agenda 
informal Transport Council). 
- Questions MPs 
- Replies government. 
-EM government 
- 2 meetings I&E Committee, 
EAC and gov. (one about 
scrutiny reserve). 
 
4: first control phase - Letter gov. to SC X 
5: second influence phase - 2 letters gov. to SC 
 
- Letter gov. to SC (agenda 
Transport Council 
- Meeting EAC, I&E and gov. 
6: second control phase - Letter gov. to SC - Letter gov. to SC 
Extra influence phase Not applicable - Letter gov. to SC (agenda) 
- Meeting EAC, I&E and gov. 
Extra control phase Not applicable - Letter gov. to SC 
- Meeting I&E, EAC and gov. 
7: adoption  Not yet applicable 
IMPACT Weak Weak 
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Table 21 Outcome of the Pair-wise Comparison between Case 7a and 8a 
Seven steps of OLP 
 
Use of formal powers 
CASE 7a (use of RO) 
Use of formal powers 
CASE 8a (no use of RO) 
1: publication X X 
2: eight weeks yes X 
3: first influence phase - Reception of EM 
- Meeting with gov. (attempts to 
influence) 
- Letter gov. (attempt to 
influence) 
-Scrutiny Reserve. 
- 2 letters government 
- EM government 
- Meeting gov. + NP 
4: first control phase -Letter gov. 
-Plenary meeting 
-Motions adopted. 
- Plenary meeting 
- Letter government 
5: second influence phase - Letter gov. 
- Meeting NP-gov. 
(expressions of party opinions in 
order to impact gov.) 
-Letter government 
- Meeting government and NP + 
expression of opinions. 
6: second control phase X - Letter government 
- Letter NP 
Extra influence phase - Letter to gov. to ask for IA 
- Meetings with gov. 
- Expression of views in order to 
gain information 
- Letters gov. 
Not applicable 
Extra control phase - Letter gov. 
- IA gov. 
Not applicable 
Extra influence phase - Meeting gov. 
- Expression of views in order to 
impact 
Not applicable 
Extra control phase X Not applicable 
Extra influence phase - Meeting gov. 
- Expression of views in order to 
get more information. 
Not applicable 
Extra control phase X Not applicable 
Extra influence phase - Meeting gov. 
- Expression of views in order to 
get more information 
Not applicable 
Extra control phase X Not applicable 
7: adoption Expected in 2016 X 
IMPACT Intermediate Weak 
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Chapter 9 
 
Research findings and conclusions 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
This research has analysed the different conditions under which NPs operate and under 
which they are able to increase or decrease their impact on their government’s EU 
policy position. It thereby tried to answer the following research question: under what 
conditions will NPs have an impact on their government’s policy on the EU?  
In this research, a theoretical framework was developed which combined normative 
standards and empirical research. The overall theoretical argument was that institutional 
design shapes parliamentary impact on government positions on EU policies via the 
mechanisms of influence and control, but this occurs only under certain conditions such 
as the composition of the government, the salience of EU issues, or when operating 
under the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty. The overall contribution of the thesis was 
therefore twofold; first, it adds to an existing literature on formal powers which so far 
focuses mainly on comparative quantitative studies of formal powers and, second, on 
the normative standards regarding political representation.  Thus, it adds a huge variety 
of new data in the form of personally-collected meeting documents and interviews. The 
main novelty of this study is not only its attempt to link new external conditions under 
which NPs operate and their formal powers, but by measuring impact it also goes a step 
further than measuring their formal powers. It establishes whether using these is 
relevant and what happens when they are used under the new explanatory factors. 
 
The outcome of the empirical research determining whether the relationship between 
government and NP varies when operating under different conditions in EU issues 
contributes to the normative standards on political representation, namely by inferring 
when authorisation and accountability in EU issues are most likely to take place. It also 
adds to the existing literature on institutional adaption and actual policy-makers, since 
in order for NPs to make a real difference via their governments on EU policies, they 
require incentives (for example, Europeanised or politicised EU topics) to use their 
formal powers.   
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The research began with a Chapter dealing with the conceptualisation of political 
representation and how to apply this concept to the relationship between the 
government and the NP in EU decision-making. It presented two tables, one matrix in 
which the NPs could be placed on a continuum between the delegatory and trusteeship 
models according to the formalistic and substantive strand of political representation 
based upon Pitkin’s political representation theory. This matrix shows that according to 
the formalistic strand, the NP can either be acting according to the trusteeship model or 
the delegatory model depending on its formal powers. However, according to the 
substantive strand, the position of the represented1240 can alter according to different 
external factors. A second table gives an overview of the formal powers of NPs in the 
EU, according to which they can either be described as forming part of the trusteeship 
or delegatory model. This table has been helpful in the selection of NPs for the 
empirical analysis for which two NPs were selected, one with stronger ex post control 
mechanisms (House of Commons) and the other with stronger ex ante influence powers 
(Second Chamber). A selection of these NPs with different types of formal powers was 
useful in order to establish whether there is a different outcome depending on the use of 
such formal powers or whether external conditions determine the outcome of the NP’s 
use of formal powers when scrutinising their government over an EU legislative file. 
 
The following Chapter gave an overview of previous research in this field and the 
theoretical arguments per hypothesis. It introduced the different independent variables 
for the thesis, namely partisan composition, euro-scepticism, salience and the Lisbon 
provisions.  
Chapter 3 set out the research design and explained in-depth how to overcome the many 
challenges of measuring the dependent variable, that being measurable impact. It 
furthermore described the reasons for selecting a number of case studies for the 
empirical analysis and how a combination of qualitative methods would attempt to 
overcome the challenges of measuring impact. Combining process-tracing with the 
comparative method has proven to be helpful in looking at the expected causal 
processes per case and combining any different causal steps when the condition to be 
measured is either absent or present. Process-tracing has furthermore been useful in 
order to look at each step of the OLP to discover the extent to which it used more or less 																																																								
1240 Although Pitkin’s theory about political representation describes the role of the representative as 
trustee or delegate, this thesis applies these terms to the represented (in this case the NP), which can be 
part of a trusteeship (few ex ante influence powers) or delegatory model (strong ex ante influence 
powers). 
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than the expected formal powers and whether different variables other than the main 
explanatory factors were responsible for the outcomes.1241  
Interviews were added in order to determine whether the causal steps as identified 
during the process-tracing analysis could indeed be linked to the expected condition or 
whether there were any rival explanations. Interviews were furthermore helpful in order 
to find out whether informal influence had taken place or the government had already 
included the parliamentary position when drafting its initial position (anticipated 
reactions).  
The empirical section of the thesis was covered in Chapters 5-8 where each Chapter set 
out the analysis of one of the independent variables.  
The outcome of the analysis has led to some interesting findings which will be 
presented in two separate sections: the first will deal with the empirical conclusions, 
looking at the outcomes of measuring impact and summarising the conclusions of each 
independent variable separately, followed by the implications for future research in this 
field. A second part consists of the contributions of these findings to the normative 
literature in the field of political representation.  
 
9.2 Empirical Findings 
 
9.2.1 Measuring impact 
 
As predicted in Chapter 4 of the thesis, measuring impact has been difficult. In only a 
few of the case studies has measurable impact been identified. However, not identifying 
measurable impact does not mean that the NP has no impact on its government’s EU 
policy position. During the scrutiny of the EU Water Policy dossier, for example, the 
HC sought clarifications from witnesses, such as the EC, about government attendance 
and actual involvement in this file. Interviewees have confirmed that increasing the use 
of formal powers, such as applying a scrutiny reserve, helps the government to realise 
the importance of the topic for the NP and will, consequently, increase its feedback to 
the NP. Using formal powers, therefore, does make a difference, even if it leads to 
softer forms of impact. Although the dependent variable consisted of real measurable 
impact, the softer forms of impact should not be underestimated. As Russell and Benton 
argue, if the HC does not use its formal right of a veto, it does not mean that it is 
																																																								
1241 George & Bennett, 2005, p. 81. 
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powerless.1242 The NP can use formal powers not so much to change the government’s 
position, but rather to make it behave in a certain way, like in the Ports Case (C4a and 
C8) where the NP wanted the government to attend Council meetings. This ‘softer’ type 
of impact would be extremely hard to measure which is why this research focused on 
the more tangible form of impact. 
However, a few cautionary notes are needed here and generalisations in this field are 
limited. This thesis only looks at impact on governmental EU policy position in the area 
of legislative files. However, it should not be forgotten that next to this measurable 
impact and its softer forms discussed above, the NP can have an impact in non-EU 
legislative files and this is sometimes a more likely outcome. Interviews with MPs 
confirmed the importance of political dossiers linked to an increased use of formal 
powers, instead of EU regulations and directives.1243 
For example, during the negotiations of the EU fiscal Treaty1244 in 2011, UK MPs very 
actively lobbied their government.1245 However, measurable impact would be hard to 
prove even though the NP clearly acted as a delegatory NP with strong formal powers in 
this non-legislative case. These crisis-related topics, which  include those providing 
financial support to Greece, have led to much media attention1246 and are therefore 
expected to increase the use of formal powers in the NP as well. 
From the different case studies, it was indeed clear that in the case of topics dealing 
with the transfer of power from national to EU level (the CFP and the Fourth Railway 
Package) and in the case of topics dealing with left/right partisan cleavages (Fourth 
Railway Package: Opening of the railway market for passengers), MPs were most active 
and most debates took place with the government. The clearest example of some level 
of measurable impact was during the opening of the market to railway passengers, a 
political topic covering not only a left/right wing topic, but also dealing with the extent 
to which EU integration should continue. More specifically, impact was only noticeable 
in cases of conflict, either between left and right-wing topics or when discussing issues 
related to the extent to which the EU should be integrated. 
 
The cases where impact was hardly noticeable were often technical ones where the 
issues of how far EU integration should stretch and the left/right cleavage are less 																																																								
1242 Russell & Benton, 2009, p. 4. 
1243 Williams MP, 25th June 2015; Koolmees MP, 6th July 2015; Monasch 16th June 2015. 
1244 Signed on 2nd March 2012. 
1245 HC, Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union: 
political issues, Research Paper, 12/14 27 March 2012.  
1246 Kröger & Bellamy, 2016, p. 2.	
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relevant. In other words, during the interviews with most MPs and government 
representatives it became clear that if an EU legislative file was discussed, often the 
government and NP followed the same line - that of the national interest. In these cases, 
measurable impact is hardly noticeable, as government and NP would often support one 
another. This confirms O’Brennan and Raunio’s findings that in member states with 
cohesive parties, the executive and NP are often so intertwined that measuring their 
independent influence in decision-making is at best difficult.1247  
 
Future research in this field might therefore want to concentrate on more Europeanised 
or non-legislative and more political EU issues in order to establish the extent to which 
NPs have an impact compared to their influence on EU legislative dossiers.  
 
A second cautionary note on measuring impact is that in some of the cases impact was 
considered to be weak because the government’s EU policy position had not been 
changed after scrutiny by the NP. However, it had not been parliament’s intention to 
change the government’s position. In the maritime cases, for example, spatial maritime 
planning, ports and the IMP, the national interest seemed to be at stake and different 
opinions between the government and opposition were minimal. However, the NP still 
made use of formal powers, sometimes just to make sure that the government would not 
take any actions without informing the NP. The NP in these cases deliberately chose a 
more controlling role rather than that of influence, as it did not oppose the government’s 
position on major issues. These are cases where impact has not been measured, but the 
salience variable still has been at work; this is reflected in both parliamentary actions 
and government responses (both were increased). The increased use of formal powers 
by the NP and the government’s more active feedback to it show that the NP can still be 
powerful, even though there is no clear difference in their preferences with regard to the 
contents of the EU legislative files. This corresponds to Barry’s paper about power and 
luck1248, in which he argues that an actor may not have the incentive to actually make a 
change if the position by these other actors coincides with his own position.1249 Only if 
you have a specific interest in making a difference to a certain issue, the proportion of 
successful interventions is relevant.  
Those with the courage to measure impact in future studies could therefore perhaps look 
at other forms of measuring impact, such as the increased feedback by the government 																																																								
1247 O’Brennan & Raunio, 2007: 7. 
1248	Barry, 1980.	
1249 Ibid., p. 28. 	
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to the NP. Operationalising measurable impact differently, could lead to a different 
outcome. This has also been noted in various studies of the power of the EP, often 
leading to different outcomes.1250 This does not necessarily imply that one study is 
necessarily more valid than other ones. It is important to look at both the formal powers 
and the preferences of the parliament in order to be able measure its power.1251 As 
discussed in the Chapter 4, dealing with the Research Design, a pragmatic response to 
measuring impact was followed in this study, as no single analysis will be able to cover 
all different aspects of the vast amount of theoretical literature on ‘power’.1252 
Besides, one of the limitations of this research, as clearly stated in the research design, 
is that measuring impact remains extremely difficult and that some types of impact are 
just not quantifiable, as it consists of softer forms of impact or is due to, for example, 
anticipated reactions. Even though government representatives ruled these out during 
the interviews, it is still possible that when writing some government policy positions, 
representatives referred to previous positions to which different political parties did 
contribute. Although impact will be measurable only to a limited extent, the use of 
formal powers and government responses to their use, subject to the different 
conditions, do lead to interesting outcomes. These will be looked at in the next section. 
 
9.2.2 Partisan composition  
 
The first hypothesis suggested that NPs scrutinising coalition governments have more 
chances to increase the impact on their government’s EU policy position than those 
scrutinising a single party government, even if it is a NP with few ex ante influence 
powers.  
Two legislative files were selected as cases, both scrutinised by the HC; the first case1253 
occurring during the Cameron-Clegg coalition government and the second1254 during 
the Brown single party (Labour) government.  
 
During the scrutiny of CFP reform, when the UK government consisted of a coalition 
between the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats, many more meetings took place 
to scrutinise the government. Several motions were adopted and meetings did not only 
take place in the EAC, but also in EFRAC and the European Committee A. Many more 																																																								
1250	Selck and Steunenberg, 2004: 40. 
1251 Ibid.,42	
1252	Dür and De Bièvre, 2007:2-3.	
1253 The Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy (COM(2011)425. 
1254 Control on compliance with the Common Fisheries Policy (2008)721. 
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in-depth discussions took place between the interested MPs (from both government and 
opposition parties) and the relevant department in government than in the second case 
(control on compliance with the CFP) when scrutinised under the Brown single party 
government. Formal powers are also used during the scrutiny of this second file, but 
with the exception of referring the file to the European Committee A, communication 
with the government during the seven steps of the OLP is limited to receiving 
information and at no single point did the NP intend to have an impact on its 
government’s position. In other words, the causal processes for both the single- and 
multi-party government were confirmed. 
However, the causal mechanism, namely finding a link between the different parties in 
government and a stronger dependence from government on the opposition in the NP, 
cannot be found here. From the contributions by MPs during meetings in C1, it appears 
that the simple reason for an increased use of formal powers during the reform of the 
CFP was the importance of the topic. There was a lot more at stake than during the file 
dealing with increasing the control of compliance with the CFP. Even if the CFP and its 
reform had been discussed several years before and also during the Brown single party 
government, the reason why it now led to the increased use of parliamentary activity in 
the HC seems to be related to the fact that during the reform proposal the topic became 
highly politicised.1255 This was confirmed during interviews with MPs, government 
officials and interest parties. Both cases show weak impact by the NP on government, 
even with a difference in the use of formal powers. Miklin’s argument that politicisation 
of EU legislative proposals increases parliamentary activities is hereby confirmed.1256  
Interviewees described the Reform of the CFP as a highly politicised (in the media, 
concerns among public) topic, but also a Europeanised topic.1257 Because MPs were 
Eurosceptic, they wanted to leave the CFP altogether. Other politicians, including 
Benyon MP himself due to his pro-European viewpoint, fought for reform of the 
CFP.1258  
The salience condition seems even more predominant in the additional pair-wise 
comparison in which the cod stocks case scrutinised by a multi-party government is 
compared to the cod recovery file which took place during a single party administration. 
Although in the first pair-wise comparison the causal process is confirmed, rival 
explanations interfere with the partisan composition condition and evidence from the 																																																								
1255 E.g. due to issues such as the discarding of fish. 
1256 Miklin, 2012, p. 132. 
1257 Clayton, 21st July 2015; Luk, 4th August 2015. 
1258 Benyon, 25th June 2015.	
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second pair-wise comparison even disconfirm the causal process. This shows us that a 
multi-party government is no guarantee for an increased use of formal powers, let alone 
an increased impact. Salience, however, does increase parliamentary activity, 
notwithstanding the number of political parties in government. 
However, a number of cautionary remarks are made here. It is possible that variation in 
the use of formal powers between the multiparty case and the single party one as a 
consequence of the multi-party government of Cameron-Clegg (2010-2015) is less 
visible in this comparison, as it an anomaly UK political history. Previous research has 
indeed shown that NPs are more likely to increase the use of formal powers in cases 
where the government normally consists of different coalition partners. NPs are likely to 
design institutional capabilities to influence and control their government’s EU policies 
according to the long-term history of conflict between government backbenchers and 
ministers.1259 Change in the use of formal powers is often path-dependent, and NPs 
usually adapt their procedures gradually in response to changes in the environment.1260 
In other words, the use of formal powers by the NP in the case of a multi-party 
government - when it is used to scrutinising a single-party administration - is unlikely to 
take place overnight and a difference in scrutiny as a consequence of the number of 
parties in government can take more time to emerge. Interviews have indicated this in 
the Dutch case: ‘The Dutch NP is used to scrutinising multi-party governments. They 
do this all the time. Governments always make compromises. This is part of our 
genes’.1261 A more suitable indicator, especially for quantitative research, could thus be 
the frequency of coalition governments measuring the strength of the NP, such as that 
undertaken by Rozenberg.1262  
Another point to consider is that in a situation where no single party has a majority, 
such as the Cameron-Clegg coalition government, an issue that centres on the UK’s 
territorial concentrated interests - such as fishing - can give rise to more political 
leverage. It can be a deciding factor in how the vote goes in affected constituencies and 
determine the outcome of a future parliamentary or national vote on this or other topics. 
In other words, the government could have been pressured by the NP to keep this 
sectional interest sweet.  
																																																								
1259 Saalfeld, 2005, p. 357. 
1260 Raunio, 2005, p. 337. 
1261 Kisters, 19th May 2015. 
1262 Rozenberg, 2002, p. 3.	
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Thirdly, interviewees1263 showed that it was easier to impact the multi-party government 
of Cameron-Clegg than the single party Labour administration because the 
Conservative party was so divided on EU issues, while the Labour government of 2005-
2010 was unified in its pro-European stance. It is therefore possible that when 
discussing EU issues during the current conservative single party government, MPs will 
have an equal amount of chances to achieve parliamentary impact. This is as a 
consequence of the divided Conservative party when it comes to EU issues. The UK is a 
unique case in this instance, as most political parties in Europe under a coalition 
government would be united in either a pro-European or Eurosceptic attitude (as 
discussed in Chapter 3.4.2).  
In conclusion, there seem to be many reasons explaining a possible higher use of formal 
powers by the NP in this case, but none are directly linked to the partisan composition 
condition. Since this is confirmed during analysis of the alternative cases (C1a and 
C2a), the hypothesis cannot be confirmed (with a cautionary remark that in other 
coalition governments the outcome could be different). 
  
9.2.3 Eurosceptic government 
 
Secondly, the paper hypothesised that the NP would have a greater impact on its 
government’s EU policy position if the latter was depending on the support of a 
Eurosceptic party. In order to verify the causal mechanisms, two cases were compared 
dealing with the European Railways; the first1264 was scrutinised by the Dutch SC 
during the first Rutte government (consisting of a coalition between Liberals and 
Christian-democrats, with the tolerating support1265 of the PVV1266, an anti-EU party). 
The second case1267 was scrutinised by the SC during the Rutte II government 
(consisting of a coalition between the Liberals1268 and the Social Democrats1269). In both 
cases, the SC (from all different political parties) executed many formal powers 
throughout the OLP, consisting of debates with the government before Council 
meetings, and asking questions and receiving information from the government after 																																																								
1263 E.g. Hopkins, 30th June 2015. 
1264 First Railway Package (COM(2010)475. 
1265 Although the PVV was not technically part of the government (it did not have any ministers in 
government), it gave its support to the administration’s policy agenda in order that it would obtain a 
majority in the Second Chamber. 
1266 Freedom Party. 
1267 Fourth Railway Package: Directive for Interoperability (COM(2013)30. 
1268 VVD 
1269 PvdA 
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Council meetings. It was expected that in the case where the Eurosceptic condition was 
absent, the NP would use less formal powers. This causal process has not been 
confirmed. The causal processes in the additional pair-wise comparison have not been 
confirmed either. Process-tracing analysis in the first case, where the Eurosceptic 
condition was present, showed that the NP used less formal powers than in the case 
where the Eurosceptic condition was absent.  
Interviewing both MPs and government representatives made clear that the Eurosceptic 
party did not indeed put any stamp on the direction of the debate of this case and that 
the Eurosceptic PVV only focused its attention on more political issues (such as EU 
integration or migration and asylum policies), but not on technical issues such as EU 
Railways.1270 These findings are largely supportive of literature arguing that political 
parties tend to focus on issues which voters can then connect to them.1271 It is also in 
line with previous research examining the relationship between euro-scepticism as an 
explanatory factor which appears to have little effect on the strength of oversight.1272  
Interviews confirm that it was not so much the presence of the PVV, but rather other 
issues such as the ‘no’ in the Dutch referendum against the EU Constitution in 2005, 
that made politicians more aware of the importance of the scrutiny of EU legislative 
files and guarding against the EU dealing with issues that lie outside its 
competencies.1273 This conclusion supports previous quantitative studies, such as that by 
Raunio, which conclude that having a Eurosceptic public opinion increases the chances 
of tighter scrutiny of government on EU issues.1274 
It does become clear from the interviews that the opposition did, however, feel that the 
governing parties (Liberals and Christian-Democrats) could not often count on the PVV 
for support in the field of EU legislative files, leading to more EU control. In these 
cases, government members did have to rely on other parties within the NP for support - 
often the Social Democrats (the biggest opposition party during Rutte I), a pro-
European party.1275 In these cases, it can therefore be argued that the disagreement 
between coalition partners in government and their tolerating party, the PVV, regarding 
the extent of EU integration gave the opposition extra chances to use its powers and 
impact the government’s EU policy position. However, this, again, will be more visible 
																																																								
1270 Van Dongen, 3rd June 2015; Atsma, 29th May 2015; Kisters, 29th May 2015; Hoogland, 4th June 2015; 
De Boer, 3rd June 2015. 
1271 Netjes and Binnema, 2007, p. 40. 
1272 Winzen, 2015a, p. 317. 
1273 Atsma, 29th May 2015; Koolmees, 6th July 2015; Monasch, 16th June 2015. 
1274 Raunio, 2005, p. 336. 
1275 Monasch MP, 16th June 2015; Koolmees, 6th July 2015.	
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in dossiers dealing with EU integration rather than technical ones, such as these on 
which the PVV apparently had no clear position. This is confirmed in interviews.1276  
The need for the government to seek support among the opposition would also have 
been present had it not depended on the PVV for its support; it is therefore more related 
to the fact that the existing government was a minority one and if it could not rely for 
support on one party (in this case the PVV), it would seek it from another.  
 
Previous research draws similar conclusions. Auel and Christiansen argue that often in 
coalition governments, ministers from different parties must find compromises, and this 
is hardest in the case of minority governments where the administration cannot 
automatically rely on the support of the NP but must negotiate majorities for its 
policies.1277 Minority governments give the opposition direct policy influence, as they 
cannot rely on their own parliamentary majority.1278 The NP is more influential if it can 
threaten the existence of the government, as it becomes a necessity for the 
administration to take its opinions into account.1279  
It is therefore more likely that any increased possibilities to effect an impact on 
government in both cases are mostly related to the fact that the government consists of a 
minority coalition cabinet and this, combined with the salience of the topic, gave 
opposition parties more opportunities to try to impact its EU policy position.1280 The 
tradition of consensus decision-making within Dutch political culture1281 could 
therefore be more decisive than the dependence of the government upon a Eurosceptic 
party. This is different from the outcome of the pair-wise comparison in Chapter 5 
between a multi-party government and a single party one. There, it seemed that impact 
was not so much related to the increased use of formal powers as the divided views of 
Conservatives on EU issues. In contrast, in this pair-wise comparison the partisan 
composition seemed to have mattered, but not the Eurosceptic condition. 
However, salience should not be ruled out in this case either. As Kisters argued in one 
of interview, ‘the composition of the coalition is not so relevant. What mostly 
determines the NP’s chances of influencing its government’s EU policy position is the 
subject itself. If a topic is important to a NP, it will try harder to convince the 
																																																								
1276 Van Dongen, 3rd June 2015; Koolmees, 7th July 2015; Monasch 16th June 2015. 
1277 Auel & Christiansen, 2015, p. 270. 
1278 Auel and Höing, 2015, p. 380 
1279 Rozenberg, 2002,p.  14. 
1280 Rutte I had no majority in the Second Chamber without the support of the PVV, and Rutte II has no 
majority in the First Chamber. 
1281 Holzhacker, 2005, p. 438.	
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government.’1282 The importance of the salience condition indeed appeared from the 
analysis of this hypothesis and will also be discussed in the next section.  
 
9.2.4 Salience 
 
The third hypothesis suggested that NPs have more chances to increase their substantive 
impact on governmental EU policy position where the case is salient. Two legislative 
files, both scrutinised during the Cameron-Clegg coalition government, were selected. 
One is a salient one1283; the other is not.1284 While the measurable impact in both cases 
can be considered to be weak, there is a clear variation in parliamentary activity in both 
cases to be observed, corresponding to the expected causal processes. The HC refers the 
EU Water Policy case to be dealt with by the S&T Committee which receives a 
substantial number of witnesses before the committee adopts a standpoint. The HC not 
only focuses on the contents of the file, but also and more so, on finding out whether the 
UK Government is doing enough to play a role in the EU file. In the second case, the 
EAC refrains from the use of formal powers by not asking questions, not including any 
sectoral committee and limiting its use of formal powers to ask the government to 
inform it on the further developments of the file during the OLP. Interviews with MPs 
confirmed that they were more active in the case of EU Water Policy as they felt more 
was at stake, such as environmental issues and finance. MPs were also of the impression 
that the government had not been active enough in this field, so they felt it needed extra 
instruction from the HC. The alternative pair-wise comparison between the EMFF and 
Cod Stocks equally confirm both causal processes.  
The hypothesis regarding the salience variable can therefore be clearly confirmed and it 
seems that even an NP without strong influential power can still increase its use of 
formal (ex ante) powers when the case is important enough. This corresponds to 
previous research in this field, such as that of Netjes and Binnema1285 and Miklin1286 
who found that the salience of a given issue for legislators matters1287 and is more 
influential in showing variation in impact than other variables.1288 The EU often deals 
with issues, such as trade, industrial regulation, foreign aid or agricultural policy, which 
																																																								
1282 Kisters, 19th May 2015. 
1283 EU Water Policy, 2012. 
1284 Ship Recycling, 2012. 
1285 Netjes & Binnema, 2007. 
1286 Miklin, 2012. 
1287 Rozenberg & Hefftler 2015, p. 26. 
1288 Saalfeld 2005, p. 367. 
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are simply less salient to European citizens those dealt with by national 
governments.1289 According to most  waves of the Euro-barometer surveys, European 
citizens are mostly worried about unemployment, the economy, crime, healthcare, 
immigration, the environment and terrorism. As we have seen in both pair-wise 
comparisons for this hypothesis, MPs do indeed increase the use of their formal powers 
when they scrutinise EU legislative files dealing with these issues (environment and 
funding). In other words, regardless of the actual outcome of weak impact, all evidence 
found in the four cases confirm the hypothesis. 
 
9.2.5 Lisbon Treaty  
 
The last explanatory factor deals with the use of the Lisbon provisions as the 
independent variable for the increased measurable impact an NP has on its 
government’s EU policy position. In other words, in the case where the NP sends a 
reasoned opinion to the EC, it is expected to increase its chances of having an impact on 
the government’s EU policy position. Again, two cases were compared, both dealt with 
by the same (Rutte II) government. In the first case1290, the NP sent a RO to the EC and 
in the second case1291 it did not. There is clear difference in the use of formal powers 
between these two cases. In the first, where the NP sent a RO to the EC, it uses less 
formal powers than in the case where it did not make use of this right. This contradicts 
the posited causal processes. According to the interviewees, the increased use of formal 
powers in the port services case (no RO) was because there was more at stake. It seems 
that the salience condition is in competition with the condition to be measured again, 
namely the Lisbon provisions. 
In the alternative pair-wise comparison there is an even clearer distinction in the use of 
formal powers in both cases. In the first case (Open market for Railway Passengers) 
many formal powers were used to influence its own government through motions, 
questions and debates with the responsible minister before the Council meeting. There 
is a remarkable continuity of debates between those parties with strong pro-EU and anti-
liberalisation views, such as the Social Democrats1292 and the Liberals1293 (in this case 
also the coalition partners). In other words, the debate is clearly a political one, cutting 
across the traditional left/right cleavage. This corresponds to Miklin’s research in the 																																																								
1289 Moravcsik, 2006, p. 225. 
1290 Maritime Spatial Planning. 
1291 Port Services. 
1292 PvdA. 
1293 VVD. 
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field of EU politicisation and NPs, during which he argues that politicisation requires 
polarising legislative proposals on which centre- left and -right parties take different 
positions. EU proposals that cut along the traditional left/right cleavage lead to more 
parliamentary debates.1294 
The use of formal powers in the second alternative case (interoperability), where the NP 
has not made use of a RO, is limited to receiving information and asking technical 
questions. In other words, in this second case the NP is looking for clarification rather 
than trying to influence the government’s position. These outcomes are in line with the 
posited causal processes. 
Interviews confirmed that in the case of opening the market for passengers, the NP was 
much more involved as it was a topic that many parties (on the left) feel should remain 
under control.1295 This is a topical debate and there is therefore more at stake. However, 
the NP probably would have used the same amount of formal power if it had not had the 
right to send a RO in this case. In other words, the salience seems to be the main reason 
for the NP to increase its parliamentary activity.  
This is the most obvious case of all in which the intermediate impact of the NP is 
noticeable. The government fully reflects the NP’s objection to the EC taking over the 
mandate in this field during its contributions to the Council meeting.1296  
In addition, according to interviewees, MPs consider sending a RO to be an objective 
subsidiarity assessment and not a political tool.1297 For that reason, they therefore 
remain concise and focused on the legal aspects of the subsidiarity principle1298, and it 
was therefore not used for political reasons, as argued in previous research.1299 It does 
not mean that as a consequence it will increase its scrutiny efforts. This depends on the 
topic and the extent to which the NP agrees with the government.  
Other interviewees, such as Atsma, the responsible minister at the time of scrutiny, did 
argue that the RO can help the negotiation position of the government in Brussels 
because the government can indicate during negotiations that it has little leeway1300. 
This is confirmed by Kisters1301 and Keulemans1302. In other words, if the EU legislative 																																																								
1294 Miklin, 2012, p. 130. 
1295 Hoogland, 4th June 2015; De Boer, 3rd June 2015; Van Dongen, 4th June 2015. 
1296 The two parties in government have opposing views on opening the market up to railway passengers, 
but as a consequence of a majority in the NP that opposes it, the government confirms it will follow this 
line even if the bigger party in the coalition, the VVD, supports the EC plan to open up the market. 
1297 Nollen, 8th July 2015; Groves, 3rd July 2015. 
1298 Högenauer, 2015, p. 261. 
1299 Gatterman & Hefftler, 2015,  p. 306. 
1300 Atsma, 29th May 2015. 
1301 Kisters, 19th May 2015. 
1302 Keulemans, 15th June 2015. 
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file is of national interest and the government and NP are therefore supporting one 
another, as shown by the case studies in the field of maritime policies, it can increase 
the overall impact the NP has on an EU legislative file. However, this does not apply to 
the outcome on the government’s EU policy position. This was supported by MPs1303 
and government representatives.1304 
On those occasions the relationship between the NP and its government becomes one 
that is less hierarchical in a way and instead of controlling and influencing the 
government in its capacity as principal, the government and NP are more or less on the 
same level. Obviously, this is only the case if the NP and government agree on the 
negative subsidiarity judgement. If the government is in favour of an EU legislative 
proposal and the SC against, then there is a problem.1305 In those cases, the relationship 
between the NP and government remains that of the represented and the representative 
where the NP controls what the government is doing. In those cases, increased use of 
formal powers by the NP is likely. 
In conclusion, a negative subsidiarity judgement by the NP is definitely a way to 
increase the delegatory aspect of the relationship with government, as it is more likely 
to inform the NP after having sent a negative reasoned opinion to the EC. 
More specifically, as the four cases have shown, contrary to the theoretical argument, 
the RO is often not applied in order to impact the government’s EU policy position (as 
it is used as a legislative tool, checking for any possible breaches with the subsidiarity 
principle). However, once it used, the NP will increase the use of formal powers to 
scrutinise its government, since even if the contents of the topic are not salient to the 
electorate, the very fact that the NP considers this suitable to be dealt with at national 
level - in itself creating a form of salience - leads to increased parliamentary activities.  
Whereas the causal mechanisms linking the use of a RO to an increased impact in the 
alternative case largely corresponded to the causal process, other observations were 
made, such as the national interest of the topic which led to a stronger relationship with 
the increased use of formal powers and the intermediate measurable impact. 
It seems that a combination of the Lisbon Treaty and the generally more Eurosceptic 
views of public opinion seem to have jolted NPs into being more alert about new EU 
legislative proposals, although the subsidiarity tool as such is generally used as a 
legislative one. This does not automatically lead to a higher use of formal powers or 
more chances of having an impact on the government’s EU policy position. The 																																																								
1303 Hoogland, 4th June 2015. 
1304 Pol, 4th June 2015. 
1305 Keulemans, 15th June 2015.	
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variable of the Lisbon Treaty is very closely linked to the salience variable, as the use of 
the RO seems to increase the salience of the topic as a consequence it being deemed in 
need of national scrutiny. The causal processes for both the analysis of salience and 
Lisbon provisions appear very similar.  
Table 22 gives an overview of the findings per hypothesis and causal process.  
 
Table 22 Findings per hypothesis and causal process  
Hypotheses Finding 
Multi-party gov. is a favourable condition for NPs to 
increase their substantive impact on its gov’s EU policy 
position. 
Disconfirmed  
The more the gov. depends on the support of a 
Eurosceptic party, the more likely the NP will have a 
substantive impact on its gov.’s EU policy position. 
Disconfirmed 
The more salient an EU issue is to the NP, the more 
likely the NP will have a substantive impact on the 
gov.’s EU policy position. 
Confirmed. 
Those NPs opposing an EU legislative proposal in a 
RO have greater substantive impact on the gov.’s EU 
Policy position than those NPs that do not oppose the 
proposal. 
Partly confirmed. 
 
9.3 Main findings and implications for future research 
 
What this research clearly shows, in both the evidence from the process-tracing and the 
pair-wise comparisons, is that the use of formal powers by the NP is dependent on the 
contents of the topic. In other words, salience is all that matters. Although the analyses 
of the different hypotheses have shown a positive relationship between the minority 
government and the possible increased impact, the Eurosceptic link and the use of the 
Lisbon provisions cannot be confidently confirmed with any evidence.   
We can however conclude with conviction that salience is a necessary condition for 
MPs to make increased use of parliamentary activities, which elicits a response in 
increased levels of governmental activities. In every topic that had a lot at stake for the 
electorate this causal process was followed, even if it did not always lead to measurable 
impact. Interviews confirmed that most influence is expected on more important 
dossiers which would draw interest from public opinion, such as the Euro crisis or 
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issues dealing with EU integration.1306 However, as became clear during the analysis of 
the cases, there are different types of salience. In some cases salience consisted of the 
levels of Europeanisation (the extent of EU integration). For example, in the case of the 
Railways and the CFP, there is the left/right salience, such as liberalisation, but there are 
also other types of salience such as the importance of money (the case dealing with 
European funding), environmental salience (Water), a moral form of salience (the issue 
of discards in the reform of the CFP), but also the national interest has been found to be 
a form of salience (maritime policies). Even the use of the RO and the background 
objection against the publication of an EU legislative proposal because of a breach of 
subsidiarity implied a type of salience.  
All these salience types are related to incentives, such as policy-shaping, vote-seeking 
and overcoming contestation and MPs select these topics to use their powers upon, as in 
these cases they are most likely to be effective (see also Chapter 3.4).  
Conflict over either Europeanised or politicised topics was most likely to lead to an 
impact in the analysed cases. Conflict was in fact more noticeable between different 
parties within the NP (for example, the opening of the railway market led to an 
argument between a Liberal MP and a Social-Democrat) than between the NP and the 
government. In other words, conflict was more likely to take place along party political 
lines than by the NP as an overall institution.  
As the variable of salience seems to be present in all cases it would be interesting for 
future research to look at breaking up these different types of salience, which this 
research has not done (with the exception of dividing electoral salience from salience to 
the legislative actors). An interesting research question in this respect would be the 
extent to which some salient issues in the EU might lead to more parliamentary 
activities and opportunities to effect impact than others.  
From the process-tracing analysis it also became clear that when increasing the use of 
formal powers, it is more likely to impact the government’s EU policy position. Even 
though measurable impact was hard to notice on many occasions, the government did 
increase its feedback to MPs (by letters and/or meetings) in order to keep the NP 
involved. This is confirmed in interviews with Dutch government representatives.1307 In 
other words, sometimes impact is not so much reflected in the outcome of the actual 
government document, but is reflected in an increased use of feedback by the 
administration to its NP. The use of formal powers has been shown to be necessary for 																																																								
1306 Keulemans, 15th June 2015; Koolmees, 6th July 2015. 
1307 Abspoel, 3rd June 2015; Pol, 4th June 2015. 
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impact, but it is no guarantee. The increased use of formal powers was, however, in all 
cases met with an increased use of feedback by the government. In all cases where the 
use of formal powers by the NP was absent, the government did not give feedback 
either. In other words, parliamentary activity is necessary as its absence prevents the 
outcome of the use of governmental feedback.1308 
Turning to the existing literature in this field, three specific findings can be contributed 
as a consequence of this research. First, the most significant finding to be contributed is 
that no matter how many or few formal powers a NP possesses or whether they are ex 
ante influence powers or ex post control powers, its efforts mostly depend upon the 
salience or politicisation of the topic or the composition of the government (whether it 
has a minority or majority in the NP). All the while MPs feel that an EU legislative 
proposal will have consequences that touch upon the interests of voters or which are 
highly politicised1309, they will increase the use of their powers to influence government 
EU policy positions and therefore increase their chances of having an impact. In other 
words, salience is a necessary condition for a certain outcome and its absence will 
prevent this outcome.1310 Existing contributions to the literature, such as that of Miklin, 
point in similar directions by arguing that politicisation increases parliamentary debates 
in which parties discuss and justify different views.1311  
A second finding to be added to the literature on formal powers is that governments 
have been shown to be more open to include the wishes of NPs and keep them informed 
when they receive clear signals, such as motions, scrutiny reserves, attention to the 
House or a RO, even if this does not directly mean that the NP will have a substantive 
impact on its government’s input into the Council meeting. 
In other words, using formal powers does make a difference. All cases showed that 
increased parliamentary activities (MPs choose from different instruments, such as the 
scrutiny reserve, asking questions, debating) were responded to by increased 
governmental activities. Interviewees confirmed this as well. Most government 
representatives stated that they felt under pressure if MPs had an explicit opinion on a 
matter and would tell them what they expected the government to do.1312  
A note of caution is necessary here. The use of formal processes proves relevant, but 
only when using them ex ante. It became clear that even the HC, selected by the NP 
selected on its weak ex ante influence and stronger ex post control powers, would have 																																																								
1308 See also Beach & Pederson, 2013,  p. 27.	
1309 i.e. they cut along the left/right cleavage. 
1310 See also Beach & Pederson, 2013, p. 27-30.	
1311 Miklin, 2014, p. 88. 
1312 Atsma, 29th May 2015; Benyon, 25th June; Clayton, 21st July 2015. 
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meetings before a Council meeting if it had more to say about a topic. After Council 
meetings, very little happened in most cases. Early information is thus relevant and MPs 
confirm that receiving the Council agenda and holding a pre-Council meeting, as 
happened in the Dutch cases, helps the NP to be better prepared and increase its chances 
to make a difference. In the HC cases the government was sometimes just too late in 
providing information, causing the NP to miss a chance to make a difference to the 
outcome.  
A third finding is that although using formal powers does make a difference, impact 
was hardly ever noticed. This is not only a consequence of the difficulties of measuring 
impact, it is also related to the very fact that in all cases (16 in total) MPs hardly ever 
really try to impact the government. They mostly control it. They often ask for 
clarification and information. This could be a consequence of the fact that when 
scrutinising EU dossiers, the national interest often prevails which temporarily 
diminishes left/right differences, as raised during some interviews.1313 It also became 
clear, however, that even when impact as measured in this research is rarely ever 
noticeable, the use of parliamentary activities did vary under different conditions; 
responded to by an increased use of feedback by the government. Again, this shows that 
it does make a difference when NPs use formal powers.  
These outcomes indicate that an NP’s involvement depend not so much upon its rules of 
Procedure, as on the importance of the EU case at stake. If MPs care about a topic their 
involvement does make a difference and can increase democratic control of EU 
legislation at domestic level. 
Another cautionary remark is necessary here. Admitting that the salient condition and 
the impact are positively linked, other conditions may have a different outcome, such as 
the Eurosceptic condition where other cases had been selected. Although in the current 
two pair-wise comparisons, the condition between the Eurosceptic government and 
increased parliamentary activities (and impact) could not be established, it appeared 
from interviewees that this was likely because the Eurosceptic party was not interested 
in the technical dossiers used as cases. If the NP discussed topics such as, for example, 
Brexit or the Refugee crisis when having a Eurosceptic government, the levels of 
parliamentary activity could potentially be a lot higher. The Eurosceptic presence in part 
of the Conservative government did give Eurosceptic MPs more chances to make 
themselves heard in debates about the EU.1314 The variable cannot therefore be 																																																								
1313 Atsma, 29th May 2015; Pol, 4th June 2015; Van Dongen, 3rd June 2015.	
1314 Hopkins, 30th June 2015. 
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completely ruled out as a potential condition for increased parliamentary activities and a 
higher measurable impact.  
As also discussed under the concluding remarks of measuring impact, one of the 
limitations of this research is the sole focus on EU legislative files. An interesting 
direction for future research would be to find out whether these types of scrutiny, 
outside the OLP, imply different types of formal power or whether the scrutiny of non-
legislative files is less structured, for example, when discussing the Euro-crisis. In these 
cases, the Eurosceptic variable could be a lot more active in determining the outcome of 
the analysis. This is not only because of the more Europeanised and political nature of 
many of the non-legislative files discussed during EU summits, but also because the 
scrutiny process is different. For example, during the interviews it became clear that 
after EU summits the prime minister must go to the NP straight away in order to be held 
to account, whereas after a Transport Council meeting, for example, reports are often 
published a lot later.1315 By that time the NP has already moved onto other topics.  
Besides, the selection of the cases consisted entirely of technical ones, and as Miklin 
argued, more polarised EU legislative files could increase parliamentary debate.1316 
Also the partisan condition could have had a different outcome if applied differently. 
For example, rather than looking at a multi-party and single party government, a 
minority administration could be selected. In this case, an increased use of formal 
powers as a consequence of this variable is highly likely, as became clear in Chapter 6. 
Another topic that demands further research arises from the conclusions drawn from the 
Lisbon provisions condition. Although only an indirect link could be established 
between the use of the EWM and increased parliamentary activities (via salience), many 
interviewees were of the opinion that referring to NPs in the Lisbon Treaty has made a 
difference.1317 It would therefore be interesting to find out the extent to which the 
increased involvement of MPs in EU issues is a consequence of actual new powers or 
increased euro-scepticism among citizens and many politicians which could be the 
result of this Treaty, viewed by many critics as another step towards further EU 
integration and loss of sovereignty. This was raised in many interviews.   
Being a European tool, rather than one forming part of the national Rules of Procedure, 
it would be interesting to look further into the impact that NPs have on European 
negotiations during Council meetings after sending a negative RO to the EC, as it 
																																																								
1315 Pol, 4th June 2015; Monasch, 16th June 2015. 
1316 Miklin, 2014, p. 88.	
1317 Keulemans, 15th June 2015; Hoogland, 4th June 2015; Monasch, 16th June 2015. 
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appeared from interviews that making use of the RO can indeed improve the 
government’s negotiation position in Brussels. 
At the same time, other provisions included in the Lisbon Treaty applying to NPs have 
been underexposed in this research, such as inter-parliamentary cooperation. Finding 
out whether this provision has increased parliamentary chances of impact and whether 
NPs have a chance of becoming ‘virtual third chambers’, as expected by Cooper1318, 
would be an interesting follow-up study.  
Another interesting direction for future research is to be found in extending similar 
explanatory factors in a cross-country comparison. The applied comparative methods 
are limited in that that they can only treat dichotomised variables.1319 This research 
focused on comparing different EU legislative files when scrutinised by the same NP, as 
this would lead to less chances of rival explanations. However, this impeded the 
research from explaining cross-national variation.  
As this thesis consists of a small-N case study, generalisations of its findings are 
limited. Although it is expected that NPs with a similar amount of formal powers might 
respond similarly when operating under the conditions applied in this research, NPs 
with other characteristics such as those with more or less formal powers or those NPs in 
member states more geographically-remote from the EU, could lead to a different 
outcome. The non-representative nature of pair-wise comparisons is a well-known 
limitation in small-N comparative analysis.1320 For example, the outcome of the analysis 
of the multi-party government versus a single party government is pretty unique for the 
UK for two reasons. First of all, the UK’s multi-party government from 2010-2015 was 
an outlier in its tradition of single party administrations. Besides, the divided nature of 
the Conservative party on EU issues cannot be compared to other EU member states 
where mainstream political parties tend to be more united on EU issues. The outcome of 
other conditions, such as salience, on the other hand, is expected to be similar across all 
NPs, as this condition and its causal process was present in all 16 cases.  
In thinking about how the findings of this study could be applied more widely, a 
quantitative study is suggested that focuses on measuring the levels of feedback from 
the government to its NP when operating under different types of salience. 
																																																								
1318 Cooper, 2012.	
1319 De Meur et al., 2009,  p. 148.	
1320 Tarrow, 2010, p. 28. 
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9.4 Normative contribution 
 
This research applied Pitkin’s categories of political representation to empirical 
research. The aim has been to find out whether her argument regarding the relationship 
between the represented and representative can change depending on different external 
factors. Her categorisation also applies to the relationship between the NP as the 
represented and the government as the representative when operating in EU issues. The 
research therefore looked at the formalistic strand of representation (the NP and its 
formal powers) and the substantive strand (the extent to which the relationship alters 
when operating under different conditions). The relationship between the NP and 
government was described as being on a continuum, where the relationship can be 
either on the trustee side (giving the government more leeway to act freely) or the 
delegatory side (the government is bound to tight instructions from the NP).  
The empirical research showed that allocating a role to NPs means that this is not 
simply a matter of applying parliamentary processes of accountability and authorisation, 
but there are certain conditions under which they operate that determine their chances of 
being effective as well (such as the levels of politicisation and Europeanisation). 
From the empirical research it indeed became clear that the use of formal powers did 
increase in cases where the NP’s efforts had more chances of having an effect. This 
appeared to be the case in minority governments or when the topic was salient. The 
extra use of the NP’s formal powers was in most cases (for example, the CFP, Fourth 
Railway Package and the Port Services file) responded to by increased responsiveness 
of the government (for example, by giving more information during letters and or 
meetings). In other words, it can be argued that in delegatory relationships the 
representative is more likely to increase its responsiveness to the NP as the represented 
in cases where the NP uses few formal powers (for example, Cod Stocks or Ship 
Recycling). In these cases the government was basically free to follow its own 
judgement and received no clear instruction from the NP. These examples of a lack of 
activity by the represented were responded to by a lack of governmental activity as well 
(no feedback). These were clear examples of a trustee relationship between the NP and 
the government. We can therefore also conclude that in a trustee relationship, the 
responsiveness of the representative is lower. This corresponds to Bowler’s argument 
that the higher the responsiveness of the representative to the represented, the more 
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likely it is that the relationship will be delegatory.1321 Without getting into a cross-
country comparison here, when looking at the scrutiny by the HC (described as forming 
part of the trusteeship model) and by the SC (considered to be part of the delegatory 
model) it became clear that in most cases the SC, which normally meets before the 
Council meeting with the government, was a lot more explicit in expressing its own 
views and giving clear instructions to the government, as the representative. The HC, by 
contrast, seldom gave clear instructions to the government in which it explicitly told the 
government what it expected it to say during the Council meetings. This is likely related 
to the fact that HC meetings were often ex post the Council meeting and the scrutiny is 
thus more on controlling what the government has done than influencing it. The chance 
of impact is therefore indeed higher in cases where the NP forms part of the delegatory 
model, where meetings take place ex ante. 
However, these relationships are not static. In other words, the use of formal powers 
does not solely depend on how these are laid down in the Rules of Procedure and 
whether, according to this, the NP can be considered to be part of the delegatory or 
trusteeship model.  
Depending on the contents of the files, the HC would also increase the use of formal 
powers by giving clear instructions and binding the government to give regular 
feedback (for example, in the case of CFP reform). In all cases where the NP increased 
its use of formal powers, the government was also more responsive to the NP than when 
it had not done so. More concretely, the contents of the EU legislative file are more 
relevant in determining the parliamentary activities of the represented than the formal 
powers as such. The case studies showed that the selected NP with few ex ante 
influence powers (in other words, a NP forming part of the trusteeship model) could 
still act to form part of the delegatory model when the topic was judged to be salient 
enough (for example, the EU Water policy, EMFF, CFP). On the other side, the selected 
NP with higher ex ante influence mechanisms (forming part of the delegatory model) 
could act to form part of a trusteeship model in cases where the contents of the EU 
legislative proposal dealt with a more technical topic (Interoperability or the Integrated 
Maritime Policy). Next to the contents of an EU file (salient ones including 
Europeanised and political dossiers), other conditions seem to change the substantive 
strand of representation, such as a minority government and issues challenging 
subsidiarity that can alter the relationship between the government and its NP to a 
delegatory one. 																																																								
1321 Bowler, 2016, p. 2. 
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Pitkin therefore correctly argued in her famous account of political representation that 
the relationship between representative and represented not only depends on formal 
powers, and that it is necessary to look at the wider context under which the relationship 
interacts. This also applies to the relationship between the NP and its government on 
EU issues. Different case studies showed that in the relationship between representative 
and represented, different contexts were dominant, such as geographical region (for 
example, in the CFP), the nation (Port Services), an ideology (Opening of the railway 
market to passengers) or a ministry (EU Water Policy).1322  
Looking at what this could possibly mean for normative literature which has often 
described the mode of political representation as being problematic at EU level and has 
brought up as a solution involving NPs. As suggested by Bellamy (see Chapter 2), it 
seems that increasing government responsiveness to these NPs relating to EU issues 
could improve overall political representation at EU level as well. In other words, as 
Bowler argues, democratic responsiveness occurs when the government implements 
policies desired by citizens.1323 Assuming that the NP, which represents the public, 
pleads on behalf of those whom it represents in relation to EU policies (as became clear 
in the case studies, MPs were indeed more active when the topic was salient to citizens), 
discussing more EU topics related to political or EU integration issues will increase 
parliamentary activities and, consequently, government responsiveness. When this 
occurs, it can be argued that responsiveness is a justification for democracy itself.1324 
Bowler indeed shows that responsiveness to voters is a prerequisite for democracy.1325 
Including NPs in EU decision-making, as was the case during the Lisbon Treaty, can be 
considered as a way to respond to the democratic will of the various demoi and retain 
on-going support.1326 Even if the use of the Lisbon provisions, such as the EWM as 
dealt with in one of the case studies, does not automatically increase the parliamentary 
activities of NPs, the Lisbon Treaty as such does seem to have been a wake-up call, 
making NPs more aware of EU activities that are relevant for voters, combined with the 
knowledge that they can play a role in policy-making. NPs can help particularly in 
normalising EU policy-making, bringing it closer to home. They are capable of 
domesticating EU debates when they control and influence their governments.1327 
																																																								
1322 See also Bray, 2011, p. 91 for more information on these different contexts.	
1323 Bowler, 2016, p. 4. 
1324 Bowler, 2016, p. 91. 
1325 Ibid., p. 12. 
1326 Kröger & Bellamy, 2016, p. 9. 
1327 Ibid. 
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Government representatives indicated during the interviews their appreciation of clear 
signals from the NP in the form of a scrutiny reserve, but also a RO, as it places them in 
a better position when negotiating in Brussels.1328  
As the relationship between the NP and government is more likely to be a delegatory 
one in cases of Europeanised or political topics, and if that relationship can be referred 
to as one of democratic responsiveness1329, EU issues covering these topics can be said 
to promote democracy since they are more likely to reflect the views of the electorate. 
However, an increased delegatory relationship, and consequently higher levels of 
responsiveness from the represented, is no guarantee for higher levels of democracy.  
On the one hand, technical issues are more likely to be scrutinised along the trusteeship 
relationship, which is fine in democratic terms since they often do not include topics 
about which the public is worried (see the theories of Majone and Moravcsik, explained 
in Chapter 2). In other words, some topics simply do not require high levels of 
responsiveness when MPs have chosen not to offer input. The case studies showed how 
much pressure is placed on MPs to cover the vast amount of new EU legislative 
proposals, and carefully select topics on which to focus their efforts using formal 
powers which are most likely to have an effect. 
On the other hand, on some occasions relating to EU issues, the government can only 
act in the interest of the represented and the citizens if it receives more freedom to act 
freely. In other words, in order to attain the result the government wants in Brussels, it 
must act as a trustee. This became clear in the interviews where government 
representatives argued that Brussels is more likely to give something if the member 
state is also free to give something back.1330 The interviewees argued that member states 
such as Denmark, often referred to as an example in academic literature for the strong 
delegatory relationship between the NP and government, is often considered to hinder 
negotiations on EU issues when it has not obtained from its NP  the freedom to act. This 
makes the achievement of a compromise more difficult. Not being able to negotiate in 
Brussels implies not taking part in creating a compromise.1331 An increased delegatory 
relationship, therefore, can work counterproductively since in the end the country may 
not get what it wants simply because it did not gain the freedom to come to an 
agreement which had not previously been discussed with the NP. This is in line with 
Weale’s book on Democracy: 																																																								
1328 Atsma, 29th May 2005; Keulemans, 15th June 201;, De Vries, 8th June 2015. 
1329 Bowler, 2016, p. 4.	
1330 Benyon, 25th June 2015; Van Dongen, 3rd June 2015; Pol, 4th June 2015. 
1331 Pol, 4th June 2015. 
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… ‘A conception of political representation that stresses responsible government 
holds that political representatives can sometimes only act substantively in the 
interests of their constituents when they are free from the obligations of 
responsiveness. On such accounts, representatives may be accountable, but not 
overly responsive.’1332 
 
This also corresponds to empirical research by Auel1333 and Raunio1334 who show that 
NPs are often cautious in giving the government a mandate that is too strict, as it could 
limit their government’s negotiation position.1335 
In other words, there is a fine line between giving the government clear instructions but 
also allowing it the freedom to act if necessary. It would not be in the interest of the 
country to be too strict and MPs feel that governments need some kind of freedom to 
follow their own judgement during negotiations in Brussels. Sometimes, just because 
the topic is salient, also in Brussels, the government gains more leeway from its NP in 
order to increase its chances of returning with a result that most closely reflects the 
interests of citizens at home. 
Too much of a delegatory relationship can, therefore, in the end be harmful for 
democracy because it can risk the interests of citizens by excluding when the 
government gets excluded from the final agreement. 
An interesting normative follow-up question could be the extent to which a NP with 
stronger delegatory ex ante powers could impede the wishes of the public from being 
represented at EU level when its government has too little freedom to achieve a 
compromise with other member states. In these cases, the government might be 
sidelined at the negotiation table. 
 
In conclusion, it can be argued that although those worried about the future existence of 
the EU as a consequence of current problems relating to the economic crisis (the 
emergency aid plan for Greece) and refugee crisis, these items of high salience 
(covering both political and Europeanised issues) will increase parliamentary activities 
with the result that the public’s views are more likely to be reflected in such salient EU 
topics. This is likely to at least remove one of the EU’s problems, that of the democratic 
deficit.  																																																								
1332 Weale, 2007, p. 135.   
1333 Auel, 2007. 
1334 Raunio, 2007. 
1335 Auel, 2007, p. 493.	
	 291	
 
Appendices 
 
Appendix I 
 
Seven Steps of OLP and the National Input: use of parliamentary mechanisms, 
methods and evidence * 
 
 
Steps Control and influence mechanisms 
used by the NP 
 
1) EC publication of EU legislative proposal  X 
2) NPs get 8 week to respond to EC - Meeting in EAC;  
- Discussion on whether to circulate the file to any 
relevant sectoral committees; 
- Request for a governmental referendum 
3) First reading. Start of ex ante influence 
phase 
- NP sends a letter to government; 
- NP requests a meeting with the government; 
- NP asks question to the relevant minister. 
4) Common Position Council. Ex post control 
phase 
- NP meets up in EAC and sectoral committee;  
- NP asks the relevant minister to attend the 
meeting; 
- NP asks minister questions about the outcome of 
the Council; 
- NP meets in plenary (with possible attendance 
of minister). 
5) Second Reading. Ex ante influence phase - NP sends a letter to government;  
- NP requests a meeting with the government;  
- NP asks questions to the relevant minister. 
6) Common position. Ex post control phase. - NP meets up in EAC and sectoral committee;  
- NP asks the relevant minister to attend the 
meeting; 
- NP asks minister questions about the outcome of 
the Council meeting; 
- NP meets in plenary (with possible attendance 
of minister). 
7) Adoption of EU legislative proposal. X 
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Steps 
 
Methods 
1) EC publication of EU legislative proposal  X 
2) NPs get 8 week to respond to EC - Trace any ROs (including other forms of 
correspondence) to the EC.  
- Trace any contact with other NPs during this 
stage (bilaterally or via COSAC). 
3) First reading. Start of ex ante influence 
phase 
-Trace the number and contents of meetings of 
involved parliamentary committees, plenary 
meetings, and meetings with the minister/civil 
servants. 
- Trace the position of the NP, 
- Compare the first reaction of the government to 
NP’s reaction. 
- Hold interviews with MPs and govt 
representatives. 
4) Common Position Council. Ex post control 
phase 
- Trace the number and contents of meetings of 
involved sectoral committees and EAC, plenary 
meetings and meetings with civil 
servants/ministers. 
- Hold interviews with MPs and govt 
representatives  
-Analyse and compare the contents of documents 
(first position government) to input NPs and to 
outcome of govt’s contribution to Council. 
5) Second Reading. Ex ante influence phase Trace the number and contents of meetings of 
involved parliamentary committees, plenary 
meetings, and meetings with the minister, 
-Trace the position of the NP, 
- Compare the first reaction of the government to 
NP’s reaction. 
- Hold interviews with MPs and government 
representatives. 
6) Common position. Ex post control phase. - Trace the number and contents of meetings of 
involved committees, plenary meetings and 
meetings with civil servants/ ministers. 
- Hold interviews with MPs and govt 
representatives  
-Analyse and compare the contents of documents 
(first position government) to input NPs and to 
outcome of govt’s contribution to the Council. 
7) Adoption of EU legislative proposal. X 
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Steps 
 
Evidence 
1) EC publication of EU legislative proposal  X 
2) NPs get 8 week to respond to EC Real evidence will not be present at this stage 
other than differences in positions by NP and 
Government (minutes of meetings, governmental 
memoranda, letters and official positions by NP). 
These will be used during the later steps to 
compare any possible changes. 
3) First reading. Start of ex ante influence 
phase 
- Minutes of meetings between NP and govt, in 
which govt specifies which points of the NP (s)he 
can/cannot adopt, govt position into the Council 
in which it refers/does not refer to NP’s position.  
 
4) Common Position Council. Ex post control 
phase 
- Council press release, in which the relevant 
government refers/does not refer to any of the 
points from its NP’s position, 
 - Letter from the minister in which it specifies 
that it has or has not adopted (some of) NP’s 
points,  
- Minutes of meetings of the NP (with minister), 
in which is referred to which NP’s points 
have/have not been adopted. 
5) Second Reading. Ex ante influence phase - Minutes of meetings between NP and govt, in 
which govt specifies which points of the NP (s)he 
can/cannot adopt, govt position into the Council 
in which it refers/does not refer to NP’s position.  
 
6) Common position. Ex post control phase. - The Council press release, in which the relevant 
govt department  refers/does not refer to any of 
the points from its NP’s position, 
 - Letter from the minister in which it specifies 
that it has or has not adopted (some of) NP’s 
points, - minutes of meetings of the NP (with 
minister), in which is referred to which NP’s 
points have/have not been adopted. 
7) Adoption of EU legislative proposal. X 
 
 
The tables in Appendix I represents the seven different steps of the OLP during which 
NPs can have an impact on the government’s EU policy position via the use of ex ante 
influence and ex post control mechanisms. It furthermore indicates which methods will 
be used to establish whether the use of these mechanisms have led to an impact and 
what counts as evidence during each step to either confirm or refute the hypotheses.  
 
* Even if the official EC procedure consists of 7 steps, in some cases, there are many 
more Council meetings wherein the relevant draft EC legislative proposal is discussed 
(also in cases where the EU legislative file only consists of one reading) and where 
different governments can give their opinion.  
Press releases published after each Council meeting are often more useful than official 
Council position papers as there are no longer any references to the opinions of 
individual member states in final Council positions. 
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Appendix II 
 
Seven Steps Process of OLP 
 
1) The EC publishes its proposal and sends it to EP, Council and NP.  
2) The NP get 8 weeks to decide whether it will send a RO to the EC indicating that 
it considers the principle of subsidiarity to have been breached. At the same time 
the influence and control of the government takes place, ex ante the Council 
meeting. The NP decides, for example, depending on the salience of the topic, to 
what extent it needs to use its formal powers, such as the number of EAC 
meetings, the involvement of sectoral committees, raising questions to the 
minister, inviting the minister to attend a meeting, government memoranda. If, for 
example, a case is of huge salience, the NP can at this stage also decide to use its 
informal powers, like raising the topic in the media to increase pressure on the 
government, informal email or phone contacts with civil servants and/or 
ministers.  
3) First reading in the Council, (during which it either amends or adopts EP’s 
position).  
4) Common position in Council is sent to the EP. The vast majority of legislative 
proposals are adopted at this stage. The ex post control phase by the NP takes 
place here. NP decides again whether it is necessary to use formal powers, like 
asking questions to responsible minister, meeting ministers and/or civil servants to 
hold the government to account on its decision in the Council.   
5) In case the EP does not accept the common position of the Council, it can submit 
amendments, which will lead to the second reading. During this phase the NPs get 
another chance to ex ante influence its government, see under 2. 
6) Council adopts a common position in second reading, whereby it either accepts or 
rejects the EP’s amendments. 
7) Where it is accepted, the legislative proposal is adopted at this stage. In this case, 
the NP gets another chance to ex post control its government, see step 4. This 
seven-step procedure is normally preceded by an agenda-setting process and 
followed by an implementation phase, but because the influence and control 
mechanisms of the NP are not used during this stage of the EU legislative 
proposal, I will not include these stages in my research.  
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Appendix III 
Overview of the main political parties in the United Kingdom and members of 
relevant committees during the Blair/Brown cabinet (2005-2010) and Cameron-
Clegg cabinet (2010-2015). 
Political system and main political parties in the UK 
The UK has a parliamentary democracy and the UK Parliament consists of two 
chambers, the House of Lords and the HC. The HC is the most influential chamber and 
consists of 648 members. UK governments normally consist of one party, with the 
exception of the 2010-2015 government which consisted of a coalition between the 
Conservatives and Liberal Democrats.  
Conservatives: The party of the political right, covering a broad range of traditional 
conservatives and royalists, neo-liberals and social conservatives.1336  
The party is deeply divided over issues related to the EU. Part of the party wants to 
leave the EU, whereas others - including industrial and business leaders - are strongly 
pro-European.1337 Since the Bloomberg speech of January 2013 by David Cameron, the 
Conservative party has adopted a more Eurosceptic view.1338 
In the single party government of Blair/Brown from 2005-2010 the Conservatives had 
198 seats, whereas after the election of 2010 when the party entered into a coalition 
with the Liberal Democrats, it had 307 seats. 
Labour: The Labour party covers left wing politics in Britain.1339 Since Tony Blair 
(1997), the party has adopted a more social-liberal centre left focus (New Labour)1340, 
which was later rejected under Ed Miliband.1341 
With regard to the EU, it can be considered to be a pro-EU party, although it has a 
number of more Eurosceptic members and has been split over the question as to 
whether there should be an in/out referendum.1342 																																																								
1336 http://about-britain.com/institutions/political-parties.htm 
1337 Ibid. 
1338 Liddle, Roger, Policy Network, 4th July 2014, http://www.policy-
network.net/pno_detail.aspx?ID=4677&	
1339 Ibid. 
1340 Ibid. 
1341 Parker, G., Financial Times, 26th September 2010. 
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In the 2005-2010 cabinet, Labour had 355 seats, whereas during the Cameron/Clegg 
coalition its number dropped to 258. 
SNP: The Scottish National Party is a nationalist party (pro-Scottish independence) 
which is on the centre-left.1343 It’s a pro-EU party, but on some issues, like the CFP, it 
would like to see that powers are given back to Scotland.1344 In the 2005-2010 single 
party government of Blair/Brown, the SNP had two seats and in the 2010-2015 coalition 
government of Cameron/Clegg it had six.  
Liberal Democrats: This party of the centre consists originally of a mixture of social 
conservatives and social democrats.1345 The party is the most pro-European of the major 
British parties.1346 In the 2005-2010 single party government of Blair/Brown it had 62 
seats which after the 2010 election dropped to 57. This is when it entered into a 
coalition with the Conservatives.  
The Greens: This left-wing party’s main focus concerns to the promotion of 
environmental issues.1347 In the 2005-2010 cabinet it had no seats, rising to one seat in 
the 2010-2015 coalition. On EU issues, the Greens are critical, as the party believes that 
governance should happen as closely as possible to the people.1348 
UKIP: The UK Independence Party is a Eurosceptic party which wants Britain to leave 
the EU.1349 It did not have any seats in Parliament in the 2005-2010 Labour cabinet nor 
in the 2010-2015 Conservatives-Liberal Democrats cabinet.  
																																																								
1342 The Economist, ‘Labour’s new Pro-Europeanism’, 2nd July 2013. 
1343 http://about-britain.com/institutions/political-parties.htm 
1344 Ibid. 
1345 Ibid.	
1346 Ibid. 
1347 Ibid. 
1348 Civitas, EU Fact Sheets, UK political parties’ positions on the EU. 
1349 Ibid.	
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Composition European Affairs Committee (2005-2010 and 2010-2015), the European 
Committee A (2005-2010 and 2010-2015) and the Science and Technology Committee 
(2010-2015) 
Members ESC 2005-2010 
Connarty, Michael (Chair)       Labour  
Bailey, Adrian        Labour 
Borrow, Mr David S        Labour 
Cash, Mr William        Conservatives 
Clappison, Mr James        Conservatives 
Clark, Ms Katy        Labour  
Dobbin, Jim  +       Labour 
Hands, Mr Greg        Conservatives 
Heathcoat-Amory, Mr David       Conservatives  
Hill, Keith         Labour 
Hopkins, Kelvin        Labour 
Hoyle, Mr Lindsay        Labour 
Laxton, Mr Bob        Labour 
Robertson, Angus        SNP  
Steen, Mr Anthony        Conservatives 
Younger-Ross, Richard      Liberal Democrat 
 
Members ESC 2010-2015 
Cash, Sir William (Chair)       Conservative 
Bingham,	Mr	Andrew       Conservative   
Clappison,	Mr	James        Conservative  
Connarty,	Mr	Michael	       Labour  
Davies,	Mr	Geraint       Labour (Co-op)   
Elliott,	Ms	Julie        Labour  
Gilbert,	Mr	Stephen       Liberal Democrat  
Griffith,	Ms	Nia	       Labour   
Heaton-Harris,	Mr	Chris	       Conservative   
Hopkins,	Mr	Kelvin       Labour   
Kelly,	Mr	Chris	        Conservative 
Phillips,	Mr	Stephen	        Conservative 
Rees-Mogg,	Mr	Jacob       Conservative  
Riordan,	Mrs	Linda        Labour (Co-op) 
Smith,	Mr	Henry	       Conservative   
Thornton,	Mr	Mike        Liberal Democrat 
 
Members of the European Committee A 2005-2010 
Betts, Mr. Clive (chair)      Labour 
Atkins, Charlotte       Labour  
Cox, Mr. Geoffrey       Conservative 
Farron, Tim         Liberal Democrat 
George, Andrew        Liberal Democrat 
Hill, Keith        Labour 
James, Mrs. Siân C.        Labour 
Jones, Lynne        Labour 
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Kumar, Dr. Ashok       Labour 
Spellar, Mr. John        Labour 
Steen, Mr. Anthony        Conservative 
Watkinson, Angela        Conservative 
 
European Committee A 2010-2015 
Clark, Ms Katy (chair)      Labour 
Connarty, Michael        Labour   
Gardiner, Barry        Labour 
Heaton-Harris, Chris         Conservative 
Jones, Susan Elan        Labour 
Kawczynski, Daniel        Conservative   
Mills, Nigel         Conservative  
O'Donnell, Fiona        Labour   
Reid, Mr Alan        Liberal Democrat   
Rudd, Amber         Conservative 
Stuart, Ms Gisela       Labour   
Watkinson, Angela         Conservative 
Whiteford, Dr Eilidh        SNP  
 
Members of the S&T Committee 2010-2015  
Miller, Mr. Andrew (chair)      Labour 
Byles, Mr. Dan       Conservative 
Dowd, Mr. Jim       Labour 
Heath, Mr. David       Liberal Democrat 
Metcalfe, Mr. Stephen      Conservative 
Nash, Mrs. Pamela       Labour 
Newton, Mrs. Sarah       Conservative 
Stringer, Mr. Graham       Labour 
Tredinnick, Mr. David      Conservative 
Williams, Mr. Hywel       Plaid Cymru 
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Appendix IV 
Overview of the main political parties in the Netherlands and members of relevant 
committees during the Rutte I (2010-2012) and Rutte II cabinet (2012-present) 
Political system and main political parties in the Netherlands 
The Netherlands has a parliamentary democracy and the Staten-Generaal, the Dutch 
Parliament, consists of two chambers; the First (Senate) and Second Chamber (House of 
Representatives). The House of Representatives is the most influential chamber and 
consists of 150 members, belonging to 11 political parties.  
The Dutch government always consists of a coalition of two or three political parties.  
The Rutte I government 2010-2012 
The Rutte I government consisted of a coalition between the Liberals (31 seats) and the 
Christian Democrats (21 seats). As a coalition between those two parties did not give 
them a majority in the SC, the government needed the support of a third party -  the 
PVV (24 seats) - which would ‘tolerate’ this minority government. In other words, the 
government would depend on the PVV for its support, but the PVV would not enter the 
government itself. The PVV was therefore referred to as the ‘tolerating’ partner of the 
Rutte I government. 
The Rutte II government 2012-present 
The Rutte II government consists of a coalition between the VVD (41 seats) and the 
PvdA (38 seats). This is a small majority and the government must often negotiate with 
other opposition parties in order to gain enough support for its proposals.  
The main political parties in the House of Representatives:  
VVD: The Liberal party which is a strong supporter of private enterprise in the 
Netherlands and is considered to be a centre-right party in favour of a free market with 
conservative values.1350 In both the Rutte I (31 seats) and the Rutte II (41 seats) cabinet, 
this party is the biggest in the House of Representatives and is part of the government. 																																																								
1350 The European Election Database: 
http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/country/netherlands/parties.html 
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The leader of this party is the Prime Minister (Rutte). For the VVD, the EU is a way to 
guarantee a single market. Political integration is therefore only supported for pragmatic 
reasons.1351 
PvdA: The Social Democratic party or Labour party. The main ideals of this party are 
shared responsibility, stewardship, justice, and solidarity.1352 During the Rutte I 
government this party was in the opposition (30 seats), while in Rutte II (38 seats) it is 
part of the coalition. The PvdA is pro-European integration, but has problems with the 
current neo-liberal programme of the EU.1353 For that reason it has reservations about a 
political EU integration, but expects the EU to restore international law and deal with 
poverty in less developed countries.1354  
PVV: the Party for Freedom. This party has a conservative programme which is in 
favour of economic liberalism and stricter rules for immigration.1355 It is also known as 
an anti-Islam party1356 and anti-EU party.1357 It won 24 seats in 2010 and 15 seats in 
2012 (Rutte II). In the Rutte I cabinet, the PVV formed a formal alliance with the 
coalition government to which it gave its support. When it abandoned its support in 
2012, the cabinet fell and new elections were held. While in its 2010 manifesto the PVV 
focused mainly on Islam issues1358, during the election campaign of 2012 the main 
objective in its manifesto was for the Netherlands to leave the EU.1359 
CDA (Christian Democratic Appeal): The Christian Democratic Party represents a 
centre position in the field of the economy combined with conservative leanings.1360 In 
2010 it won 21 seats and joined the government together with the VVD in a minority 
coalition that was supported by the PVV. In 2010, the CDA falls back to 13 seats and 
enters the opposition. The CDA is in favour of further EU integration, mainly because it 
agreed so with the European People’s Party’s manifesto. This states that the EU as a 
																																																								
1351 WRR, Scientific Council for Government Policy, Europe in the Netherlands, Political Parties, The 
Hague, June 2007, p.22, figure 3 and 4, p.22-26. 
1352 Ibid.  
1353 WRR, Scientific Council for Government Policy, Europe in the Netherlands, Political Parties, The 
Hague, June 2007, p.22, figure 3 and 4, p.22-26. 
1354 Ibid. p.23. 
1355 The European Election Database: 
http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/country/netherlands/parties.html 
1356 Kanne, 2011: 31. 
1357 Ibid, 243.	
1358 Next to being an anti-Islam party during these elections, it was also already an anti EU party (see also 
party manifesto 2010. 
1359 PVV, Hun Brussel, ons Nederland, Verkiezingsprogramma 2012-2017. 
1360 Ibid. 
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political union must play an important role in the formation of the new world order.1361 
In the current cabinet it is a member of the opposition. 
SP: The Socialist Party defends values based upon human dignity, equality and 
solidarity. Its core principles are employment, social welfare, and investing in 
education, public safety and healthcare.1362 The SP is against the privatisation of public 
services and has a critical position regarding further EU integration, because it considers 
Europe to be mainly a neoliberal project.1363  In 2010 and 2012 it had 15 seats in 
Parliament.  
D66: The Democratic Party (founded in 1966) is known as a progressive-liberal and 
radical-democratic party.1364 This left-liberal party supports further EU integration. In 
its view, the EU member states have a cultural unity and share the same values.1365 In 
2010 it had 10 seats and in 2012, it had 12. 
GL: Green Left has democracy, respect for the environment, social justice and 
international solidarity as its main political principles1366. In 2010 it had 10 seats which 
fell to four in 2012. The Green Left party is one of the most willing parties to shift 
national sovereignty to the European level.1367  
CU: The Christian Union is an orthodox reformed political party, combining 
conservative values on ethical and social issues with a more centre-left view on 
economic and environmental questions.1368 In 2010 and 2012 it had five seats. The CU 
is in favour of economic EU integration, but not political.1369 
PvdD: Party for the Animals claims not to be a single-issue party, but does have animal 
rights and animal welfare as its core values.1370 It had two seats in both the Rutte I and 
																																																								
1361 WRR, Scientific Council for Government Policy, Europe in the Netherlands, Political Parties, The 
Hague, June 2007, p.22, figure 4, p. 22-24 
1362 Ibid. 
1363 WRR, Scientific Council for Government Policy, Europe in the Netherlands, Political Parties, The 
Hague, June 2007, p.22, figure 4. 
1364 Ibid. 
1365 WRR, Scientific Council for Government Policy, Europe in the Netherlands, Political Parties, The 
Hague, June 2007, p.23, figure 4.	
1366 Ibid. 
1367 Ibid. 
1368 Ibid. 
1369 WRR, Scientific Council for Government Policy, Europe in the Netherlands, Political Parties, The 
Hague, June 2007, p.22-24, figure 4. 
1370 Ibid. 
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Rutte II governments. The party is in favour of EU integration, but not until the 
democratic deficit has been solved first.1371 
SGP: This political reformed party is an orthodox Protestant political party. It has had 
two seats in both the 2010 and 2012 governments. Just like the CU, it is in favour of 
economic integration, but no further political integration of the EU.1372 
Composition Committee Infrastructure and Environment and the European Affairs 
Committee in the Netherlands 
Members Committee for Infrastructure and Environment 2010-2012 
Dijksma, S.A.M. (chair)      PvdA  
Gent, W. van         GL  
Snijder-Hazelhoff, J.F. (chair)      VVD 
Slob, A.         CU) 
Haverkamp, M.C.        CDA  
Aptroot, Ch.B.        VVD  
Samsom, D.M.        PvdA 
Jansen, P.F.C.        SP 
Graus, D.J.G.         PVV  
Ouwehand, E.        PvdD 
Rouwe, S. de         CDA  
Bashir, F.         SP  
Mos, R. de         PVV 
Tongeren, L. van        GL  
Monasch, J.S.         PvdA 
Dekken, T.R. van        PvdA 
Dijkgraaf, E.         SGP 
Veldhoven, S. van        D66  
Koolmees, W. (sub-chair)       D66 
Jong, L.W.E. de        PVV 
Leegte, R.W.         VVD 
Caluwé, I.S.H. de        VVD 
Holtackers, M.P.M.        CDA 
 
Members European Affairs Committee 2010-2012 
Van Bommel, H. van (chair)      SP  
Van der Staaij, C.G.       SGP 
Albayrak, N.         PvdA  
Ormel, H.J.         CDA 
Ferrier, K.        CDA  
Eijsink, A.M.C.        PvdA  
Van Dam, M.H.P.        PvdA  
Knops, R.W. (chair)        CDA  																																																								
1371 https://www.partijvoordedieren.nl/standpunt/europese-unie 
1372 WRR, Scientific Council for Government Policy, Europe in the Netherlands, Political Parties, The 
Hague, June 2007, p.22-24, figure 4.	
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De Roon, R., de       PVV  
Jansen, P.F.C.        SP 
Voordewind, J.S.        ChristenUnie  
Ten Broeke, J.H.        VVD  
Ouwehand, E.        PvdD  
Bontes, L.         PVV  
Groot, V.A.         PvdA  
Braakhuis, B.A.M.       Groen Links  
Nieuwenhuizen, C.        VVD  
Schouw, A.G.         D66  
El Fassed, A.        Groen Links 
Hachchi, W.         D66  
Dijkhoff, K.H.D.M.        VVD  
Driessen, J.H.A.        PVV  
De Caluwé, I.S.H.        VVD 
 
Members Committee for Infrastructure and Environment 2012-present 
Dekken, T.R. van (chair)      PvdA 
Gesthuizen, S.M.J.G.        SP 
Graus, D.J.G.         PVV 
Jacobi, L.         PvdA 
Ouwehand, E.        PvdD 
Bashir, F.         SP 
Elias, T.M.Ch.        VVD 
Harbers, M.G.J.        VVD 
Madlener, B.         PVV 
Boer, B.G. de        VVD 
Dekken, T.R. van        PvdA 
Hachchi, W.         D66 
Tongeren, L. van        GL 
Veldhoven, S. van       D66 
Leegte, R.W.         VVD 
Bisschop, R.         SGP 
Dijkstra, R.J.         VVD 
Dik-Faber, R.K.        CU 
Geurts, J.L.         CDA 
Visser, B.         VVD 
Vries, A.A. de        PvdA 
Hoogland, D.         PvdA 
Krol, H.C.M.         50plus 
Cegerek, Y.         PvdA 
Leenders, H.J.M.        PvdA 
Veldman, H.S.        VVD 
Helvert, M.J.F. van        CDA 
 
European Affairs Committee 2012-present 
Azmani, M. (chair)        VVD 
Bommel, H. van        SP 
Omtzigt, P.H.         CDA 
Broeke, J.H. ten        VVD 
Dijk, J.J. van         SP 
Ouwehand, E.        PvdD 
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Pechtold, A.         D66 
Vos, M.L.         PvdA 
Madlener, B.         PVV 
Beertema, H.J.        PVV 
Dijkhoff, K.H.D.M.        VVD 
Klaver, J.F.         GL 
Monasch, J.S.         PvdA 
Schouw, A.G.         D66 
Leegte, R.W.         VVD 
Caluwe, I.S.H. de        VVD 
Klein, N.P.M.         Klein 
Bisschop, R.         SGP 
Maij, M.E.         PvdA 
Rog, M.R.J.         CDA 
Schut-Welkzijn, A.        VVD 
Segers, G.J.M.        CU 
Servaes, M.         PvdA 
Vos, J.C.         PvdA 
Wout, B. van ‘t        VVD 
Vacancy PvdA 
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Appendix V Shadow Pair-wise comparisons   
Partisan composition pair-wise comparison 
The two alternative cases (C1a and C2a) dealt with in Chapter 5 examined the partisan 
composition condition. The Eurosceptic and Lisbon conditions are absent in both cases, 
as the scrutiny of the single party case takes place during the Blair/Brown cabinet (pro-
European) and the multiparty case takes place before 2013.1373 Besides, the NP does not 
make use of a RO. Both cases deal with cod stocks/recovery and this topic is part of the 
wider CFP, which is why it is expected that the NP and the government might have 
opposing views (see for more information on the policy positions of British political 
parties on the CFP in Chapter 5). 
C1a (presence of multi-party condition) takes place during one reading only and can be 
considered non-salient (as there is no separate chapter dedicated to this topic in any of 
the governing party manifestos1374 nor any reference to this topic in the Euro-barometer 
of 20121375). During this case, evidence is expecting to be found showing whether there 
are more or less attempts by the NP to scrutinise its government - as during a multi-
party government there are more opportunities to do so - or whether there is no 
difference between the levels of scrutiny and consequently the measurable impact 
during a multi-party or single party scrutiny of the government.  
C2a (absence of multi-party condition) will be used to find evidence of a case dealing 
with the same topic as C2 (Fisheries) being dealt with by the same Labour single party 
government, with the only difference being that the scrutiny of the draft regulation takes 
place before the Lisbon Treaty has come into force. This is useful, as in the pair-wise 
comparison between C1 and C2, both cases, including C2 (single party), took place 
after the Lisbon Treaty came into force. Neither of these cases makes use of the new 
Lisbon provisions for the NP, such as writing a RO to the EC, which decreases the 
chances of rival explanations. However, it is possible that after the Lisbon Treaty came 
into force, NPs improved the scrutiny of EU legislative files through their governments 
because the Lisbon Treaty worked as some form of incentive adapting NPs’ 																																																								
1373 January 2013 is the date of David Cameron’s Bloomberg speech, which in this research is considered 
to be the start of the Eurosceptic phase of the Conservative party during the Cameron coalition. 
1374 Liberal Democrat Manifesto 2010, Conservative Manifesto 2010. 
1375 Euro-barometer 77 and 78, question 7 (annex).	
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consciousness to make a difference.1376 This pair-wise comparison therefore does not 
only compare C1a to C2a, but also C2 to C2a (see also Chapter 5).  
The multi-party variable is the only varying condition in the comparison between C1a 
and C2a and the Lisbon Treaty is the only varying condition in the pair-wise 
comparison between C2 and C2a. It is therefore important to emphasise that even 
though the OLP procedure was introduced with the Lisbon Treaty, replacing the COD 
procedure, the scrutiny during this previous procedure still took place over several steps 
whereby the NP had several stages during which it had a chance to use its formal 
powers either ex ante or ex post Council meetings. This depends on whether the NP 
could be considered a NP forming part of a delegatory model or being part of a 
trusteeship model. Out of consistency, the same 7-step model has been followed in this 
case, even if being dealt with before the Lisbon Treaty has come into force. 
C1A The draft regulation establishing a long-term plan for cod stocks and the 
fisheries exploiting those stocks (COM(2012)211377) 
Background of the proposal 
Since the introduction of the conservation policy into the CFP in 1983, in particular the 
stocks of cod in EU waters have led to levels of concern. As a consequence, the EC 
published a new regulation in order to ensure that cod stocks are exploited on the basis 
of the maximum sustainable yield and, in order to reach these levels, the EC suggests 
the introduction of rules for establishing the total allowable catch (TAC) and maximum 
fishing effort.1378 This proposal replaces the previous regulation of 2008 regarding cod 
stocks.  
Step one: Publication 
Publication  31st January 2012 and is deposited in the HC on 7th 
February 20121379.  
Step two: Subsidiarity deadline: 27th March 2012.  
																																																								
1376 Kiiver, 2012:47. 
1377 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/HIS/?uri=celex:52012AE0835 
1378 HC ESC, 64th Report, 25th April 2012.  
1379 On the website of both EUR-Lex and IPEX (the platform for EU Inter-parliamentary Exchange) it 
mentions the 31st January 2012 as the transmission date.		
	 307	
The HC has no objections against the publication of this EU legislative proposal.  
Step three: First ex ante influence phase. 
20th February 2012 Publication EM1380 by the government (first 
government position) (standard use of formal 
powers in the sense of reception of information by 
government).1381  
DEFRA shows in its EM that it agrees with the proposal and that it is appropriate to 
adjust the biological reference levels, fishing mortality rates and spawning stock 
biomass in accordance with scientific advice to be dealt with in a delegated act. 
However, according to government, giving the EU the powers to adjust fishing efforts 
in certain circumstances would be an essential element of a recovery plan and therefore 
not eligible for a delegated act.1382  
Earlier in March the proposal was discussed in a working group, during which most 
member states rejected the proposal, with the UK noting that the effort elements did not 
qualify as non-essential, and that the EC had not put forward most of the substantive 
changes as required by the Member States. The EM furthermore mentions the technical 
meeting of 20th March which was organised in order to discuss the nature of those 
changes which are a priority for the UK. 1383 
25th April 2012:   ESC meeting 
The ESC sees a parallel with the recently discussed recovery plan for the West of 
Scotland herring on which it reported. For that reason, the ESC decides not to draw the 
current draft regulation to the attention of the HC, but it clears the scrutiny for this 
document.1384 The HC does not have the intention to impact the government’s EU 
position in this case. 
11th June 2013 Adoption of regulation in the first reading.  
																																																								
1380 DEFRA EM on COM(2012)21, 20th February 2012, 13745/12.  
1381 HC ESC, 64th Report, 25th April 2012, p.32.  
1382 Ibid., p.33. 
1383 Ibid., p.34. 
1384 Ibid.	
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Member States agree to set up 
multi-annual management plans to 
check the stocks in the future.  
Concluding remarks 
When comparing the current case to C1 during which the NP scrutinises the government 
on an EU legislative file in the same field (fisheries), it is evident that in C1 (multi-
party), the HC is clearly much more active and uses more than its standard formal 
powers than in C2 (single party), and even less in C1a (multi-party). In the reform of the 
CFP in C1, there is apparently more for MPs to use their powers on. This leads to the 
preliminary conclusion that salience is more important than the number of parties in 
government. In C1, which dealt with the general reform of the CFP, there was clearly 
more at stake for MPs to work on than on C1a (multi-party) and C2 (single party).  
Interviews confirm that there was much more at stake in the files on the reform of the 
CFP than in the case about cod stocks.1385  
C2 also deals with a reform of the CFP, but this regulation is more focused on the 
control of the CFP and not so much on its whole reform , such as in C1.  
In C1a, it appears from all parties involved (EC, Council, EP, NP) that there is not a lot 
to say about this topic. The draft regulation is adopted without much discussion after 
only one meeting. This means that the partisan composition variable is less decisive in 
determining the parliamentary use of formal powers than the contents (i.e. the salience) 
of the topic. The HC uses more formal powers if there is more at stake (C1) and it will 
not use its formal powers if there is not much to influence, as the EC, the Council and 
government themselves do not pay much attention to it (C1a). In other words, whereas 
the theoretical argument expected an increase in the use of formal powers if the 
government consists of various parties, this is not reflected in the analysis of the 
process-tracing of this case.   
Measurable impact 
Interviews confirm that no informal influence had taken place in this case and that the 
EM was drafted based upon the position of the government (not anticipating the 																																																								
1385 Benyon, 25th June 2015, Smith, 2nd July 2015, Rees-Mogg, 22nd June 2015. 
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position in the NP)1386. As there were no attempts by MPs to influence this EU 
legislative file and the government has not made any changes to its viewpoint as a 
consequence of the NP’s position, the impact in this EU legislative file can be 
considered to be weak. As the NP believes that the government knows its position in 
this case (it had recently dealt with a similar one), it gives the government full freedom 
to act according to its own judgement, even knowing that the government consists of 
various parties.  
Case 2a: The EU draft regulation regarding the cod recovery (COM(2008)1621387) 
Step 1: Publication  
Publication 2nd of April 2008 and is deposited in the ESC on 
fourth of April 2008.  
Step 2: Not applicable 
Step 3: First ex ante influence phase 
No evidence is found of any use of formal powers at this stage, which confirms the 
causal mechanism. The NP trusts the government to make its own judgement and does 
not receive any information or raise any questions about this topic. This is as expected 
and confirms my causal mechanism at this stage.  
Step 4: First ex post control phase  
14th April 2008 Council meeting regarding the Cod Recovery 
proposal.1388  
25th April 2008  EM1389 government (first position). 
The UK government argues that there are good reasons for improving the operation of 
the cod recovery mechanism, since most of the stocks in question are still showing 
insufficient signs of recovery. The government therefore supports the EC’s proposals, 
as they largely reflect the broad conclusions reached at a symposium in March 2007 led 																																																								
1386 Benyon, 25th June 2015, Smith, 2nd July 2015.	
1387 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52008SC0389 
1388 Council Press Release, 2862nd Council meeting, Agriculture and Fisheries, Luxembourg, 14th April 
2008. 
1389 HC ESC, 23rd Report of session 2007-2008, 14th May 2008.	
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by the Regional Advisory Council, and in particular the simplified regional approach to 
management.1390 
30th April 2008  Ministerial statement with feedback from the 
Fisheries Council of 14th April 2008.1391  
14th May 2008  Meeting ESC  and publication of first report in 
this field. 
The ESC concludes that it recognises the government’s support for the cod recovery 
proposals, but notes its reservations vis-à-vis a number of issues, and therefore the ESC 
decides to draw the document to the attention of the House.1392 It feels it would be 
sensible to await for the assessment before taking a firm view on its future handling.1393 
The EC thereby asks the government for one clarification:  
‘The Commission has referred in its Explanatory Memorandum to the need 
to introduce new mechanisms to encourage fishermen to engage in cod-
avoidance programmes so as to reduce the level of discards. However, it is 
not clear to us from its proposal, or from the Explanatory Memorandum 
provided by the Minister, whether or how those measures are covered by the 
proposal (and, if not, what further steps the Commission envisages to tackle 
this long-standing problem). We would welcome the Minister's comments on 
this.’1394 
Step 5: Second ex ante influence phase 
No evidence found. 
Step 6: Second ex post control phase 
29th September 2008  Second debate in the Council takes place.1395  
																																																								
1390 Ibid. 
1391 HC, plenary, written Ministerial Statement, plenary 30th April 2008. 
1392 HC ESC, 23rd Report, 14th May 2008. 
1393 Ibid. 
1394 Ibid.	
1395 Press Release, 2892nd meeting of the Council Agriculture and fisheries, Brussels, 29-30th September 
2008 
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10th November 2008 Mr Huw Irranca-Davies, Minister DEFRA, sent a 
letter to the HC: 
Government expects a revised plan to be agreed at the meeting of the Agriculture and 
Fisheries Council on 18-20th November.1396 The Minister asks the ESC to release 
scrutiny. The letter is accompanied by an IA.1397  
Extra step: Ex ante influence phase  
12th November 2008  ESC meeting discussion of the Cod recovery 
plan.1398  
The meeting focuses thereby mainly on procedural issues, like the late arrival of 
DEFRA’s letter which arrived only a day before the meeting of the ESC.1399 Therefore, 
it was impossible for the ESC to deal with the matter then; any such consideration thus 
having to be delayed until after the Council meeting. No evidence of the use of formal 
powers is found other than the standard ESC meeting including the published report.  
Extra ex post control phase 
18th November 2008  Fisheries Council agreement on the Cod Recovery 
plan.1400  
22nd November 2008  DEFRA letter to the HC to inform it on the 
outcome of the Fisheries Council meeting: 
‘… [A] package of measures was agreed during Council last week, which 
the Government believes will significantly enhance the prospects for stock 
recovery (and which the UK supported on the grounds that it had been able 
to secure a number of changes to reflect its concerns) …’1401 
																																																								
1396 HC ESC, fortieth report of session 2007-2008, 26th November 2008.  
1397 Ibid. 
1398 HC ESC, Thirty-Ninth Report, 12th November 2008. 
1399 Ibid. 
1400 Press Release, 2904th meeting of the Council Agriculture and fisheries, Brussels, 18-20th  November 
2008.	
1401 HC ESC, Fortieth Report, 26th November 2008. 
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The Minister also referred to the poor feedback it has given the NP during this case, 
which has challenged MPs to fully scrutinise government.1402 
The Minister accepts that the circumstances under which the Government sought 
clearance were "far from ideal", and he says that "important lessons" have been noted. 
He also apologises for having given insufficient time to consider the IA on the proposal 
before the November Council, adding that the delay was caused by the difficulties of 
gaining the necessary information from the industry on the potential impacts of the new 
regime. Also, in expressing regret at having overridden the scrutiny process, he says 
that this was necessary in order that the UK should not have been put at a negotiating 
disadvantage. 1403 
26th November 2008  ESC has a meeting: the NP still cannot clear the 
document, as there are still a number of 
outstanding issues, including those mentioned in 
the letter of the Minister of 22nd November 
2008.1404 The ESC Argued: 
‘We are therefore recommending the document for debate in the European 
Committee. In doing so, we are also conscious that the Commission has now 
put forward its wider proposals on the total allowable catches for 2009, 
although we have yet to receive an Explanatory Memorandum on these, 
making it unlikely that any debate on them could be held before decisions are 
taken at next month's Fisheries Council. That being so, it would be our 
intention, once we eventually consider those proposals, to recommend that 
they too should be debated in European Committee, albeit after the Council 
has taken a decision, and we think it might be sensible if any such debate 
were to be combined with the one we are now recommending on the cod 
recovery plan.’1405 
The ESC is thereby explicit that it does not want its use of formal powers to be lost, but 
shows how they can be included in the Government’s input into EU policies more 
generally. 																																																								
1402 Ibid. 
1403 Ibid. 
1404 Ibid.	
1405 Ibid. 
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Step 7: Adoption by Council 
18th December 2008  Council adopts the Cod Recovery Plan. The plan 
covers different types of cods, but excludes the cod 
in the Celtic Sea, although it will received 
increased attention.1406 New mechanisms were 
introduced to encourage fishermen to engage in 
avoiding discards.1407 
Concluding remarks 
Parliamentary activity is limited to asking for clarifications in this case and referring it 
to a European Committee. The NP does not make an active attempt to change the 
government’s position. It is possible that the late publication of the IA by government 
prevented the HC from using its formal powers. When comparing the scrutiny of this 
case to the scrutiny of C1A (multi-party government), the use of formal powers is 
higher in C2A, and therefore one can rule out the single party government as the 
variable that leads to little parliamentary activity.  
Interviewees argued that the topic of the CFP in 2009 may not have received as much 
attention because many MPs were not really alarmed about the issue of EU fisheries at 
that time.1408 
During the other steps of the process, all causal mechanisms are confirmed, in the same 
way as during C2 and the Lisbon provisions can therefore confidently be ruled out from 
having influenced the causal mechanisms during this process. Both in C2 (post-Lisbon) 
and C2a (pre-Lisbon) the same causal steps took place during the scrutiny of the single-
party government.  
In other words, the theoretical argument set out the expectation that the NP is more 
likely to increase the use of formal powers when scrutinising a multi-party government 
as opposed to a single party administration and that it is more likely to impact the 
government’s EU policy position is not reflected in the pair-wise comparison between 
C1 and C2 or in the comparison between C1a and C2a.  																																																								
1406 Press Release, 2904th meeting of the Council Agriculture and fisheries, Brussels, 18-20th  November 
2008.	
1407 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52008AP0487&rid=1 
1408 Benyon, 25th June 2015, Hopkins, 30th June, 2015. 
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Besides, when cross-comparing these files, namely when comparing C1 to C1a (both 
multi-party governments) and C2 to C2a  (both single party governments) it is evident 
that it is not the varying number of parties that increases the use of formal powers, but 
the contents of the topic. Salience, in other words is at work here.  
Measurable impact 
The NP did not make any attempts to change the government’s position and the impact 
can be considered weak here. This is partly a consequence of the timings of scrutiny. 
The HC realises that there is not enough time to refer the file for discussion to the 
European Committee A before the meeting in the Council takes place, but it continues 
doing so anyway, expecting that it will be able to influence and control the  government 
in future EU legislative files about similar topics.  
Euro-scepticism pair-wise comparison  
The next two cases examine the Eurosceptic condition. The multiparty, the salient and 
the Lisbon conditions are constant in the sense that these conditions are similar in both 
cases (they both deal with a multi-party government and non-salient case which takes 
place post-Lisbon), and the pair-wise comparison will compare this case to one where 
only the Eurosceptic condition varies. C3a looks into the scrutiny of an EU legislative 
file, the Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP), which took place during the Rutte I coalition 
cabinet (depending on the support of a Eurosceptic party). C4a is one during which the 
Dutch SC scrutinises the Rutte II coalition (without Eurosceptic support), dealing with a 
case of similar non-salience as C3a, namely the Regulation on Port State Control.1409 
The topics are considered to be of no salience to the electorate, as none of the party 
manifestos1410 of the political parties in government refer to the topic and it does not 
appear to be a concern for European citizens, based upon the Euro-barometer in 
20101411 and 20121412.  
Case 3A The EU Integrated Maritime Policy (COM(2010)04941413) 
																																																								
1409 This case is the same case 8, as the selection of variables are similar (presence of multi-party, non-
Eurosceptic government, non salient and no use of a RO). 
1410VVD Partij-programma 2010-2014, CDA Partijprogramma 2010-2015, Party for Freedom Manifesto, 
Partij-programma 2010-2015. 
1411 Standard Euro-barometer 73 and 74, annex question 7. 
1412 Standard Euro-barometer 77, July 2012, and Standard Euro-barometer 78, December 2012.	
1413 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52010PC0494 
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Policy Positions on EU Maritime Policy 
Although EU maritime policy is not one that MPs can win many votes on1414, it is 
expected that in this particular case, there will be disagreements between the coalition 
partners and between the NP and government.1415 This is mainly because of the 
financial implications of the proposal and several political parties feel that they cannot 
spend any more money on the EU and would resist increasing their annual budgetary 
contributions (such as the coalition parties VVD, CDA and PVV). The two main 
coalition partners (VVD and CDA) have, on the other hand, no objections to the EU 
dealing with this topic as such, as long as it does not imply contributing more money to 
the EU1416, whereas the PVV does not want the EU to intervene with any policy at 
all.1417 Then there is the opposition, of which some parties are likely to want to go 
further on EU issues and would support the EU to take these topics on board, even if 
this would mean an increase in the budget, like D66 and Green Left.1418   
Background EC proposal 
In 2007 the EC published a first plan for an IMP for the EU. In 2009, it published an 
action plan to further elaborate the EU maritime policy. One of the problems in setting 
up a proper EU maritime policy is the lack of financial resources. For that reason, the 
Council for General Affairs has requested the EC come up with proposals to enable the 
financing of the maritime policy. For that reason, the EC has published this draft 
regulation to establish a programme to support a further development of the integrated 
maritime policy. The proposal establishes, amongst others, the programme’s general 
and specific objectives, the actions that will receive finance and the possible ways to 
finance. Besides, the proposal suggests the setting up of an advisory council to assess 
the annual work programmes.1419  
Step 1: 
29th September 2010  Publication EU legislative proposal. 
																																																								
1414 As explained in the introduction of this case, it does not appear in any of the 2010 party manifestos or 
any of the Barometers of 2009 and 2010. 
1415 For more information on the views of Dutch political parties on EU Maritime policies, see Chapter 7. 
1416 Regeerakkoord VVD-CDA, Vrijheid en Verantwoordelijkheid, 2010, p.7. 
1417 PVV, De agenda van hoop en optimisme Een tijd om te kiezen: PVV 2010-2015, p.15. 
1418 Kanne: 2011, p.249.	
1419 TK, 22 112, nr. 1082, 8th November 2010. 
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Step 2: 
25th November 2010 Deadline RO, none have been sent. 
Step 3: First ex ante influence phase 
8th November 2010 Publication governmental EM (first government 
position).  
The Dutch government expresses its support for the EC proposals to further develop 
and execute the IMP. What plays a role, therefore, are the possible chances for Dutch 
knowledge institutions to make money from the EU programmes. However, the 
government is of the opinion that an early ex ante evaluation and better foundation of 
the proposal is crucial to be able to make a better estimate of the financial 
consequences. So far, the programme will cost approximately €50 million, of which the 
Dutch government would pay €2.5 million.1420  
10th June 2011 Letter by Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. 
Rosenthal, with the agenda of the Council for 
General Affairs which will take place on 21st June 
2011.1421 
16th June 2011  Meeting between ESC and the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, Rosenthal, to discuss the Council for 
General Affairs of 21st June 2011, but no reference 
is made to the IMP.1422 
Step 4: First ex post control phase 
21st June 2011 Council meeting to discuss IMP  
No feedback is found on the outcome of this Council meeting.1423 
Step 5: Second ex ante influence phase 
																																																								
1420 Ibid.  
1421 TK, 21 501-02, nr. 1070, 10th June 2011.		
1422 TK, 21 501-02, nr. 1077, 19th July 2011. 
1423 TK, 21 501-02, nr. 1077-, 19th July 2011. 
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21st September 2011 Letter from Atsma, I&E Minister regarding the 
agenda of the Informal Council meeting about the 
IMP taking place on 8th October 2012, including a 
copy of the declaration which will be signed during 
the Council meeting.1424  
The Dutch government supports the general approach of this agenda and is in favour of 
giving sustainable economic development combined with employment a central place 
on the agenda for the Integrated Maritime Policy. It requests, however, that more 
attention be paid to sustainable energy, food supplies and transport.1425 
On 27th September 2011  Letter from NP to Minister about IMP who 
responds to them by letter as well.1426 This is the 
first position of the NP. 
The Social Democrat fraction (PvdA, opposition) is of the opinion that EU decisions 
will be taken in the field of obtaining energy from the sea. The oil prices will remain 
high. The members of the Social Democrat party plead for a ‘power point’ in the sea. 
This does not only mean placing many windmills to gain energy for millions of 
households, but also the connections of power networks between those countries 
bordering the North Sea.  
The Christian Democrats (CDA, coalition partner), however, would like the Minister to 
clarify some of the agenda points for the informal Council meeting of 8th October 2011. 
It wants to know what the consequences of the execution of this agenda will be for any 
Dutch players in the Maritime sector. The CDA also asks whether the Minister will 
suggest other innovative fishing methods during the informal Council meeting.   
The members of the Party for the Animals (PvdD, opposition) are disappointed that the 
current approach in Maritime Policy is only driven by economic interests in this field 
and not by the ecosystem approach. It therefore cannot sign the joint declaration and the 
agenda for ‘growth and employment’. 1427 
The Minister, Mr Atsma, replies to the different questions of the SC.  																																																								
1424 Ministerie van I&M, Letter by the Minister of Infrastructure and Environment, J. Atsma, 21st 
September 2012. 
1425 Ibid. 
1426 TK, 22 112, nr, 1495, 23rd October 2012.	
1427 Ibid., p.3-5. 
	 318	
On the questions from the PvdA he says that the Netherlands undertakes many activities 
in the field of wind energy and electricity in the North Sea. As examples, he mentions 
the Green Deal with Dutch Wind energy Association (NWEA) to propose new 
legislation in the field of wind energy before 2015.1428  
With regard to the question of the CDA which asks for further specifics regarding the 
agenda and consequences for the Dutch Maritime sector, Minister Atsma responds that 
all issues on the agenda of the informal council will be discussed. The declaration to be 
signed in the field of EU maritime policy emphasises the importance of an efficient 
policy to develop a ‘blue economy’ which would need to reduce all kinds of 
administrative burdens in the maritime sector.1429  
Atsma continues to respond to the questions of the Party for the Animals (PvdD). He 
explains that the emphasis of the IMP is on sustainable economic growth, as the current 
economic situation in the EU is one that needs a quick and efficient recovery.  
He furthermore reassures the PvdD that he requests a widening of the possibilities to 
improve animal welfare and animal health.1430 
Step 6: Second ex post control phase 
8th October 2011  Informal Council about IMP. 
23rd October 2011  Letter from government to NP about the outcome 
of the informal Council meeting of 8th October 
2012 regarding the Integrated Maritime Policy.1431  
Step 7: Adoption 
24th November 2011 Adoption of IMP, which include some broad 
recommendations in the field of economic 
development, employment and environmental 
protection through fostering integrated maritime 
and coastal affairs. No specific recommendations 																																																								
1428 Ibid., p. 6-10. 
1429 Ibid., p.6-10.	
1430 Ibid. 
1431 Ibid. 	
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are included in the field of obtaining energy from 
the sea.1432 
 
Concluding remarks 
It takes the NP some time to become active regarding this file and not one parliamentary 
meeting takes place to discuss the item, but during the second stage of ex ante influence 
and ex post control of the OLP, the NP does feel the need to use its formal powers on 
this. However, this contradicts the expected causal process whereby it was expected that 
the scrutiny of an EU legislative file during a coalition government depending on a 
Eurosceptic party would lead to higher chances of impact for the NP. The analysis of 
the process-tracing confirms the outcome of the analysis of C3, that the dependence on 
a Eurosceptic party by the government does not necessarily create more opportunities 
for the NP to have an impact on their government’s EU policy position.  
Measurable impact 
Only during step 5, the second ex ante influence phase, does the NP increase the use of 
formal powers. It does so by asking questions in a letter sent to the responsible Minister, 
but without a clear aim of trying to impact the government position. This is the only 
occasion during which the NP uses its formal powers, and it only does so via a letter to 
which the government responds by offering information and showing no signs of 
changing its position. Interviews confirmed that the NP did not make use of informal 
types of influence in this case and the EM of the government was written based upon 
the position of the coalition partners without anticipating what the position of the NP 
would be.1433  
During the scrutiny process the NP showed some positions (though via individual party 
comments, not a joint position): the IMP should have a stronger focus on obtaining 
energy from the sea, like windmills and protecting animal welfare. It thereby clearly had 
an intention of controlling the government’s input to the Council.  
																																																								
1432	Press Release, 3127th meeting of the Council of Transport, Telecommunication and Energy, 24th 
November 2011. 
1433	Atsma, 29th May 2015, Abspoel, 3rd June 2015. 
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Of these, none of the contributions have at any point been reflected in the government’s 
position, even though it was the intention of the SC to have an impact. The impact of 
this case can therefore be considered weak.  
Case 4A: The EU draft regulation regarding port services (COM(2013)2961434) 
Background EU proposal 
The regulation applies to all ports of the Trans European Network for Transport (TEN-
T), which together are responsible for more than 90% of all forms of sea transport. It 
deals with ports management, pilots, towing, mooring, dredging and terminal services 
(goods and passengers). The regulation sets up a framework for access to the market for 
port services and requires the transparent financing of ports.  
The harbour manager is allowed to set minimum standards to the service provider and 
can limit the number of providers of a specific service only in the case that there is not 
enough space.  
National supervisors are required to exchange information to ensure the uniform 
implementation of the regulation. Member states must set up sanctions for those who 
violate the rules and they have to ensure their execution. The topic of the labour market 
in seaports will be left to social dialogue for the time being. This regulation will not 
harm the social and labour laws of the member states.1435  
Step 1: Publication 
23rd May 2013  Publication of the draft legislative proposal. 
Step 2: NPs given eight weeks to oppose the EU legislative proposal 
30th July 2013 RO deadline. 
Many NPs decide to indeed send a RO about this1436, but the Dutch Second and First 
Chamber decide not to do so.  
																																																								
1434 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/procedure/EN/202670	
1435 TK, 22 112 33 677, 14th June 2013. 
1436 French National Assembly, Italian Senate, Saeima Parliament of Latvia, Polish Sejm, Spanish Cortes 
Generales and Swedish Parliament. 
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14th June 2013 Publication of EM1437 (initial governmental 
position). 
The Dutch government supports the application of the freedom of services, also in 
ports. This draft regulation offers sufficient space to continue the ways in which the 
Netherlands has executed these services in its harbours. The regulation suggests making 
financial transparency compulsory. The Dutch government agrees that this is a 
condition, although not yet sufficient to tackle state aid, which could have a distorting 
effect on competition. The Netherlands will support this proposal as long as the current 
commercial freedom of port managers can continue and as long as the current Dutch 
harbour policies, which have proven to be successful, will not be affected1438.  
5th September 2013  Meeting government (including Secretary of State, 
Schulz (VVD), and I&E Committee. First 
expression of the parliamentary views on this file. 
During this meeting, Mr De Vries (PvdA1439, coalition partner) argues that his fraction 
is positive about the ways in which the government approached Port regulation in its 
EM. However, according to the PvdA, the marginal comments made by the government 
on the draft regulation could be broadened a lot wider.1440  
The Social Democrat fraction is furthermore worried about attempts by the EC in this 
draft regulation to put forward proposals for liberalisation in ports, even in areas that are 
part of semi-public services. In the Netherlands, there exists a sort of concession system 
with free access. The concession must guarantee quality and availability. This system 
works well.1441  
The Dutch government writes in its EM that the pilot services do not form part of the 
regulation. Mr De Vries would like to know why the Secretary of State thinks so and 
why she does not further investigate whether this is really true.1442  
According to De Vries, labour law has previously been an issue in another European 
Ports directive. Although this has been kept outside the current regulation, the PvdA 																																																								
1437 TK, 22 112 33 677, 14th June 2013.	
1438 Ibid.  
1439 Social Democrats. 
1440 TK, 22 112 33 677, 5th September 2013, p.2-3. 
1441 Ibid. 
1442 Ibid. 
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does note that there are some issues with the labour law of seamen and asks the 
Secretary of State to keep actively following any developments in this field. The PvdA 
will ask parliamentary questions about this matter in due course.1443 The issue of labour 
law is not part of the government’s initial position. 
Mrs De Boer (VVD, liberal, coalition partner) is of the opinion that the EC should focus 
much more on unequal competition instead of the regulation of ports internally.1444 The 
VVD does support the government approach as explained in its EM, but does have a 
few comments and questions. The VVD thinks the focus should be much more on 
competition between ports. The current proposal, however, is too focused on 
compensation for the use of infrastructure which should be set up by port managers. 
This is something that should not be regulated when the markets between ports are 
opened. Ports can only compete if there is no such regulation.  
Mrs De Boer adds that contrary to Mr. De Vries (PvdA), she does not agree that labour 
issues of seamen should be regulated at EU level. The VVD is therefore happy that 
these issues are excluded from the regulation.1445 She also asks the government to send 
a copy of the concept agreement before the negotiations take place in the Council to the 
SC, both during the first and the second reading.1446 Besides this, it asks that the 
government keep it informed every term/half year, depending on what is on the agenda.  
Mr De Rouwe (CDA1447, opposition party) mentions that the EU is very much focused 
on details. However, particularly in this field, it is important to stress the importance of 
international competition. Previous proposals from the EC in this field (2007) were 
more focused on transparency and access to markets, but the EC has admitted as well 
that these plans never worked and had an adverse effect. The CDA therefore wonders 
whether these decisions can be reversed.1448  
Bashir (SP1449, opposition party) would like to know whether this regulation has any 
consequences for the pilot service and if so, what the consequences will be.1450 
According to the Socialist Party, this should remain as it is, as the services offered by 																																																								
1443 Ibid., p.2-3. 
1444 Ibid., p.3-4.	
1445 Ibid. 
1446 Ibid. 
1447 Christian Democrats. 
1448 TK, 22 112 33 677, 5th September 2013, p.4-5. 
1449 Socialist party. 
1450 TK, 22 112 33 677, 5th September 2013, p.5-6. 
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the pilot service are not suitable for competition. This concerns a public service. Bashir 
asks the Secretary of State to give a reaction. He furthermore asks the Secretary of State 
how to promote the transport of goods during short distances over sea (‘short sea 
shipping).1451 
Bashir asks why the Dutch government supports the necessity of this regulation instead 
of, for example, a directive. A directive would give the member state more freedom to 
implement new agreements according to its own circumstances.  
Mrs Schultz, the Secretary of State replies to the contributions of the MPs. She argues 
that the government welcomes the draft regulation, but that it is also hugely critical of 
it.1452 
Schultz continues to answer the questions of individual MPs:  
‘Mr Bashir asked about the real issue of this regulation. There is a difference 
between our ports, which are completely financially self-supporting without 
any financial support of the government, and there are ports which still need 
a contribution.’1453 
Most of her concerns are similar to those mentioned by the MPs in the I&E 
Committee.1454 The Dutch government will try to deal with these issues. Schultz also 
responds to the request made by De Boer (VVD, coalition partner) to keep the SC 
informed and agrees to the list of requirements by the SC. She also mentions that the 
EC will set up some guidelines in this field to deal with state aid.1455  
Mr De Rouwe (CDA, opposition) responds that these guidelines should be integrated in 
the regulation and asks the Secretary of State to request the same.1456 Mrs Schultz 
responds that the Dutch government will ask that both the regulation and guidelines be 
in line with each other. There will be no time to have them included in the draft 
regulation.1457 
																																																								
1451 Ibid.	
1452 Ibid., 6-8. 
1453 Ibid. 
1454 Ibid., 6-8. 
1455 Ibid. 
1456 Ibid. 
1457 Ibid., 8.	
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Mr De Vries (PvdA coalition partner) explains the state aid issues which affect the 
southern ports in the Netherlands, pointing out that those in Belgium receive much 
financial funding. Dutch ports have to compete with this. It cannot be solved with 
guidelines, but should be laid down in a proper regulation.1458 
Mrs Schultz responds that issues, such as financial transparency needs to be laid down 
in the regulation and be uniformly applied across all EU member states. With regard to 
the state aid rules, this will be examined from a wider angle.1459  
Step 3: First ex ante influence phase 
15th November 2013 Government sent the agenda for the next Transport 
Council (5th December 2013).1460  
28th November 2013  Meeting takes place between the I&E Committee, 
the EAC, Secretary of State, Mrs. Schultz, and 
Minister Van Mansveld.1461   
During this meeting the Ports regulation is discussed as well. Mrs Kuiken (PvdA, 
coalition partner) emphasises that the PvdA can only support an EU ports directive if 
the commercial freedom of port service provision continues to exist. According to 
Kuiken, this is important for the monopoly of the pilotage service.1462  
Mrs Schulz responds:  
‘In my opinion, we will support and maintain this monopoly of the pilotage 
service, which is an example for the rest of the EU. It is supervised by the 
ACM, which determines its tariffs. I will plead to continue with this 
arrangement. The opinion of the EP in this field goes in the right direction. 
The discussions on the contents of the regulation have not yet started, but I 
will show that this is what we want.’1463  
Step 4: First ex post control phase 
																																																								
1458 Ibid. 
1459 Ibid. 
1460 TK, 21 501-33, nr. 445, Brief van de Minister van I&M, 15th November 2013.  
1461 TK, 21 501-33, nr. 459, 27th January 2014. 
1462 Ibid., 7. 
1463 Ibid., 10.	
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5th December 2013 Council meeting. 
No feedback on the Ports regulation is given. 
Step 5: Second ex ante influence phase 
20th May 2014 Letter from government to NP with Agenda of next 
Transport Council to be held on 5th June 2014. 
28th May 2014  Meeting between NP and I&E Minister, Mrs 
Mansveld to discuss the next Transport Council to 
take place on 5th June 2014.  
During this meeting, various references are made to the Ports Regulation.1464  
Mrs Visser (VVD, coalition partner) shows her support for the Dutch government’s 
position in this field. She asks the Minister, however, what will happen with the 
amendments and how likely it will be that those that focus on less administrative 
burdens will be accepted.1465 She also stresses the importance of continuing to push for 
guidelines for state aid, as some member states, including the Italian EU Presidency, 
have different views on this.1466 
The Minister, Mrs Mansveld, reacts to this and mentions that during the previous Greek 
EU Presidency no real discussions about the contents of the ports regulation took 
place.1467 However, she expects that the amendments in the field of the pilotage service 
provision and its supervision will be accepted.1468 With regard to the guidelines in the 
field of state aid, Mrs Mansveld says that these guidelines will not be part of the Ports 
regulation, but that the EC will publish some guidelines in this field at a later stage. 1469 
 
Step 6: Second ex post control phase 
5th June 2014  Transport Council. 
  
4th July 2014  Letter government to NP. 
 
It also updates on the Ports regulation:  																																																								
1464 TK, 21 501-33, nr. 495, 31st July 2014. 
1465 Ibid., 8. 
1466 Ibid. 
1467 Ibid., 17. 
1468 Ibid., 17. 
1469 Ibid., 17.	
	 326	
‘The Council has taken note of the progress report … EU Commissioner 
Kallas stressed the importance of efficient seaports for growth and jobs and 
he expressed the wish for more transparency in the sector. He argued that he 
hoped that the Council would reach an agreement on this regulation during 
the Italian EU Presidency.’1470 
Extra ex ante influence phase 
18th September 2014 Letter government to NP regarding the Transport 
Council meeting of 8th December 2014.1471 
30th September 2014  Meeting government and NP (EAC and I&E 
Committee) 
Bashir (SP, opposition) asks what kind of objections other EU member states have 
regarding this regulation, as it has not been positively received in many member 
states.1472 Bashir also seeks to know whether in general member states are in favour of 
opening up the market to the pilotage services. The SP is of the opinion that this should 
not happen and hope that the government will oppose this idea.1473 
Mrs De Boer (VVD, coalition partner) also refers to the Ports directive. The VVD will 
support the position of the government in this, but would like to know what will be 
discussed in this area during the Transport Council.1474 She also asks for clarification in 
the field of dredgers and the position of pilots.1475 
Mr Hoogland (PvdA, coalition partner) also requests clarification about the pilotage 
service provision and whether the Dutch government can protect this against the open 
market.1476 It furthermore stresses the importance of a European level playing field in 
this regulation. At the moment there are many inequalities between European ports.1477 
Schultz replies:  
																																																								
1470 TK, 21 501 33, nr.494, 4th July 2014.  
1471 TK, 21501-33, Nr 500, 18th September 2014. 
1472 Ibid. 
1473 TK, 21 501-33, nr. 512, 11th November 2014, p.4. 
1474 Ibid., 6. 
1475 Ibid.	
1476 Ibid. 
1477 Ibid. 
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‘During our meeting of September 2013, the SC showed me their concerns. 
All these concerns seem to have been solved by now. The Dutch arrangement 
of pilotage services is protected. Freedom of services in Dutch ports is a fact, 
with the exception of the pilotage service. The Dutch government does 
support the current version of the regulation and it happy that this remains a 
regulation and will not become a directive, as this allows us to have a 
separate arrangement for the pilot service. In the regulation the EC is asked 
to come up with some guidelines in the field of state aid. We are on top of 
that.’1478  
Extra ex post control phase 
8th October 2014  Transport Council 
3rd November 2014  Report from the government to the NP with an 
update on the Transport Council:1479  
‘The Italian EU president stressed that a specific condition was added that 
public finance in all cases should be clearly traceable in bookkeeping. 
Finland and the Netherlands regretted the weakening of transparency rules, 
which increases the risk of abuse. In a written declaration together with 
Denmark and Estonia, they will confirm this in the hope that the EP will take 
this over.’1480 
27th November 2014  Meeting takes between government and NP (I&E 
Committee) 
During this meeting, the Transport Council of 8th October is also discussed,1481 during 
which the focus is mainly on the attendance of the government at Council meetings.  
Mr Bashir (SP, opposition) argues that there is no point in asking the government 
anything, as it hardly ever attends Council meetings.1482 
																																																								
1478 Ibid., 9 
1479 Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu, 3rd November 2014.  
1480 Ibid.	
1481 TK, 21 501-33, nr. 523, 10th February 2015. 
1482 Ibid., 4. 
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Mr Van Helvert (CDA, opposition) reacts to this and asks the Secretary of State to 
inform the SC whether she will attend the next Transport Council. He refers thereby to 
news articles in the press, stating that the Dutch Minister and Secretary of State hardly 
ever attend Transport Council meetings.1483 
Mrs Hachchi (D66, opposition) continues to stress further that De Telegraaf1484 
published an article discussing the absence of the government during Transport 
Councils.1485 The press article mentioned that during the past two years, only once had a 
Minister or Secretary of State attended a meeting.1486 Hachchi is worried about this 
situation:  
‘If this is true, then I am worried. Even if civil servants are extremely good, it 
is a sign that the Netherlands does not consider these meetings to be 
important. This weakens our negotiation position. I would like to know 
whether this press article is true and if so, what the reasons have been for the 
Minister and the Secretary of State not attending more often?’1487 
With regard to the attendance of the Secretary of State or Minister at the Transport 
Council, Schultz comments as follows: 
‘It is true that we are not always present, but the numbers are not exactly 
right. The Transport Council takes place four times a year and two times 
there is an informal Council. The past two years, we have been present four 
times. Is this important? No, what is important, is the result … However, I do 
always keep the time free in my agenda, so Brussels does get my attention. I 
did also attend one of the informal Councils this year ... As the Netherlands 
will take over the EU Presidency in 2016, attending the Council meetings 
will be increasingly important. 1488 
Step 7: Adoption The legislative file was informally adopted 
during the EU Presidency on 29th June 
2016, whereby member states agreed on 
how to make ports more efficient and 																																																								
1483 Ibid. 
1484 Dutch newspaper, 3rd December 2014. 
1485 TK, 21 501-33, nr. 523, 10th February 2015, p.6. 
1486 Willems, M. De Telegraaf, 3rd December 2015. 
1487 TK, 21 501-33, nr. 523, 10 February 2015, p.6.	
1488 Ibid., 14. 
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competition between them fairer.1489 
Outstanding issues were the social aspects 
as raised in the EP, but also in some of the 
NPs (such as the SC), which were 
discussed in trialogue meetings between 
the Council, EP and EC and eventually 
included in the Regulation.1490 
Concluding remarks 
The Ports Regulation was selected as a case to compare to another maritime case (C3a) 
whereby the NP scrutinised a coalition government which, for its majority, depended on 
the support of a Eurosceptic party. The Ports Regulation is scrutinised during the Rutte 
II coalition government (between Liberals and Social Democrats) and evidence was 
expected to be found of the NP using less formal powers to impact the government’s 
position on this EU file. However, the expected causal process is not reflected in this 
case in which the NP uses many more formal powers than in the C3a, including more 
than standard formal powers1491 such as the use of the parliamentary scrutiny reserve. 
During various stages of the OLP, the NP tries to impact the government’s position and 
on one occasion it even does so after the Council meeting. The use of formal powers is 
higher than expected and although this case is considered to be non-salient to the 
electorate based upon the party manifestos of coalition parties in government and the 
Euro-barometer, the topic of ports is still of major concern for many MPs due to the 
large economic and employment contribution of different ports in the Netherlands (such 
as Rotterdam, Amsterdam and the Westerschelde).  
Interviews confirmed indeed that MPs felt very strongly about this topic because of its 
relationship to the internal market, but also its potential impact on labour rights.1492 De 
Vries MP (Social Democrat), for example, confirmed that he was lobbied by the trade 
unions on this file.1493 In other words, even though the SC scrutinised a coalition 
																																																								
1489 https://felixstowedocker.blogspot.co.uk/2016/06/eu-council-approves-new-
port.htmlhttp://english.eu2016.nl/eu-presidency/councils-and-themes/transport-telecommunications-and-
energy 
1490 TK, 21 501 33, nr. 611, 14 July 2016.	
1491 Such as the reception of information and asking question for clarification. 
1492 De Boer, 4th June 2015, Pol, 4th June 2015, De Vries, 8th June 2015.	
1493 8th June 2015. 
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government in this case which did not depend on the support of a Eurosceptic part, it 
still increased the use of its formal powers.  
Both pair-wise comparisons (C3 to C4 and C3a to C4a) show that the increased use of 
formal powers cannot necessarily be linked to the dependence of a Eurosceptic party by 
the government.  
Measurable impact 
Interviews confirmed that no informal influence had taken place in this file and that the 
government had not yet taken into account the position of the NP when drafting the 
EM.1494  
The NP tried to impact the government in the field of including labour law (not taken 
over) and the exemption of pilot services (which was also in the government EM), so 
the government has not included any new parliamentary position into its own position. 
There has been a weak measurable impact on the government’s input into the Council in 
this case.  
Salience pair-wise comparison 
This pair-wise comparison examines the salience variable. The partisan composition 
and Lisbon variables are constant, as C4a will be compared in a pair-wise comparison to 
another non-salient case which will also take place during the same coalition 
government after the Lisbon Treaty has come into force. In both cases, the HC decides 
not to make use of a RO and has no objections to the publication of the legislative 
proposal with regard to a possible breach of the principle of subsidiarity. The 
Eurosceptic condition is also absent, as the legislative proposal is published at the end 
of 2011. And, although the scrutiny of this file continues after David Cameron’s 
Bloomberg speech1495 (January 2013), the main meetings in the HC take place before 
the speech1496 and the Eurosceptic direction of the Conservative party in government, 
therefore, does not seem to be a possible rival explanation for the outcome of this case.  
																																																								
1494 Pol, 4th June 2015.	
1495 This speech is considered to be the start of a more Eurosceptic tone within the Conservative party.  
1496 From January 2013, the HC no longer discusses the case during any scrutiny meetings.  
	 331	
C5a is selected on the salient condition (it deals with funding) which will be compared 
to a non-salient case (C6a1497) and is dealt with by the same government department 
(DEFRA). This again, decreases any chances of rival explanations, as the only condition 
that varies in the pair-wise comparison is the salience of the case. 
The salient case (C5a) is considered to be of salience since although it concerns a file 
dealing with fisheries, which in previous cases has been a non-salient file with regard to 
the electorate, this file deals with funding for projects creating jobs and the development 
of economies in coastal areas. This aspect of the fisheries is considered to be of 
particular interest, especially for those MPs representing constituencies depending on 
fisheries, such as Scotland, Cornwall and Devon. Funding is part of the party manifestos 
of the Conservatives1498 and Labour1499 and, the manner in which the EU’s money is 
spent is also part of the Liberal Democrat national party manifesto.1500 The EMFF gives 
funding to economically support coastal communities1501 and economic development is 
one the major concerns in the Euro-barometer of 2011.1502  
Case 5A: The draft regulation regarding the European Maritime and Fisheries 
Fund (EMFF) 2014-2020 (COM(2011)8041503) 
Party Policy Positions 
Although most political parties like the possibility of receiving funding for their 
regions, possible disagreements are expected to be found between the political parties in 
government and between the government and the NP. The case deals with an EC 
proposal to allocate funding for actions in the member states dealing with the support of 
the overall CFP and for the first time it would also include the EU integrated Maritime 
Policy. These include actions such as maritime spatial planning and integrated coastal 
zone management. Different EU political parties (SNP, the Conservatives and UKIP) 
argue that these are topics that should be dealt with at a national level, while other 
parties are of the opinion that the EU is the right level to deal with them.1504 The 
Cameron coalition wanted to see a reduction in the EU budget, and this current Fund 																																																								
1497 This is the same case as used in C1A, as all necessary conditions to be present and absent correspond 
to C1A. 
1498 The Conservative Manifesto 2010. 
1499 The Labour Party Manifesto 2010. 
1500 Liberal Democrat Manifesto 2010, p.67. 
1501 http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/emff/index_en.htm 
1502 Standard Euro-barometer, 76, annex question 7. 
1503 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/procedure/EN/2011_380	
1504 HC ESC, 54th Report, 1st February 2012. 
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would imply a real increase in the budget. This proposal can therefore expect an 
opposing UK government.1505 For the party policy positions on fisheries, see Chapter 5, 
table 8. 
Background EU proposal 
The European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF) replaces the European Fisheries 
Fund (EFF) and sets out arrangements to fund activities between 2014-2020, which 
promote sustainable and competitive fisheries and aquaculture. This will foster the 
development and implementation of the EU's Integrated Maritime Policy in a way 
which complements the Cohesion Policy and the CFP. This promotes a balanced and 
inclusive territorial development of fisheries areas and fosters the implementation of the 
CFP. The EMFF will have a budget of €6.6 billion for the period in question.1506 
Step 1: Publication 
2nd December 2011 Publication the EU legislative file.  
Step 2: NPs given eight week to oppose the EU legislative proposal (deadline: 19th June 
2013). 
The HC shows no objections (just like all other EU NPs).  
Step 3: First ex ante influence phase 
12th January 2012 EM Government (initial position)1507 
In the EM, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Natural Environment and Fisheries at 
DEFRA, Mr Richard Benyon MP, argued that the general aim of the EMFF is to 
support the objectives of the CFP. It furthermore includes provisions to support the 
development of the EU IMP, such as actions on maritime spatial planning and 
integrated coastal zone management. However, according to the UK government, these 
issues should be carried out by the member states. Benyon MP argued that DEFRA has 
particular concerns about the way in which this could establish a precedent for the EC to 
																																																								
1505 HC ESC, 19th Report, 7th November 2012. 
1506 HC ESC, 54th Report, 1st February 2012.	
1507 DEFRA, Explanatory Memorandum, 17870/11, January 2012.  
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lead in these areas, which could lead to cutting across existing national policy and 
implementation.1508  
DEFRA will consult industry and other stakeholders on this issue and will publish an IA 
on this.  
1st February 2012  Meeting ESC: Discussion EMFF. 
The Committee considers this topic to be important because it provides funding. The 
ESC. 
‘… raises questions not only about the desirability of the Commission involving 
itself in certain areas of the Integrated Maritime Policy best left to Member 
States, but also about the extent to which the proposal lacks a certain focus and 
the priority to be given to the different activities covered by it, including in 
particular reform of the Common Fisheries Policy as opposed (say) to support 
for aquaculture …’1509 
Step 4: First ex post control phase 
9th October 2012  Letter from government1510 to NP. 
In the letter, Minister Benyon indicates that the EU Presidency hopes to find a partial 
agreement on this proposal during the Council meeting of 22nd and 23rd October 2012. It 
therefore asks the ESC to lift the scrutiny reserve in advance of this meeting.   
The ESC sends a reply to the government in which it indicates that until further 
information is received, for example, the reception of the IA, it cannot lift the scrutiny 
reserve (use of formal powers).1511  
22nd October 2012  Letter from government to NP 
In this letter, the Minister mentioned that indeed a partial agreement had been reached, 
covering all but the management aspects of the proposal.1512 The Minister writes that 
																																																								
1508 Ibid. 
1509 HC ESC, 54th Report 1st February 2012.	
1510 HC ESC, 19th Report, 7th November 2012. 
1511 Ibid. 
1512 Ibid. 
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‘… [F]rom a UK perspective, the agreement was a positive one, and that, 
working with like-minded Member States and in close consultation with the 
Commission, it had seen possible to influence the text in line with the 
approach the Government had previously set out.’1513 
The Minister says furthermore that he had to override the Parliamentary scrutiny reserve 
and support the general approach of the agreement. If he had not done so, it would have 
had no influence on the outcome. There were not enough member states to create a 
blocking minority.1514 The UK played a decisive role in the negotiations and the best 
deal was reached during this meeting.1515 This is a clear example of the government 
undermining the role of the HC and it allocates itself a role to act as a trustee in this 
occasion.  
7th November 2012 Meeting ESC: discussion EMFF. 
With regard to the Minister overriding the scrutiny reserve, the Committee is of the 
opinion that the actual agreement does not seem as good as the Minister indicated. The 
ESC argues in particular that 
‘… [T]he overall budgetary provision for 2014-2020 remains to be decided; 
that no agreement was reached on the crucial question of how the funds 
would be allocated between Member States; that funds will still be available, 
albeit under strict conditions, for both the temporary and permanent cessation 
of fishing, and modernisation, to which the UK was previously opposed; and 
that it remains unclear how far the Government's concerns over the extent to 
which the Integrated Maritime Policy might impinge on areas which the UK 
believed were better carried out by Member States have been met.’1516 
For that reason, the ESC decides to forward the document to the European 
Committee A.  
Step 5: Second ex ante influence phase 
																																																								
1513 Ibid. 
1514 Only Belgium, Germany, Lithuania and Malta voted against the proposal. 
1515 HC ESC19th Report, 7th November 2012.	
1516 Ibid. 
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26th November 2012  Letter from government to HC, including the 
IA.1517  
8th January 2013  Meeting of European Committee A1518 with 
Minister Richard Benyon.1519 During this meeting 
MPs express their views on the EMFF for the first 
time (first parliamentary position).  
Mr Tom Harris MP (Labour, opposition party), asks the Minister if he agrees that the 
partial agreement reached during the October Council meeting is a weak one. Harris 
also queries plans for extra European funding for improving fishing boat engines. He 
argues: 
‘… [W]hy has the partial general approach, for which he [the Minister] 
voted, failed to make fleet capacity assessments mandatory for all financial 
aid for fishing vessels? I do not want to be accused of being a luddite, but I 
do not believe that technological developments in fishing inevitably lead to 
an increase in the fishing power of the fleets—it is not a one-way street.’1520 
Benyon responded that when working together with all those other EU member states, 
you cannot get everything you want. With regard to the Harris’ specific point about 
engine replacement, he says: 
‘… [E]ngines can be replaced to assist efforts by the fishing industry to 
combat climate change. Support for new engines can be granted only in those 
sectors in balance with fishing opportunities available—that means fishing 
sustainably. Replacement engines will be subject to physical inspection and 
testing to ensure that they do not exceed the new threshold, and I hope that 
that addresses his point about under-declaration.’1521 
																																																								
1517 HC ESC, 22nd Report of Session 2010-2012, 5/12/2012. 
1518 For more information on the composition and structure of the European Committee A, see Appendix 
III. 
1519 European Committee A, 7.01.2013.	
1520 Ibid. 
1521 Ibid. 
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Eilidh Whiteford (SNP, opposition party) asks the Minister about the EMFF and the 
matter of ‘young entrants’.1522	
Benyon assures Whiteford that several member states, including the UK, have raised the 
issue of including young fishermen in the fund.1523 	
Michael Connarty (Labour, opposition party) asks about the discarding of fish. Benyon 
shares his concern and argues that this issue is a priority to all parties.  
‘… DEFRA has been working with colleagues around the UK to try and 
support small projects—and some quite large projects—that are seeing 
dramatic reductions in discards. There will be practically zero cod discards 
for vessels in the North Sea in the catch quota scheme …’1524 
Sheryll Murray MP (Conservative, coalition partner in government) congratulates the 
Minister on his achievements during the Council negotiations. 	
She asks about fleet measures and whether the Minister intends to detach the fixed 
quota allocations of any decommissioned vessels, perhaps utilising them for the under 
10-meter fleet. She seeks to know if otherwise the fund will be used to introduce safety 
measures (for example, secure funding for fishermen in small fishing vessels).1525  
Benyon replied that decommissioning was not always done in the best way, but under 
the current proposals, abuse is less likely to happen.  
‘… I believe, and I know that my Hon. Friend agrees, that fishing opportunity 
quota is a national resource, and where it is not being used, it should be used. That 
is what has driven us to try to find extra support for the under 10-metre sector 
from the larger fleet’s unused quota …’1526   
He promises that he will intervene when it becomes about helping smaller fishing 
communities to keep them alive.  
																																																								
1522 Ibid. 
1523 Ibid. 
1524 European Committee A, 8th January 2013.	
1525 Ibid. 
1526 Ibid. 
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‘… This is not a free market; it is an allocation of a national resource and we have 
to be smart about how we use it, but if opportunities such as this arise where we 
can allocate opportunity for people who we believe are particularly hard-pressed, 
hanging on by their fingernails, I will not be afraid to do so.1527  
Michael Connarty MP (Labour, opposition party) takes the floor again and argues that 
in his letter of 26th November 2012, he asked: 	
‘… [W]ill the Government argue for funding to replace that lost profitability 
during the period in which discards are eradicated, because I think that is what 
the public really want? They want to see us doing something through the 
European Union to get rid of discards—we have little wriggle room because it 
has total competence in this field—without driving people out of the industry 
...’1528 
Benyon clarifies that DEFRA is working on creating new supply chains that will deal 
with the fish that will be landed. DEFRA is working with companies, such as Seafish, to 
ensure being ahead of the game, and understands the impact which are beginning to be 
imposed on these fishermen.1529 Benyon states: 
‘What we want to achieve is good fisheries management: killing fewer fish 
but landing more. I hope we are moving towards what the public wants, but 
in a practical and achievable way and working with the industry rather than 
imposing yet another top-down control, in addition to those to which it has 
been subjected for much too long.’1530  
Benyon continues by defending his overruling of the scrutiny reserve during the 
October Council meeting and asks the MPs to back the motion overall. 	
'I hope that knowing that 90% of the EMFF, the new fund, will go towards 
sustainability issues will encourage Opposition Members, as well as 
Members on the Government side of the Committee, to support the motion. 
A small—very small—amount of the remainder will go towards issues such 
																																																								
1527 Ibid. 
1528 Ibid.	
1529 European Committee A, 8th January 2013. 
1530 Ibid. 
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as engine replacement, but I have already described the caveats that I think 
move this in the right direction.’1531 
Benyon shows hereby that he is aware of the concerns in the NP. Mr Harris MP asked 
Benyon whether he agrees that the partial agreement reached is a weak one. If he does, 
then Harris is not sure whether he can ask parliament to pass the motion before them 
today.1532  
Benyon replies by asking:  
‘Should we have been outside the room, not taking part in the discussions 
and voting against the proposals, which are a dramatic change from the old 
European fisheries fund to a new one, in which the kind of fears that he has 
about the old one simply cannot exist?’1533  
Harris replies: 
‘I am very happy to correct the record. If the Minister checks Hansard, he 
will see that I did not suggest that he got the best deal possible. I said that he 
went into the negotiations in good faith. I do not believe that the outcome of 
the negotiations is good enough for the Committee to support. It is as simple 
as that. We need to draw a line and say that the negotiations are not a good 
deal for the whole of the EU fishing industry. I do not think that the measure 
is worthy of the Committee’s support and I ask Members to vote against 
it.’ 1534  
This is an interesting intervention by a member of the opposition who has been 
very explicit in criticising the deal reached in the Council and asks for other 
opposition members to not support the government’s motion. After all, the 
opposition fails (with 8 in favour and 5 against), but the committee is clearly 
divided. There are real attempts to impact the Minister’s position, as on various 
occasions the MPs show their own opinions, which are issues not covered by the 
governmental EM (fleet capacity and fixed quota allocations) and ask the Minister 
for his position and what he will do to ensure this.  																																																								
1531 Ibid.  
1532 Ibid.	
1533 Ibid. 
1534 Ibid.	
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Step 6: Second ex post control phase 
28th January 2013 Council meeting (no feedback)  
Step 7: Adoption 
6th May 2014  Adoption of the EMFF. After a initial 
disagreements about the  budget, Member States 
have now agreed to strengthen the funding for 
aquaculture at sea and inland and the new EMFF 
will provide support for better selectivity, 
innovation, control and data collection.1535 It also 
refers to measures to eliminate discarding of 
fish.1536 Young fishermen are allowed to get extra 
financial support, as also asked by UK MPs.1537 
Concluding remarks 
More evidence of increased parliamentary activity during the scrutiny of this case was 
expected to be found as a consequence of its high salience (like the involvement of the 
European Committee A and the use of the scrutiny reserve). Although not during every 
stage, there was indeed evidence found of MPs using more than their standard formal 
powers and trying to impact the government’s position (part of the HC opposed 
supporting the government). Different interviewees indeed confirmed having picked 
this topic as one on which to increase scrutiny, as the topic was an important one.1538 
The intervention of Connarty MP, for example, during the European Committee A 
meeting shows that the public has an opinion about this issue. This corresponds to the 
theoretical argument of representing the wishes of the electorate which could get him 
re-elected and MPs normally select topics that are of high importance to their voters.1539 
This corresponds to the theoretical argument suggesting a link between the importance 
of a topic and increased parliamentary activity and impact. 
																																																								
1535 Council Press Release, 3193rd Council meeting, Agriculture and Fisheries, Luxembourg, 22 and 23rd 
October, 2012. 
1536 European Commission Press Release, Brussels 23rd October 2013. 	
1537 TK, 32 201, 4th April 2014.	
1538 Rees-Mogg MP, 15th June 2015, Smith MP, 3rd June 2015, Hopkins, 30th June 2015. 
1539 Auel & Raunio, 2012a:20. 
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Measurable impact 
Even if the government neglected some of these powers (such as the scrutiny reserve) 
and impact appears weak after all, it can be concluded that salience is indeed a 
condition, making NPs use more than their ordinary formal powers which were 
responded to by the government.  
Interviewees confirmed that no informal influence had taken place and that the initial 
position of the government had been drafted solely based upon the views of the 
government coalition.1540 
In other words, a NP, such as the HC, which forms part of a trusteeship can, when the 
topic is salient to the government or to the NP and its constituents, rise above itself and 
act as a delegatory NP. This implies increased governmental activities as well. In 
conclusion, even though the measurable impact is not visible, the increased 
governmental response to the HC shows that the use of formal powers by the NP 
certainly does make a difference.  
Case 6A: The draft regulation establishing a long-term plan for cod stocks and the 
fisheries exploiting those stocks (COM(2012)211541) 
Background of the proposal 
Since the introduction of the conservation policy into the CFP in 1983, in particular the 
stocks of cod in EU waters have led to levels of concern. As a consequence, the EC 
published a new regulation in order to ensure that cod stocks are exploited on the basis 
of the maximum sustainable yield and, in order to reach these levels, the EC suggests 
the introduction of rules for establishing the total allowable catch (TAC) and maximum 
fishing effort.1542 This proposal replaces the previous regulation of 2008 regarding cod 
stocks.  
Step 1: Publication 
31st January 2012 Publication of EU legislative file. 
Step 2: Subsidiarity deadline: 27th March 2012  																																																								
1540 Sowrey, 6th July 2015, Benyon, 25th June 2015.	
1541 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/HIS/?uri=celex:52012AE0835 
1542 HC ESC 64th Report, 25th April 2012.  
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Just like all other EU NPs, the HC has no objections against the publication of this EU 
legislative proposal.  
Step 3: First ex ante influence phase. 
20th February 2012  Publication of the governmental EM (initial 
position).1543 
In the EM, Richard Benyon describes that his officials are examining the individual 
elements of the EC proposal to make sure that the topic can be described as ‘non-
essential’, as it is similar to the recent Multi-annual Framework for West of Scotland 
herring.1544 
However, according to DEFRA, the UK was anxious, following the problems relating 
to days at sea which had arisen in the Fisheries Council in December 2011, to see key 
changes made in the cod recovery plan, and was continuing to press the Commission to 
bring these forward. DEFRA shows in its EM that it agrees with the proposal that it is 
appropriate to adjust the biological reference levels, fishing mortality rates and 
spawning stocks biomass in accordance with scientific advice to be dealt with in a 
delegated act. However, according to the government, giving the EU the power to adjust 
fishing effort in certain circumstances would be an essential element of a recovery plan, 
and therefore not eligible for a delegated act.1545  
25th April 2012 ESC meeting: discussion Cod Stocks 
The ESC sees a parallel with the recently discussed recovery plan for the West of 
Scotland herring, on which it reported. For that reason it draws the current draft 
regulation to the attention of the HC, but based upon what the Minister has said it clears 
the scrutiny for this document.1546 The ESC does not want to impact the government’s 
position. 
11th June 2013 Adoption of regulation in the first reading. 
Member States agree to set up multi-annual 
																																																								
1543 DEFRA Explanatory Memorandum, 20th February 2012, 13745/12. 
1544 HC ESC, 64th Report, 25th April 2012.	
1545 Ibid. 
1546 Ibid.	
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management plans to check the stocks in the 
future.  
Concluding remarks 
There is a clear difference in the amount of powers used in C5a (European Fisheries and 
Maritime Fund) compared to those used in C6a (Cod recovery).  
In the non-salient case, the NP does not attempt at all to impact the government and 
hardly uses any formal powers (it limits itself to receiving information on this file). In 
the salient case, C5a, the ESC has several meetings and decides to include the European 
Committee A which has a meeting with Minister Benyon in which it clearly tries to 
impact the position of the government (by expressing its own opinion). In both cases the 
government consists of a coalition between Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, so 
this condition is considered a non-intervening variable. It is an obvious example 
wherein salience is the one varying condition in this case, determining a different use of 
formal powers by the HC. 
Measurable impact 
Both C5a and C6a are in line with the theoretical argument linking the use of formal 
powers to increased parliamentary activities and their potential impact.  
The only varying condition is the salience one and therefore based upon this evidence  
my hypothesis can be confirmed after the process-tracing analysis of this case. The HC 
does not intend to have an impact and there is no form of impact visible in this case. 
Interviews have confirmed that no use of informal influence has taken place in this case 
and that the government followed its position when writing its EM without anticipating 
the views of the NP.1547 
The Lisbon provisions pair-wise comparison 
This last shadow pair-wise comparison deals with the presence and absence of the 
condition of the use of a RO to the EC as introduced by the Lisbon Treaty to be applied 
by a NP when it objects to the publication of an EU proposal when it considers that it 
																																																								
1547 Benyon, 25th June 2015. 
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conflicts with the principle of subsidiarity. The multi-party and salience variables are 
constant for this case and the Eurosceptic variable is absent.  
The multi-party variable is constant, as in the pair wise comparison C7a is compared to 
a case where the NP does not make use of a RO (C8a) during the scrutiny of the same 
coalition cabinet of Liberals and Social Democrats. The Eurosceptic variable is absent, 
as the scrutiny of the case takes place during the Rutte II cabinet which consists of the 
Liberals and Social Democrats, both pro-European parties, and the cabinet no longer 
depends upon the Eurosceptic PVV1548 as it did during the Rutte I cabinet.  
The salience variable is constant, as both the legislative file in C7a and C8a are 
considered to be of the same policy area (European Railways) and of similar importance 
to the public. European Railways can be considered to be non-salient to the electorate 
but salient to legislators, as the topic of the Railways is not one that appears in any of 
the party manifestos of the Rutte II cabinet1549, nor is it a concern of the citizens as 
shown in the Euro-barometer of 2012.1550 However, it is a topic dealing with issues, 
such as public procurement and liberalisation, which are close to the heart of both 
coalition and opposition parties. It is therefore expected that although this is not 
potentially a topic on which many votes can be won, it is expected that the NP will 
increase the use of its formal powers in this case. In addition, it is a case on which the 
Dutch parliament decides to send a RO to the EC. 
																																																								
1548 Party for Freedom. 
1549 Social Democrats Party manifesto:  PvdA, Nederland: Sterker en Socialer, 2012 and the Liberal Party 
Manifesto: VVD, Niet doorschuiven, maar aanpakken, 2012.	
1550 Standard Euro-barometer 77, July 2012 and Standard Euro-barometer 78, December 2012, questions 
7 (annex). 
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Case 7a: The EU Draft Regulation regarding the opening of the market for 
domestic passenger transport services by rail (COM(2013)00281551 
Policy positions 
The issue regarding the extent to which the procurement of railways should be either 
publicly or privately dealt with has been one that received a lot of coverage during the 
Nineties when the Dutch Railways were privatised.1552 This led to a sizeable division 
between the right wing parties (Liberals, Christian Democrats and Christian Union) in 
favour of the liberalisation and the left wing parties (Social Democrats, Socialist Party 
and Green Left) against privatisation. This division continues during the debate of this 
EU package. Left wing parties warn against the ‘destruction’ of the Dutch Railway after 
privatisation, whereas the right wing parties welcome the new EU proposals.1553 
Interviews confirm that the different political parties had different opinions about the 
extent to which the railways should be liberalised at EU level.1554  
When speaking to the government representative working on this file, she confirmed the 
disparities in views on the Fourth Railway Package between the coalition partners (the 
Liberals and the Social Democrats).  
‘The VVD was happy with opening the market, while the PvdA wanted the 
railways to remain a public service and argued that the EU legislative 
proposal was opposing the principle for subsidiarity.’1555  
She also confirmed that a divided government is more dependent upon the support of 
the NP as it needs to come up with a compromise and requires the support of the NP in 
order to gain backing for the compromise.1556 Despite the different views by coalition 
partners on the extent to which the railways should open up to the market, the Transport 
representative of the Dutch Permanent Representation in Brussels argued: 																																																								
1551 See Eur-lex: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?qid=1436782729554&uri=CELEX:52013PC0028 
1552 WRR, Dertig jaar privatisering, verzelfstandiging en marktwerking, Amsterdam University Press, 
Amsterdam, 2012.  
1553 Spoorpro.nl, ‘Mansveld: liberalisering spoor niet van tafel’, 7th March 2013. 
1554 Van Dongen, 3rd June 2015, De Boer MP, 4th  June 2015, Hoogland MP, 4th June 2015, Hartkamp, 7th 
July 2015, Kisters, 19th May 2015. 
1555 Van Dongen, 3rd June, 2015. 
1556 Ibid.	
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‘The coalition-partners have different views on liberalisation of the Railways, 
but they do respect each other’s views. They will find a compromise and will 
speak publicly with one voice. We are used to having coalitions and looking 
for compromises is part of the Dutch genes.’1557  
For more information on the views of political parties in the Netherlands on the 
European railways, see Chapter 6 (table 12). 
Background of the proposal: 
The Fourth Railway Package suggests proposals to further open up the market for the 
railways, including arranging the governance of the European railways and their 
technical operation. The Fourth Railway Package consists of various individual 
proposals dealing with governance, the opening up of domestic passenger markets, and 
interoperability and safety.1558 This case only looks at the scrutiny of the draft 
regulation dealing with the market for railway passengers.  
Step 1:  
Publication 30th January 2013  
Step 2:  
The NPs have eight weeks to respond to the EC with a RO in that case that they feel the 
EU proposal is conflicting with the principle of subsidiarity. The chair of the EAC 
sends a letter to the SC1559 on 14th February 20131560 in which it seeks parliamentary 
support to send an objection to the EC. It argues that this topic should be dealt with by 
the national member states. The majority of the NP supports the request from the EAC 
and a RO is sent to the EC (both the SC and the Dutch Senat1561 sent a RO to the 
EC).1562 
Step 3: Ex ante influence phase 																																																								
1557 Kisters, 19th May 2015. 
1558 TK, 33 546, Nr. 3, 1st March 2013, par. 2.	
1559 TK, 33 546, Nr, 1, 14th February 2013. 
1560 The ESC requests the SC adopt a motion, proposed by MP Hoogland (Social Democrat), to send a 
RO to the EC regarding a negative subsidiarity opinion.   
1561 The First Chamber. 
1562 Letter SC to the European Commission, 26th March 2013 (courtesy translation); next to the Dutch 
Parliament, the Lithuanian, Austrian, Luxembourgian and Swedish parliament sent ROs to the EC which 
were not enough to raise a yellow card. 
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19th February 2013  The Secretary of State of the Department for I&E 
sends a letter to the chair of the SC to inform 
parliament on topics that will be discussed during 
the Transport Council of 11th March 2013.1563 This 
includes the Fourth Railway Package. The position 
of the Dutch government still needs to be 
determined1564 (in other words, there should be 
scope to impact the government’s input into the 
Council meeting when using parliamentary 
influence mechanisms before the Council 
meeting).  
The Secretary of State explained furthermore, that the Dutch government in principle 
supports the idea of increasing the efficacy of European train passengers, but it is unsure 
as to what extent the EC needs to take control over this dossier. The government 
thereby seems to carefully support the decision of the parliament to have sent a RO. 1565 
Explanatory memorandum 
 
1st March 2013 The Minister for Foreign Affairs sends a letter to 
the SC (plenary) including the EM about the 
Fourth Railway Package.1566  
In the EM (the first governmental position), the Dutch government has an interim 
negative subsidiarity position in the field of the internal market for the railways.1567 The 
Dutch government argues that at the moment it does not see any added value in opening 
up the railway to the European market.1568 However, its final judgement will depend 
upon the publication of the IA.1569 The government furthermore has a negative opinion 
about the proportionality of the section on the public procurement of public services 
																																																								
1563 TK, 21 501-33, nr. 407, 19th February 2013.  
1564 Ibid, par. ‘spoorvervoer’.	
1565 Ibid, par. ‘spoorvervoer’. 
1566 TK, 33 546, nr. 3, 1st March 2013. 
1567 Ibid., 5. 
1568 Ibid. 
1569 Ibid., 4. 
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contracts. The proportionality judgement on all other draft regulations is positive.1570 
However, again, a final judgement will be made after the IA. 1571 
The Railway Package suggests that all contracts will be publicly procured from 
2023.1572 The government will withhold its opinion during the negotiations in the 
Council until the IA has come out (in other words, it is not waiting for the parliamentary 
position to form its opinions).1573 
At this stage, however, the Dutch government can already foresee some issues which it 
is not happy about, particularly in the field of public service contracts.1574 The new 
proposal does not take into account the current public service contracts. Besides, with 
regard to opening the market to passenger transport, the Dutch government is not sure 
whether 2023 is an appropriate date.1575 It has from the start indicated how important it 
is to retain the freedom of national choice in case of the public procurement of national 
railway issues. This is in line with the adopted motion from the SC (regarding the 
negative subsidiarity opinion).1576 
Letter Prorail 
5th March 2013 ProRail1577 responds to a request from the SC to 
judge the European Fourth Railway Package and 
the implications for railways in the Netherlands.1578 
ProRail writes in its letter that the EC proposals in 
principle match well with the Dutch railway 
network and for that reason seem feasible. 
However, it is important to keep checking whether 
the developments of these proposals are in line 
with the possibilities of cooperation between 
																																																								
1570 The Fourth Railway Package consists of different pieces of legislative proposal (Railway Agency, 
Passenger Transport, a single European Railway area, Interoperability and Safety).  
1571 TK, 33 546, nr.3, 1st March 2013, p.4. 
1572 Ibid., 9. 
1573 Ibid. 
1574 Ibid.	
1575 Ibid. 
1576 Ibid. 9. 
1577 Organisation responsible for the railway network in the Netherlands. 
1578 ProRail, letter to member of the committee for I&E, 5th March 2013. 
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different parties and between different 
countries.1579 
The SC expresses its opinion 
7th March 2013  Meeting I&E Committee1580 and the EAC with the 
I&E Minister, Mrs Mansveld (social democrat).1581 
First expressions of parliamentary views. 
The PvdA1582 fraction (coalition partner) shows concerns about the Fourth Railway 
Package, but indicates that it will wait for the IA before it makes further judgement.1583 
However, with regard to the draft regulation on free passenger transport, it is sceptical. 
This regulation will have a direct impact on Dutch railway traffic and will have a 
negative impact on the passengers. Besides, it should be up to the member state to 
decide on these issues, as it is a public service. That is why it put forward a motion to 
the plenary in order to submit a RO to the EC.1584  
The PVV1585 (opposition) supports the PvdA and argues indeed that the Dutch 
government should focus on the country’s sovereignty.1586  
The reasons for making a case for the protection of this public service in the opinion of 
Social Democrats has a political dimension (it is not so much because of anti-EU 
ideology that it wants to keep this topic in national hands, but it wants to protect the 
public service). For the Party for Freedom, on the contrary, the motive is Europeanised. 
It does not mind the opening of the public service to the market, but does not approve if 
it this is done by the EC. This is an interesting mishmash of political and European 
arguments, which causes the opposition and coalition party to stand together on this 
issue.  
However, the variation in opinions continues to vary across both coalition parties and 
opposition parties.  
																																																								
1579 Ibid.  
1580 See appendix III for more information about this committee. 
1581 TK, 33 546, nr. 9, determined on 11th April 2013. 
1582 Social Democrats 
1583 TK, 33 546, nr. 9, determined on 11th April 2013, p.2.	
1584 Ibid. 2.  
1585 Party for Freedom (Eurosceptic and anti-Islam party) 
1586 Ibid., 3 
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GL (‘Groen links’)1587 and the SP1588, two other opposition parties, also oppose the EU 
proposals in their current form and support the need for a RO.1589 GL, a pro-European 
party but sceptical about liberalisation, does this most likely for political reasons 
whereas the SP is as such both anti-liberalisation and very sceptical about the EU1590.  
However, the D661591 party (opposition) argues that although this is an important 
package and it is crucial that member states adapt their systems to those of surrounding 
countries, it wants to hold off on its final position on this file until it has seen the IA.1592  
D66 has no objections either against opening up the market or against the 
Europeanisation of the railways1593, matching its policy position in this field (see table 
12).  
D66 furthermore asked the Minister that it be kept informed on what other member 
states do. It wants to know what their positions are in this field and whether they will 
publish IAs as well.1594 D66 would appreciate being kept informed well on time on all 
developments including discussions in Council meetings.1595 Again, rather than trying 
to impact the political (to what extent does the internal market reach) or European (has 
the EU got anything to say about this) contents of the proposal, D66 is holding the 
government to account ex ante by giving it instructions on what it is expected to do after 
the Council meeting. The opposition thereby consolidates the delegatory relationship 
between the government and the parliament. The government is given clear instructions 
and cannot just follow its own judgement in this field. However, as D66 has not 
opposed the EU as such to deal with this legislative proposal, but a majority in the NP 
has, it is likely that D66 uses its formal powers as a consequence of the salience of the 
topic and Lisbon provisions in that case would not play a role for this party. 
Interviewees, who argued that the RO was just a tool to check the subsidiarity principle, 
confirm this. The NP has got many other tools that it uses for a salient topic.1596  
																																																								
1587 The Greens.  
1588 Socialist Party. 
1589 TK, 33 546, nr.9, 11th April 2013, p.6-8. 
1590 Website of Parlement en Politiek: 
http://www.parlement.com/id/vh8lnhrouwy6/socialistische_partij_sp 
1591 Democratic Party 1966. 
1592 TK, 33 546, nr. 9, 11th April 2013, p.4.	
1593 Ibid., 5. 
1594 Ibid. 
1595 Ibid. 
1596 Van Dongen, 3rd June 2015, Koolmees, 6th July 2015. 
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The VVD1597 (part of the coalition) MP also speaks out in favour of an internal market 
for railways, as it will improve the situation of passengers.1598 This is in line with the 
party’s position on liberalisation (see table 12, Chapter 6). However, according to the 
VVD, there should be a strict separation between those who manage the railways and 
those who transport passengers.1599 This separation is absent in the current proposal but 
should be there, as otherwise it will not lead to a proper internal railway market. The 
VVD would like the Minister to promote this in Brussels.1600 It also argues that the 
parliament needs to be fully informed on this dossier (this is part of the scrutiny 
reserve).1601  
Minister Mansveld (PvdA) responds by explaining the different parts of the Railway 
Package and argues that all the questions raised by MPs will be included in the IA. The 
government will keep the SC informed and will discuss all relevant issues before all 
next Council meeting.1602 The Minister does ask for the parliamentary position before 
she enters into negotiations. However, she also asks to give her the freedom to discuss 
and participate in the debates in the Council.1603  
The Minister basically asks for the trust of the NP to have freedom during the 
negotiations, but with parliament’s input in mind. In other words, the Minister asks for 
the relationship with the parliament to be a delegatory one, but when necessary it might 
have to be a trustee one.  
The PvdA (coalition partner) reminds the Minister of the RO sent by the SC to the EC. 
The Finnish NP agrees with the Dutch parliament.1604 
The D66 (opposition) argues that it will introduce a motion to receive regular 
information updates from the Minister in a certain order and discuss particular types of 
issues in a certain order. The VVD (coalition partner) agrees with D66.1605  
																																																								
1597 Liberal Party. 
1598 TK, 33 546, nr.9, 11th April 2013, p.5. 
1599 Ibid. 
1600 Ibid.	
1601 Ibid., 6. 
1602 Ibid., 13-14. 
1603 Ibid. 
1604 Ibid., 15. 
1605 Ibid. 
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GL1606 (opposition) is of the opinion that the Dutch government must continue opposing 
the proposals for an internal railway market in Brussels. CDA (opposition) opposes a 
yellow card, suggesting that there will not be enough support for this in other NPs.1607  
The parliament continues to be divided on this issue and gives different types of 
instructions to the government. When looking back at the original policy positions of 
the governmental parties (see table 12, Chapter 6), it is likely that an equal division of 
opinions exists within government.  
The parliament does not respond to the Minister’s request to obtain more freedom 
during its negotiations, but de facto emphasises the need to be informed by the 
government during this process.  
During this phase, evidence was expected to be found of the NP making use of extra 
formal powers as a consequence of sending a RO. There are indeed several indications 
showing increased use of formal powers, such as the insistence on being informed. 
There is furthermore the use of the RO, the formal power via the EC as laid down in the 
Lisbon Treaty. There is even a sign of impact in this case, as the Minister shows that the 
government’s position corresponds to that of the NP when it comes to procurement of 
passengers transport. Although this is a sign that the causal mechanism during this 
phase has been confirmed (increased salience and increased use of formal powers which 
are linked to measurable impact), it is not yet clear whether the increased salience is a 
consequence of the fact that the NP sent a RO. Within parliament both parties that have 
supported the ‘yellow card option’ (PvdA, SP, GL) and those that have opposed sending 
the RO to the EC (CDA, D66) intend to impact the government’s position. In other 
words, even if the majority of the NP had voted against the RO, it is likely that parties 
would still have tried to impact the government’s position in this file. This would 
explain that the NP intends to impact the position of the government because of its 
salience. According to Keulemans, EU advisor to the SC, the NP had an obvious 
influence here. The government position, as exposed in the EM, was temporarily 
negative. The SC was directly negative by a majority. This convinced the 
government.1608  
																																																								
1606 Green Left. 
1607 TK, 33 546, nr.9, 11th April 2013, p.16.	
1608 Keulemans, 15th June 2015. 
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‘The NP had influence in this file. After the input of the NP regarding the negative 
position towards the subsidiarity principle, the government adapted their position to 
‘negative’ as well. The coalition deals with a political reality here; a majority in the 
Chamber considers this file to be a breach of subsidiarity.’1609 
Step 4: Ex post control phase  
11th March 2013 Transport Council1610  
 
22nd March 2013 The Secretary of State I&E, Mrs Schulz, sent a 
letter to the Chair of the SC to give feedback about 
discussions had during the Council meeting.1611 
During the negotiations, the Dutch government 
showed its reservations regarding the Fourth 
Railway Package.1612 This is in line with part of the 
opposition in parliament.  
The government’s letter also informed the NP that it had informed the Council to 
continue including it in this dossier1613 (reminding the Council of the delegatory 
relationship with the NP in this file, implying that it is bound by the NP’s formal 
powers of being supervised (right of information) and of giving input (right of questions 
and a meeting with a government representative before the Council meeting). This can 
be considered a warning to the Council that the Dutch government has little freedom to 
act according to its own judgement on this occasion. If the NP is of the opinion that this 
topic should be dealt with at national level, it is indirectly a file of which the NP would 
have wanted to use more powers (domestically, it can directly hold the government to 
account rather than indirectly after a Council meeting). It is likely that the NP has 
requested increased levels of information feedback by the government because it feels 
that this topic should have been one for the national member states to decide upon. The 
use of the Lisbon provisions and the salience of the topic are thereby pretty inextricably 
																																																								
1609 Ibid.	
1610 Press Release, 3229th Council meeting Transport, Telecommunications and Energy, Brussels, 11th 
March 2013.  
1611 TK, 501-33, nr. 412, 22nd March 2013. 
1612 Ibid. 
1613 Ibid.	
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bound up with each other. In other words, if the topic were not salient, the NP would 
not want to deal with it at national level and keep a close eye on it.  
The Secretary of State reports that she has informed the Council that the Dutch opinion 
with regard to the internal market proposal of the Railway Package has so far been 
negative and that at the moment an IA is being prepared to consider the consequences 
for the Netherlands. There should be enough space left for Dutch providers in its own 
market. 1614 
By making clear to the Council to what extent the government is bound to the NP in this 
case, it could be a way of trying to increase its position in the Council. By showing it 
has little freedom from its NP in this case, it could try to force the Council to take into 
account the Dutch wishes. In other words, the Dutch government seems to make use of 
its parliament’s RO to improve its bargaining position in the Council. This corresponds 
to Kiiver’s predictions in his handbook regarding a possible future use of the EWM.1615 
A RO could thereby not only increase the parliamentary impact on the government’s 
EU policy position, but increase the government’s impact on Council altogether as well.  
16th April 2013  NP formally closes the parliamentary scrutiny 
reserve on the Fourth Railway Package1616 (with 
only the PVV1617 opposing).1618  
At this stage, it was expected to find that the NP had used extra formal powers to hold 
its government to account as a consequence of the RO to the EC. In its feedback, the 
government does show that it is obeying the NP’s request to be ‘fully informed’. It also 
shows that in the Council it raises the question of whether public procurement is a 
national issue. Although this has become the government’s main position, its 
representative and VVD MP in this file do recognise impact by the NP in this field. 
‘The government did not change its original position, but the liberals agreed to ask to 
keep public procurement out of the Railway Package and that this should happen at 
national level. Although the liberals are the bigger party in the coalition, a majority in 																																																								
1614 Ibid. 
1615 Kiiver, 2012:144-145. 
1616 TK, 33545, nr. 8, 16th April 2013. 
1617 The Eurosceptic Party for Freedom. 
1618 Since the Lisbon Treaty came into force in 2009, the SC obtained a new influence mechanism in the 
field of EU legislation. It gives the SC a chance to indicate to government that a topic is important to it 
and that it cannot agree with a proposal before the topic has been discussed in parliament.		
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the SC was in favour of keeping public procurement in national hands and the coalition 
needed a majority on this.’1619  
‘The coalition partners did not agree about a free market for passengers in the railways. 
The Liberals just did not have enough support in the Chamber to get a majority for a 
free market in this field. The VVD in the coalition was aware of this, which is why it 
supported PvdA in this field to keep procurement in national hands.’1620  
Interviews confirm too that because the topic should have been dealt with at national 
level, in the opinion of the NP, it tightens its scrutiny and reminds the government of its 
delegatory position whereby it must discuss any developments in this field with the 
NP.1621  
Step 5: Ex ante influence Phase 
22nd May 2013  The I&E Minister sent a letter to the Committee 
I&E (with a reference to the motion) with an 
agenda of the next Transport Council of 10th June 
2013).1622  
5th June 2013  Meeting between the I&E Committee, the EAC 
and the Secretary of State of I&E, Mrs Schulz 
(VVD).1623 
During this meeting, the D66 (opposition) requests more information regarding the state 
of affairs of the Fourth Railway Package.1624  
The SP (opposition) wants to know if the government has already found other 
supporters in the EU to stop the proposals. 1625 
The Secretary of State, Mrs Schulz, responds about the Fourth Railway Package that at 
this stage, there will not yet be a debate about compulsory procurement.1626 She 																																																								
1619 Van Dongen, 3rd June 2015. 
1620 De Boer MP, 4th June 2015. 
1621 Van Dongen, 3rd June 2015, Hoogland MP, 4th June 2015. 
1622 TK, 21-501-33, Nr. 412, 22nd May 2013. 
1623 TK, 21 501-33, nr. 430, 17th July 2013. 
1624 Ibid., 4.	
1625 Ibid. 
1626 Ibid., 17. 
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furthermore informs that there were not enough yellow cards to make the EC withdraw 
its proposal on the free market for railway passengers.1627 
Step 6: Ex post control phase 
10th June 2013  Transport Council dealing with the Fourth Railway 
Package.1628 No feedback sent.  
Extra Ex ante influence phase 
12th September 2013  Meeting between the I&E Committee with I&E 
Minister, Mrs Mansveld.1629 During this meeting, 
they mostly discuss the state of affairs of the Dutch 
railways. Other than some references during the 
meeting, MPs do not show any intentions of using 
their formal powers in the field of the Fourth 
Railway Package. 1630 
18th September 2013  The Secretary of State for I&E sends a letter to the 
SC regarding the Transport Council of 10th 
October 2013.1631 In the letter, the government 
explains that the EU Presidency will try to reach a 
general orientation in the Fourth Railway Package 
in the field of security. The Dutch government is in 
favour of this deal, but does test the practical 
applicability of the proposals.1632 
2nd of October 2013  Meeting between the EAC, the I&E Committee, the 
Secretary of State, Mrs Schulz (VVD), and Minister, 
Mrs. Mansveld (PvdA), in which  the Fourth 
Railway Package is discussed.1633 
																																																								
1627 Ibid. 
1628 Press Release, 3243rd Council meeting, Transport, Telecommunications and Energy, Luxembourg, 6, 
7 and 10th June 2013  
1629 TK, 29 984, nr. 436, determined on 8th October 2013. 
1630 Ibid.  
1631 TK, 21 501-33, nr. 436, 18th September 2013.		
1632 Ibid. 
1633 TK, 21 501-33, nr. 441, determined on 29th October 2013.  
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The CDA (opposition) asks to be informed on new developments regarding the Fourth 
Railway Package, even if the topic is not on the agenda of the next Transport 
Council.1634  
The VVD (coalition partner) asks whether the government is prepared to have a 
discussion with the neighbouring member states about language issues at the railway 
stations in frontier areas.1635  
The SP (opposition) also asks for an update regarding the Railway Package, particularly 
in the field of the single market.1636  
Just like the previous ex ante influence phase, the opposition parties (of which one, the 
SP, supported the RO) ask for more information while only one of the coalition 
partners, the VVD, gives its own opinion with the idea of impacting on the 
government’s position.  
Mrs Mansveld responds:  
‘So far, we have only talked about the technical part of the Directive. In June 
2014 the Council reached an agreement on the interoperability directive. In 
the next Transport Council, the recast of the security directive will be 
discussed … To decide the Dutch position an impact study will take place to 
decide the consequences for the Dutch market ...  
With regard to the language problems in frontier areas, I am obviously 
willing to speak to our neighbours and with Prorail1637. I will inform the SC 
on any progress in this field.’1638 
Extra ex post control phase 
10th October 2013  Transport Council takes place.1639  
																																																								
1634 Ibid. p.5. 
1635 Ibid. p.4. 
1636 Ibid. p.7.	
1637 Authority responsible for the Dutch Railway Network. 
1638 TK, 21 501-33, nr. 441, determined on 29th October 2013, p.15. 
1639 Press Release, 3261st Council meeting, Transport, Telecommunications and Energy, Transport Items, 
Brussels, 10th October 2013  
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11th November 2013  Letter from government to NP regarding the Fourth 
Railway Package, including the long-awaited 
IA.1640 The NP had agreed to receive the IA before 
the summer recess on 21st June 2013.  
From the letter it appears that after the publication of the IA, the Dutch government has 
a permanent negative view with regard to the proposals relating to the opening up of the 
market.  
‘... We remain of the opinion that the Dutch government should remain in 
power when it comes to making decisions in the field of procurement of the 
main Railway Network. A compulsory opening of the market will not 
automatically improve the quality of the railways … 
The Dutch input is focused on creating a blocking minority in the Council 
with regard to this specific proposal. If this will not be found, the Dutch 
government will have an active approach in the discussions to adapt the 
proposals to the Dutch interests.’1641 
From the IA it appears that the government supports the opinion of (part of) the NP. 
According to Keulemans, the EU advisor to the SC, this definite1642 negative attitude 
towards opening up the market to railway passengers has been partly influenced by the 
NP.1643 This is confirmed by MPs1644 and government: ‘The SC obviously played a role 
in this’.1645  
Extra ex ante influence phase 
27th November 2013 Meeting between the I&E Committee and Minister 
Mansveld.1646  
The PvdA (coalition partner) reiterates during this meeting that public transport should 
remain a public service. It refers hereby to negative experiences in England. Research 																																																								
1640 TK, 33 546, nr. 12, 11th November 2013.  
1641 Ibid. 
1642 In its initial position, it showed doubt about this, see the EM: TK, 33 546, EU Voorstel, het Vierde 
Spoorpakket (2013)28, 1st March 2013.	
1643 Keulemans, 15th June 2015. 
1644 Hoogland MP, 4th June 2015, De Boer, 15th June 2015. 
1645 Van Dongen, 3rd June 2015. 
1646 TK, 33 546, nr. 14, determined on 30 January 2014. 
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has shown that Dutch railway passengers are not asking for any competition in the 
railways. 1647 
The VVD (coalition partner) representative does not agree with his Social Democrat 
colleague. According to him, the EU proposal suggests opening up the market for 
passenger transport inside the member states. The VVD supports this. Competition in 
this field could save a lot of money. However, opening up the market should happen 
gradually and not via a big bang.1648  
Both coalition partners obviously offer opposing messages to government, which shows 
that the NP is different from the government in the sense that the coalition parties of the 
NP do not just blindly support the government’s position, but both parties in this 
instance try to impact the administration with their own principles.  
The CDA (opposition) and D66 (opposition) support the VVD in the defence of a free 
market for the railways.1649 The SP (opposition) and GL (opposition) argue that it is up 
to the Netherlands to decide whether it wants a free market for railways or not.1650 The 
EU should not decide about the Dutch Railways. The Dutch Railways (NS) are doing 
well compared to other member states. The Minister should show this in the Council 
and take a more active approach in this field. 1651 
The Minister replies that the main question in getting a level playing field is whether or 
not there is a need for an open market.1652 In general, she feels from MPs’ comments 
that passengers have to be central in this debate. Tomorrow the Council will further 
debate the technical part of the Package. A decision about this is expected in March 
2014.1653 Decision-making about the market proposals has been delayed. Mrs Mansveld 
is of the opinion that it is important that the Netherlands can make its own choices with 
regard to the procurement of its railways.1654 There have not been enough yellow cards 
from EU NPs to make the EC reconsider the proposals.1655  
Extra ex post control phase 																																																								
1647 Ibid., 3-4. 
1648 Ibid., 3. 
1649 Ibid., 3-4. 
1650 Ibid., 15.	
1651 Ibid. 
1652 Ibid., 19-20. 
1653 Ibid. 
1654 Ibid. 
1655 Ibid. 
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28th November 2013 Transport Council 
Extra ex ante influence phase 
12th March 2014 Meeting between the I&E Committee, the EAC, 
the Secretary of State, Mrs Schulz, and the 
Minister, Mrs Mansveld to discuss the next 
Transport Council.1656 
The VVD (coalition partner) asked for an update on the Fourth Railway Package.1657 
The SP (opposition) wanted to know what the consequences are of the late submission 
of the objection of the Dutch government against the internal railway market.1658  
The PvdA asks what the Minister will do to stop these plans. It is important that the 
Dutch can decide themselves about this topic.1659  
Minister Mansveld replied that now that the EP has decided upon its amendments, the 
coming Transport Council will decide upon the proposals in the field of the technical 
pillar.1660 The discussions for the remaining proposals (opening up the market) have yet 
to be discussed by the Council. Mrs Mansveld does not expect this to happen during the 
next half year.1661  
The Minister responds to the PVDA that the NP knows the position of the government 
and the Dutch input into this dossier. Two yellow cards have been handed out. The 
Dutch government is still trying to get a blocking minority in the Council.1662 This 
week the Minister will have discussions with other Ministers about this to set up a 
strategy with other member states. If the blocking minority is not reached, the 
government will have to sit around the table to participate in the negotiations.1663 
As previously promised, the Minister will remain active in this dossier and will keep the 
SC informed on new steps taken or discussed.1664 
																																																								
1656 TK, 21 501-33, nr. 478, determined on 19th May 2014.	
1657 Ibid., 2. 
1658 Ibid., 4. 
1659 Ibid., 5. 
1660 Ibid., 9-10. 
1661 Ibid. 
1662 Ibid., 11. 
1663 Ibid. 
1664 Ibid., 12. 
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Extra ex post control phase 
14th March 2013  Transport Council takes place.1665 No feedback 
offered. 
Extra ex ante influence phase 
28th of May 2014  Meeting takes place between the I&E Committee, 
the EAC and the Minister.1666  
The CDA (opposition) seeks to know how realistic it is for the Dutch government to get 
a blocking minority in this field. 1667 
The SP (opposition) argued that it has seen the joint approach of the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg and Belgium in this field, but would like to go further and try to get the 
bigger member states on board regarding the blocking minority, like Germany and 
France.1668  
The PvdA (coalition partner) shows support for the technical pillar of the fourth 
Railway Package.1669 The Social Democrats appreciate the critical position of the 
Minister with regard to opening the market in this field.1670  
The VVD (coalition partner) argues that it had hoped that opening up the market would 
have proceeded a lot faster. It argued that the internal market could not go fast enough. 
The VVD has reservations with regard to the yellow card procedure, but this has been a 
democratic decision.1671  
Minister Mansveld reacted by stating that she has referred to the yellow card, which was 
shown by the First Chamber and the SC.1672 However, the government does need to stay 
around the table if it does not reach a blocking minority. Government members are now 
actively lobbying, together with other member states in this field, and have set up a 
																																																								
1665 European Commission, press release, Transport Council 14th March 2014.	
1666 TK, 21 501 33, nr. 495, determined on 31st July 2014. 
1667 Ibid., 4.  
1668 Ibid., 5-6. 
1669 Ibid., 9. 
1670 Ibid. 
1671 Ibid., 9. 
1672 Ibid., 14 
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Benelux-declaration. Other member states do similar actions, but not entirely along the 
Dutch lines. However, movement on this dossier is still possible. 1673 
Whenever procurement comes onto the agenda, the Minister promises to discuss this 
with the Chamber beforehand.1674 
Extra ex post control phase 
8th October 2014 Transport Council meeting takes place1675 
No evidence is found of any attempts by the NP to either impact the government ex ante 
or ex post, even though during this Council meeting the open market for railway 
passengers got discussed:  
‘Ministers held a policy debate on two proposals to improve rail services in 
the EU by opening the market for domestic passenger services and stronger 
governance (Fourth Railway package). The discussion will guide future work 
on the proposals.’1676  
Step 7: Adoption of the proposal 
20th April 2016  An agreement between the Council and EP was 
reached on the Fourth Railway Package and the 
opening of the market for domestic passengers by 
rail during the Dutch EU Presidency. The 
agreement reached is very much in line with the 
position of the Dutch government, supported by 
the SC. 1677 Member States will still be able to 
directly award public service rail contracts1678 and 
Railway Network and the actual Rail transport 
organisation in one holding, 
 																																																								
1673 Ibid.	
1674 Ibid., 15. 
1675 Press Release, 3335th Council meeting. Transport, Telecommunications and Energy, Luxembourg, 8th 
October 2014  
1676 Ibid.  
1677 Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, 7th July 2016.  
1678 Press Release, European Commission, 20th April 2016	
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Concluding remarks 
Although the scrutiny of this EU legislative proposal has not yet come to an end, most 
of the discussions around the opening of the market to railway passengers has already 
taken place at national level. It is obvious that the NP gets many chances to have an 
impact on the government’s position and on several occasions the NP uses more than its 
standard formal powers (next to it using a RO). For example, the use of the scrutiny 
reserve. Besides, it reiterates on several occasions what its opinion is and its 
expectations from the government during the Council negotiations. It was clear that the 
NP during several stages tried to tighten the delegatory relationship with its 
government. In other words, it gave the government clear instructions before Council 
meetings on what it expected the government to do and what it expected from the 
administration after the Council meeting (being informed). When comparing these 
activities to parliamentary ones during the scrutiny of a file in which the NP did not 
send a RO to the EC (see also C8 and C8a), it is clear that the NP in a case whereby it 
makes use of this Lisbon provision tightens its scrutiny. This is in line with the 
theoretical argument, expecting that the NP will increase the use of its domestic tools to 
influence the government’s EU policy position after having sent a RO to the NP. 
The reason why the Dutch NP sent an RO to the EC was that it was of the opinion that 
the responsibility for organising domestic passenger transport services by rail must 
remain at the national government level. According to the Dutch parliament, member 
states should be free to decide how and to whom they award passenger transport 
services contracts on their railway infrastructures. 
In other words, the NP is worried that the procurement of passenger transport will 
become private and thus out of the control of the national member state. If the EU has 
the power to decide about passenger transport and its procurement, it implies that the 
NP will have less formal powers to scrutinise since this will happen by the EP instead. 
The NP, during the scrutiny of this file, only raised the use of its formal powers if there 
was a chance that the Transport Council would discuss the procurement of this railway 
package (rather than, for example, the technical side, see also C8a). This is namely the 
topic about which the majority in the SC wanted to keep decisions at national level. 
More specifically, the RO as such can be considered another tool the NP can use to 
show its opinion on an EU legislative file. Yet, the underlying reason for sending a RO, 
namely the possible violation of the subsidiarity principle could be explained for an 
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increased use of MPs’ formal powers. This is confirmed in the interview with Hoogland 
MP:  
‘The SC not only sent a reasoned opinion to the European Commission, it 
also adopted a motion in this field, stating that the EU should not decide 
about our railways. This put pressure on the government to follow us’.1679 
Hoogland explained here that it was the subsidiarity matter that made the file so 
important for the MPs. Using the RO combined with a motion did have an effect on the 
actions of the government, as it felt pressurised. This is confirmed by the government 
representative in this file.1680 
However, MPs who also opposed the use of a RO (VVD, CDA, D66) used (more than) 
their formal powers during these meetings, which might mean that salience is another 
present condition here explaining why the SC increased the use of its formal powers. In 
other words, the salience and use of RO are rather intertwined in this case. The issue is 
both Europeanised (the level to which the EU is allowed to have a say about national 
railways) and politicised (liberalisation), which explains the increased use of formal 
powers. The Europeanised part of the debate (should the EU have or not have anything 
to say about national railways) is reflected in the use of the RO (a majority of the NP 
thinks that the EC should not be involved in this topic) and therefore there is indeed a 
link between the use of the RO and the parliamentary activity. 
Measurable impact  
The main coalition partner in government, the Liberals, supported opening the market 
further for rail passengers, but their smaller Social Democrat coalition partner was 
against this. The majority in the NP was also against opening up the market in this 
respect, which is why the government coalition agreed to plead against the opening of 
the market. It might have been harder for the NP to convince the coalition of this view if 
the Social Democrats had not been part of the coalition (in other words another coalition 
government could have lead to a different outcome), but it can be argued that thanks to 
the NP majority, the government came around in the end in favour of the views of its 
smaller coalition partner. One can therefore conclude that the impact in this case is 
																																																								
1679 Hoogland, 4th June 2015. 
1680 Van Dongen, 3rd June 2015. 
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intermediate. Although this is the only substantial point the NP sought to impact1681, 
and it has been successful, because the coalition partners were divided on this file and 
the government had started off with an interim negative subsidiarity judgement, the NP 
cannot be considered to be fully responsible for the government’s position on the matter 
of retaining passenger railways at national level.  
Different interviewees confirm that the NP has had some impact in this dossier and 
without the NP, the government might not have decided to keep pushing for a national 
sovereignty in the area of rail passengers.1682  
Case 8a: The Fourth Railway Package: Directive for Interoperability 
(COM(2013)301683) 
Background EU proposal 
As part of the Fourth Railway Package, the EC has published a proposal with regard to 
the Directive about the interoperability of the railway system in the EU. The purpose of 
this proposal is the decrease of administrative and technical obstructions by developing 
an EU approach with regard to security and interoperability procedures. In this 
particular proposal the EC proposes conditions which need to be followed by an 
interoperable railway system in the EU. It furthermore suggests ways to make the 
submission of permissions more efficient via a larger role for the European Railway 
Agency (ERA). Technical norms and the conformity judgement rules need to be clearer 
and updated.1684 
Step 1: Publication 
30th January 2013 Publication of EU legislative proposal. 
Step 2: NPs given eight week to oppose the EU legislative proposal 
Whereas the Dutch SC sent a RO to the EC on 28th March 2013 regarding the proposal 
concerning the opening of the market for domestic passenger transport services by rail, 
																																																								
1681 Next to some minor issues, such as discussing language problems with neighbouring countries. 
1682 Kisters, 19th May 2015, Keulemans, 15th June 2015, Hartkamp, 7th July 2015. 
1683 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A52013AE1024 
1684 TK, 33.546, nr, 3, 1st March 2013. 
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which is also part of the Fourth Railway Package1685, it does not have any problems 
with the proposal regarding interoperability (it is only the Swedish and Lithuanian 
parliaments that sent ROs to the EC with regard to this proposal).  
Step 3: First ex ante influence phase 
14th February 2013    Letter government to NP.1686  
The main points focus on applying a scrutiny reserve in the field of the opening of 
passenger railway transport and the subsidiarity objection against this proposal. It would 
furthermore like to receive a technical briefing from the EC and will ask interest groups 
to send their views on the Package. No specific references to the draft regulation 
regarding interoperability are included in this letter.1687 The correspondence shows 
clearly the difference in the use of formal powers regarding the freedom to provide 
domestic passenger services by rail (C7a) and the technical file (C8a).  
19th February Letter government to NP regarding Transport 
Council of 11th March.1688 
The Dutch government informs the SC that at the point of writing it is still studying the 
proposals to get a better understanding of the consequences for the Netherlands. The 
EM is being prepared. 1689  
25th February 2013 The I&E Minister sends a letter to the NP to 
inform it that the governmental memorandum will 
not be ready before 1st March 2013.1690 
1st March 2013 The government publishes its EM (first 
governmental position). 
 
																																																								
1685 The Fourth Railway Package consists of different EU legislative proposals: one on opening up the 
market towards passenger rail transport, one on safety,	one on an EU Agency for Railways, one on a 
Single European Railway Area and one on interoperability.  
1686 TK, 33 546, nr. 1 14th February 2013. 
1687 List with decisions of the procedure meeting of the Committee I&E of 13th February 2013 and TK, 
33.546, TK, 1, letter 26th February 2013. 
1688 TK, 21.501-33, nr. 407, 19th February 2013. 
1689 Ibid. 
1690 TK, 33.546; 22.112, 25th February 2013.	
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The government indicates that it will further elaborate upon the national consequences 
of the proposals in an IA. This will be sent to the SC in due course. The Dutch 
government is of the opinion that any changes to the main railway line should not begin 
until 2025 and not 2022, as sought by the EC, since contracts will still be running 
then.1691  
7th March 2013 Meeting between the I&E Committee, the EAC 
and the I&E Minister dealing with the scrutiny 
reserve of the Fourth Railway Package. The 
Minister agrees to inform the SC on every agenda 
of the Transport Council, on every draft position of 
the Council including government opinions and 
any changes in its, or in the EU proposals.  
Besides this, it is agreed that a plenary session will 
take place on 21st March. During this meeting, 
MPs have a chance to submit motions (on the 
whole Fourth Railway Package, not solely the 
Interoperability file).1692  
Step 4: First ex post control phase 
11th March 2013 Transport Council takes place.1693  
21st March 2013 Plenary meeting of NP to discuss the Fourth 
Railway Package. During this meeting, four 
motions are submitted1694, although none apply to 
the Interoperability Directive.  
This, again, is a clear example of the different use of formal powers in the case 
regarding the freedom to provide domestic passenger services by rail and the 
interoperability case.  
																																																								
1691 TK, 33.546, nr. 3, 1st March 2013. 
1692 TK, 33 546, Nr. 9, 7th March 2013.  
1693 European Commission, press release, 11th March 2013. 
1694 One by Hoogland (Social Democrat), two by Bashir (Socialist Party) and one by Van Tongeren 
(Groen Links).  
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22nd March 2013 Letter from government to NP regarding the 
Transport Council 11th March 2013.  
Most references that are made to the Fourth Railway Package are related to the free 
market of railway passengers and none in the field of the interoperability regulation.  
Step 5: Second ex ante influence phase 
22nd May 2013  The Dutch government sends the Transport 
Council agenda to the I&E Committee. It informs 
the committee that the draft regulation regarding 
interoperability will probably be adopted during 
this meeting of 10th June 2013.1695 
5th June 2013  Meeting between the I&E Committee, EAC and 
the Secretary of State for I&E, Mrs Schulz 
(Liberal). This is the first and only time the NP 
shows its own opinion on the interoperability 
regulation.  
The VVD MP (coalition partner) argues that with regard to the interoperability 
regulation that it should not lead to a greater administrative burden, and there should be 
a clear division between those who look after the railways and those responsible for 
railway transport.1696  
Mrs Schulz replies that the concern about administrative burden is shared by several 
member states. She also agrees with the separation of transport and the management of 
the railways, and states that the government will raise this during the Council 
meeting.1697   
Step 6: Second ex post control phase 
10th June 2013  Transport Council  
During this meeting, an agreement is reached on the Interoperability part of the Fourth 
Railway Package. The final agreement has decreased the number of issues that would 																																																								
1695 TK, 21.501-33, nr 423, 22nd May 2013. 
1696 TK, 21 501-33, nr. 430, 17th July 2013.  
1697 Ibid. 
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be dealt with at EU level, such as a centralised procedure to allocate permissions. 
Member States agree to keep this at the national level, as they are worried that it being 
at EU level would lead to an increase in financial and administrative burdens. There will 
be a transition period of five instead of two years (as proposed by the EC).1698 The SC 
receives a letter from its government regarding the outcome of the Council meeting.1699 
The government also gives an overview of the discussion regarding the agreement 
reached on the Interoperability file:  
‘The Council finished a general orientation about this proposal regarding a 
directive for interoperability of the railways, which is part of the technical 
pillar of the Fourth Railway Package … The Netherlands was already in 
favour of the original technical pillars about interoperability, but had initially 
some minor concerns about the practical workability of this proposal. This 
has been taken into account in the compromise proposal …  
During the Council meeting the Netherlands has emphasised the importance of 
the technical pillar, and according to the views of the SC, the Dutch government 
has suggested to not make an agreement on the technical pillar dependent on the 
other proposals of the Railway Package.1700 
Step 7: Adoption Although the Fourth Railway Package has 
not yet been finally adopted as such by the 
Council, during the Council meeting of 5th 
June 2014, a political agreement is reached 
about the three proposals regarding the 
Package’s technical pillar (interoperability, 
railway safety and the Railway Agency).  
The Dutch government feeds this back to the SC 
to inform it on the agreement. The agreement is in 
line with the wishes of the Dutch government, 
supported by the SC.1701 
Concluding remarks 																																																								
1698 Press Release, Council for Transport, Telecommunications and Energy, 6-10th June 2013, 10457/13. 
1699 TK, 21 501 33, nr. 429, 24th June 2013. 
1700 Ibid.	
1701 TK, 21 501 33, nr.495, 31st July 2014. 	
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The scrutiny of this file seems to be a pretty standard one during which the NP reacts to 
the letters of the government and during meetings asks for clarifications. On no 
occasion during the OLP does the NP use more than its formal powers, and only once 
does the government show that it has taken the NP’s position on board (step 6). 
However, according to the government representative on this file, Van Dongen, this was 
in line with government views, so cannot be considered impact.1702 The MPs did not try 
to change the government’s position on this file. According to various interviewees, the 
limited amount of use of formal powers by the NP is as a result of the topic’s contents. 
The topic of interoperability is quite technical and less controversial and political than 
other topics (such as the freedom to provide domestic passenger services by rail, see 
C7).1703 The causal process is therefore confirmed but is closely related to that of (the 
absence of) salience (see Chapter 7). In other words, even though the NP did increase 
the use of formal powers in the case where it made use of the RO, when it does not 
make use of this it can still choose to increase the use of formal powers (port services) 
or it might not (interoperability of the railways). Salience in these cases motivate this 
judgement.  
During the process of the OLP there has not been any moment in which the government 
shows it needs to adapt its position as a consequence of the NP’s use of formal powers. 
Data extracted from interviews confirm this.1704  
Measurable impact 
None of the NP’s position has been included in the government’s viewpoint and the 
impact here can therefore be classified as weak. This corresponds to the theoretical 
argument expecting less parliamentary activity when no RO is sent.  
Data from interviews1705 also confirm that no use of informal influence has taken 
place.1706 The government also verifies that it has stuck to its own position (as explained 
in the EM) and has not drafted its opinion with the views of the NP already taken on 
board. It has on a few occasions included the NP’s position into the Transport Council 
meeting, but as this was a position that was shared by the government (separation of 																																																								
1702 Van Dongen, 3rd June 2015. 
1703 Van Dongen, 3rd June 2015, Den Boer MP and Hoogland MP, 4th June 2015, Hartkamp, 7th July 2015. 
1704 Van Dongen, 3rd June 2015, Den Boer MP and Hoogland MP, 4th June 2015.	
1705 Kisters, 19th May 2015, Van Dongen, 3rd June 2015, Den Boer, 4th June 2015. 
1706 In the Netherlands, there is a rule that makes informal contact between the government and NP illegal 
during the scrutiny process. This was introduced during the Kok government in 1998, better known as the 
‘Oekaze’ rule.	
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transport and management of the railways, and not to make an agreement on the 
technical pillar dependent on the other proposals of the Railway Package) this cannot be 
considered as impact. It can therefore be concluded that during the scrutiny of this file, 
the impact was weak. This is as expected. Again a note of caution is needed here, as the 
NP did not change the government’s position in this field, nor was that its intention. 	
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